财务管理外文文献
Japan and the World Economy
15 (9>2003) 447–458
Financial systems, risk management, and entrepreneurship: historical perspectives Richard Sylla*
Department of Economics, Stern School of Business, New York
University,
44 W1>. 4th Street, New York, NY 10012, USA
Received 15 January 2003; accepted 15 April 2003
Abstract
Economic historians ??nd that the most successful economies of history tend to be ones that early in
their modern histories developed sophisticated ??nancial systems that subsequently sustained their
development and growth. Financial economists are ??nding the same association of ??nancial devel-
opment and growth across a wider range of countries and levels of economic development in recent
decades. This essay argues that more sophisticated ??nancial systems not only mobilize more capital
and allocate capital more ef??ciently than do less developed systems. By offering more sophisticated
methods of managing and reducing risks than primitive ??nancial systems, modern ??nancial systems,
perhaps paradoxically, also promote higher levels of risk taking and entrepreneurship.
# 2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
JEL classification: G20; M13; N20; O16
Keywords: Financial systems; Risk management; Entrepreneurship; Economic growth
1. Introduction
Evidence building at a rapid rate indicates that ??nancial development plays a leading
role in economic growth and in accounting for the relative performance of the world’s
national economies. The evidence challenges older interpretations, still held to by some,
that ??nancial development is mostly a passive response to the needs of economies that
began to grow more rapidly for other reasons, such as the exploitation of international
trading opportunities—the globalization of trade—and
technological breakthroughs in
production—the industrial revolution. Instead of being a passive response to changes
arising in non-??nancial sectors of economies, ??nancial development now appears to an
active, instigating cause of economic growth and modernization.
*
Tel.: ?1-212-998-0869; fax: ?1-212-995-4211.
E-mail address: rsylla@stern.nyu.edu (R. Sylla).
0922-1425/$ – see front matter # 2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/S0922-1425(03)007>024-0
448
R. Sylla / Japan and the World Economy 15 (2003) 447–458
Some of the evidence for the enhanced importance of ??nancial factors in economic
development comes from my own ??eld of research, economic history. Economic historians
have demonstrated that ‘‘??nancial revolutions,’’ a vivid term used to connote bursts of
??nancial innovation leading to the establishment of modern, articulated ??nancial systems,
often occurred before the leading economies of modern history became leading economies
(Sylla, 2002). Other evidence stressing the primacy of ??nancial factors in economic growth
comes from the work of ??nancial economists in analyzing large cross-country data sets
pertaining to recent decades. These economists ??nd that countries
having more developed
banking systems and more developed securities markets—two key
components of modern
??nancial systems—tend to grow faster and perform better on other measures than countries
with less developed ??nancial systems (Demirgu? c?-Kunt and Levine,
2001). Moreover, by
means of careful modeling and painstaking econometric estimation, these ??nancial econ-
omists argue that good ??nance is a cause, not merely a result, of better economic performance.
In this paper, I summarize some of the evidence for the importance of ??nancial devel-
opment in modern economic history. I also consider theoretical arguments about why good
??nance matters, which typically involve the advantages of good ??nancial systems in
mobilizing capital and allocating it ef??ciently among competing uses, and I extend these
arguments in a new direction, to encompass the ways in which modern ??nancial systems
facilitate risk management. Economic historians have not paid much
attention to the risk
management facilities offered by modern ??nancial systems. I argue here that understanding
the implications of ??nancial systems’ risk management facilities can have a large payoff. It
can help us to understand how ??nancial systems promote higher levels of risk taking and
entrepreneurship.
I proceed as follows.
First, I want to emphasize the key importance of modern ??nancial systems in creating
our world as we know it today, a world of great economic inequalities between the rich and
the poor countries.
Second, I want to describe in institutional terms just what I mean by a modern ??nancial
system. The rich countries have such systems, and the poorer countries do not. But the
poorer countries, assisted by the rich countries and international institutions such as the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, are trying to create modern ??nancial
systems. In our era of history, this is one of the most important items of the agenda of global
economic development.
Third, I want to discuss why modern ??nancial systems are so crucial to economic growth
and modernization. In addition to the standard economic reasons—namely, the ways in
which good ??nancial systems promote ef??cient resource allocation—I explore a less
standard reason—the ways in which modern ??nancial systems promote economic growth
by promoting more ef??cient allocations of risk, that is, the ways in which such systems
facilitate more ef??cient risk management.
2. How rich are the rich countries?
I begin by drawing attention to the position of today’s leading national economies in the
world economy during the past ??ve centuries. Table 1, based on the research of the
R. Sylla / Japan and the World Economy 15 (2003) 447–458
449
Table 1
Real GDP per capita relative to world average, selected countries,
1500–1998 (world average ? 100 at each date)
Date
Country
Italy The Netherlands
UK
USA
Japan France Germany
1500 1600 1700 1820 1870 1913 1950 1973 1998 195
185
179
167
173
170 166 259 311 133 231 343 273 318 268 284 319 354 126 164 203 256 368 326 327 293 328
71
67
86
188 282 351 452 407 479 88
88
93
100 85
92
91
279 358 129 142 160 184
216
231
249
320
343
120
131
145
159
210
242
184
292
312
Source: Derived from Maddison (2001).
economic historian Maddison (2001), provides a convenient summary.
It shows for seven
of today’s rich countries the real GDP per capita (one index of
economic growth and
development) of that country relative to the world average GDP per capita at various years
starting with 1500. In 1500, late-renaissance Italy was the richest economy, with a per
capita product about twice the world average. Italy was followed by The Netherlands,
France, the United Kingdom (Great Britain), and Germany, all of which had per capita
products 500 years ago that were a ??fth to a third higher than the world average. Japan and
the United States in 1500 were countries with per capita product levels below the world
average. The USA, of course, did not yet exist in 1500, but there were people living in the
territory that became the USA in 1776, and it is possible to estimate roughly what the
standard of living was relative to the world average.
Compare 1500 with 1998, ??ve centuries later. The USA, the poorest of the seven
countries in 1500, became the richest, with a GDP per capita almost ??ve times the world
average. And that world average includes the USA, which is a very large
economy. If we
remove the USA from the rest of the world and compare it to the rest, we would ??nd that its
real GDP per capita was about six times the average of the rest of the world.
In the context of the entire table, it is apparent that the world today is a much more
unequal world than the world of 500 years ago. Then, Italy was the richest of the seven
economies with a real GDP per capita twice the world average. Now the USA is the richest
of the seven, with a real GDP per capita ??ve to six times the average.
Another result from the table is the changing locus of economic leadership. By 1600, the
leading economy was no longer Italy, but The Netherlands, called then the Dutch Republic
or the United Provinces. The Netherlands remained the leading economy until the early-
19th century. Then the UK—Great Britain essentially—succeeded The
Netherlands as the
economic leader. UK leadership lasted until the late-19th century when the USA passed it.
By 1913, the USA (as Table 1 indicates) was the leading economy in terms of real GDP per
capita, and it has remained the leader from then to now.
Japan hovered around the world average until the middle of the 20th century. But that is
not the entire story told by the table. Note that Japan increased its GDP per capita relative to
450
R. Sylla / Japan and the World Economy 15 (2003) 447–458
the world average from 1870 to 1913, a period when countries
considerably richer than
Japan—The Netherlands and the UK—declined relative to the world
average. Japan clearly
was growing considerably faster than The Netherlands and the UK in that period, which
historians call the Meiji era.
Note also the remarkable leap of Japan after 1950, when it transformed itself from an
economy with a GDP per capita about equal to the rest of the world to one with a level of
per capita real product second only to the USA among the seven leading economies. When
we realize that the world average per capita product was itself increasing through the 20th
century, Japan’s growth is all the more remarkable. From these facts—maybe we should
call them ‘‘stylized facts’’ since the data are incomplete and subject to revision—one can
easily grasp why economic historians are so fascinated by Japan. It made the transition
from being a relatively poor country to being one of the richest countries in roughly a
century.
3. Why are the rich countries so rich?
Why did the countries in Table 1 become so much richer relative to the rest of the world
than they were 500 or even 300 years ago? Undoubtedly, there are many reasons. During
most of the 20th century, economic historians contended that the so-called industrial
revolution—the advent and development of modern manufacturing technologies and the
factory system of large-scale production—was the main reason. Great
Britain was the
leader of this development, and we can see its rise in Table 1. The industrial revolution
spread from Britain to the other countries in the table, that is, to Western Europe, the USA,
and Japan.
I have come to believe that there are good reasons for doubting the contention that the
industrial revolution and its diffusion from Britain to a number of other countries are main
reasons why the inequality between the rich and the poor countries of the world has
increased so much. The ??rst industrial revolution did not arise in Britain until the late-18th
century. It therefore cannot account for why Italy was twice as rich as the rest of the world
in 1500. It cannot account for why The Netherlands in 1700 had just about the same high
per capita product relative to the world as it does today.
Moreover, modern industrial technologies are now known to, and available to, most of
the countries of the world, and they have been for a long time. Yet, the world became
increasingly unequal during that period, judging by Table 1. If most countries have not
industrialized or modernized their economies, it is not because they lack access to the great
technological changes that arose from the industrial revolution.
I and other economic historians, doubting the traditional industrial revolution explana-
tion of these world economic trends, have searched for better explanations. In general, we
argue that institutions and institutional changes, not breakthroughs in manufacturing
technologies, account for long-term trends such as those described in Table 1. That is,
we think today’s rich countries are rich because they developed institutions more favorable
to economic growth than did other, poorer countries. Some examples of such institutions
are good government, the protection of property rights, and effective legal systems. Such
institutions usually develop slowly over long periods of history. These institutions are
R. Sylla / Japan and the World Economy 15 (2003) 447–458
451
much more dif??cult to transfer from one country to another than are industrial technol-
ogies. Hence, institutions and institutional differences among countries may offer more
insights than industrial technologies into why great income gaps among nations emerged
and why they have persisted.
My own work stresses the importance of ??nancial institutions, namely the appearance of
modern ??nancial systems. It is well known among economic historians that medieval and
renaissance Italy achieved a higher development of ??nancial institutions than any other
part of the world. Indeed, the English word ‘‘bank’’ comes from the Italian ‘‘banco,’’ which
means ‘‘small table,’’ or ‘‘desk,’’ or ‘‘counter.’’ An
Italian long ago placed his ‘‘banco’’ in
the town square, receiving deposits of money from some, making loans to others, and
recording the transactions in his account books on top of the ‘‘banco.’’ He became therefore
a ‘‘banchiere’’ or, in English, a banker.
But banks are only one component of a modern ??nancial system, although certainly an
important one. I argue that a modern ??nancial system has a number of key components.
They are given as follows:
Stable public finances and markets for government debt securities.
Stable money and money markets.
Sound banks and banking systems.
An effective central bank.
Efficient securities markets for business firms’ debts (bonds) and equities (stocks).
Sound insurance companies and insurance markets.
Corporations with limited liability to facilitate equity share issuance and ownership.
The leading economies of modern economic history—The Netherlands,
the UK, the
USA, and Japan are notable examples—developed such ??nancial systems
very early in
their modern economic histories. They did this before they became leading economies. The
early development of modern ??nancial systems was a key reason why their economies
subsequently developed so rapidly, far outpacing those of other countries where ‘‘??nancial
revolutions,’’ the term economic historians often use to describe
the initial appearance of
modern ??nancial systems, did not occur.
Space constraints will not allow me to describe ways in which the various key
components of a modern ??nancial system interact with one another, and reinforce one
another, in modern economies. From our own experiences with the ??nancial system, we
will quickly realize some of them, and with a little more time we would think of still more.
We pay our taxes, we receive services from our governments, and we invest in government
securities. We spend our yen and dollar incomes, and we keep most of our money in banks.
Sometimes we invest, directly or indirectly, in corporate bonds and stocks. We borrow
money to buy our houses and to make other purchases. We insure our houses, our cars, and
our lives against the risks of adverse events. And we expect the Bank of Japan and the
Federal Reserve, two examples of modern central banks, to oversee our ??nancial systems
and prevent or alleviate ??nancial crises.
We should also want to think about the great advantages an economy with such a
??nancial system has over one that does not have it. Many places in
the world still do not
have such modern ??nancial systems. We might also think about the bad consequences
that come when one or more of the components of such modern ??nancial systems
452
R. Sylla / Japan and the World Economy 15 (2003) 447–458
encounter serious problems. If, for example, the banking system becomes burdened with
a lot of non-performing loans, as happened in Japan during the 1990s,
or if the stock
market encounters a major de??ation of values, as occurred in Japan after 1990, and the
United States after 1999, the consequences for the rest of the ??nancial system and for
the economy are not good. We are aware, even painfully aware, of the problems that
from time to time can beset even good ??nancial systems. But not everyone has an
appreciation of the importance of well-functioning ??nancial systems. Too often we take
them for granted. We do not appreciate how rare they are in history, and the large
advantages they conferred on economies that have had them. The key ??ndings of ??nancial
historians can help us overcome our limited perspectives on the importance of ??nancial
systems.
In The Netherlands, the ??nancial revolution occurred in the late-16th and early-17th
centuries. The Dutch at that time established in some form each of the key components
of a modern ??nancial system. For example, a market in public debt grew to help the
Dutch ??nance their wars of independence from Spain. The Bank of Amsterdam, something
of a central bank, appeared in 1609, and what was the world’s ??rst common stock, the
standardized, tradable equity shares of the Dutch East India Company, appeared at the
same time. The value of the Dutch currency, the guilder, was stabilized, and banking and
insurance facilities grew. After this Dutch ??nancial revolution occurred, The Netherlands
economy had what historians variously describe as its ‘‘golden age’’ its ‘‘embarrassment of
riches,’’ and it became ‘‘the ??rst modern economy’’ (t’Hart et al., 1997; de Vries and van
der Woude, 1997). In that period, Dutch merchants and ships appeared throughout the
world, in New Amsterdam, which later under the English became New York, and even
in Japan. And the Dutch Republic established a colonial empire that included today’s
Indonesia among other colonies.
In Britain, the ??nancial revolution came a century later. For example, the Bank of
England was founded in 1694, and a modern market for public debt and equity securities
appeared around 1720. This era also featured the stabilization of the pound sterling
currency and the advent of the ??rst insurance companies. After the British ??nancial
revolution, the British had the ??rst industrial revolution, aided in no small part by the prior
appearance of a modern British ??nancial system having all of the key components I have
identi??ed (Dickson, 1967).
In the USA, the ??nancial revolution was compressed into the years 1789–1795, when the
??rst government under the new Constitution was established. In that brief period, the new
government’s ??nances were stabilized and active public debt markets appeared. The US
dollar was invented in 1791. A banking system emerged, and the Bank of the United States
(an early version of the Federal Reserve System) was founded as a central bank with
interstate branches in 1791. Ef??cient securities markets were established (the New York
Stock Exchange traces its origins to 1792), and insurance companies and markets emerged.
Much of this ??nancial development was the doing of a brilliant ??nance minister and US
founding father, Alexander Hamilton, the ??rst Secretary of the Treasury. After the ??nancial
revolution, the USA expanded geographically and its economy took off into modern
economic growth, as Table 1 indicates. The USA subsequently had an industrial revolution
and a transportation revolution, which generations of US historians identi??ed as the causes
of economic modernization. What these historians did not appreciate was that much of the
R. Sylla / Japan and the World Economy 15 (2003) 447–458
453
industrial, transportation and other investments were ??nanced by the modern ??nancial
system that ??rst emerged during the years 1789–1795 when Hamilton
was ??nance minister.
The modern ??nancial system appeared so quickly at the beginning of the country’s history
that historians took it for granted instead of appreciating, as we are now beginning to do,
what a rare advantage it had then conferred on the United States (Sylla, 1998, 2002;
Wright, 2002a,b).
In Japan, the ??nancial revolution occurred in the early-Meiji era,
the 1870s and 1880s.
The Meiji government’s ??nances were stabilized and public debt markets appeared to trade
the bonds the government issued to replace Samurai rice stipends. Modern securities
markets were founded—the Tokyo and Osaka stock exchanges appeared in 1878. The yen
came in as a new currency. New banks including the Yokohama Specie Bank were founded,
and a modern banking system emerged. The Bank of Japan appeared in 1882, and
insurance companies and markets also appeared around that time. As in the USA, a lot
of the credit for this can be given to a brilliant Meiji era ??nance minister, Masayoshi
Matsukata who, like Hamilton in the USA, studied
best-practice ??nance around the world
and then implemented the key components of a modern ??nancial system in Japan. And like
the USA, after Matsukata did his work, the economy of Japan began to grow rapidly, more
rapidly (as Table 1 indicates) than the world economy, which itself
was growing rapidly in
the Meiji era (Sylla, 1999, 2002; Suto and James, 1999; Rousseau, 1999). Japan, which had
been a rather isolated country during the Tokugawa period, quickly became a major player
in the world economy and on the world political stage.
This brief account of how modern ??nancial systems ??rst appeared in four countries, and
of the stimulating economic effects that such systems introduced to those countries,
provides evidence that ??nancial development often tended to precede economic moder-
nization, and that modern economic growth may well have been ‘‘??nance led.’’ These are
some of the key lessons of ??nancial history that I have gleaned from my study of and work
in ??nancial history.
4. How do financial systems promote economic development?
Why is good ??nance so important to an economy? Why do countries that
have effective
modern ??nancial systems prosper so much relative to those that do not? What exactly are
the sources of the differential advantages that arise in economies that have good ??nancial
systems?
We economists have some well-accepted answers to these questions. On the most
general level, the ??nancial resources of an economy—its ??nancial
capital—are scarce
resources, and the more ef??ciently these resources are mobilized and allocated to
investments that yield the highest returns, the better that economy will perform in terms
of its growth and development. One of the main purposes of a ??nancial system is to
promote the ef??cient allocation of capital. But that is not the only function of a ??nancial
system. Financial economists have identi??ed several basic functions of a ??nancial system
(Merton and Bodie, 1995). They include:
Providing ways of making payments to facilitate trade.
454
R. Sylla / Japan and the World Economy 15 (2003) 447–458
Providing ways of pooling capital resources and subdividing of public and private debts
as well as shares of enterprises into units attractive to investors.
Providing ways to transfer economic resources through time, across geographical
boundaries, and among economic sectors and industries.
Providing price information to coordinate decentralized decision-making in an econ-
omy.
Providing ways of dealing with incentive problems cause by what economist term
‘‘asymmetric information,’’ that is, when some actors in the economy have more
information than do others, and when ‘‘principal-agent
problems’’ arise, for example,
when managers of enterprises are different from the owners of enterprises, and may
have different interests than owners do.
Providing ways of managing risks.
There is a correspondence of sorts between this functional 5>view of a ??nancial system and
the key institutional components of a ??nancial system that I described earlier. Stable money
facilitates making payments and is a form of holding wealth. A variety of institutions such
as governments, banks, and companies pool ??nancial resources, provide goods and
services, and create bonds and shares attractive to investors. Money markets and securities
markets give liquidity to ??nancial instruments such as bills, notes, bonds, and shares, and
they both produce and use price information to coordinate decision-making. And the
insurance companies and markets that I mentioned earlier provide
products and services
that help us to manage risks.
5. Risk management and entrepreneurship
I want to focus in the rest of the essay on the risk management facilities provided by
??nancial systems. In the work of ??nancial historians facilities ??nancial systems provide for
managing risks are rather neglected in comparison with their functions of mobilizing and
allocating capital.
Providing insurance is only one of a several ways that a modern ??nancial system helps us
in managing risks. Economists identify three broad categories of risk management (Mason,
1995). They are hedging, diversi??cation, and insurance. Modern ??nancial systems provide
all of them. We need to have an understanding of each form of risk management, the
bene??ts it confers to the economic actors that use it, and the overall
economic effects of the
provision of risk management services.
Hedging is one way of eliminating a risk exposure. To illustrate it, imagine a pre-modern
economy made up of rice farmers and rice consumers who meet and trade with each other
in markets for rice. It takes time to produce rice. The risk faced by the farmer is that the
price of rice after it is produced will be different from what was expected. The risk faced by
the consumer is the same, a price that differs from what the consumer expected. If there is
no ??nancial system providing risk management services, the farmer and the consumer will
just have to live with these risks. Suppose, however, that the ??nancial system provides a
futures market for rice, in which participants buy and sell standardized futures contracts
calling for them to trade rice at a speci??ed price at some future date. In that market,
R. Sylla / Japan and the World Economy 15 (2003) 447–458
455
producers and consumers of rice come together, use all the information available to them,
and establish a consensus about what the price of rice will be in, say, 6 months. Then the
farmer effectively can sell now the rice he plans to grow during the next 6 months. The
farmer has eliminated price risk, and can plan rice production accordingly. The same holds
for the consumer, who can plan consumption accordingly. Instead of being uncertain about
the price she will have to pay for rice in 6 months, she uses the futures market to eliminate
that uncertainty.
That is how hedging in futures markets eliminates price risk for individual producers and
consumers. It does not, however, eliminate the overall risk that the price of rice in 6 months
will be different from what the consensus now thinks it will be then. Maybe a typhoon will
destroy part of the crop just before it is harvested, resulting in a higher price. Or maybe the
weather will be better than expected, resulting in a large crop and low prices. Either of these
unexpected events could cause the price of rice in 6 months to be different. Nonetheless, the
farmer who sold, and the consumer who purchased, a futures contract for rice eliminated
their risk of the price they would receive or pay. The fact that modern ??nancial systems give
rise to such futures markets indicates that a lot of producers and consumers are risk averse.
They use futures markets to eliminate the risks they face, and the
fact that they do indicates
that this hedging of price risk is a valuable risk management service of the ??nancial system.
Diversi??cation is a second broad way that ??nancial systems provide risk management
services. How does it reduce risk? If an investor holds an equity stake in only one
enterprise, as is common in pre-modern economies, the investment return to that equity
holding, and hence the value of the holding, will vary from year to year with whatever
idiosyncratic factors affect that enterprise. But a modern ??nancial system provides a host of
equity securities in which investors can invest their capital. By holding a portfolio of made
up of the securities of enterprises having uncorrelated or less-than-perfectly correlated
idiosyncratic risks of what the return this year will be for each individual security, most or
all of the idiosyncratic risk of variable returns can be eliminated. This is one of the most
basic results of modern ??nance theory. A diversi??ed portfolio of
securities can provide the
same return as an individual security, but with much less risk in the form of the variability
of that return.
A modern ??nancial system, of course, goes much farther than this in providing
opportunities for shedding risk through diversi??cation. It provides not only equity
securities, but also a host of other ??nancial assets—bonds, bills,
notes, bank deposits,
and mortgage loans, for example—all of varying degrees of risk. All
of this allows
investors rather easily to minimize the risk of achieving whatever ??nancial returns they
desire, given their attitudes toward risk and return. The vast proliferation of ??nancial
instruments, institutions, and markets we see in modern ??nancial systems, along with the
substantial resources we devote to them, all testify to the value of the risk management
services they provide. Great as these services are, some argue that they could be made far
more extensive to cover a wide range of risks that remain uncovered by current risk
management institutions (Shiller, 2003).
Insurance is a third form of risk management provided by a modern ??nancial system.
From experience, we know that every year some cars will be involved in accidents, that
some airplanes will crash, that some ships will sink, that some houses will burn down, that
some people will become ill, and that some will die. But each of us does not know that our
456
R. Sylla / Japan and the World Economy 15 (2003) 447–458
car will have an accident, that our airline will have a crash, that we ourselves will become
ill or die, and so on. These are risks we all bear day to day, week by week, month by month,
and year by year, throughout our earthly existence. Insurance companies, however, can
predict fairly accurately how many of these adverse events will occur each year, and so they
can offer us contracts that insure us against the adverse consequences of these risks. In
effect, the insurance company pools together the risks of a large number of individuals, and
offers individuals and ??rms insurance against such adverse consequences. The more
extensive are the forms of insurance available to us, and the more competitive are the
markets for insurance, the greater is the likelihood that we can manage the risks that are a
part of our existence. Modern ??nancial systems provide such
insurance services. They help
us to manage our risks.
This account of risk management and ??nancial systems leads me to a fundamental
question. If modern ??nancial systems provide us with a wide variety of ways in which to
manage our risks, why is that good for our economic growth? Earlier in the article, I
provided a number of pieces of historical evidence indicating that countries developing
modern ??nancial systems early in their histories subsequently grew faster, developed more,
and became much richer on average than the far greater number of countries that failed to
do so and hence remain relatively poor. Economists and economic historians, I included,
have often contended that the modern ??nancial systems of the rich countries—The
Netherlands, the UK, the USA, and Japan were the ones I discussed here—bene??ted in
economic development and growth from their ??nancial systems. The ??nancial systems of
those nations mobilized more capital than did less
developed ??nancial systems in other
countries, and then they also allocated the capital that was mobilized more ef??ciently.
This is certainly part of the answer to the question of why some countries are far richer
than others. But I am not sure that the mobilization and ef??cient allocation of capital are the
main contributions of modern ??nancial systems to economic growth. The risk management
facilities afforded us by our ??nancial systems, which are just beginning to be discussed by
economic and ??nancial historians (although ??nancial economists have discussed them for
some time), are equally if not more important parts of the contribution of ??nancial systems
to economic modernization.
Why? I think the answer has to relate the facilities for managing risks offered by modern
??nancial systems to their possible impacts on the amount of entrepreneurial activity we
might expect to see in economies with and without such facilities.
One of the pre-eminent
economists of the ??rst half of the 20th century, Joseph Schumpeter, was largely correct, I
think, when he argued that the driving force of economic development was
entrepreneurship. Most economists listened to Schumpeter, and then proceeded to ignore
his insight regarding the importance of entrepreneurial innovation. Entrepreneurship did
not seem to be tractable in the contexts of the economists’ mathematically rigorous
economic theories and models. Entrepreneurship was important, economist could agree,
but it seemed to involve more sociology and psychology than economics. Therefore,
economists pretty much left entrepreneurship as a ??eld of study to sociologists and social
psychologists.
But just who is this entrepreneur, one of two key actors in Schumpeter’s analysis of
economic development? The entrepreneur is the ‘‘idea person,’’ the visionary who
innovates in various unexpected ways, and in doing so changes the world and drives
R. Sylla / Japan and the World Economy 15 (2003) 447–458
457
economic development. For Schumpeter, ‘‘Development . . . is . . . de??ned by the carrying
out of new combinations,’’ that he famously went on to characterize
as follows:
This concept covers the following five cases: (1) The introduction
of a new good . . . or of
a new quality of good. (2) The introduction of a new method of production . . .. (3) The
opening of a new market . . .. (4) The conquest of a new source of supply of raw materials
or half-manufactured goods . . .. (5) The carrying out of the new organization of any
industry, like the creation of a monopoly position . . . or the breaking up of a monopoly
position. (Schumpeter, 1934, p. 66)
The other key actor in Schumpeter’s model is, of course, the banker, the person who
provides the entrepreneur with the ??nancing to implement his or her visionary ideas. I would
generalize Schumpeter’s banker by saying it is a shorthand term for
the entire ??nancial system.
The entrepreneur and the banker are risk takers, and entrepreneurial innovation ??nanced
by bankers is all about taking risks, often large risks, that may have only limited
probabilities of succeeding. Such risks will not be taken if there
are no entrepreneurs,
or if entrepreneurs are timid. Much the same can be said if there are no bankers, or only
timid ones. In that case, there will not be much development. The economic world will stay
much the same year after year, century after century, as it did for much of recorded history.
But all that changed in recent centuries, at least in a few countries such as those contained
in Table 1. These countries developed good ??nancial systems early in their modern
histories, an entrepreneurial achievement in itself, and also one that subsequently fostered
and sustained the higher levels of non-??nancial entrepreneurship characterized by
Schumpeter in the quotation above. Good ??nance helped to institutionalize entrepreneur-
ship, and the countries that had it raced ahead of the pack.
If entrepreneurship and its ??nancing are essentially about risk-taking, how does that
relate to my discussion of the role of modern ??nancial systems in promoting better risk
management? I arrive at a seemingly paradoxical conclusion. Because modern ??nancial
systems enable economic actors to reduce and better manage their economic and ??nancial
risks, they promote a higher level of risk-taking, that is, they promote a higher level of
entrepreneurship. By being able better to manage many of our risks through the facilities
for hedging, diversi??cation, and insurance afforded by modern ??nancial systems, we tend
to take more risks. As a result of having higher levels of entrepreneurship induced at least in
part by our modern ??nancial systems, we as individuals, along with the rich economies in
which we live, tend as a consequence to prosper, grow, and develop more rapidly than do
people and economies whose ??nancial systems provide fewer opportunities for sophis-
ticated risk management. If my reasoning here has a modicum of validity, the risk
management facilities provided by our modern ??nancial systems are not simply a minor
byproduct of economic and ??nancial development. They are at the very core of entre-
preneurship and economic development.
6. Conclusion
The hypothesis developed here that modern ??nancial systems, by offering a wide variety,
although hardly a complete menu, of ways to manage risks, tend to encourage risk taking
458
R. Sylla / Japan and the World Economy 15 (2003) 447–458
and entrepreneurship is just that, a hypothesis. It requires further re??nement, as well as
systematic investigation and testing. Advancing the hypothesis is just a ??rst step, and I hope
that others will join in exploring its rami??cations, both in history and our contemporary
world. Some day it may not even seem paradoxical that by helping economic agents to
reduce and manage their risks, ??nancial systems promote higher levels of risk taking and
entrepreneurship. Perhaps we shall come to think of that as obvious.
References
Demirgu? c?-Kunt, A., Levine, R., 2001. Financial Structure and Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Comparison
of Banks, Markets, and Development. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
de Vries, J., van der Woude, A., 1997. The First Modern Economy:
Success, Failure, and Perseverance of the
Dutch Economy, 1500–1815. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Dickson, P.G.M., 1967. The Financial Revolution in England: A Study in the Development of Public Credit,
1688–1756. Macmillan, London.
Maddison, A., 2001. The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective. OECD, Paris, p. 64.
Mason, S.P., 1995. The allocation of risk. In: Crane, D.B., Merton, R.C., Froot, K.A., Bodie, Z., Mason, S.P.,
Sirri, E.R., Perold, A.F., Tufano, P. (Eds.), The Global Financial System: A Functional Perspective. Harvard
Business School Press, Boston, MA, pp. 153–196.
Merton, R.C., Bodie, Z., 1995. A conceptual framework for analyzing the financial environment. In: Crane,
D.B., Merton, R.C., Froot, K.A., Bodie, Z., Mason, S.P., Sirri, E.R., Perold, A.F., Tufano, P. (Eds.), The
Global Financial System: A Functional Perspective. Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA, pp. 3–31.
Rousseau, P.L., 1999. Finance, investment, and growth in Meiji-era Japan. Japan and the World Economy 11,
185–198.
Schumpeter, J.A., 1934. The Theory of Economic Development: An
Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit,
Interest, and the Business Cycle. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Shiller, R.J., 2003. The New Financial Order: Risk in the 21st Century. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Suto, I., James, J., 1999. Savings and early economic growth in the United States and Japan. Japan and the World
Economy 11, 161–184.
Sylla, R., 1998. US securities markets and the banking system, 1790–1840. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Review 80, 83–98.
Sylla, R., 1999. Emerging markets in history: the United States, Japan, and Argentina. In: Sato, R.,
Ramachandran, R.V., Mino, K. (Eds.), Global Competition and Integration. Kluwer Academic Publishers,
Boston.
Sylla, R., 2002. Financial systems and economic modernization. Journal of Economic History 62, 277–292.
t’Hart, M., Jonker, J., Van Zanden, J.L., 1997. A Financial History of The Netherlands. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge.
Wright, R.E., 2002a. Hamilton Unbound: Finance and the Creation of
the American Republic. Greenwood
Publishers, Westport, CT.
Wright, R.E., 2002b. The Wealth of Nations Rediscovered: Integration and Expansion in American Financial
Markets, 1780–1850. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
本文档为【财务管理外文文献】,请使用软件OFFICE或WPS软件打开。作品中的文字与图均可以修改和编辑,
图片更改请在作品中右键图片并更换,文字修改请直接点击文字进行修改,也可以新增和删除文档中的内容。
该文档来自用户分享,如有侵权行为请发邮件ishare@vip.sina.com联系网站客服,我们会及时删除。
[版权声明] 本站所有资料为用户分享产生,若发现您的权利被侵害,请联系客服邮件isharekefu@iask.cn,我们尽快处理。
本作品所展示的图片、画像、字体、音乐的版权可能需版权方额外授权,请谨慎使用。
网站提供的党政主题相关内容(国旗、国徽、党徽..)目的在于配合国家政策宣传,仅限个人学习分享使用,禁止用于任何广告和商用目的。