微观经济管理学与财务知识分析规划(英文版)

IntermediateMicroeconomicsIntroductionContentsInstructorandTAsRequirementsCourseoutlineAnexample:marketforapartmentsTextbookIntermediateMicroeconomics:AModernApproach(SixthEdition)byHalR.VarianW.W.Norton，2003TheTheoryofEconomicsdoesnotfurnishabodyofsettledconclusionsimmediatelyapplicabletopolicy.Itisamethodratherthanadoctrine,anapparatusofthemind,atechniqueofthinkingwhichhelpsitspossessortodrawcorrectconclusions---JohnMaynardKeynesIsEconomicsUseful?AthinkingmachineChangesthewayyouviewlifeandunderstandproblemsAnallroundmajorEconomicsGraduatesTypeofEmployerPercentofGraduatesTraditionalBusiness23.3Government18.4FinancialBusiness17.7GraduateSchool13.7ConsultingServices4.4Private/publicSchool3.9LawFirm3.5Other9.8JobsforEconomistsBusinesseconomistsGovernmenteconomistsAcademiceconomistsMicroeconomicsTheoryApplicationsLaboreconomicsEconomicsofeducationAgriculturaleconomicsIndustrialorganizationsHealtheconomics……CourseOutlineConsumertheory(1-15)Producertheory(18-27)Marketequilibrium(16-17,30-32)SpecialtopicsonequilibriumEconomicModelingWhatcauseswhatineconomicsystems?Atwhatlevelofdetailshallwemodelaneconomicphenomenon?Whichvariablesaredeterminedoutsidethemodel(exogenous)andwhicharetobedeterminedbythemodel(endogenous)?ModelingtheApartmentMarketHowareapartmentrentsdetermined?Supposeapartmentsarecloseordistant,butotherwiseidenticaldistantapartmentsrentsareexogenousandknownmanypotentialrentersandlandlordsModelingtheApartmentMarketWhowillrentcloseapartments?Atwhatprice?Willtheallocationofapartmentsbedesirableinanysense?Howcanweconstructaninsightfulmodeltoanswerthesequestions?TwoPrinciplesinEconomicsOptimization:Eachpersontriestochoosethebestalternativeavailabletohimorher.Equilibrium:Marketpriceadjustsuntilquantitydemandedequalsquantitysupplied.ModelingApartmentDemandDemand:Supposethemostanyonepersoniswillingtopaytorentacloseapartmentis$500/month.Thenp=$500QD=1.Supposethepricehastodropto$490beforea2ndpersonwouldrent.Thenp=$490QD=2.ModelingApartmentDemandTheloweristherentalratep,thelargeristhequantityofcloseapartmentsdemandedpQD.Thequantitydemandedvs.pricegraphisthemarketdemandcurveforcloseapartments.MarketDemandCurveforApartmentspQDModelingApartmentSupplySupply:Ittakestimetobuildmorecloseapartmentssointhisshort-runthequantityavailableisfixed(atsay100).MarketSupplyCurveforApartmentspQS100CompetitiveMarketEquilibrium“low”rentalpricequantitydemandedofcloseapartmentsexceedsquantityavailablepricewillrise.“high”rentalpricequantitydemandedlessthanquantityavailablepricewillfall.CompetitiveMarketEquilibriumQuantitydemanded=quantityavailablepricewillneitherrisenorfallsothemarketisatacompetitiveequilibrium.CompetitiveMarketEquilibriumpQD,QS100CompetitiveMarketEquilibriumpQD,QSpe100CompetitiveMarketEquilibriumpQD,QSpe100Peoplewillingtopaypeforcloseapartmentsgetcloseapartments.CompetitiveMarketEquilibriumpQD,QSpe100Peoplewillingtopaypeforcloseapartmentsgetcloseapartments.Peoplenotwillingtopaypeforcloseapartmentsgetdistantapartments.CompetitiveMarketEquilibriumQ:Whorentsthecloseapartments?A:Thosemostwillingtopay.Q:Whorentsthedistantapartments?A:Thoseleastwillingtopay.Sothecompetitivemarketallocationisby“willingness-to-pay”.ComparativeStaticsWhatisexogenousinthemodel?priceofdistantapartmentsquantityofcloseapartmentsincomesofpotentialrenters.Whathappensiftheseexogenousvariableschange?ComparativeStaticsSupposethepriceofdistantapartmentrises.Demandforcloseapartmentsincreases(rightwardshift),causingahigherpriceforcloseapartments.MarketEquilibriumpQD,QSpe100MarketEquilibriumpQD,QSpe100HigherdemandMarketEquilibriumpQD,QSpe100Higherdemandcauseshighermarketprice;samequantitytraded.ComparativeStaticsSupposethereweremorecloseapartments.Supplyisgreater,sothepriceforcloseapartmentsfalls.MarketEquilibriumpQD,QSpe100MarketEquilibriumpQD,QS100HighersupplypeMarketEquilibriumpQD,QSpe100Highersupplycausesalowermarketpriceandalargerquantitytraded.ComparativeStaticsSupposepotentialrenters’incomesrise,increasingtheirwillingness-to-payforcloseapartments.Demandrises(upwardshift),causinghigherpriceforcloseapartments.MarketEquilibriumpQD,QSpe100MarketEquilibriumpQD,QSpe100Higherincomescausehigherwillingness-to-payMarketEquilibriumpQD,QSpe100Higherincomescausehigherwillingness-to-pay,highermarketprice,andthesamequantitytraded.TaxationPolicyAnalysisLocalgovernmenttaxesapartmentowners.Whathappenstopricequantityofcloseapartmentsrented?Isanyofthetax“passed”torenters?TaxationPolicyAnalysisMarketsupplyisunaffected.Marketdemandisunaffected.Sothecompetitivemarketequilibriumisunaffectedbythetax.Priceandthequantityofcloseapartmentsrentedarenotchanged.Landlordspayallofthetax.ImperfectlyCompetitiveMarketsAmongstmanypossibilitiesare:amonopolisticlandlordaperfectlydiscriminatorymonopolisticlandlordacompetitivemarketsubjecttorentcontrol.AMonopolisticLandlordWhenthelandlordsetsarentalpricepherentsD(p)apartments.Revenue=pD(p).Revenueislowifp0RevenueislowifpissohighthatD(p)0.Anintermediatevalueforpmaximizesrevenue.MonopolisticMarketEquilibriumpQDLowpriceLowprice,highquantitydemanded,lowrevenue.MonopolisticMarketEquilibriumpQDHighpriceHighprice,lowquantitydemanded,lowrevenue.MonopolisticMarketEquilibriumpQDMiddlepriceMiddleprice,mediumquantitydemanded,largerrevenue.MonopolisticMarketEquilibriumpQD,QSMiddlepriceMiddleprice,mediumquantitydemanded,largerrevenue.Monopolistdoesnotrentallthecloseapartments.100MonopolisticMarketEquilibriumpQD,QSMiddlepriceMiddleprice,mediumquantitydemanded,largerrevenue.Monopolistdoesnotrentallthecloseapartments.100Vacantcloseapartments.PerfectlyDiscriminatoryMonopolisticLandlordImaginethemonopolistkneweveryone’swillingness-to-pay.Charge$500tothemostwilling-to-pay,charge$490tothe2ndmostwilling-to-pay,etc.DiscriminatoryMonopolisticMarketEquilibriumpQD,QS100p1=$5001DiscriminatoryMonopolisticMarketEquilibriumpQD,QS100p1=$500p2=$49012DiscriminatoryMonopolisticMarketEquilibriumpQD,QS100p1=$500p2=$49012p3=$4753DiscriminatoryMonopolisticMarketEquilibriumpQD,QS100p1=$500p2=$49012p3=$4753DiscriminatoryMonopolisticMarketEquilibriumpQD,QS100p1=$500p2=$49012p3=$4753peDiscriminatorymonopolistchargesthecompetitivemarketpricetothelastrenter,andrentsthecompetitivequantityofcloseapartments.RentControlLocalgovernmentimposesamaximumlegalprice,pmax<pe,thecompetitiveprice.MarketEquilibriumpQD,QSpe100MarketEquilibriumpQD,QSpe100pmaxMarketEquilibriumpQD,QSpe100pmaxExcessdemandMarketEquilibriumpQD,QSpe100pmaxExcessdemandThe100closeapartmentsarenolongerallocatedbywillingness-to-pay(lottery,lines,largefamiliesfirst?).WhichMarketOutcomesAreDesirable?Whichisbetter?RentcontrolPerfectcompetitionMonopolyDiscriminatorymonopolyParetoEfficiencyVilfredoPareto;1848-1923.AParetooutcomeallowsno“wastedwelfare”;i.e.theonlywayoneperson’swelfarecanbeimprovedistoloweranotherperson’swelfare.ParetoEfficiencyJillhasanapartment;Jackdoesnot.Jillvaluestheapartmentat$200;Jackwouldpay$400forit.JillcouldsublettheapartmenttoJackfor$300.Bothgain,soitwasParetoinefficientforJilltohavetheapartment.ParetoEfficiencyAParetoinefficientoutcomemeansthereremainunrealizedmutualgains-to-trade.Anymarketoutcomethatachievesallpossiblegains-to-trademustbeParetoefficient.ParetoEfficiencyCompetitiveequilibrium:allcloseapartmentrentersvaluethematthemarketpricepeormoreallothersvaluecloseapartmentsatlessthanpesonomutuallybeneficialtradesremainsotheoutcomeisParetoefficient.ParetoEfficiencyDiscriminatoryMonopoly:assignmentofapartmentsisthesameaswiththeperfectlycompetitivemarketsothediscriminatorymonopolyoutcomeisalsoParetoefficient.ParetoEfficiencyMonopoly:notallapartmentsareoccupiedsoadistantapartmentrentercouldbeassignedacloseapartmentandhavehigherwelfarewithoutloweringanybodyelse’swelfare.sothemonopolyoutcomeisParetoinefficient.ParetoEfficiencyRentControl:somecloseapartmentsareassignedtorentersvaluingthematbelowthecompetitivepricepesomerentersvaluingacloseapartmentabovepedon’tgetcloseapartmentsParetoinefficientoutcome.HarderQuestionsOvertime,willthesupplyofcloseapartmentsincrease?rentcontroldecreasethesupplyofapartments?amonopolistsupplymoreapartmentsthanacompetitiverentalmarket?