约瑟夫·奈：《软实力》Nye-Soft+Power

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Soft Power Author(s): Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Source: Foreign Policy, No. 80, Twentieth Anniversary (Autumn, 1990), pp. 153-171 Published by: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1148580 Accessed: 08/02/2009 03:04 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ceip. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Foreign Policy. http://www.jstor.org SOFT POWER by Joseph S. Nye, Jr. The Cold War is over and Americans are try- ing to understand their place in a world with- out a defining Soviet threat. Polls report that nearly half the public believes the country is in decline, and that those who believe in decline tend to favor protectionism and to counsel withdrawal from what they consider "overex- tended international commitments." In a world of growing interdependence, such advice is counterproductive and could bring on the decline it is supposed to avert; for if the most powerful country fails to lead, the conse- quences for international stability could be di- sastrous. Throughout history, anxiety about decline and shifting balances of power has been accompanied by tension and miscalculation. Now that Soviet power is declining and Japa- nese power rising, misleading theories of American decline and inappropriate analogies between the United States and Great Britain in the late nineteenth century have diverted our attention away from the real issue-how power is changing in world politics. The United States is certainly less powerful at the end of the twentieth century than it was in 1945. Even conservative estimates show that the U.S. share of global product has declined from more than a third of the total after World War II to a little more than a fifth in the 1980s. That change, however, reflects the artificial effect of World War II: Unlike the other great powers, the United States was strengthened by the war. But that artificial preponderance was bound to erode as other countries regained their economic health. The important fact is that the U.S. economy's share of the global product has been relatively constant for the past decade and a half. The Council on Com- petitiveness finds that the U.S. share of world JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., is director of the Center for Interna- tional Affairs at Harvard University. This article draws from his 1990 book, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books). 153. FOREIGN POLICY product has averaged 23 per cent each year since the mid-1970s. The CIA, using numbers that reflect the purchasing power of different currencies, reports that the American share of world product increased slightly from 25 per cent in 1975 to 26 per cent in 1988. These studies suggest that the effect of World War II lasted about a quarter century and that most of the decline worked its way through the system by the mid-1970s. In fact, the big adjustment of American commitments occurred with then President Richard Nixon's withdrawal from Vietnam and the end of the convertibility of the dollar into gold. The dictionary tells us that power means an ability to do things and control others, to get others to do what they otherwise would not. Because the ability to control others is often associated with the possession of certain re- sources, politicians and diplomats commonly define power as the possession of population, territory, natural resources, economic size, military forces, and political stability. For ex- ample, in the agrarian economies of eight- eenth-century Europe, population was a criti- cal power resource since it provided a base for taxes and recruitment of infantry. Traditionally the test of a great power was its strength in war. Today, however, the defi- nition of power is losing its emphasis on mili- tary force and conquest that marked earlier eras. The factors of technology, education, and economic growth are becoming more signifi- cant in international power, while geography, population, and raw materials are becoming somewhat less important. If so, are we entering a "Japanese period" in world politics? Japan has certainly done far better with its strategy as a trading state since 1945 than it did with its military strategy to create a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere in the 1930s. On the other hand, Japan's security in relation to its large military neighbors, China and the Soviet Union, and the safety of its sea routes depend heavily on U.S. protection. While they may diminish, these problems will not vanish with the end of the Cold War. One should not leap too quickly to the conclusion that all trends favor economic power or countries like Japan. 154. Nye What can we say about changes in the distri- bution of power resources in the coming de- cades? Political leaders often use the term "multipolarity" to imply the return to a balance among a number of states with roughly equal power resources analogous to that of the nine- teenth century. But this is not likely to be the situation at the turn of the century, for in terms of power resources, all the potential challengers except the United States are deficient in some respect. The Soviet Union lags economically, China remains a less-developed country, Eu- rope lacks political unity, and Japan is deficient both in military power and in global ideological appeal. If economic reforms reverse Soviet de- cline, if Japan develops a full-fledged nuclear and conventional military capability, or if Eu- rope becomes dramatically more unified, there may be a return to classical multipolarity in the twenty-first century. But barring such changes, the United States is likely to retain a broader range of power resources-military, economic, scientific, cultural, and ideological -than other countries, and the Soviet Union may lose its superpower status. The Great Power Shift The coming century may see continued American preeminence, but the sources of power in world politics are likely to undergo major changes that will create new difficulties for all countries in achieving their goals. Proof of power lies not in resources but in the ability to change the behavior of states. Thus, the critical question for the United States is not whether it will start the next century as the superpower with the largest supply of re- sources, but to what extent it will be able to control the political environment and get other countries to do what it wants. Some trends in world politics suggest that it will be more diffi- cult in the future for any great power to control the political environment. The problem for the United States will be less the rising challenge of another major power than a general diffu- sion of power. Whereas nineteenth-century Britain faced new challengers, the twenty-first century United States will face new challenges. As world politics becomes more complex, the power of all major states to gain their objec- 155. FOREIGN POLICY tives will be diminished. To understand what is happening to the United States today, the distinction between power over other countries and power over outcomes must be clear. Al- though the United States still has leverage over particular countries, it has far less leverage over the system as a whole. It is less well-placed to attain its ends unilaterally, but it is not alone in this situation. All major states will have to confront the changing nature of power in world politics. Such changes, of course, are not entirely new. For example, the rapid growth of private actors operating across international borders, whether large corporations or political groups, was widely recognized in the early 1970s. Even Henry Kissinger, with his deeply rooted belief in classical balance-of-power politics, conceded in a 1975 speech that "we are entering a new era. Old international patterns are crumbling. ... The world has become interdependent in economics, in communications, in human aspi- rations." By the late 1970s, however, the American political mood had shifted. Iran's seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran and the Soviet inva- sion of Afghanistan seemed to reaffirm the role of military force and the primacy of the tradi- tional security agenda. Ronald Reagan's presi- dency accentuated these trends in the early 1980s. The U.S. defense budget increased in real terms for five straight years, arms control was downgraded, and public opposition to nu- clear forces and deterrence grew. Conventional military force was used successfully, albeit against the extremely weak states of Grenada and Libya. The shifting agenda of world poli- tics discredited the 1970s' concern with inter- dependence and restored the traditional em- phasis on military power. But interdependence continued to grow, and the world of the 1980s was not the same as that of the 1950s. The appropriate response to the changes oc- curring in world politics today is not to aban- don the traditional concern for the military balance of power, but to accept its limitations and to supplement it with insights about inter- dependence. In the traditional view, states are the only significant actors in world politics and only a few large states really matter. But today 156. Nye other actors are becoming increasingly impor- tant. Although they lack military power, trans- national corporations have enormous economic resources. Thirty corporations today each have annual sales greater than the gross national products (GNPs) of 90 countries. In the 1980s, the annual profits of IBM and Royal Dutch/ Shell Group were each larger than the central government budgets of Colombia, Kenya, or Yugoslavia. Multinational corporations are sometimes more relevant to achieving a coun- try's goals than are other states. The annual overseas production by such corporations ex- ceeds the total value of international trade. In a regional context, a portrait of the Middle East conflict that did not include the superpowers would be woefully inadequate, but so would a description that did not tell of transnational religious groups, oil companies, and terrorist organizations. The issue is not whether state or nonstate actors are more important-states usually are. The point is that in modern times, more complex coalitions affect outcomes. With changing actors in world politics come changing goals. In the traditional view, states give priority to military security to ensure their survival. Today, however, states must consider new dimensions of security. National security has become more complicated as threats shift from the military (that is, threats against terri- torial integrity) to the economic and ecological. For example, Canadians today are not afraid that U.S. soldiers will burn Toronto for a sec- ond time (as in 1813); rather they fear that Toronto will be programmed into a backwater by a Texas computer. The forms of vulnerabil- ity have increased, and trade-offs among poli- cies are designed to deal with different vulnera- bilities. The United States, for instance, might enhance its energy security by sending naval forces to the Persian Gulf; but it could accom- plish the same goal by enlarging its strategic petroleum reserve, by imposing a gasoline tax to encourage conservation at home, and by improving cooperation in institutions like the International Energy Agency. While military force remains the ultimate form of power in a self-help system, the use of force has become more costly for modern great powers than it was in earlier centuries. Other 157. FOREIGN POLICY instruments such as communications, organi- zational and institutional skills, and manipula- tion of interdependence have become impor- tant. Contrary to some rhetorical flourishes, interdependence does not mean harmony. Rather, it often means unevenly balanced mu- tual dependence. Just as the less enamored of two lovers may manipulate the other, the less vulnerable of two states may use subtle threats to their relationship as a source of power. Fur- ther, interdependence is often balanced differ- ently in different spheres such as security, trade, and finance. Thus, creating and resist- ing linkages between issues when a state is either less or more vulnerable than another becomes the art of the power game. Political leaders use international institutions to dis- courage or promote such linkages; they shop for the forum that defines the scope of an issue in the manner best suiting their interests. As the instruments of power change, so do strategies. Traditionalists consider the goal of security and the instrument of military force to be linked by a strategy of balancing power. States wishing to preserve their independence from military intimidation follow a balancing strategy to limit the relative power of other states. Today, however, economic and ecologi- cal issues involve large elements of mutual ad- vantage that can be achieved only through co- operation. These issues are often critical to the reelection of political leaders. A French presi- dent today would not interfere with Germany's increased economic growth because German growth is critical to French economic growth. The French decision to forego an independent economic policy and remain in the European monetary system in the early 1980s is one ex- ample of such interdependence. Traditionalist accounts of world politics often speak of an international system that re- sults from the balancing strategies of states. Although bipolarity and multipolarity are use- ful terms, today different spheres of world politics have different distributions of power- that is, different power structures. Military power, particularly nuclear, remains largely bipolar in its distribution. But in trade, where the European Community acts as a unit, power is multipolar. Ocean resources, money, space, 158. Nye shipping, and airlines each have somewhat dif- ferent distributions of power. The power of states varies as well, as does the significance of nonstate actors in different spheres. For exam- ple, the politics of international debt cannot be understood without considering the power of private banks. If military power could be transferred freely into the realms of economics and the environ- ment, the different structures would not mat- ter; and the overall hierarchy determined by military strength would accurately predict out- comes in world politics. But military power is more costly and less transferable today than in earlier times. Thus, the hierarchies that charac- terize different issues are more diverse. The games of world politics encompass different players at different tables with different piles of chips. They can transfer winnings among tables, but often only at a considerable dis- count. The military game and the overall structure of the balance of power dominate when the survival of states is clearly at stake, but in much of modern world politics, physical survival is not the most pressing issue. Converting Power The fragmentation of world politics into many different spheres has made power re- sources less fungible, that is, less transferable from sphere to sphere. Money is fungible, in that it can be easily converted from one cur- rency to another. Power has always been less fungible than money, but it is even less so today than in earlier periods. In the eighteenth century, a monarch with a full treasury could purchase infantry to conquer new provinces, which, in turn, could enrich the treasury. This was essentially the strategy of Frederick II of Prussia, for example, when in 1740 he seized Austria's province of Silesia. Today, however, the direct use of force for economic gain is generally too costly and dan- gerous for modern great powers. Even short of aggression, the translation of economic into military power resources may be very costly. For instance, there is no economic obstacle to Japan's developing a major nuclear or conven- tional force, but the political cost both at home and in the reaction of other countries would be 159. FOREIGN POLICY considerable. Militarization might then reduce rather than increase Japan's ability to achieve its ends. Because power is a relationship, by defini- tion it implies some context. Diminished fun- gibility means that specifying the context is increasingly important in estimating the actual power that can be derived from power re- sources. More than ever, one must ask the question, "Power for what?" Yet at the same time, because world politics has only partly changed and the traditional geopolitical agenda is still relevant, some fungibility of military power remains. The protective role of military force is a relevant asset in bargaining among states. The dependence of conservative oil-pro- ducing states on the United States for their security, for example, limited their leverage on the United States during the 1973 oil crisis. The United States is still the ultimate guaran- tor of the military security of Europe and Japan, and that role is a source of bargaining power in negotiations with its allies. In general, the allies' need for protection strengthens American influence, and may continue to do so even with a reduced Soviet threat. During the Cold War, the United States often worried about the frailty of its allies and tended to sacrifice some economic interests in its effort to contain the perceived Soviet menace. Despite the waning of that threat, if the United States worries less than its allies do, it may be able to demand more of them. To evaluate power in a post-Cold War world, it is necessary to recognize instruments and balance-of-power strategies necessary for a successful policy. But new elements in the modern world are diffusing power away from all the great powers. Thus, any successful strategy must incorporate both continuity and change. The great powers of today are less able to use their traditional power resources to achieve their purposes than in the past. On many issues, private actors and small states have be- come more powerful. At least five trends have contributed to this diffusion of power: eco- nomic interdependence, transnational actors, nationalism in weak states, the spread of tech- nology, and changing political issues. 160. Nye New forms of communications and trans- portation have had a revolutionary effect on economic interdependence. A century ago, it took two weeks to cross the A