From hermeneutics in social science toward a hermeneutics of social science

From hermeneutics in social science toward a hermeneutics of social science AGNES HELLER Department of Philosophy, New School for Social Research On understanding social sciences A new type of historical consciousness, both reflected and universal, emerged during the Enlightenment and has become dominant since the French Revolution. Western men and women embarked on an under- standing of their age in terms of its being a product of world-historical progression, where each stage contained its own possibilities and limi- tations as well as being superceded in turn by another stage. Hegel con- structed a grand philosophical edifice on this new ground of self- understanding. No one has ever transcended and no one will ever transcend, he contended, in action, thought, project, fantasy or utopia his own Time; we shall not be able to do so either. Yet, Hegel added, the past that we are able to recollect from the peak of our present is the Whole, that is, the whole History and the whole Truth. 1 The Hegelian time capsule carries a dual paradox that only the Hegelian system was momentarily able to sublate. Reflected universalism had given birth to Faustian Man, who overthrows all taboos and transcends all limits, who is eager to know everything, to act out all his projects and desires. However, the same reflected universality publicly declared that we are captives of the prisonhouse of contemporaneity. Reflected universalism had transformed Truth into "historical Truth," robbing the world of the eternal, the timeless, without ever being able to quench the thirst for certitude both in the outer and inner worlds. Modern historical con- sciousness inherently encompasses this dual paradox, just as well as all the attempts to live with it and bear with it proudly. The quest for understanding and self-understanding includes the quest for knowing present history, the historical present, our own society as ourselves. One is confronted with the task of obtaining true knowledge about a world whilst being aware that this knowledge is situated in that Theory and Society 18: 291-322, 1989. �9 1989 KluwerAcademic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. 292 world. How can one know that one's knowledge is true? How can one know that one knows? In order to overcome the paradox, an Archi- medean point outside contemporaneity must be found. However, this is exactly what cannot be done: the prisonhouse of the present only allows for illusory escape. Even so, one escape route has indeed remained open. Let us suppose that our history and our historical consciousness, and these things alone, create certain language games or methods that provide contem- porary men and women with Archimedean points outside the bound- aries of contemporaneity. Under these conditions, the paradox will prove unreal, a mere semblance. Language games like this are termed social sciences. Both nomothetic and hermeneutical social sciences offer an Archimedean point, albeit ones different in kind. Let us first take nomothetic (or explanatory) social sciences. Suppose we can establish certain general historical-social l~aws or regularities that, once discovered, can be applied to all histories and all societies, ours in- cluded. Thus our own history, our own institutions, our society can be explained, and so understood fully and truly. We overcome the limits of our historical consciousness by using the potentials of that same historical consciousness. Hermeneutical sciences will yield a similar result. Sup- pose we can converse with actors of bygone ages or with members of alien cultures; let us further suppose that we are able to read the minds of these people (or their texts) and come to know what they really meant (or mean). Finally, let us assume that due to all this we are able to look back at our- selves with these very alien eyes, from the cultural context ofthis"other." If only we can make these "others" raise their questions, and assess and judge our history and institutions from their perspective, in other word~ their historical consciousness, we will have established an Archimedean point outside our own culture. Here, again, we overcome the limits to our own historical consciousness by mobilizing its own potentials. Thus nomothetic and hermeneutical social sciences alike are products of our historical consciousness. Both have expressed the awareness of our his- toricity; both have originated as formidable attempts to provide true self- knowledge for an epoch that understands itself as historical. The increas- ing awareness of the complexity and fallibility of the undertaking termed "social science" did not shake the belief in the ultimate success of this undertaking itself. It is only now, in the period termed "post-modern," that the scene has been reset. That is why the compound term "social sciences" itself has been put under hermeneutical scrutiny. In the process of a progressive division of the cultural spheres in modern- 293 ity, the social sciences have established themselves in the dominant sphere, that of science. Weber, whose vision of the division of cultural spheres is a lucid rendering of the modem condition, discusses science as a vocation, 2 though he only had social sciences in mind. With certain provisos, one can still subscribe to the Weberian diagnosis as well as to his interdictions. Science, Weber contended, is one cultural sphere alongside the political, legal, aesthetic, economic, religious, and erotic spheres. The relative independence of each sphere results from, and is the precondition of, the reproduction of modernity. Each sphere contains norms and rules intrinsic to itself and different from the norms and rules of the other spheres. If, for example, the intrinsic norms and rules of the political sphere or the economic sphere, or for that matter of the aesthetic sphere, were to be applied to and observed in the sphere of science, the proper norms of the latter would be curtailed, and science would be distorted. Yet it should be noted that spheric distinction depends also on our percep- tion. Though social sciences have never really behaved like natural sciences, it is only in the last fifty years or so that we have become aware of this fact. The natural sciences, despite changes of paradigm, proved to be essentially cumulative, whereas the social sciences, despite the tendency to build up certain kinds of knowledge, proved to be essentially noncumu- lative although they claimed to be all-embracingly cumulative. Knowledge can be cumulative in so far as the intrinsic language game is pre-eminently one of problem-solving. X has solved a problem, I can rely upon this solution, I can go on and solve the next problem, and so on. In the social sciences, this would mean, for example, that Marx solves aproblem, Tonnies relies on this solution and goes one step further, Weber, relying on both of these efforts, goes a great deal further. Parsons inherits all these solutions and adds his own to the list, whilst in the present, Luhmann builds upon the solutions of all the preceding sociologists in his research, and so on. This sounds like and indeed is, a parody. The reason for the parodic character of this assumption is simply that social sciences are not predominantly concerned with problem solving in the first place. They create meaning and they contribute to our self-knowledge. They address problems, they elucidate them, they place them into one context or another, and insofar as they do solve problems, which they certainly do, they solve them within this broad and overarching context. In social sciences there is no such thing as the final solution to a problem, not even when working within the framework of one and the same paradigm. In this respect the social sciences are akin to philosophy, and not the natural sciences. From Dilthey onwards, hermeneutics has been well aware of this. 294 Social sciences can establish an independent sphere of their own (after being divorced from natural sciences), and can renounce the claim to cumulative knowledge and exactitude. Yet there is one claim they certain- ly cannot renounce: the claim that they can provide true knowledge about society, in particular about our own modern society, ff they withdrew this claim they would undoubtedly cease to exist. In social sciences, meaning is related to, or rather "wrung out of" true knowledge. History, Ranke insists, should narrate events as they really happened, and sociology, in terms of Max Webcr's imperative, should construct ideal types that enable us to understand how institutions really work. On this point, whether or not historians, sociologists, or social scientists of any other hue can com- pletely fulfill this norm is irrelevant. Moreover, norms, in contrast to rules, can be observed in different ways. The gist of the matter is that the norm of verisimilitude must be observed or else social science no longer exists. Yet if there is no problem-solving in social sciences (or if problem-solving plays a subordinate role), if there is no cumulative knowledge in social sciences other than in the area of publications, how can the claim to veri- similitude be redeemed? First, this can be done by avoiding misunderstandings. Nietzsche once said that science had been invented in order to fend off Truth. In Heideg- ger's rendition, the original Greek insight into the character of Truth as aletheia (Unconcealment) had, in modern philosophy and modern sciences, been replaced by the correspondence theory of Truth. True knowledge alias "mirroring" alias correctness occupied the place of Truth. Certain branches of philosophy, in particular those with positivist leanings, are indeed guilty of this crude blunder, and social scientists too have followed suit. However, the quest for true knowledge itself can neither fend off Truth nor "conceal" it - Truth and true knowledge are simply different in kind. True knowledge can become Truth (other condi- tions, yet to be elaborated on, having been met), but it cannot become Truth simply by presenting itself as true knowledge. The greatest social scientists have always been the least likely to confuse true knowledge with Truth. Weber, who denounced this fallacy as a dangerous delusion, is an obvious example. Weber clearly warned his students not to seek insight into the meaning oflifein their pursuit of the social sciences: the search for true knowledge must be chosen as a vocation and not as a path leading to Truth. To offer insight into Truth through the pursuit of true knowledge is to make a false promise, one which the social sciences have no authority to keep. If this most serious of misunderstandings is avoided, there are still serious 295 questions to be faced. How can one live up to the norm of verisimilitude? How can one ascertain whether one has done so? The matter can be summed up in the following question: what are the criteria of true knowl- edge, the criteria of verisimilitude, in the social sciences? If we succeed in finding these criteria, we can satisfied that we have sufficiently - though not completely - understood social sciences. On the quest for true knowledge in social sciences Although modern sciences are supposed to stand under the Cartesian spell, whoever casts a dispassionate glance at the history of social sciences will see that the latter have never fully subscribed to the rationalistic criteria of Truth as developed during the seventeenth century by Descartes, Spinoza, or even Hobbes. The advice given by the great rationalists, that we should throw away all books because reading only fills our minds with falsities and prejudices, could not be heeded in social science. Nor could the social sciences live up to the other methodological imperative, that of deducing all their statements from a few axioms. To "know something" in the sphere of social sciences at least included the knowledge of certain texts. Even the most dedicated attempts at mathematizing certain branches of social science stopped short of being fully rationalistic-deductive. And as noted by Anthony Giddens, mere empiricist methods did not fare much better? To mention only one obstacle, the so-called factual material in social science is never completely based on observation. Nowadays, "knowing something in the sphere of social sciences" is associated more with "having a great deal of information," being "widely read," being "knowledgeable" and so forth. One need not be pleased with this deve- lopment to agree that being "knowledgeable" constitutes at least one aspect of "having true knowledge" in the social sciences, a factor that Descartes would certainly have regarded as a sign of complete ignoran- ce. The element of the great rationalist tradition that has remained effective is the "Cartesian moment" manifest in every scientific inquiry. By "Cartesian moment" I mean what Kant termed Selbstdenken, some- thing that is tantamount to the attitude of not accepting any text, state- ment, or presentation as representing uncontestable authority. For knowledge can only be true if it is also condoned by the researcher's own reason. There is yet another Cartesian legacy that cannot be completely abandoned in the social sciences. Although social scientists cannot 296 possibly subscribe to the Cartesian tenet that the clarity and distinct- ness of a notion that is present in one's mind must be taken as proof of its veracity, they must still keep their notions as clear and distinct as their medium permits. In social science one can only rarely use "real definitions" in a reasonable manner, since the more central and the more crucial a social concept is, the less this concept can be defined. Should one try to define notions like "society," "work," "culture," and the like, one will immediately come to realize that these definitions will be completely empty, and therefore either insignificant in the quest for true knowledge or incapable of being consistently applied in this quest. Of course, a nominal definition can always be provided, and such definitions fulfill a proper orientative function, but they have no cog- nitive value and do not contribute to our knowledge, whether this knowledge is true or false. This is why Weber recommended Bestim- mung (determination) instead of definition in sociology. Bestimmung makes concepts as clear as possible only insofar as the notion thus determined provides the identity of the notion prevailing in all uses and interpretations, but it also indicates something more or less than or dif- ferent from what we ourselves have chosen to indicate. The aspect of nonidentity is further highlighted by the circumstance that even the consistent use of the notion can and will be viewed as not entirely con- sistent by those looking at this matter from a different perspective. In short, the social sciences do not only open themselves up to falsifica- tion, which all sciences do; they also open themselves up to interpreta- tion-reinterpretation. What has apparently begun here in the usual apologetic manner ("social sciences cannot be completely deductive or totally inductive," "they can- not offer a clear and distinct definition of their own basic notions") has finished on a positive note: with the social sciences we are dealing with branches of knowledge that are open to interpretation and reinterpreta- tion. Significant works of social science are treasure-troves that we always revisit in our quest for meaning and true knowledge. Let me reiterate that the quest for true knowledge in the social sciences is coterminous with reconstructing, depicting, narrating, modelling, under- standing, interpreting "how it really happened," "how it really works;' "how it was really meant" "how it was really understood" and the like. Irrespective of whether events, institutions or other things are primarily interpreted or explained, both interpretation and explanation must be plausible. It has frequently been noted that in social sciences, probability or plausibility amounts to verisimilitude. The act of proving, Collingwood 297 says, 4 is the translation of the Latin probare, which can also be rendered as "making plausible" And here we reach a significant parting of ways: while I accept that verisimilitude can be rendered in terms of plausibility, I do not accept that plausibility in a general sense is a sufficient criterion of true knowledge in social sciences. It is equally common knowledge that plausibility is also a central category of rhetoric. I would add to this that plausibility and probability make a theory true in everyday thinking as well. If theories in social sciences are true insofar as they are plausible, then the criteria of verisimilitude would prove to be identical in rhetoric, social sciences, and everyday life. Since this is a less than promising starting point, we could extend our search for a criterion for social science that is stronger than that of plausibility. Yet this criterion could only be that of certi- tude, a criterion we have rejected at this preliminary stage. In this ap- parent impasse, the answer seems to be that we need not go beyond plausibility, but we should look for a specific type of criterion of plausi- bility. Briefly, what makes a theory plausible in rhetoric and everyday life is a set of procedures that are not identical with those making a theory plausible in the social sciences. Verisimilitude is the result of social inquiry, and this inquiry must be guided by certain norms. One of these norms can be formulated as fol- lows: social science shouM not use the addressee as the means to achieve certain goals of the social scientist. One uses the addressee as a means if one formulates a theory such that the addressee acts in a manner the social theorist wants, desires, wishes, or wills them to act in mobilizing certain emotive responses or playing upon certain interests of the addressee. This interdiction is both practical (moral) and theoretical. It is practical (moral) because if the addressee is used in the manner out- lined, he or she becomes the object of manipulation (which is exactly what strong rhetoric is all about). The interdiction is equally valid on the theoretical plane, because in respect of strong rhetoric the theory will be completely plausible for the addressee but for no one else. Furthermore, even for the addressee it will only remain plausible as long as the emotions and interests the theorist plays upon remain charged. This is why heavily rhetorical theories can be extremely influential in their original context but quickly decline to the level of being mere historical documents, and do not show evidence of the paradigmatic appeal that the theories we have called the "treasure- troves" of the social sciences show. 298 However, the interdiction on strong rhetoric in social sciences does not entail the interdiction on evaluation. There is no need for either non- rhetorical or mildly rhetorical social theories to be "value-free." I have repeatedly expressed my agreement with Weber that the social sciences should observe the norms of their own sphere and that the norms of other cultural spheres should not encroach upon the norms of social science. By this I did not mean to assert that values inherent in the other spheres cannot inform inquiry in the realm of social sciences or that they cannot provide a critical standpoint from which an inquiry can be conducted. Many different, albeit equally plausible and equally scientific theories, can coexist, one theory being informed by one value of one sphere, another theory being anchored in a different value of ye