Kirishima_Damage_Analysis

All rights reserved. No part of this article may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the author. Kirishima Damage Analysis By Robert Lundgren There were only two battleship vs. battleship actions in the Pacific during World War II. Kirishima’s duel with Washington and South Dakota on 14-15 November 1942 was the first of these actions. This pitted two of the most modern and newest US battleships against one of Japan’s oldest battleships. For a detailed report on this action, see Battleship_Action_Guadalcanal.pdf. What has been written about her final hours has largely been taken from a single USSBS Interrogation of Lt.Cdr. Tokuno Horishi. In this report Horishi writes that Kirishima received nine 16-inch shell hits and forty 5-inch shell hits and that Captain Iwabuchi had Kirishima scuttled. The estimate of nine major caliber hits was consistent with Admiral Lee’s estimate of eight 16-inch shell hits documented in his action report to Admiral Nimitz. There however was no information on the location of these hits or the damage suffered. There was no information on what attempts were made to save her after the battle if any. Kirishima’s story is still largely a mystery though she plays a huge role in the most important battle of the war. Many Japanese records were destroyed when Tokyo was fire bombed in 1945 by US air raids. Japanese commanders would file a brief action report soon after the battle and then a detailed action report maybe a month later. The detailed action report for Kirishima seems to have been lost. Pieces of the battle from the Japanese side have had to come from a wide number of sources including some brief action reports from Kirishima, Takao, Sendai, detailed action report from Atago, surviving officer testimony post war, and Japanese secondary sources written on the subject. The most important piece of new evidence was supplied by Lt.Cdr. Shiro Hayashi who was Kirishima’s Chief Damage Control Officer and before the ship sank he sketched a drawing of the hit locations suffered by his ship. Lt.Cdr. Tsurukichi Ikeda was his good friend and when they were about to abandon ship Ikeda copied these hit locations meticulously and published it post war in a small Japanese book Shikikan-tachi no Taiheiyô Sensô [Pacific War as Described by the Senior Officers]. What was reported was vastly different then Horishi’s account. Ikeda shows 20 major caliber hits and seventeen smaller caliber hits and that Kirishima actually capsized to port despite all the gunfire damage striking the starboard side of the ship totally unexpectedly while they were in the process of abandoning the ship in an orderly fashion. Then in 1992 Dr. Robert Ballard discovered Kirishima’s wreck and was shocked to see her upside down with her forward section completely destroyed and her forward anchor chain draped over the stern. Dr. Ballard gave me permission to view all the film taken of Kirishima on his expedition. My examination of what the film shows confirms Hayashi’s and Ikeda’s account. Unfortunately, when it was discovered she was upside down, Dr. Ballard decided not to film the entire wreck and so not all hit locations were caught on tape and two hits are only partially filmed as the camera moves right past them, including one which was hidden by the anchor chain over her stern. With this new information in hand, the following essay is composed of the following sections: Kirishima_Damage_Analysis.doc 26 June 2009 Page 1 Kirishima_Damage_Analysis.doc 26 June 2009 Page 2 1) A technical description of her officer testimony as given to the USSBS 2) Kirishima’s original armor protection scheme and additions to that scheme 3) Damage she suffered during the battle 4) The causes of her sinking 5) My theory on why her wreck is in its current condition. Kirishima Damage Analysis Kirishima_Damage_Analysis.doc 26 June 2009 Page 3 1. United States Official Documentation and Officer Testimony USS Washington was the only ship to fire at Kirishima with both her main and secondary battery. The following chart is taken from her track chart which shows the critical time period Washington fired on Kirishima. According to Washington’s action report she is on a heading of 290 degrees true and Kirishima is on a course of 130 degrees true. After Kirishima’s turn North at 0105 she presents her port side to Washington and I believe this plays an important roll in her rudder damage. USS South Dakota’s main battery was silent during this phase of the battle and her secondary guns engaged Atago. Kirishima Damage Analysis Kirishima_Damage_Analysis.doc 26 June 2009 Page 4 At 0100 when Atago turned on her search lights USS Washington main battery opens fire bearing 008 degrees true, range 8,400 yards. Secondary battery opened fire. Director 1 with mounts 1 and 3 on main battery target. Director 3 with mounts 5 and 7 firing on ship probably CA with search lights trained on South Dakota. Director 4 provided star shell illumination with mount 9 for main battery beginning after second salvo for a total of 62 star shells being fired. Fire was rapid for about two minutes thirty nine seconds, firing about thirty nine 16-inch projectiles. Main caliber fire was checked for one minute thirty seconds on an erroneous report target had been sunk. The main battery hit battleship with at least three salvos with projectiles exploding during the first two minutes thirty nine seconds.1 Fire was resumed for two minutes forty five seconds in which thirty six 16-inch projectiles were fired for a total of seventy five main caliber rounds and 107 5-inch AA common rounds between 0100 and 0107. There is no record of the number of salvos fired by Washington during this time period. Hank Seely in spot one witnessed Washington’s main battery gun fire hit the Pagoda superstructure on her second salvo and then on the third strike Kirishima amidships causing large bright explosions. Washington’s action report states that she achieved hits on at least three salvos during the first two minutes and thirty nine seconds. During the one minute and thirty seconds Washington checked fire it was observed that Kirishima was still able to fire from three gun turrets which is an important observation. When she resumed it was noted that more hits were obtained and that only turret 4 was able to return fire. Washington walked her gunfire across her target noted she was turning to the north and then at 0107 Kirishima pulled to port and made a 500 degree turn or almost two complete circles. Though Washington would track Kirishima for ten more minutes, she never re-opened fire on her and soon left her behind, leaving Kirishima to her fate. Washington also reported that during this phase “overs” as well as shorts were observed optically, however, during this the time no splashes were observed by the fire control radar even though a particular attempt was made to do so. The reason for this is not known. It may be that the battleship signal was so strong that receiver sensitivity had been cut too low to see the splashes. On the other hand, the other nearby targets and Savo Island itself could have confused the return signals. This means that Washington’s estimate of hits scored was based on what she could see and not based on counting the shell splashes by her fire control radar.2 Concerning Washington’s secondary battery fire, Group one, which was firing on the main battery target, was observed twice to score hits that started fires in upper works of the target and when the search lights on this target were extinguished and other ships turned on their search lights, fire was shifted to the new targets. During this phase 107 AA common projectiles were fired at Kirishima. The 40 estimated hits claimed by Lt.Cdr. Tokuno Horishi would be an incredible 62.7% hit ratio of this number, which is simply too high to be realistic. The 5-inch battery is firing at mid-range for their caliber with a much higher angle of fall (about 20 degrees) than was the main battery (about 7 degrees). The flatter the trajectory, the easier it is to score hits and Washington is firing nine 16-inch guns vs. only four 5-inch guns at Kirishima. Lee also documents that Group One’s fire hit the enemy battleship and that both the main and secondary battery had scored hits prior to Kirishima’s firing her first salvo at South Dakota. Concerning the type of projectiles fired at Kirishima, Lee notes that the 5-inch 38 caliber AA Common were without base detonating fuzes and so could be expected to give only about 50% high order bursts against surface targets, and that these rounds would burst at the point of impact without deeply penetrating into the target ship. His comment on the 16-inch AP shells was that they were very effective against large targets, but were apt to go clear through the superstructure of small vessels before 1 USS Washington’s action report 2 USS Washington’s action report Kirishima Damage Analysis Kirishima_Damage_Analysis.doc 26 June 2009 Page 5 detonating.3 This was common for AP rounds as the thin steel in the superstructure did not provide enough deceleration to activate the fuze. 2. Japanese Official Documentation and Officer Testimony In two brief action reports, one of which is on microfilm at the National Archives and one that is from Ukagi’s diary, we gain only a small amount of information on the damage inflicted on Kirishima. The first report simply states; “Many hits were sustained and fires broke out in all departments. Considerable flooding occurred and steering became impossible”.4 The second report points out that South Dakota was identified as a “North Carolina class” battleship and that Washington was identified as an “Idaho class” battleship. It also states enemy gunfire was concentrated on Kirishima and inflicted more than 6 hits. Fires started at various sections while the fore radio room was destroyed, hydrometers of number 3 and 4 turrets stopped and the rudder developed trouble. Her engine rooms remained operational for a time but her steering gear room was completely flooded so making way was impossible. Eventually the engine rooms became intolerable due to increased heat and most of the engineers were killed even though they had been ordered to evacuate. Only the central engine room could make way but only at the slowest speed. Fires once thought under control gained strength and threatened the fore and aft magazines. Orders to flood them were issued. Requests for a tow to the light cruiser Nagara were denied and attempts to prevent the flooding of the steering gear room also failed and the ship became hopeless. Then we gave up the ship and asked destroyers Asagumo and Teruzuki to come along side to transfer the crew. We lowered the ensign and shouted three banzais. The Emperors portrait was transferred first to the Asagumo and then the crew were transferred. The list grew so that we could hardly stand on deck without help. The ship finally went down at 0125 (Japanese time, 0325 local time) at a point eleven miles bearing 265 degrees from Savo Island. Sixty nine officers and 1,031 men were rescued by the destroyers.5 Japanese documentation reports that the first hits struck forward, smashing both forward main gun turrets and after a short lull she was hit aft. The brief action reports were never meant to give full details, but were simply a summary to provide superior officers with a general idea of what had happened. The Detailed Action Reports or DARs were meant to give full details but it appears that Kirishima’s was lost during the war. However, these brief action reports do provide important clues to back up officer testimony and other secondary source material. Post war, three officers gave accounts of Kirishima’s final hours with far greater detail. Lt.(jg) Michio Kobayashi was Kirishima’s supply officer, but during the battle he was stationed on the battle bridge with the ships senior officers.6 Lt.Cdr Kyshichi Yoshino was Kirishima’s chief flooding control officer who describes his attempts to keep the ship on an even keel.7 Lt.Cdr. Tsurukichi Ikeda preserved and provided 3 USS Washington’s action report and VAdm Lee’s report to Adm. Nimitz 4 JT 1 Troms and ARs of battleship and cruisers 5 Fading Victory: The Diary of Admiral Matome Ugaki 6 Senkan Kirishima no Saigo (Last of Battleship Kirishima) 1987 written by Lt.(jg) Michio Kobayashi 7 Senkan Kirishima no Saigo (Last of Battleship Kirishima) 1960 written by Lt. Cdr Kyshichi Yoshino Kirishima Damage Analysis Kirishima_Damage_Analysis.doc 26 June 2009 Page 6 the most important data and that was Lt.Cdr. Shiro Hayashi hit locations.8 Concerning Kirishima’s battle damage, here are the details each officer documented. Lt.Cdr. Tsurukichi Ikeda was in charge of Kirishima’s secondary battery and was also Lt.Cdr. Tokuno Horishi senior officer. He could see his gunfire hitting South Dakota and was sure that Kirishima was illuminating the target as well. He felt only a strange vibration and had no idea that his ship was hit. However, he soon he felt his back getting hot so he thought there might be a fire in the next compartment. When he was ordered to the upper deck he witnessed massive destruction on the compass bridge level and once on deck he moved aft and saw two ten meter holes over his secondary guns. He also reported that once on deck he noticed a starboard list and in the end Kirishima capsized to port. Ikeda’s copy of Hayashi’s drawing showed 20 major caliber hits and 17 secondary hits. Lt.(jg) Michio Kobayashi said, “Washington’s first salvo was a straddle.” He then received reports that the hemp rope “mantelets”, protecting the vicinity of the first funnel and search lights had caught on fire. Then he heard a report through voice pipes about fire in aft secondary battery turrets. The XO Commander Koro Ono ordered the aft magazines flooded and soon came a report via voice pipe confirming that this measure had been successfully executed. Kobayashi had felt several successive impacts but was not sure they came from shells or torpedoes. New reports came into Kobayashi of rudder failure, fires in the forward main battery turrets and aft secondary battery casemates and then machinery breakdowns. He estimated Kirishima had been hit by 20 major caliber rounds and at least 10 secondary rounds. He also describes how Kirishima keeps shifting from one side to the other and that each time she lists to one side the XO orders the opposite side counter flooded in an attempt to correct off center flooding. At first this seemed to work but later had no effect and Kirishima which was then listing to starboard continued to list so that standing on the bridge became impossible. He also states that in the end Kirishima capsizes to port. Lt.Cdr. Kyûshichi Yoshino, Kirishima’s flooding control officer at his station below decks he could feel the ship shudder below his feet every time when hit. Temperature within the compartment had reached 45 degrees Celsius (113º F) telling us how hot it was below decks even before the ship caught fire. He notes getting reports about several fires forward and aft and notes she soon developed a starboard list. Then he received a report of flooding in the starboard outboard engine room and then an urgent order form Captain Iwabuchi to flood the magazines to turret one. He tried to keep the ship on an even keel but was not sure his efforts did any good. Captain Iwabuchi wanted to beach Kirishima using the destroyers or Nagara’s help to tow his wounded ship. Destroyers did attempt to tow her but she would not move and the Captain of Nagara refused to help tow her. Captain Iwabuchi then attempted to steer Kirishima using just her engines but this failed. He sent divers to the steering compartments, but they were unable to get past the watertight scuttles. The first report of rudder trouble had the rudders jammed at 10 degrees starboard. Fires were brought under control by 0149 however the engine rooms had to be abandoned due to heat and smoke being swept down by her supply ventilation. Though he was trying to save his ship Kirishima was not responding and as she rolled from side to side each time the list was more serious than before. The XO eventually suggested it was time to abandon ship which he agreed and sent word to the destroyers to come along side. The Japanese had a very specific way on how to abandon a ship. First the Emperor’s portrait, followed by the wounded, and then the rest of the crew by division. Iwabuchi and his crew followed this doctrine, 8 Shikikan-tachi no Taiheiyô Sensô [Pacific War as Described by the Senior Officers], Shishi Ruirui (Heaps of Corpses) written by Lt. Cdr. Tsurukichi Ikeda Kirishima Damage Analysis Kirishima_Damage_Analysis.doc 26 June 2009 Page 7 however, as time went on the starboard list grew so bad that standing on the upper deck became impossible. Iwabuchi ordered the port engine room flooded to correct this list. This is when Kirishima, with 300 men still on board, begins to shift suddenly to port and lurches with her bow rising and then capsizes to port, almost crushing Terizuki in the process and throwing the last 300 men into the water. This was totally unexpected and is inconsistent with the report that Iwabuchi scuttled his ship. Ikeda’s sketch of her damage is probably the most important new piece of evidence as to Kirishima ’s damage. The 20 major caliber and 17 secondary caliber hits is far more consistent with what may be expected by the number of major caliber shells and secondary shells fired at their respected ranges. In addition all the hits that struck the ship below the waterline would have been observed by Washington as a miss due to the shell throwing up a splash. Some hits so close together may have been observed as single hits so the 8-9 hits viewed optically becomes a realistic estimate but falls short of actual damage. The documentation and officer testimony brings up some important questions. 1. Based on Ikeda’s sketch and her official blueprints what was actually hit and do these locations correspond to the documentation and testimony? 2. Why would a ship with rudders jammed at 10 degrees to starboard make a 500 degree turn to port? 3. Why would a ship which took most of her damage to starboard keep shifting from the starboard list to port and then back to starboard and keep repeating this trend until she finally capsizes to port? 4. Where the damage control efforts made after the battle the correct actions to take and did they help or hurt in the effort to save her? 5. Was the reason she was lost directly due to the gunfire damage and her design concepts or was she really scuttled? The answers to these questions have only become clearer in the past two decades. In 1992 Dr. Robert Ballard found the wreck of Kirishima and his filming of the wreck provided the final pieces of evidence to confirm what happened to her. First, she was discovered to be upside down and the forward half of the ship appeared to have been destroyed by a massive e