CRITO
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CRITO
by Plato
Translated by Benjamin Jowett
CRITO
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INTRODUCTION.
The Crito seems intended to exhibit the character of Socrates in one
light only, not as the philosopher, fulfilling a divine mission and trusting in
the will of heaven, but simply as the good citizen, who having been
unjustly condemned is willing to give up his life in obedience to the laws
of the state...
The days of Socrates are drawing to a close; the fatal ship has been
seen off Sunium, as he is informed by his aged friend and contemporary
Crito, who visits him before the dawn has broken; he himself has been
warned in a dream that on the third day he must depart. Time is precious,
and Crito has come early in order to gain his consent to a plan of escape.
This can be easily accomplished by his friends, who will incur no danger
in making the attempt to save him, but will be disgraced for ever if they
allow him to perish. He should think of his duty to his children, and not
play into the hands of his enemies. Money is already provided by Crito
as well as by Simmias and others, and he will have no difficulty in finding
friends in Thessaly and other places.
Socrates is afraid that Crito is but pressing upon him the opinions of
the many: whereas, all his life long he has followed the dictates of
reason only and the opinion of the one wise or skilled man. There was a
time when Crito himself had allowed the propriety of this. And although
some one will say 'the many can kill us,' that makes no difference; but a
good life, in other words, a just and honourable life, is alone to be valued.
All considerations of loss of reputation or injury to his children should be
dismissed: the only question is whether he would be right in attempting
to escape. Crito, who is a disinterested person not having the fear of
death before his eyes, shall answer this for him. Before he was
condemned they had often held discussions, in which they agreed that no
man should either do evil, or return evil for evil, or betray the right. Are
these principles to be altered because the circumstances of Socrates are
altered? Crito admits that they remain the same. Then is his escape
consistent with the maintenance of them? To this Crito is unable or
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unwilling to reply.
Socrates proceeds:--Suppose the Laws of Athens to come and
remonstrate with him: they will ask 'Why does he seek to overturn
them?' and if he replies, 'they have injured him,' will not the Laws answer,
'Yes, but was that the agreement? Has he any objection to make to them
which would justify him in overturning them? Was he not brought into
the world and educated by their help, and are they not his parents? He
might have left Athens and gone where he pleased, but he has lived there
for seventy years more constantly than any other citizen.' Thus he has
clearly shown that he acknowledged the agreement, which he cannot now
break without dishonour to himself and danger to his friends. Even in the
course of the trial he might have proposed exile as the penalty, but then he
declared that he preferred death to exile. And whither will he direct his
footsteps? In any well-ordered state the Laws will consider him as an
enemy. Possibly in a land of misrule like Thessaly he may be welcomed
at first, and the unseemly narrative of his escape will be regarded by the
inhabitants as an amusing tale. But if he offends them he will have to
learn another sort of lesson. Will he continue to give lectures in virtue?
That would hardly be decent. And how will his children be the gainers if
he takes them into Thessaly, and deprives them of Athenian citizenship?
Or if he leaves them behind, does he expect that they will be better taken
care of by his friends because he is in Thessaly? Will not true friends
care for them equally whether he is alive or dead?
Finally, they exhort him to think of justice first, and of life and
children afterwards. He may now depart in peace and innocence, a
sufferer and not a doer of evil. But if he breaks agreements, and returns
evil for evil, they will be angry with him while he lives; and their brethren
the Laws of the world below will receive him as an enemy. Such is the
mystic voice which is always murmuring in his ears.
That Socrates was not a good citizen was a charge made against him
during his lifetime, which has been often repeated in later ages. The
crimes of Alcibiades, Critias, and Charmides, who had been his pupils,
were still recent in the memory of the now restored democracy. The fact
that he had been neutral in the death-struggle of Athens was not likely to
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conciliate popular good-will. Plato, writing probably in the next
generation, undertakes the defence of his friend and master in this
particular, not to the Athenians of his day, but to posterity and the world at
large.
Whether such an incident ever really occurred as the visit of Crito and
the proposal of escape is uncertain: Plato could easily have invented far
more than that (Phaedr.); and in the selection of Crito, the aged friend, as
the fittest person to make the proposal to Socrates, we seem to recognize
the hand of the artist. Whether any one who has been subjected by the
laws of his country to an unjust judgment is right in attempting to escape,
is a thesis about which casuists might disagree. Shelley (Prose Works) is
of opinion that Socrates 'did well to die,' but not for the 'sophistical'
reasons which Plato has put into his mouth. And there would be no
difficulty in arguing that Socrates should have lived and preferred to a
glorious death the good which he might still be able to perform. 'A
rhetorician would have had much to say upon that point.' It may be
observed however that Plato never intended to answer the question of
casuistry, but only to exhibit the ideal of patient virtue which refuses to do
the least evil in order to avoid the greatest, and to show his master
maintaining in death the opinions which he had professed in his life. Not
'the world,' but the 'one wise man,' is still the paradox of Socrates in his
last hours. He must be guided by reason, although her conclusions may
be fatal to him. The remarkable sentiment that the wicked can do neither
good nor evil is true, if taken in the sense, which he means, of moral evil;
in his own words, 'they cannot make a man wise or foolish.'
This little dialogue is a perfect piece of dialectic, in which granting the
'common principle,' there is no escaping from the conclusion. It is
anticipated at the beginning by the dream of Socrates and the parody of
Homer. The personification of the Laws, and of their brethren the Laws
in the world below, is one of the noblest and boldest figures of speech
which occur in Plato.
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CRITO
PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, Crito.
SCENE: The Prison of Socrates.
SOCRATES: Why have you come at this hour, Crito? it must be
quite early.
CRITO: Yes, certainly.
SOCRATES: What is the exact time?
CRITO: The dawn is breaking.
SOCRATES: I wonder that the keeper of the prison would let you in.
CRITO: He knows me because I often come, Socrates; moreover. I
have done him a kindness.
SOCRATES: And are you only just arrived?
CRITO: No, I came some time ago.
SOCRATES: Then why did you sit and say nothing, instead of at
once awakening me?
CRITO: I should not have liked myself, Socrates, to be in such great
trouble and unrest as you are--indeed I should not: I have been watching
with amazement your peaceful slumbers; and for that reason I did not
awake you, because I wished to minimize the pain. I have always
thought you to be of a happy disposition; but never did I see anything like
the easy, tranquil manner in which you bear this calamity.
SOCRATES: Why, Crito, when a man has reached my age he ought
not to be repining at the approach of death.
CRITO: And yet other old men find themselves in similar
misfortunes, and age does not prevent them from repining.
SOCRATES: That is true. But you have not told me why you come
at this early hour.
CRITO: I come to bring you a message which is sad and painful; not,
as I believe, to yourself, but to all of us who are your friends, and saddest
of all to me.
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SOCRATES: What? Has the ship come from Delos, on the arrival
of which I am to die?
CRITO: No, the ship has not actually arrived, but she will probably
be here to-day, as persons who have come from Sunium tell me that they
have left her there; and therefore to-morrow, Socrates, will be the last day
of your life.
SOCRATES: Very well, Crito; if such is the will of God, I am
willing; but my belief is that there will be a delay of a day.
CRITO: Why do you think so?
SOCRATES: I will tell you. I am to die on the day after the arrival
of the ship?
CRITO: Yes; that is what the authorities say.
SOCRATES: But I do not think that the ship will be here until to-
morrow; this I infer from a vision which I had last night, or rather only just
now, when you fortunately allowed me to sleep.
CRITO: And what was the nature of the vision?
SOCRATES: There appeared to me the likeness of a woman, fair and
comely, clothed in bright raiment, who called to me and said: O
Socrates,
'The third day hence to fertile Phthia shalt thou go.' (Homer, Il.)
CRITO: What a singular dream, Socrates!
SOCRATES: There can be no doubt about the meaning, Crito, I
think.
CRITO: Yes; the meaning is only too clear. But, oh! my beloved
Socrates, let me entreat you once more to take my advice and escape.
For if you die I shall not only lose a friend who can never be replaced, but
there is another evil: people who do not know you and me will believe
that I might have saved you if I had been willing to give money, but that I
did not care. Now, can there be a worse disgrace than this--that I should
be thought to value money more than the life of a friend? For the many
will not be persuaded that I wanted you to escape, and that you refused.
SOCRATES: But why, my dear Crito, should we care about the
opinion of the many? Good men, and they are the only persons who are
worth considering, will think of these things truly as they occurred.
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CRITO: But you see, Socrates, that the opinion of the many must be
regarded, for what is now happening shows that they can do the greatest
evil to any one who has lost their good opinion.
SOCRATES: I only wish it were so, Crito; and that the many could
do the greatest evil; for then they would also be able to do the greatest
good-- and what a fine thing this would be! But in reality they can do
neither; for they cannot make a man either wise or foolish; and whatever
they do is the result of chance.
CRITO: Well, I will not dispute with you; but please to tell me,
Socrates, whether you are not acting out of regard to me and your other
friends: are you not afraid that if you escape from prison we may get
into trouble with the informers for having stolen you away, and lose either
the whole or a great part of our property; or that even a worse evil may
happen to us? Now, if you fear on our account, be at ease; for in order to
save you, we ought surely to run this, or even a greater risk; be persuaded,
then, and do as I say.
SOCRATES: Yes, Crito, that is one fear which you mention, but by
no means the only one.
CRITO: Fear not--there are persons who are willing to get you out of
prison at no great cost; and as for the informers they are far from being
exorbitant in their demands--a little money will satisfy them. My means,
which are certainly ample, are at your service, and if you have a scruple
about spending all mine, here are strangers who will give you the use of
theirs; and one of them, Simmias the Theban, has brought a large sum of
money for this very purpose; and Cebes and many others are prepared to
spend their money in helping you to escape. I say, therefore, do not
hesitate on our account, and do not say, as you did in the court (compare
Apol.), that you will have a difficulty in knowing what to do with yourself
anywhere else. For men will love you in other places to which you may
go, and not in Athens only; there are friends of mine in Thessaly, if you
like to go to them, who will value and protect you, and no Thessalian will
give you any trouble. Nor can I think that you are at all justified,
Socrates, in betraying your own life when you might be saved; in acting
thus you are playing into the hands of your enemies, who are hurrying on
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your destruction. And further I should say that you are deserting your
own children; for you might bring them up and educate them; instead of
which you go away and leave them, and they will have to take their
chance; and if they do not meet with the usual fate of orphans, there will
be small thanks to you. No man should bring children into the world
who is unwilling to persevere to the end in their nurture and education.
But you appear to be choosing the easier part, not the better and manlier,
which would have been more becoming in one who professes to care for
virtue in all his actions, like yourself. And indeed, I am ashamed not
only of you, but of us who are your friends, when I reflect that the whole
business will be attributed entirely to our want of courage. The trial need
never have come on, or might have been managed differently; and this last
act, or crowning folly, will seem to have occurred through our negligence
and cowardice, who might have saved you, if we had been good for
anything; and you might have saved yourself, for there was no difficulty at
all. See now, Socrates, how sad and discreditable are the consequences,
both to us and you. Make up your mind then, or rather have your mind
already made up, for the time of deliberation is over, and there is only one
thing to be done, which must be done this very night, and if we delay at all
will be no longer practicable or possible; I beseech you therefore, Socrates,
be persuaded by me, and do as I say.
SOCRATES: Dear Crito, your zeal is invaluable, if a right one; but if
wrong, the greater the zeal the greater the danger; and therefore we ought
to consider whether I shall or shall not do as you say. For I am and
always have been one of those natures who must be guided by reason,
whatever the reason may be which upon reflection appears to me to be the
best; and now that this chance has befallen me, I cannot repudiate my own
words: the principles which I have hitherto honoured and revered I still
honour, and unless we can at once find other and better principles, I am
certain not to agree with you; no, not even if the power of the multitude
could inflict many more imprisonments, confiscations, deaths, frightening
us like children with hobgoblin terrors (compare Apol.). What will be
the fairest way of considering the question? Shall I return to your old
argument about the opinions of men?--we were saying that some of them
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are to be regarded, and others not. Now were we right in maintaining
this before I was condemned? And has the argument which was once
good now proved to be talk for the sake of talking--mere childish nonsense?
That is what I want to consider with your help, Crito:--whether, under my
present circumstances, the argument appears to be in any way different or
not; and is to be allowed by me or disallowed. That argument, which, as
I believe, is maintained by many persons of authority, was to the effect, as
I was saying, that the opinions of some men are to be regarded, and of
other men not to be regarded. Now you, Crito, are not going to die to-
morrow--at least, there is no human probability of this, and therefore you
are disinterested and not liable to be deceived by the circumstances in
which you are placed. Tell me then, whether I am right in saying that
some opinions, and the opinions of some men only, are to be valued, and
that other opinions, and the opinions of other men, are not to be valued. I
ask you whether I was right in maintaining this?
CRITO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: The good are to be regarded, and not the bad?
CRITO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And the opinions of the wise are good, and the
opinions of the unwise are evil?
CRITO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And what was said about another matter? Is the pupil
who devotes himself to the practice of gymnastics supposed to attend to
the praise and blame and opinion of every man, or of one man only--his
physician or trainer, whoever he may be?
CRITO: Of one man only.
SOCRATES: And he ought to fear the censure and welcome the
praise of that one only, and not of the many?
CRITO: Clearly so.
SOCRATES: And he ought to act and train, and eat and drink in the
way which seems good to his single master who has understanding, rather
than according to the opinion of all other men put together?
CRITO: True.
SOCRATES: And if he disobeys and disregards the opinion and
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approval of the one, and regards the opinion of the many who have no
understanding, will he not suffer evil?
CRITO: Certainly he will.
SOCRATES: And what will the evil be, whither tending and what
affecting, in the disobedient person?
CRITO: Clearly, affecting the body; that is what is destroyed by the
evil.
SOCRATES: Very good; and is not this true, Crito, of other things
which we need not separately enumerate? In questions of just and unjust,
fair and foul, good and evil, which are the subjects of our present
consultation, ought we to follow the opinion of the many and to fear them;
or the opinion of the one man who has understanding? ought we not to
fear and reverence him more than all the rest of the world: and if we
desert him shall we not destroy and injure that principle in us which may
be assumed to be improved by justice and deteriorated by injustice;--there
is such a principle?
CRITO: Certainly there is, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Take a parallel instance:--if, acting under the advice of
those who have no understanding, we destroy that which is improved by
health and is deteriorated by disease, would life be worth having? And
that which has been destroyed is--the body?
CRITO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Could we live, having an evil and corrupted body?
CRITO: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: And will life be worth having, if that higher part of
man be destroyed, which is improved by justice and depraved by injustice?
Do we suppose that principle, whatever it may be in man, which has to do
with justice and injustice, to be inferior to the body?
CRITO: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: More honourable than the body?
CRITO: Far more.
SOCRATES: Then, my friend, we must not regard what the many
say of us: but what he, the one man who has understanding of just and
unjust, will say, and what the truth will say. And therefore you begin in
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error when you advise that we should regard the opinion of the many
about just and unjust, good and evil, honorable and dishonorable.--'Well,'
some one will say, 'but the many can kill us.'
CRITO: Yes, Socrates; that will clearly be the answer.
SOCRATES: And it is true; but still I find with surprise that the old
argument is unshaken as ever. And I should like to know whether I may
say the same of another proposition--that not life, but a good life, is to be
chiefly valued?
CRITO: Yes, that also remains unshaken.
SOCRATES: And a good life is equivalent to a just and honorable
one--that holds also?
CRITO: Yes, it does.
SOCRATES: From these premisses I proceed to argue the question
whether I ought or ought not to try and escape without the consent of the
Athenians: and if I am clearly right in escaping, then I will make the
attempt; but if not, I will abstain. The other considerations which you
mention, of money and loss of character and the duty of educating one's
children, are, I fear, only the doctrines of the multitude, who would be as
ready to restore people to life, if they were able, as they are to put them to
death--and with as little reason. But now, sinc
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