Towards a Philosophy of Argument

Title: Title: Towards a Philosophy of Argument Author: J. Anthony Blair Commentary: T. Govier 2003 J. Anthony Blair http://web2.uwindsor.ca/faculty/arts/philosophy/ILat25/edited_Blair_paper.doc This paper is an essay in the philosophy of argument. It recommends a way of conceptualizing argument and argumentation. The goal is to construct a framework in terms of which various particular theories of argument can be seen to have their place, and the various controversies in the field of argument studies can be located. I argue that the recommended conceptualizations have the implication that some of the controversies have been misplaced, and either disappear or need to be thought of differently. 1. Preliminaries Each of the terms ‘argument’ and ‘argumentation’ is defined in textbooks and the argumentation literature in a variety of ways. Most definitions focus on some particular aspect, element or perspective of a complex of concepts and activities. If philosophy consists, at least partly, of the activity of sorting out or classifying, defining, framing, and thereby clarifying the world for our understanding and action, as I think it does, then the philosophy of argument is in part the task of clarifying this complex. Any account will tend to abstract from the concrete, disorderly reality of the phenomena, and thus select and simplify. Still, the goal is to understand what argument is and how it works. Jacobs observed that the activity of argumentation (perhaps we should say the many activities of argumentation) requires or presupposes at its heart or base the deployment of reasons taken to support claims. As he put it, “Arguments are fundamentally . . . entities that express with a special pragmatic force propositions where those propositions stand in particular inferential relations to one another” (2000, p. 264). Jacobs is referring to what I once called the “illative core” of argumentation—the “this, therefore that” which is a sine qua non of argument and argumentation. Even the broadest definitions of argument, such as those of Willard (1989 ) and Gilbert (1997 ), presupposes some element of reason-using. Otherwise what one has is simply a difference, as when you say “tomayto” and I say “tomahto,” which is not a disagreement. Disagreements are over what is right or correct. If I say that your “tomayto” is the wrong pronunciation, then we have a disagreement and the possibility of argument. It is expected that there be reasons why one view is correct and its contraries incorrect. Whatever else is going on, without an illative core there is no argument and no argumentation. However, I also called the illative core the smallest unit of argumentation, and in doing so I was conflating two distinct points. One is the point that Jacobs was making and that I have just underscored: illation is a necessary condition of argument or argumentation—hence the metaphor of the “core.” However, what is the smallest unit of illation is another matter. Argumentation often includes any number of units of illation, chained together or running along independent lines, and there is nothing at the “centre” of all of them, even though all might lead in the same direction. So the metaphor of a “core” is misleading. When speaking of the smallest unit of illation, I think it better to use the metaphor of the cell or the atom. So I now want to suggest that the smallest unit of argument consists of a reason to take (that is, maintain, adopt or change) an attitude towards a proposition, or towards an event or state of affairs or property, or towards an action or policy, and so on (in a broad sense of ‘attitude’). I will call this an “atomic argument.” An atomic argument is something that, taken by itself, does, or is taken to, or is offered to, imply or support a proposition, an attitude or an action. An argument supports a proposition, attitude or action if accepting the argument makes it more reasonable than otherwise to accept the proposition, adopt the attitude or do the action. It is necessary to include the qualification, “taken by itself,” because there can at the same time exist both an argument in favour of an attitude or action and also an argument against an attitude or action, so that the net effect of the two arguments is a stalemate. Still, either one, taken by itself, will have made the attitude or action more reasonable than otherwise. Also, there can be two or more arguments in favour of an attitude or action, such that any one of them makes it completely reasonable and so adding a second one could not possibly make the attitude or action more reasonable. Still, absent all the others, any one of them, taken by itself, will make the attitude or action more reasonable than otherwise. It is necessary to add the qualification “than otherwise,” because something can be an argument for an attitude or action without making it completely reasonable to adopt the attitude or perform the action. By ‘attitude’ I mean to include epistemic attitudes such as degrees of belief, but also non-epistemic attitudes such as degrees of liking or favouring, degrees of supporting, degrees of commitment, degrees of commendation, and the like. By an attitude towards an event or a state of affairs or a property I mean such things as approving or disapproving of it to some degree, wanting it to occur or not to occur, liking or disliking it, and valuing or disvaluing it. By an attitude towards an action or policy I mean such things as approving or disapproving it, prescribing or endorsing it or the opposite, and choosing it or rejecting it. So when I speak of “adopting” an attitude, I mean to include not only such things as moving from unbelief to belief or conversely, or changing one’s degree of conviction, but also such things as coming to approve or disapprove, or changing one’s degree of approval or disapproval, and so on. By ‘action’ I mean not just act-tokens but also policies or rules, and the like. So when I speak of “doing” or “performing” an action I mean to include as well making a decision, approving or implementing a plan, policy or regulation, and so on. The extent to which there are or can be reasons for such things is a matter of philosophical debate. My point is that if there can be such reasons, the smallest unit of such reason is an atomic argument. This is not the place to settle the larger philosophical questions that are pertinent here. So the concept of argument should not be specified in a way that begs any of these questions. It should not close off, just by the definition of argument, the possibility of arguing for one or another of these things. By a reason I do not mean a premise as the latter term is usually understood. Usually a premise is taken to consist of a single proposition. A reason may consist of several propositions, that is, of a conjunction of propositions, or of other vehicles for conveying reasons, if others there be. A reason can be a proposition or group of propositions that stands in the relation to some other proposition. But there can be reasons for decisions or actions, and decisions or actions are not propositions. So reasons mustn’t be conceived in such a way that there cannot be reasons for actions, since clearly there can be. Can there be non-propositional reasons? It seems that sensory experiences can serve as reasons, or partial reasons, for beliefs. One’s gestalt impression of a person can serve as a partial reason to take an attitude towards that person, perhaps of trust or of distrust, of sympathy or hostility. Also, an emotion, such as fear, can serve as a partial reason for an action, such as flight; love can serve as a partial reason for an action, such as marriage; and so on. So rather than presuppose that only propositions can serve as reasons, I will speak more generally of “considerations.” A reason is constituted by whatever considerations prima facie justify a modification in either the direction or the intensity (or both) of the attitude or action. Two or more considerations belong to the same reason just when, although singly they do not constitute reasons, their conjunction constitutes a reason. Any two offered reasons constitute two distinct atomic arguments just when, if either turns out not to count as a reason, the other, without inconsistency, could count as a reason. A group of considerations may be taken to be or may be presented as an atomic argument although they do not constitute an argument at all. In that case, they are irrelevant, although the person offering them might have erroneously thought that they were relevant, or might have thought that the audience to which he addressed them would erroneously think that they were relevant. Whether what is offered as an argument is an argument can be a subject of controversy. So we say such things as, “Her argument was irrelevant,” when what we mean more precisely is, “What she took to be (or offered as) an argument was not an argument because what she took (or offered) as reasons for the claim in question were irrelevant.” We identify as arguments considerations that make attitudes or actions more reasonable than otherwise whether or not they are recognized as such. So there can be arguments that not everyone understands, and there can be arguments that have only just been discovered or invented, yet once identified can make a past attitude or action correct, or mistaken. However, as just noted, we also identify as arguments things that are taken to make an attitude or action more reasonable even though they do not, and things that are offered as making an attitude or action more reasonable although they do not. Otherwise we could not speak of people adopting logically bad arguments or deliberately using logically bad arguments. A logically bad argument is an argument either unintentionally or deliberately taken to make, or offered as making, an attitude or action more reasonable when it does not do so. Atomic arguments are prima facie reasons when an atomic argument in one direction is consistent with an atomic argument in a different direction. For example, there can be an atomic argument in favour of adopting a point of view when there is also an atomic argument in favour of rejecting it, or an atomic argument that a point of view should be firmly adopted when there is also an atomic argument that a point of view should be only tentatively adopted. We might, following Pinto (2001) (and Beardsley, 1976, 5), think of offering an atomic argument as inviting another or others to take something to be an atomic argument, that is, to take its considerations as reasons to take an attitude or action—in other words, to infer the attitude or action in question from the considerations it adduces. A group of considerations constituting an atomic argument can belong anywhere on a continuum from weak argument to strong. Atomic arguments can be weak or strong in either of two dimensions. First, assuming that there is no question or doubt about the truth or acceptability of the considerations adduced, they may present justifications that have varying degrees of force. Second, there can be varying degrees of confidence in the truth or acceptability of those considerations, whatever their justificatory force would be if they were true or acceptable. The strength of atomic arguments in either dimension can be a subject of controversy. Atomic arguments are used for any of a number of purposes (to be discussed), and in the process they are regularly used in groups and in combinations. The logical merits of groups or combinations of atomic arguments are partly a function of their individual logical merits, but also a function of the comparative logical merits of different groups or combinations. An atomic argument supporting taking a particular attitude or action can itself be supported by one or more further atomic arguments, and these can in turn be similarly supported, and so on, indefinitely. I call such a chain of atomic arguments a line of argument for the ultimate attitude or action. An attitude or action can be supported by more than one line of argument supporting it, in light of more than one line of argument against contrary attitudes or actions, together with a “balance of considerations” argument that weighs the relative strengths of all the pro and con lines of argument. Such a complex of atomic arguments supporting an “all-things-considered” attitude I call a case for that attitude. Atomic arguments can be discovered, assembled, invented, or borrowed. 2. Uses of arguments The term ‘argumentation’ is used so variously and loosely in the literature that any definition will be a stipulation. However, some recent accounts run along similar lines. Van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Snoeck Henkemans (1996, 5) characterize argumentation as “a verbal and social activity aimed at increasing (or decreasing) the acceptability of a controversial standpoint for the listener or reader, by putting forward a constellation of propositions intended to justify (or refute) the standpoint before a rational judge.” Goldman (1999, 131) calls argumentation the activity of presenting arguments to an audience, whereby someone asserts and defends a conclusion by appeal to the premises. Johnson (2000, 12) calls (the practice of) argumentation the socio-cultural activity of constructing, presenting, interpreting, criticizing and revising arguments. All of these accounts take argumentation to be the use of arguments. The first two tie argumentation to particular uses of arguments; the third does not specify any particular purpose for the activity. I will follow these accounts and use ‘argumentation’ to denote any activity involving the use of atomic arguments, lines of argument or argument cases, and to denote such arguments when they are being or have been so used. So we can speak of analyzing someone’s argumentation, when what we mean is that we shall identify the nexus of atomic arguments that she used for a particular purpose. And the atomic arguments traded in an argumentative discussion will constitute its argumentation. It seems to me that arguments can be put to any number of intrinsic uses. They certainly can be used try to convey knowledge and its grounds (the use Goldman has in mind) or to try to alter someone’s opinion (the use that van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Snoeck Henkemans, and that Johnson, have in mind). They can also be used to try to demonstrate knowledge (for instance, when students are expected to produce or reproduce arguments in examination answers). They can be used to try persuade an audience to take an action or adopt a policy. They can be used to explore the pros and cons of a position with a view to deciding what attitude to take or action to perform. They can be used as a means of resolving conflicts. I call these intrinsic uses because in these uses arguments are integral to realizing the objective. The point is not that one cannot (try to) achieve these ends in other ways; it is that (usually) what is wanted is that these ends be achieved by means of arguments. Such uses of arguments can at the same time have other objectives. For instance, one might want to persuade someone to change her mind about something and at the same time maintain her friendship or respect, or at the same ensure that she will be amenable to future persuasion, or at the same time impress her with one’s cleverness or erudition. These might be called associated or incidental uses of argument, since these are objectives that might as well be sought and achieved in other ways than by using arguments, but can be aimed at along with an intrinsic use of arguments. To be distinguished from both intrinsic and associated uses of arguments are uses of arguments to achieve some end for which arguments are not particularly designed. Think of using a tool, such as a screwdriver. A screwdriver’s intrinsic use is to drive screws into some substance. One might use a screwdriver at the same time to impress someone with one’s dexterity or to demonstrative that one’s arthritis is not debilitating. These are associated or incidental uses. But one might also use a screwdriver for some purpose for which it was not designed—as a pry, a wedge or a chisel, for example: what might be called extrinsic uses. Arguments can be put to extrinsic uses. For example, arguments might be used to filibuster, or to intimidate someone, or to distract someone, to bore someone so they depart, to insult someone, and so on. In communicating arguments to others, a person can be addressing one particular person, or a particular group of people, small or large, or anyone who might listen to or read the arguments. Typically, atomic arguments are presented to another person or persons with a view to modifying their attitude or inducing action, but they can also be presented to one audience with a view to changing the attitude or decision of some third party. 3. Norms relative to uses Given the various types of intrinsic purpose for which arguments can be and are used, it is to be expected that (at least slightly) different norms will be appropriate for each such use. Consider a number of instances. If atomic arguments, singly or in groups, are used to convey knowledge, it is to be expected that the considerations serving as reasons will themselves be known or reasonable to believe, and that the arguments used will indeed strongly support the knowledge-claims they are used to support. Thus the reasons offered will be expected either to entail or to provide strong inductive support for the claims based on them. Also, one would expect appeals to testimony or authority to meet norms designed to maximize the chances that accurate information will be conveyed. And so on. Goldman (1999, 134) develops a set of such rules, among which are the following: (1)​ the speaker believes the asserted conclusion; (2) the speaker believes each of the asserted premises; (3) the speaker is justified in believing each of the asserted premises; (4) the asserted premises jointly provide strong support for the conclusion. If atomic arguments are used in dialogues aimed at rationally resolving a difference of opinion, it is to be expected that arguments will appeal to common ground (mutually acceptable reasons) that support by mutually acceptable reasoning an attitude both parties will endorse. There will be norms governing the interchange of arguments aimed at maximizing the chance of an agreement. See rules of the sort van Eemeren and Grootendorst develop (e.g., 1996, 283-284), among which are the following: (1) Parties must not prevent each other from advancing standpoints or form casting doubts on standpoints. (2) A party that advances a standpoint is obliged to defend it if asked by the other party to do so. (3) A party’s attack on a standpoint must relate to the standpoint that has indeed been advanced by the other party. (4) A party may defend a standpoint only by advancing argumentation [my atomic arguments] relating to that standpoint. If atomic arguments are used in monologues by one person rationally to persuade others, then it will be expected that the arguments will satisfy norms of reasonableness, and that the arguer will use arguments to try to remove any questions or doubts that the audience can be expected to harbour. See the norms that Johnson develops (2000, Ch. 7): the acceptability, truth, relevance and sufficiency requirements, and rules of good process. If atomic arguments are used by a person to decide for herself or himself what to believe or do in connection with a particular issue, the arguments should include those offered by proponents of the various alternatives, as well as any the person can generate based on her or his own experience. Any considerations the person finds problematic (that is, questionable, improbable or implausible, given her or his background knowledge) would themselves have to be tested in