孙子兵法英文版

孙子兵法英文版 SUN ZI THE ART OF WAR CHAPTER 1 LAYING PLANS計篇 Sun Zi (Sun Tzu) said: War is a matter of vital importance to the state; a matter of life and death, the road either to survival or to ruin. Hence, it is imperative that it be thoroughly studied. Therefore, to make assessment of the outcome of a war, one must compare the various conditions of the antagonistic sides in terms of the five constant factors: the first is moral influence; the second, weather; the third, terrain; the fourth, commander; and the fifth, doctrine. Moral influence means the thing which causes the people to be in complete accord with their sovereign, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives and without the slightest disloyalty. Weather signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons. Terrain comprises grounds, high and low; distances, great and small; places, dangerous and secure; lands, open and constricted; and the chances of life and death. The commander stands for the general?s qualities of wisdom, sincerity, benevolence, courage, and strictness. Doctrine refers to the principles guiding the organization of the army, the assignment of appropriate ranks to officers, and the control of military expenditure. These five constant factors should be familiar to every general. He who masters them wins, he who does not is defeated. Therefore, to forecast the outcome of a war, the attributes of the antagonistic sides should be analysed by making the following seven comparisons: 1. Which sovereign possesses greater moral influence? 2. Which commander is more capable? 3. Which side holds more favourable conditions in weather and terrain? 4. On which side are decrees better implemented? 5. Which side is superior in arms? 6. On which side are officers and men better trained? 7. Which side is stricter and more impartial in meting out rewards and punishments? By means of these seven elements, I can forecast victory or defeat. If the sovereign heeds these stratagems of mine and acts upon them, he will surely win the war, and I shall, therefore, stay with him. If the sovereign neither heeds nor - 1 - SUN ZI THE ART OF WAR acts upon them, he will certainly suffer defeat, and I shall leave. Having paid attention to the advantage of my stratagems, the commander must create a helpful situation over and beyond the ordinary rules. By „situation? I mean he should act expediently in accordance with what is advantageous in field and so meet any exigency. All warfare is based on deception. Therefore, when able to attack, we must pretend to be unable; when employing our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near. Offer a bait of allure the enemy, when he covets small advantages; strike the enemy when he is in disorder. If he is well prepared with substantial strength, take double precautions against him. If he is powerful in action, evade him. If he is angry, seek to discourage him. If he appears humble, make him arrogant. If his forces have taken a good rest, wear them down. If his forces are united, divide them. Launch attack where he is unprepared; take action when it is unexpected. These are the keys to victory for a strategist. However, it is impossible to formulate them in detail beforehand. Now, the commander who gets many scores during the calculations in the temple before the war will have more likelihood of winning. The commander who gets few scores during the calculations in the temple before the war will have less chance of success. With many scores, one can win; with few scores, one cannot. How much less chance of victory has one who gets no scores at all! By examining the situation through these aspects, I can foresee who is likely to win or lose. - 2 - SUN ZI THE ART OF WAR CHAPTER 2 WAGING WAR 作戰篇 Sun Zi said: Generally, operations of war involve one thousand swift chariots, one thousand heavy chariots and one hundred thousand mailed troops with the transportation of provisions for them over a thousand miles. Thus the expenditure at home and in the field, the stipends for the entertainment of state guests and diplomatic envoys, the cost of materials such as glue and lacquer and the expense for care and maintenance of chariots and armour, will amount to one thousand dollars a day. An army of one hundred thousand men can be raised only when this money is in hand. In directing such an enormous army, a speedy victory is the main object. If the war is long delayed, the men?s weapons will be blunted and their ardour will be dampened. If the army attacks cities, their strength will be exhausted. Again, if the army engages in protracted campaigns, the resources of the state will not suffice. Now, when your weapons are blunted, your ardour dampened, your strength exhausted and your treasure spent, neighbouring rulers will take advantage of your distress to act. In this case, no man, however wise, is able to avert the disastrous consequences that ensue. Thus, while we have heard of stupid haste in war, we have not yet seen a clever operation that was prolonged. There has never been a case in which a prolonged war has benefited a country. Therefore, only those who understand the dangers inherent in employing troops know how to conduct war in the most profitable way. Those adept in employing troops do not require a second levy of conscripts or more than two provisionings. They carry military supplies from the homeland and make up for their provisions relying on the enemy. Thus the army will be always plentifully provided. When a country is impoverished by military operations, it is because an army far from its homeland needs a distant transportation. Being forced to carry supplies for great distances renders the people destitute. On the other hand, the local price of commodities normally rises high in the area near the military camps. The rising prices cause financial resources to be drained away. When the resources are exhausted, the peasantry will be afflicted with urgent exactions. With this depletion of strength and exhaustion of wealth, every household in the homeland is left empty. Seven-tenths of the people?s income is dissipated and six-tenths of the government?s revenue is paid for broken-down chariots, wornout horses, armour and helmets, arrows and crossbows, halberds and bucklers, spears and body shields, draught oxen and heavy wagons. Hence a wise general is sure of getting provisions from the enemy countries. One - 3 - SUN ZI THE ART OF WAR jar of grains obtained from local area is equal to twenty jars shipped from the home country; one kilogram of fodder in the conquered area is equal to twenty kilogram from the domestic store. Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger; to gain enemy?s property, our men must be rewarded with war trophies. Accordingly, in chariot battle, when more than ten chariots have been captured, those who took the enemy chariot first should be rewarded. Then, the enemy?s flags and banners should be replaced with ours; the captured chariots mixed with ours and mounted by our men. The prisoners of war should be kindly treated and kept. This is called „becoming stronger in the course of defeating the enemy?. Hence, what is valued in war is a quick victory, not prolonged operations. And therefore, the general who understands war is the controller of his people?s fate and the guarantor of the security of the nation. - 4 - SUN ZI THE ART OF WAR CHAPTER 3 ATTACK BY STRATAGEM 謀攻篇 Sun Zi said: Generally in war the best thing of all is to take the enemy? s state whole and intact, to ruin it is inferior to this. To capture the enemy?s army entire is better than to destroy it; to take intact a battalion, a company or a five-men squad is better than to destroy them. Hence to win on hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the supreme excellence. Thus, the best policy in war is to attack the enemy?s strategy. The second best way is to disrupt his alliances through diplomatic means. The next best method is to attack his army in the field. The worst policy is to attack walled cities. Attacking cities is the last resort when there is no alternative. It takes at least three months to make mantlets and shielded vehicles ready and prepare necessary arms and equipments. It takes at least another three months to pile up earthen mounds over against the walls. The general unable to control his impatience will order his troops to swarm up the wall like ants with the result that one third of them are slain, while the cities remain untaken. Such is the calamity of attacking walled cities. Therefore, those skilled in war subdue the enemy?s army without fighting. They capture the enemy?s cities without assaulting them and overthrow his state without protracted operations. Their aim must be to take all under heaven intact through strategic superiority. Thus, their troops are not worn out and their triumph will be complete. This is the art of attacking by stratagem. Consequently, the art of using troops is this: When ten to the enemy?s one, surround him. When five times his strength, attack him. If double his strength, engage him. If equally matched, be capable of dividing him. If less in number, be capable of defending yourself. And if in all respects unfavourable, be capable of eluding him. Hence, a weak force will eventually fall captive to a strong one if it is simply holds ground and conducts a desperate defence. Now, the general is the bulwark of the state: if the bulwark is complete at all points, the state will surely be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the state will certainly be weak. Now, there are three ways in which a sovereign can bring misfortune upon his army: 1. By ordering an advance while ignorant of the fact that the army cannot go - 5 - SUN ZI THE ART OF WAR forward, or by ordering a retreat while ignorant of the fact that the army can not hobbling the army”. fall back. This is described as “ 2. By interfering with the army?s administration without knowledge of the internal affairs of the army. This causes officers and soldiers to be perplexed. 3. By interfering with direction of fighting, while ignorant of the military principle of adaptation to circumstances. This sows doubts and misgivings in the minds of his officers and soldiers. If the army is confused and suspicious, neighbouring rulers will take advantage of this and cause trouble. This is simply bringing anarchy into the army and flinging victory away. Thus, there are five points in which victory may be predicted: 1. He who knows when to fight and when not to fight will win. 2. He who understands how to handle both superior and inferior forces will win. 3. He whose ranks are united in purpose will win. 4. He who is well prepared and lies in wait for an enemy who is not well prepared will win. 5. He whose generals are able and not interfered with by the sovereign will win. It is in these five points that the way to victory is known. Therefore, I say: Know the enemy and know yourself, and you can fight a hundred battles with no danger of defeat. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning and losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and of yourself, you are sure to be defeated in every battle. - 6 - SUN ZI THE ART OF WAR CHAPTER 4 DISPOSITION OF MILITARY STRENG形篇 Sun Zi said: The skillful warriors in ancient times first made themselves invincible and then awaited the enemy?s moment of vulnerability. Invincibility depends on oneself, but the enemy?s vulnerability on himself. It follows that those skilled in war can make themselves invincible but cannot cause an enemy to be certainly vulnerable. Therefore, it can be said that, one may know how to achieve victory, but cannot necessarily do so. Invincibility lies in the defence; the possibility of victory in the attack. Defend yourself when the enemy?s strength is abundant; and attack the enemy when it is inadequate. Those who are skilled in defence hide themselves as under the most secret recesses of earth; those skilled in attack flash forth as from above the topmost heights of heaven. Thus, they are capable both of protecting themselves and of gaining a complete victory. To foresee a victory no better than ordinary people?s foresight is not the acme of excellence. Neither is it the acme of excellence if you win a victory through fierce fighting and the whole empire says, „well done!? Hence, by analogy, to lift a hair does not signify great strength; to see the sun and moon does not signify good sight; to hear the thunderclap does not signify acute hearing. In ancient times, those called skilled in war conquered an enemy easily conquered. Consequently, a master of war wins victories without showing his brilliant military success, and without gaining the reputation for wisdom or the merit for valour. He wins his victories without making mistake. Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it means that he conquers an enemy already defeated. Accordingly, a wise commander always ensure that his forces are put in an invincible position, and at the same time will be sure to miss no opportunity to defeat the enemy. It follows that a triumphant army will not fight with the enemy until the victory is assured, while an army destined to defeat will always fight with his opponent first, - 7 - SUN ZI THE ART OF WAR in the hope that it may win by sheer good luck. The commander adept in war enhances the moral influence and adheres to the laws and regulations. Thus it is in his power to control success. Now, the elements of the art of war are first, the measurement of space; second, the estimation of quantities; third, the calculation of figures; fourth, comparisons of strength and fifth, chances of victory. Measurements of space are derived from the ground. Quantities derive from measurement, figures from quantities, comparisons form figures and victory from comparisons. Therefore, a victorious army is as one dollar balanced against a cent, and a defeated army is as a cent balanced against one dollar. An army superior in strength takes action like the bursting of pent-up waters into a chasm of a thousand fathoms deep. This is what the disposition of military strength means in the actions of war. - 8 - SUN ZI THE ART OF WAR CHAPTER 5 USE OF ENERGY 勢篇 Sun Zi said: Generally, management of a large force is the same in principle as the management of a few men: it is a matter of organization. And to direct a large army to fight is the same to direct a small one: it is a matter of command signs and signals. That the whole army can sustain the enemy?s all-out attack without suffering defeat is due to operations of extraordinary and normal forces. Troops thrown against the enemy as a grindstone against eggs is an example of the strong beating the weak. Generally, in battle, use the normal force to engage and use the extraordinary to win. Now, to a commander adept at the use of extraordinary forces, his resources are as infinite as the heaven and earth, as inexhaustible as the flow of the running rivers. They end and begin again like the motions of the sun and moon. They die away and then are reborn like the changing of the four season. There are not more than five musical notes, but the various combinations of the five notes bring about more melodies than can ever be heard. There are not more than five basic pigments, yet in blending them together it is possible to produce more colors than can ever be seen. There are not more than five cardinal tastes, but the mixture of the five yields more flavours than can ever be tasted. In battle, there are not more than two kinds of postures-operation of the extraordinary force and operation of the normal force, but their combinations give rise to an endless series of manoeuvres. For these two forces are mutually reproductive. It is like moving in circle, never coming to an end. Who can exhaust the possibilities of their combinations? When torrential water tosses boulders, it is because of its momenturn; when the strike of a hawk breaks the body of its prey, it is because of timing. Thus, in battle, a good commander creates a posture releasing an irresistible and overwhelming momenturn, and his attack is precisely timed in a quick tempo. The energy is similar to a fully drawn crossbow; the timing, the release of the trigger. Amid turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be seeming disorder and yet no real disorder in one?s own troops. In the midst of confusion and chaos, your troops appear to be milling about in circles, yet it is proof against defeat. - 9 - SUN ZI THE ART OF WAR Apparent disorder is born of order; apparent cowardice, of courage; apparent weakness, of strength. Order or disorder depends on organization and direction; courage or cowardice on postures; strength of weakness on dispositions. Thus, one who is adept at keeping the enemy on the move maintains deceitful appearances, according to which the enemy will act. He lures with something that the enemy is certain to take. By so doing he keeps the enemy on the move and then wait for the right moment to make a sudden ambush with picked troops. Therefore, a skilled commander sets great store by using the situation to the best advantage, and does not make excessive demand on him subordinates. Hence he is able to select right men and exploits the situation. He who takes advantage of the situation uses his men in fighting as rolling logs or rocks. It is the nature of logs and rocks to stay stationary on the flat ground, and to roll forward on a slope. If four-cornered, they stop; if round-shaped, they roll. - 10 - SUN ZI THE ART OF WAR CHAPTER 6 WEAKNESSES AND STRENGTHS虛實篇 Sun Zi said: Generally, he who occupies the field of battle first and awaits his enemy is at ease; he who arrives later and joins battle in haste is weary. And, therefore, one skilled in war brings the enemy to the field of battle and is not brought there by him. One able to make the enemy come of his own accord does so by offering him some advantage. And one able to stop him from coming does so by inflicting damage on him. Thus, when the enemy is at ease, he is able to tire him; when well fed, to starve him; when at rest, to make him move. All these can be done because you appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend. That you may march a thousand miles without tiring yourself is because you travel where there is no enemy. That you are certain to take what you attack is because you attack a place the enemy does not or cannot protect. That you are certain of success in holding what you defend is because you defend a place the enemy must hasten to attack. Therefore, against those skillful in attack, the enemy does not know where to defend, and against the experts in defence, the enemy does not know where to attack. How subtle and insubstantial, that the expert leaves no trace. How divinely mysterious, that he is inaudible. Thus, he is master of his enemy?s fate. His offensive will be irresistible if he plunges into the enemy?s weak points; he cannot be overtake when he withdraws if he moves swiftly. Hence, if we wish to fight, the enemy will be compelled to an engagement even though he is safe behind high ramparts and deep ditches. This is because we attack a position he must relieve. If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent him form engaging us even though the lines of our encampment be merely traced out on the ground. This is because we divert him from going where he wishes. Accordingly, by exposing the enemy?s dispositions and remaining invisible ourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated, while the enemy?s must be divided. We can form a single united body at one place, while the enemy must scatter his forces at ten places. Thus, it is ten to one when we attack him at one place, which means we are numerically superior. - 11 - SUN ZI THE ART OF WAR And if we are able to use many to strike few at the selected place, those we deal with will be in dire straits. The spot where we intend to fight must not be made known. In this way, the enemy must take precautions at many places against the attack. The more places he must guard, the fewer his troops we shall have to face at any given point. For if he prepares to the front his rear will be weak; and if to the rear, his front will be fragile. If he strengthens his left, his right will be vulnerable; and if his right gets strengthened, there will be few troops on his left. If he sends reinforcements everywhere, he will be weak everywhere. Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible attacks; numerical strength from compelling the enemy to make these preparations against us. Therefore, if one knows the place and time of the coming battle, his troops can march a thousand miles and fight on the field. But if one knows neither the spot nor the time, then one cannot manage to have the left wing help the right wing or the right wing help the left; the forces in the front will be unable to support the rear, and the rear will be unable to reinforce the front. How much more so if the furthest portions of the troop deployments extend tens of miles in breadth, and even the nearest troops are separated by several miles! Although I estimate the troops of Yue(an ancient country) as many, of what benefit is this superiority in terms of victory? Thus, I say that victory can be achieved. For even if the enemy is numerically stronger, we can prevent him from fighting. Therefore, analyze the enemy?s battle plan, so as to have a clear understanding of its strong and weak points. Agitate the enemy, so as to ascertain his pattern of movement. Lure him in the open so as to find out his vulnerable spots in disposition. Probe him and learn where his strength is abundant and where deficient. Now, the ultimate in disposing one?s troops is to coneal them without ascertainable shape. In this way, the most penetrating spies cannot pry nor can the wise lay plans against you. Even though we show people the victory gained by using flexible tactics in conformity to the changing situations, they do not comprehend this. People all know the tactics by which we achieved victory, but they do not know how the tactics were applied in the situation to defeat the enemy. Hence no one victory is gained in the same as another. The tactics change in an - 12 - SUN ZI THE ART OF WAR infinite variety of ways to suit changes in the circumstances. Now, the laws of military operations are like water. The tendency of water is to flow form heights to lowlands. The law of successful operations is to avoid the enemy?s strength and strike his weakness. Water changes its course in accordance with the contours of the land. The soldier works out his victory in accordance with the situation of the enemy. Hence, there are neither fixed postures nor constant tactics in warfare. He who can modify his tactics in accordance with the enemy situation and thereby succeeds in winning may be said to be divine. Of the five elements(metal, wood, water, fire and earth) none is ever predominant; of the four seasons, none lasts forever; of the days, some are longer and others shorter, and of the moon, it sometimes waxes and sometimes wanes. - 13 - SUN ZI THE ART OF WAR CHAPTER 7 MANOEUVRING 軍爭篇 Sun Zi said: Normally, in war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign. During the process for assembling the troops and mobilizing the people to deploying the army ready for battle, nothing is more difficult that the art of manoeuvring for seizing favourable positions beforehand. What is difficult about it is to make the devious route the most direct and to turn disadvantage to advantage. Thus, forcing the enemy to deviate and slow down his march by luring him with a bait, you may set out after he does and arrive at the battlefield before him. One able to do this shows the knowledge of artifice of deviation. Thus, both advantage and danger are inherent in maneuvering for an advantageous position. One who sets the entire army in motion with impedimenta to pursue an advantageous position will be too slow to attain it. If he abandons the camp and all the impedimenta to contend for advantage, the baggage and stores will be lost. It follows that when the army rolls up the armour and sets out speedily, stopping neither day nor night and marching at double speed for a hundred miles to wrest an advantage, the commander of three divisions will be captured. The vigorous troops will arrive first and the feeble will straggle along behind, so that if this method is used only one-tenth of the army will arrive. In a forced march of fifty miles the commander of the first and van division will fall, and using this method but half of the army will arrive. In a forced march of thirty miles, but two-thirds will arrive. Hence, the army will be lost without baggage train; and it cannot survive without provisions, nor can it last long without sources of supplies. One who is not acquainted with the design of his neighbours should not enter into alliances with them. Those who do not know the conditions of mountains and forests, hazardous defiles, marshes and swamps, cannot conduct the march of an army. Those who do not use local guides are unable to obtain the advantages of the ground. Now , war is based on deception. Move when it is advantageous and change tactics by dispersal and concentration of your troops. When campaigning, be swift as the wind; in leisurely march, majestic as the forest; - 14 - SUN ZI THE ART OF WAR In raiding and plundering, be fierce as fire; in standing, be firm as the mountains. When hiding, be as unfathomable as things behind the clouds; when moving, fall like a thunderclap. When you plunder the countryside, divide your forces. When you conquer territory, defend strategic points. Weigh the situation before you move. He who knows the artifice of deviation will be victorious. Such is the art of manoeuvring. The Book of Army Management says: „As the voice cannot be heard in battle, gongs and drums are used. As troops cannot see each other clearly in battle, flags and banners are used. Hence, in night fighting, usually use drums and gongs; in day fighting, banners and flags. Now, these instruments are used to unify the action of the troops. When the troops can be thus united, the brave cannot advance alone, nor can the cowardly retreat. This is the art of directing large masses of troops. A whole army may be robbed of its spirit, and its commander deprived of his presence of mind. Now, at the beginning of a campaign, the spirit of soldiers is keen; after a certain period of time, it declines; and in the later stage, it may be dwindled to nought. A clever commander, therefore, avoids the enemy when his spirit is keen and attack him when it is lost. This is the art of attaching importance to moods. In good order, he awaits a disorderly enemy; in serenity, a clamorous one. This is the art of retaining self-possession. Close to the field of battle, he awaits an enemy coming from afar; at rest, he awaits an exhausted enemy; with well-fed troops, he awaits hungry ones. This is the art of husbanding one?s strength. He refrains from intercepting an enemy whose banners are in perfect order, and desists from attacking an army whose formations are in an impressive array. This is the art of assessing circumstances. Now, the art of employing troops is that when the enemy occupies high ground, do not confront him uphill, and when his back is resting on hills, do not make a frontal attack. When he pretends to flee, do not pursue. Do not attack soldiers whose temper is keen. Do not swallow a bait offered by the enemy. Do not thwart an enemy who is returning homewards. When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. Do not press a desperate enemy too hard. Such is the method of using troops. - 15 - SUN ZI THE ART OF WAR CHAPTER 8 VARIATION OF TACTICS 九變篇 Sun Zi said: Generally, in war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign, assembles troops and mobilizes the people. When on grounds hard of access, do not encamp. On grounds intersected with highways, join hands with your allies. Do not linger on critical ground. In encircled ground, resort to stratagem. In desperate ground, fight a last-ditch battle. There are some roads which must not be followed, some troops which must not be attacked, some cities which must not be assaulted, some ground which must not be contested, and some commands of the sovereign which must not be obeyed. Hence, the general who thoroughly understands the advantages that accompany variation of tactics knows how to employ troops. The general who does not is unable to use the terrain to his advantage even though he is well acquainted with it. In employing the troops for attack, the general who does not understand the variation of tactics will be unable to use them effectively, even if he is familiar with the Five Advantages. And for this reason, a wise general in his deliberations must consider both favourable and unfavourable factors. By taking into account the favourable factors, he makes his plan feasible; by taking into account the unfavourable, he may avoid possible disasters. What can subdue the hostile neighbouring rulers is to hit what hurts them most; what can keep them constantly occupied is to make trouble for them; and what can make them rush about is to offer them ostensible allurements. It is a doctrine of war that we must not rely on the likelihood of the enemy not coming, but our own readiness to meet him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but on the fact that we have made our position invincible. There are five dangerous faults which may affect a general: if reckless, he can be killed; if cowardly, captured; if quick-tempered, he can be provoked to rage and make a fool of himself; if he has too delicate a sense of honour, he is liable to fall into a trap because of an insult; if he is of a compassionate nature, he may get bothered and upset. These are the five serious faults of a general, ruinous to the conduct of war. The ruin of the army and the death of the general are inevitable results of these five dangerous faults. They must be deeply pondered. - 16 - SUN ZI THE ART OF WAR CHAPTER 9 ON THE MARCH 行軍篇 Sun Zi said: Generally, when an army takes up a position and sizes up the enemy situation, it should pay attention to the following: When crossing the mountains, be sure to stay in the neighbourhood of valleys; when encamping, select high ground facing the sunny side; when high ground is occupied by the enemy, do not ascend to attack. So much for taking up a position in mountains. After crossing a river, you should get far away from it. When an advancing invader crosses a river, do not meet him in midstream. It is advantageous to allow half his force to get across and then strike. If you wish to fight a battle, you should not go to meet the invader near a river which he has to cross. When encamping in the riverine area, take a position on high ground facing the sun. Do not take a position at the lower reaches of the enemy. This relates to positions near a river. In crossing salt marshes, your sole concern should be to get over them quickly, without any delay. If you encounter the enemy in a salt marsh, you should take position close to grass and water with trees to your rear. This has to do with taking up a position in salt marshes. On level ground, take up an accessible position and deploy your main flanks on high grounds with front lower than the back. This is how to take up a position on level ground. These are principles for encamping in the four situations named. By employing them, the Yellow Emperor conquered his four neighbouring sovereigns. Generally, in battle and manoeuvering, all armies prefer high ground to low and sunny places to shady. If an army encamps close to water and grass with adequate supplies, it will be free from countless diseases and this will spell victory. When you come to hills, dikes, or embankments, occupy the sunny side, with your main flank at the back. All these methods are advantageous to the army and can exploit the possibilities the ground offers. When heavy rain falls in the upper reaches of a river and foaming water descends, do not ford and wait until it subsides. When encountering „Precipitous Torrents?, „Heavenly Wells?, „Heavenly Prison?, - 17 - SUN ZI THE ART OF WAR „Heavenly Net?, „Heavenly Trap?, and „Heavenly Cracks?, you must march speedily away from them. Do not approach them. While we keep a distance from them we should draw the enemy toward them. We face them and cause the enemy to put his back to them. If in the neighbourhood of your camp there are dangerous defiles or ponds and low-lying ground overgrown with aquatic grass and reeds, or forested mountains with dense tangled undergrowth, they must be thoroughly searched, for these are possible places where ambushes are laid and spies are hidden. When the enemy is close at hand and remains quiet, he is relying on a favourable position. When he challenges battle from afar, he wishes to lure you to advance. When he is on easy ground, he must be in and advantageous position. When the trees are seen to move, it means the enemy is advancing; when many screens have been placed in the undergrowth, it is for the purpose of deception. The rising of birds in their flight is the sign of an ambuscade. Startled beasts indicate that a sudden attack is forth-coming. Dust spurting upwards in high straight columns indicates the approach of chariots. When it hangs low and is widespread, it betokens that infantry is approaching. When it branches out in different directions, it shows that parties have been sent out to collect firewood. A few clouds of dust moving to and fro signify that the army is camping. When the enemy?s envoys speak in humble terms, but the army continues preparation, that means it will advance. When their language is strong and the enemy pretentiously drives forward, these may be signs that he will retreat. When light chariots first go out and take positions on the wings, it is a sign that the enemy is forming for battle. When the enemy is not in dire straits but asks for a truce, he must be plotting. When his troops march speedily and parade in formations, he is expecting to fight a decisive battle on a fixed date. When half his forces advances and half retreats, he is attempting to decoy you. When his troops lean on their weapons, they are famished. When drawers of water drink before carrying it to camp, his troops are suffering from thirst. When the enemy sees an advantage but does not advance to seize it, he is fatigued. When birds gather above his camp sites, they are unoccupied. When at night the enemy?s camp is clamorous, it betokens nervousness. If there is disturbance in the camp, the general?s authority is weak. If the banners and flags are shifted about, sedition is afoot. If the officers are angry, it means that men are weary. - 18 - SUN ZI THE ART OF WAR When the enemy feeds his horses with grain, kills the beasts of burden for food and packs up the utensils used for drawing water, he shows no intention to return to his tents and is determined to fight to the death. When the general speaks in meek and subservient tone to his subordinates, he has lost the support of his men. Too frequent rewards indicate that the general is at the end of his resources; too frequent punishments indicate that he is in dire distress. If the officers at first treat the men violently and later are fearful of them, it shows supreme lack of intelligence. When envoys are sent with compliments in their mouths, it is a sign that the enemy wishes for a truce. When the enemy?s troops march up angrily and remain facing yours for a long time, neither joining battle nor withdrawing, the situation demands great vigilance and thorough investigation. In war, numbers along confer no advantage. If one does not advance by force recklessly, and is able to concentrate his military power through a correct assessment of the enemy situation and enjoys full support of his men, that would suffice. He who lacks foresight and underestimates his enemy will surely be captured by him. If troops are punished before they have grown attached to you, they will be disobedient. If not obedient, it is difficult to employ them. If troops have become attached to you, but discipline is not enforced, you cannot employ them either. Thus, soldier must be treated in the first instance with humanity, but kept under control by iron discipline. In this way, the allegiance of soldiers I assured. If orders are consistently carried out and the troops are strictly supervised, they will be obedient. If orders are never carried out, they will be disobedient. And the smooth implementation of orders reflects harmonious relationship between the commander and his troops. - 19 - SUN ZI THE ART OF WAR CHAPTER 10 TERRAIN 地形篇 Sun Zi said: Ground may be classified according to its nature as accessible, entangling, temporizing, constricted, precipitous and distant. Ground which both we and the enemy can traverse with equal ease is called accessible. On such ground, he who first takes high sunny positions, and keeps his supply routes unimpeded can fight advantageously. Ground easy to reach but difficult to exit is called entangling. The nature of this ground is such that if the enemy is unprepared and you sally out, you may defeat him. But, if the enemy is prepared for your coming, and you fail to defeat him, then, return being difficult, disadvantages will ensue. Ground equally disadvantageous for both the enemy and ourselves to enter is called temporizing. The nature of this ground is such that even though the enemy should offer us an attractive bait, it will be advisable not to go forth but march off. When his force is halfway out because of our manoeuvring, we can strike him with advantage. With regard to the constricted ground, if we first occupy it, we must block the narrow passes with strong garrisons and wait for the enemy. Should the enemy first occupies such ground, do not attack him if the pass in his hand is fully garrisoned, but only if it is weakly garrisoned. With regard to the precipitous ground, if we first occupy it, we must take a position on the sunny heights and await the enemy. If he first occupies such ground, we should march off and do not attack him. When the enemy is situated at a great distance from us, and the terrain where the two armies deploy is similar, it is difficult to provoke battle and unprofitable to engage him. These are the principles relating to six different types of ground. It is the highest responsibility of the general to inquire into them with the utmost care. There are six situations that cause an army to fail. They are: flight, insubordination, fall, collapse, disorganization, and rout. None of these disasters can be attributed to natural and geographical causes, but to the fault of the general. Terrain conditions being equal, if a force attacks one ten times its size, the result is flight. When the soldiers are strong and officers weak, the army is insubordinate. When the officers are valiant and the soldiers ineffective, the army will fall. When the higher officer are angry and insubordinate, and on encountering the enemy rush to battle on their own account from a feeling of resentment and the - 20 - SUN ZI THE ART OF WAR commander-in-chief is ignorant of their abilities, the result is collapse. When the general is incompetent and has little authority, when his troops are mismanaged, when the relationship between the officers and men is strained, and when the troop formations are slovenly, the result is disorganization. When a general unable to estimate the enemy?s strength uses a small force to engage a larger one or weak troops to strike the strong, or he fails to select shock troops for the van, the result is rout. When any of these six situations exists, the army is on the road to defeat. It is the highest responsibility of the general that he examine them carefully. Conformation of the ground is of great assistance in the military operations. It is necessary for a wise general to make correct assessments of the enemy?s situation to create conditions leading to victory and to calculate distances and the degree of difficulty of the terrain. He who knows these things and applies them to fighting will definitely win. He who knows them not, and, therefore, unable to apply them, will definitely lose. Hence, if, in the light of the prevailing situation, fighting is sure to result in victory, then you may decide to fight even though the sovereign has issued an order not to engage. If fighting does not stand a good chance of victory, you need not to fight even though the sovereign has issued an order to engage. Hence, the general who advances without coveting fame and retreats without fearing disgrace, whose only purpose is to protect his people and promote the best interests of his sovereign, is the precious jewel of the state. If a general regards his men as infants, then they will march with him into the deepest valleys. He treats them as his own beloved sons and they will stand by him unto death. If, however, a general is indulgent towards his men but cannot employ them, cherishes them but cannot command them or inflict punishment on them when they violate the regulations, then they may be compared to spoiled children, and are useless for any practical purpose. If we know that our troops are capable of striking the enemy, but do not know that he is invulnerable to attack, our chance of victory is but half. If we know that the enemy is vulnerable to attack but do not know that our troops are incapable of striking him, our chance of victory is again but half. If we know that the enemy can be attacked and that our troops are capable of attacking him, but do not realize that the conformation of the ground makes fighting impracticable, our chance of victory is once again but half. - 21 - SUN ZI THE ART OF WAR Therefore, when those experienced in war move, they are never bewildered; when they act, they are never at a loss. Thus the saying: Know the enemy and know yourself, and your victory will never be endangered; know the weather and know the ground, and your victory will then be complete. - 22 - SUN ZI THE ART OF WAR CHAPTER 11 THE NINE VARIETIES OF GROUND九地篇 Sun Zi said: In respect of the employment of troops, ground may be classified as dispersive, frontier, key, open, focal, serious, difficult, encircled, and desperate. When a chieftain is fighting in his own territory, he is in dispersive ground. When he has penetrated into hostile territory, but to no great distance, he is in frontier ground. Ground equally advantageous for us and the enemy to occupy is key ground. Ground equally accessible to both sides is open. Ground contiguous to three other states is focal. He who first gets control of it will gain the support of the majority of neighbouring states. When an army has penetrated deep into hostile territory, leaving far behind many enemy cities and towns, it is in serious ground. Mountain forests, rugged steeps, marshes, fens and all that is hard to traverse fall into the category of difficult ground. Ground to which access is constricted and from which we can only retire by tortuous paths so that a small number of the enemy would suffice to crush a large body of our men is encircled ground. Ground on which the army can avoid annihilation only through a desperate fight without delay is called a desperate one. And, therefore, do not fight in dispersive ground; do not stop in the frontier borderlands. Do not attack an enemy who has occupied key ground; in open ground, do not allow your communication to be blocked. In focal ground, form alliances with neighbouring states; in serious ground, gather in plunder. In difficult ground, press on; in encircled ground, resort to stratagems; and desperate ground, fight courageously. In ancient times, those described as skilled in war knew how to make it impossible for the enemy to unite his van and his rear, for his large and small divisions to cooperate, for his officers, and men to support each other, and for the higher and lower levels of the enemy to establish contact with each other. When the enemy?s forces were dispersed, they prevented him from assembling them; even when assembled, they managed to throw his forces into disorder. They moved forward when it was advantageous to do so; when not advantageous, they halted. Should one ask: „How do I cope with a well-ordered enemy host about to attack me?? I reply: „seize something he cherishes and he will conform to your desires.? - 23 - SUN ZI THE ART OF WAR Speed is the essence of war. Take advantage of the enemy?s unpreparedness, make your way by unexpected routes, and attack him where he has taken no precautions. The general principles applicable to an invading force are that the deeper you penetrate into hostile territory, the greater will be the solidarity of your troops, and thus the defenders cannot overcome you. Plunder fertile country to supply your army with plentiful food. Pay attention to the soldiers? well-being and not fatigue them. Try to keep them in high spirits and conserve their energy. Keep the army moving and devise unfathomable plans. Throw your soldiers into a position whence there is no escape, and they will choose death over desertion. For if prepared to die, how can the officers and men not exert their uttermost strength to fight? In a desperate situation, they fear nothing; when there is no way out, they stand firm. Deep in a hostile land they are bound together. If there is no help for it, they will fight hard. Thus, without waiting to be marshed, the soldiers will be constantly vigilant; without waiting to be asked, they will do your will; without restrictions, they will be faithful; without giving orders, they can be trusted. Prohibit superstitious practices and do away with rumours, then nobody will flee even facing death. Our soldiers have no surplus of wealth, but it is not because they disdain riches; they have no expectation of long life, but it is not because they dislike longevity. On the day the army is ordered out to battle, your soldiers may weep, those sitting up wetting their garments, and those lying down letting the tears run down their cheeks. But throw them into a situation where there is no escape and they will display the immortal courage of Zhuan Zhu and Cao Kuei. Troops directed by a skillful general are comparable to the Shuai Ran. The Shuai Ran is a snake found in Mount Heng. Strike at its head, and you will be attacked by its tail; strike at its tail, and you will be attacked by its head; strike its middle, and you will be attacked by both its head and tail. Should one ask: „Can troops be made capable of such instantaneous coordination as the Shuai Ran?? I reply: „They can.? For the men of Wu and the men of Yue are enemies, yet if they are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught by a storm, they will come to each other?s assistance just as the left hand helps the right. Hence, it is not sufficient to rely upon tethering of the horses and the burying of the chariots. The principle of military administration is to achieve a uniform level of courage. The principle of terrain application is to make the best use of both the high and low-lying grounds. - 24 - SUN ZI THE ART OF WAR Thus, a skillful general conducts his army just as if he were leading a single man, willy-nilly, by the hand. It is the business of a general to be quiet and thus ensure depth in deliberation; impartial and upright, and thus keep a good management. He should be able to mystify his officers and men by false reports and appearances, and thus keep them in total ignorance. He changes his arrangements and alters his plans in order to make others unable to see through his strategies. He shifts his campsites and undertakes marches by devious routes so as to make it impossible for other to anticipate his objective. He orders his troops for a decisive battle on a fixed date and cuts off their return route, as if he kicks away the ladder behind the soldiers when they have climbed up a height. When he leads his army deep into hostile territory, their momentum is trigger-released in battle. He drives his men now in one direction, then in another, like a shepherd driving a flock of sheep, and no one knows where he is going. To assemble the host of his army and bring it into danger this may be termed the business of the general. The different measures appropriate to the nine varieties of ground and the expediency of advance or withdrawal in accordance with circumstances and the fundamental laws of human nature are matters that must be studied carefully by a general. Generally, when invading a hostile territory, the deeper the troops penetrate, the more cohesive they will be; penetrating only a short way cause dispersion. When you leave your own country behind, and take your army across neighbouring territory, you find yourself on critical ground. When there are means of communication on all four sides, it is focal ground. When you penetrate deeply into a country, it is serious ground. When you penetrate but a little way, it is frontier ground. When you have the enemy?s strongholds on your rear, and narrow passes in front, it is encircled ground. When there is no place of refuge at all, it is desperate ground. Therefore, in dispersive ground, I would unify the determination of the army. In frontier ground, I would keep my forces closely linked. In key ground, I would hasten up my rear elements. In open ground, I would pay close attention to my defence. In focal ground, I would consolidate my alliances. In serious ground, I would ensure a continuous flow of provisions. In difficult ground, I would press on over the road. In encircled ground, I would block the points of access and egress. In desperate ground, I would make it evident that there is no chance of survival. - 25 - SUN ZI THE ART OF WAR For it is the nature of soldiers to resist when surrounded, to fight hard when there is no alternative, and to follow commands implicity when they have fallen into danger. One ignorant of the designs of neighbouring states cannot enter into alliance with them; if ignorant of the conditions of mountains, forests, dangerous defiles, swamps, and marshes, he cannot conduct the march of an army; if he fails to make use of native guides, he cannot gain the advantages of the ground. An army does not deserve the title of the invincible Army of the Hegemonic King if its commander is ignorant of even one of these nine varieties of ground. Now, when such an invincible army attacks a powerful state, it makes it impossible for the enemy to assemble his forces. If overawes the enemy and prevents his allies from joining him. It follows that one does not need to seek alliances with other neighbouring states, nor is there any need to foster the power of other states, but only to pursue one?s own strategic designs to overawe his enemy. Then one can take the enemy?s cities and overthrow the enemy?s state. Bestow rewards irrespective of customary practice and issue orders irrespective of convention, and you can command a whole army as though it were but one man. Set the troops to their tasks without revealing your designs. When the task is dangerous, do not tell them its advantageous aspect. Throw them into a perilous situation and they will survive; put them in desperate ground and they will live. For when the army is placed in such a situation, it can snatch victory from defeat. Now, the key to military operations lies in cautiously studying enemy?s designs. Concentrate your forces in the main direction against the enemy and from a distance of a thousand miles you can kill his general. This is called the ability to achieve one?s aim in an artful and ingenious manner. Therefore, on the day the decision is made to launch war, you should close the passes, destroy the official tallies, and stop the passage of all emissaries. Examine the plan closely in the temple council and make final arrangements. If the enemy leaves a door open, you must rush in. Seize the place the enemy values without making an appointment for battle with him. - 26 - SUN ZI THE ART OF WAR Be flexible and decide your line of action according to the situation on enemy side. At first, then, exhibit of coyness of a maiden until the enemy gives you an opening; afterwards be swift as a running hare, and it will be too late for the enemy to oppose you. - 27 - SUN ZI THE ART OF WAR CHAPTER 12 ATTACK BY FIRE 火攻篇 Sun Zi said: There are five ways of attacking with fire. The fist is to burn soldiers in their camp; the second, to burn provision and stores; the third, to burn baggage-trains; the fourth, to burn arsenals and magazines; and the fifth, to burn the lines of transportation. To use fire, some medium must be relied upon. Materials for setting fire must always be at hand. There are suitable seasons to attack with fire, and special days for starting a conflagration. The suitable seasons are when the weather is very dry; the special days are those when the moon is in the constellations of the Sieve, the Wall, the Wing or the Cross-bar; for when the moon is in these positions there are likely to be strong winds all day long. Now, in attacking with fire, one must respond to the five changing situations: When fire breaks out in the enemy?s camp, immediately coordinate your action from without. If there is an outbreak of fire, but the enemy?s soldiers remain clam, bide your time and do not attack. When the force of the flames has reached its height, follow it up with an attack, if that is practicable; if not, stay where you are. If fires can be raised from outside the enemy?s camps, it is not necessary to wait until they are started inside. Attack with fire only when the moment is suitable. If the fire starts from up-wind, do not launch attack from down-wind. When the wind continues blowing during the day, then it is likely to die down at night. Now, the army must know the five different fire-attack situations and wait for appropriate times. Those who use fire to assist their attacks can achieve tangible results; those who use inundations can make their attacks more powerful. Water can intercept and isolate an enemy, but cannot deprive him of the supplies or equipments. Now, to win battle and capture lands and cities, but to fail to consolidate these achievements is ominous and may be described as a waste of resources and time. And, therefore, the enlightened rulers must deliberate upon the plans to go to battle, and good generals carefully execute them. - 28 - SUN ZI THE ART OF WAR If not in the interests of the state, do not act. If you are not sure of success, do not use troops. If you are not in danger, do not fight a battle. A sovereign should not launch a war simply out of anger, nor should a general fight a war simply out of resentment. Take action if it is to your advantage; cancel the action if it is not. An angered man can become happy again, just as a resentful one can feel pleased again, but a state that has perished can never revive, nor can a dead man be brought back to life. Therefore, with regard to the matter of war, the enlightened ruler is prudent, and the good general is full of caution. Thus, the state is kept secure and the army preserved. - 29 - SUN ZI THE ART OF WAR CHAPTER 13 USE OF SPIES 用間篇 Sun Zi said: Generally, when an army of one hundred thousand is raised and dispatched on a distant war, the expenses borne by the people together with the disbursements made by the treasury will amount to a thousand dollars per day. There will be continuous commotion both at home and abroad; people will be involved with convoys and exhausted from performing transportation services, and seven hundred thousand households will be unable to continue their farmwork. Hostile armies confront each other for years in order to struggle for victory in a decisive battle; yet if one who begrudges the expenditure of one hundred dollars in honours and emoluments remains ignorant of his enemy?s situation, he is completely devoid of humanity. Such a man is no leader of the troops; no capable assistant to his sovereign; no master of victory. Now, the reason that the enlightened sovereign and the wise general conquer the enemy whenever they move and their achievements surpass those of ordinary men is that they have foreknowledge. This „foreknowledge? cannot be elicited from spirits, nor from gods, nor by analogy with past events, nor by any deductive calculation. It must be obtained from the men who know the enemy situation. Hence, the use of spies, of whom there are five sorts: native spies, internal spies, converted spies, doomed spies, and surviving spies. When all these five sorts of spies are at work and none knows their method of operation, it would be divinely intricate and constitutes the greatest treasure of a sovereign. Native spies are those we employ from the enemy?s country people. Internal spies are enemy official whom we employ. Converted spies are enemy spies whom we employ. Doomed spies are those of our own spies who are deliberately given false information and told to report it to the enemy. Surviving spies are those who return from the enemy camp to report information. Hence, of all those in the army close to the commander, none is more intimate than the spies; of all rewards, none more liberal than those given to spies; of all matters, none is more confidential than those relating to spying operations. He who is not sage cannot use spies. He who is not humane and generous cannot - 30 - SUN ZI THE ART OF WAR use spies. And he who is not delicate and subtle cannot get the truth out of them. Delicate indeed! Truely delicate! There is no place where espionage is not possible. If plans relating to spying operations are prematurely divulged the spy and all those to whom he spoke of them should be put to death. Generally, whether it be armies that you wish to strike, cities that you wish to attack, and individuals that you wish to assassinate, it is necessary to find out the names of the garrison commander, the aides-de-camp, the ushers, gatekeepers, and body-guards. You must instruct your spies to ascertain these matters in minute detail. It is essential to seek out enemy spies who have come to conduct espionage against you and bribe them to serve you. Courteously exhort them and give your instructions, then release them back home. Thus, converted spies are recruited and used. It is through the information brought by the converted spies that native and internal spies can be recruited and employed. It is owing to their information, again, that the doomed spies, armed with false information, can be sent to convey it to the enemy. Lastly, it is by their information that the surviving spies can come back and give information as scheduled. The sovereign must have full knowledge of the activities of the five sorts of spies. And to know these depends upon the converted spies. Therefore, it is mandatory that they be treated with the utmost liberality. In ancient times, the rise of the Shang Dynasty was due to Yi Zhi, who had served under the Xia. Likewise, the rise of the Zhou Dynasty was due to Lu Ya, who had served under the Yin. Therefore, it is only the enlightened sovereign and the wise general who are able to use the most intelligent people as spies and achieve great results. Spying operations are essential in war; upon them the army relies to make its every move. - 31 -