Political Philosophy Moral Psychology

WhenPoliticalPhilosophyMeetsMoralPsychology:ExpressivismintheMenciusXIAOYang∗I.IntroductionAcasualsurveyofthebackgroundsofthecontributorstothisjournal,aswellastooursisterjournalssuchasPhilosophyEastWest,JournalofChinesePhilosophy,andAsianPhilosophy,showsthatmostofthecontributorsareuniversityteachersindepartmentsofphilosophyorreligiousstudies.Thispartlyexplainswhy,inourstudiesofclassicalChinesephilosophy,wehaveacharacteristicallyanalyticapproachtotexts.ThestrengthofthisapproachisthatourpassionforrigorousargumentsleadstothoroughanalysisofearlyChinesephilosophicaltextsthatfocusesonhowanauthorstateshisorhertheoryandarguesforit.However,thisapproachdoeshaveitsweaknesses.Whenwefocusontheargumentsinthetexts,wetendtoseetheseearlyChinesephilosophersonlyasscholars;weeasilyforgetthatmanyofthemwerealsopoliticaladvisorsorconsultants,andtheaudienceoftheirargumentswasoftenapowerfulruler.OneofthemaingoalsofthisarticleistoshowthatwecannotstudyMencius’moralpsychologywithoutstudyinghispoliticalphilosophyatthesametime.Morespecifically,thisarticleshowsthatMencius’expressivistmoralpsychologyistheresultofhisrespondingtocertainquestionsanddebatesinthepoliticalphilosophyofhistime.IbelievethatourstudycanalsoshedlightonadebateamongcontemporaryscholarswhostudyphilosophicalpsychologyorphilosophyofactioninearlyChina.HerbertFingaretteisprobablythefirsttoclaimthatConfuciusdidnothavetheconceptsof“choice,”“choosing,”“deciding,”or“innerlife”(Fingarette:1856).ChadHansenclaimsthatclassicalChinesethinkersmadenodistinctionbetweenhumanactionsandthenaturalcourseofevents,nordidtheyhavethedistinctionbetween“agentcausation”and“eventcausation”(Hansen:378).AccordingtoHenryRosemont,classicalChinesethinkersdidnothaveconceptsof(orwordsfor)“action,”“rationalagent,”or“choice”∗AssistantProfessorofPhilosophy,KenyonCollege,Gambier,OH430229623;email:xiaoy@kenyon.edu.Dao:AJournalofComparativePhilosophyJune2006,Vol.V,No.2,pp.257271.©2006byGlobalScholarlyPublications.Allrightsreserved.Dao:AJournalofComparativePhilosophyV.2258(Rosemont:173).Incontrasttothesescholars,DavidNivisonhasarguedthatMenciusdidhaveaconceptofaction.Morespecifically,NivisonarguesthatMenciushadatheoreticalaccountofactionintermsofaninnermentalactofthought:whatdistinguishesactionsfromreflexesisthepresenceofaninneractofthoughtinactionsandtheabsenceofitinreflexes.Nivison’sargumentisbasedlargelyon6A15oftheMencius,whichweshallexamineclosely.Inspiteofmanydisagreements,thereareunstatedpresuppositionssharedbythesescholars.Thetwosideshaveatleasttwoassumptionsincommon.First,theyallbelievethat,inordertohaveaconceptofaction,onemusthaveaconceptofaninnermentalact(thinking,willing,deciding,choosing,oragentcausation).Second,theytakeitforgrantedthatclassicalChinesethinkersmusthavebeenaddressingthesamequestionswetodayconsiderimportant,suchas“Howdowegiveageneralandtheoreticalaccountofhumanaction?,”or“Howdowedistinguishvoluntaryactionsfrommerereflexes?”Theyarecentralquestionsincontemporaryphilosophyofaction.However,itcanbearguedthatbothassumptionsarefalse.First,asWittgensteinhasshown,itisnottruethataninnermentalactistheessenceofhumanactions,becausehumanactionshavenoessence.1Second,asthisarticleshows,theclassicalChinesephilosophersinfacthadotherkindsofquestionsinmind,towhichtheirmoralpsychologywasresponding.ItisveryinterestingthatthereisaparalleldebateinthestudyofclassicalGreekthought.InhisSatherLecture,BernardWilliamsmentionsapopularviewamongclassicsscholarsthatHomer’scharactershavenoconceptsofaction,agency,orresponsibility.WilliamsarguesthatwhatthosescholarsfindlackinginHomerisactuallya“badphilosophy,”whichassumesthat,foranactiontobeanaction,amentalactionmustalwaysbepresentpriortotheaction:AllthatHomerseemstohaveleftoutistheideaofanothermentalactionthatissupposednecessarilytoliebetweencomingtoaconclusionandactingonit:andhedidwellleaveitout,sincethereisnosuchaction,andtheideaofitistheinventionofbadphilosophy.(Williams1993:36)Elsewhere,Williamscallsthisthe“doublingofaction”:toperformanyvoluntaryaction,onemustfirstperformanothermentalaction(Williams1995:71).FollowingNietzsche,Williamsarguesthat“suchapeculiaraccountmusthaveapurpose,andthatthepurposeisamoralone”(Williams1995:72).ThisarticleislargelyaWilliamsianproject.ItshowsthatMencius’moralpsychologyshouldnotbeunderstoodashisimpartialandobjectiveaccountofthehumanmind;rather,itservesamoralandpoliticalpurpose,andthisiscrucialtotheunderstandingofhismoralpsychology,aswellastohispoliticalphi1IntheearlypartsofPhilosophicalInvestigations,Wittgensteinarguesthatphenomenasuchas“game,”“meaning,”and“reading”havenoessence,andthat“familyresemblance”isahelpfulmetaphortounderstandthem.Hegivesasimilartreatmentto“voluntaryaction”inthelaterpartsofthebook.Foradetailedargument,seeXiao1999.Xiao:ExpressivismintheMencius259losophy.InsectionII,IdiscussNivison’sreadingof4A15,andarguethatitisimportanttoknowtowhichquestionMencius’ideaabouttheinneractofattendingisananswer.InsectionIII,IsuggestthatthequestiontowhichMencius’moralpsychologyisrespondingisapoliticalone,andIuseSHANGYang商鞅,acontemporaryofMencius’,toshowthatthereisanintimateconnectionbetweenShang’spoliticalphilosophyandhismoralpsychology.InsectionIV,IfirstdrawtheconnectionbetweenMencius’politicalidealofbenevolentgovernanceandhisexpressivistmoralpsychology;IthenshowhowMencius’expressivistmoralpsychologyisatworkthroughananalysisof3A2.II.AnIdeaIsAlwaysanAnswertoaQuestionII.1.Nivison’sReadingof4A15ThepublicationofNivison’sTheWaysofConfucianismin1996wasamajoreventinthefieldofChinesephilosophy.Itisacollectionofpaperswrittenandpresentedinthe1970s,inwhichNivisonmakesusseetheconnectionbetweenphilosophyofactionandmoralpsychologyontheonehandandConfucius’andMencius’majorideasontheother.2DavidWongspeaksforusallwhenhesays,“OnNivison’sreadings,Menciusbecameformeamoralpsychologist”(Wong:1).Basedonhisreadingof6A15oftheMencius,NivisonarguesthatMenciushasanaccountofthedifferencebetweenactionsandreflexes.Letmequotehisargumentinfullhere:[Menciussays,]“Itisnotthefunctionoftheearsandeyestothink(si思),andtheyareobscuredby[external]things.Whenonethinginteractswithanother,asamatterofcourseitleadsitaway.Thefunctionoftheheartistothink.Ifitthinksthenitwillgetit.Ifitdoesnotthink,thenitwillnotgetit”(6A15).Thepicturecouldbereinforcedbyotherpassages,butthisshouldbeenoughtoshowthatMenciusmakestheseassumptions:wenaturallyhavealikingforandanimpulsetoseekcertainthings—thebeautiful,thedelicious,etc.,andalsothegoodandright.Wewillautomaticallyseekobjectsoftheformer,physicalkindiftheyarewithinreach,unlesswechoosenotto(ifweseethattodosowouldbewrong).However,ournatural“proattitude”towardthegoodandrightinnowayguaranteesthatwewillseekthem.Wewillnotunlesswefocusourthoughtonthemandseekthemvoluntarily,performingthisinneractofthought,sotospeak,aswewouldperformanyothervoluntaryact.Themoralactingofperfectedindividualsremainsact,anddoesnotbecomereflex.Theydoitfreely,notautomatically,andremainmoralagents.(Nivison1996a:85;emphasesadded)Nivisonseemstobesayingthat,accordingtoMencius,whatdistinguishesour2Nivisonmentionsthathehasbeeninfluencedbyseveralcontemporaryphilosophers’writingsontheweaknessofthewillandselfdeception,suchasHarryFrankfurt,RichardJeffrey,MichaelBratman,andHerbertFingarette(Nivison1996b:309).Speakingaboutthe1970swhenhewrotetheseessays,Nivisonsays,“IlearnedmuchfromDonaldDavidsonatthistime,andearlier”(Nivison1996a:xiii).Dao:AJournalofComparativePhilosophyV.2260voluntaryactionsfromreflexescannotbeexplainedintermsofournatural“proattitudes”suchasdesiresandemotions.ForNivison,wehavetoappealtosomethingelse,namely,an“inneractofthought,”whichisperformedbytheorganofxin(themindheart).Itisthisinneractofthoughtthatmakesthemoralactionofindividualsanaction,notareflex.Inotherwords,itisthecapacityfortheinneractofthoughtthatmakesindividualsagents.IagreewithNivisonthatthereisaconceptoftheinneractofthoughtinMencius;however,IdonotsharehisimpliedassumptionthatMenciuswastryingtoanswerthequestionofhowtodistinguishactionsfromreflexes,voluntaryfrominvoluntaryactions.IbelieveMenciuswasusingtheideatoanswerthequestionaboutwhysomepeoplefailtobecomevirtuouspersons.Inotherwords,wehaveidentifiedthesameideainatext,yetwetaketheideaasananswertodifferentquestions.II.2.AnIdeaIsAlwaysanAnswertoaQuestionR.G.Collingwoodbelievesthatanideaisalwaysananswertoaquestion(Collingwood:2976).Itispossiblethattwoideasthathavethesamepropositionalcontentmaynotbeexactlythe“same”ideasiftheyareanswerstotwodifferentquestions.Thishasimportantimplicationsforthepracticeofthehistoryofphilosophy.AsBernardWilliamsputsit,“youcouldnotunderstandwhatwasbeingsaidbyanauthorunlessyouunderstood—thisdidnotimply,explicitlyformulate—thequestionthathewastryingtoanswer”(Williams2006:344).3Thisdoesnotnecessarilyimplyaradicalrelativism,accordingtowhichthinkersfromdistanthistoricalperiodsorcultureshavenothingtosaytoustoday.WilliamsmentionsPeterStrawson’sremarkthatweshouldtreatgreatpastphilosophersthesamewaywetreatgreatlivingphilosophers,whichistoreadthemashavingsomethingtosaytous.Williamsremarks,Collingwoodwouldhaveagreedwiththis,solongasitisnotassumedthatwhatthedeadhavetosaytousisthesamesortofthingasthelivinghavetosaytous.Hewouldnothaveagreed,thatistosay,withRyle’sfrequentinjunctiontotreatsomethingwrittenbyPlato,forinstance,asthoughithadcomeoutinMindlastmonth.(Williams2006:344)HereweshalltrytoidentifythequestionsthatMenciuswastryingtoanswer.Asweshallsee,theyarenotquestionsthatcontemporaryphilosophersofactionaretryingtoanswer,buttheyarenotquestionsthatareirrelevanttoourtimeeither.II.3.WhatIstheQuestiontoWhichMencius’TheoryIsanAnswer?IbelievethatMencius’conceptofsiisusedtoansweranentirelydifferentquestion.ItiscuriousthatNivisondoesnotcitetheearlypartof6A15inhis3IamgratefultoBernardWilliamsforhavingdrawnmyattentiontoCollingwood.HisthenunpublishedessayonCollingwoodisnowincludedinWilliams2006.ForadetaileddiscussiononhowclassicalChinesescholarsdealwithhermeneuticissues,seeXiao2006.Xiao:ExpressivismintheMencius261remarks.Hereistheentirepassagedividedintothreeparts:(1)Gongduziasked,“Weallarehumanbeings,whysomearegreatmen,andsomesmallmen?”Menciusreplied,“Thosewhofollowtheir‘greatpart’aregreatmen;thosewhofollowtheir‘smallpart’aresmallmen.”Gongduziaskedagain,“Weallarehumanbeings,whysomefollowtheirgreatpartandsometheirsmallpart?”(2)Menciussaid,“Itisnotthefunctionoftheearsandeyestoattend(si思),andtheyareobscuredby[external]things.Whenonethinginteractswithanother,asamatterofcoursetheexternalthingsleadtheearsandeyesastray.Thefunctionoftheheartmind(xin心)istoattend.Iftheheartmindattends,itwillgetit.Ifitdoesnotattendtoit,itwillnotgetit.(3)ThisiswhatHeavenhasgivenme.Ifonefirststandsfastonhisgreatpart,thenhissmallpartcannottakeitaway.Inthisway,onecannotbutbeagreatman.”(Mencius6A15)Part(1)ofthispassageshowsclearlythatMenciusisnotreallyansweringourquestionabouthowtodistinguishactionfromreflex.MenciusisansweringaseriesofquestionsraisedbythestudentGongduzi,whosefirstquestioniswhysomepeoplefailtobecomegreatmen.ThishastobereadinlightofMencius’famousclaimthateveryoneiscapableofbecomingaYaoorShun(Mencius3A1and6B2).Thesearesagekingswhopracticebenevolentgovernance.ThismeansthatGongduzi’squestionis,atleastpartly,aboutthefactthattherearesomerulerswhofailtopracticebenevolentgovernance.Mencius’answeristhattheyfailbecausetheydonotfollowtheir“greatpart.”However,Gongduziisnotsatisfiedwiththisanswer:“Whydosomefollowtheirgreatpartandsomefollowtheirsmallpart?”ItisclearthatPart(2)andPart(3)areMencius’answertothisquestion.Menciusseemstobesayingthatsomepeoplefollowtheirgreatpartbecausetheirheartmind“attends”(si),andsomefollowtheirsmallpartbecausetheirheartminddoesnot“attend.”ItisobviousthatMenciusisnotusingtheconceptofsi(theinneractofattending)togiveanaccountofthedifferencesbetweenactionsandreflexes.4ItmustbeacknowledgedthatmostofthetimeinhisTheWaysofConfucianism,NivisondoesnotreadMenciusasaddressingquestionsinphilosophyofaction,butratherquestionsinmoralpsychology,especiallytheissueoftheweaknessofthewill,whichisthequestionofhowitispossiblethatsomepeoplefailtodowhattheyoughttodo.Nevertheless,eventhoughIagreewithNivisonthatMenciusisinterestedinthequestionoftheweaknessofthewill,Mencius’interestandperspectivearestillverymuchdifferentfromthatofcontemporaryphilosophers,suchasDavidson.AsIshallargue,Mencius’moralpsychologyneedstobeunderstoodinadifferentcontext,especiallyinvolving4ThisisnottodenythatMencius’ideascanbeusedbyustoanswerourquestionincontemporaryphilosophyofaction.Wemayputthispointasfollows:hadMenciusbeenpresentedwithandfeltneedtoaddressourquestion,therewouldhavebeensufficientconceptualresourcesinhisownthoughtforhimtodrawupon.Dao:AJournalofComparativePhilosophyV.2262questionsofpoliticalphilosophyinhistime.5III.AQuestionofPoliticalPhilosophyIII.1.ACentralQuestioninPoliticsBothMenciusandSHANGYang商鞅livedinthemiddleperiodoftheWarringStates.Menciuswasbornaround389or385BCEanddiedaround305or304BCE(QianMu:619,695andYang:1);SHANGYangwasbornaround390BCE(QianMu:618and2637)anddiedin338BCE.Bothofthemwereshi士,scholarstravelingfromstatetostate,seekingtobearuler’spoliticaladvisorormilitarystrategist.ItismentionedintheMenciusthatMenciusreceivedmoneyandhousingfromrulersforhisservice.Thesetravelingadvisorsoftenhadasignificantinfluenceontheruler,andsomeofthemevenbecamepowerfulhighrankingofficials.Asfarasweknow,therewasnopersonalencounterbetweenMenciusandShang,andwedonotfindanycrossreferencestoeachotherintheMenciusandtheShangJunShu商君書(TheBookofLordShang).6However,basedonexistingtexts,wecanseethattheyoccupiedtwoopposingpositionsintermoftheirpoliticalphilosophy,andwefindeachofthemarguingagainstideasthathavebeenmostclearlyarticulatedbytheother.Howtogovernacountryinthistimeofconflictsandturmoilwasofcentralconcerntobothofthem,althoughtheyendorsedradicallydifferentsolutions.ThetravelingadvisorsintheWarringStatesperiodwereallkeenlyawarethattheywerelivinginabrutalwartornrealitythatwasquitedifferentfromtheThreeDynastiesofthesagekings.Physicalforceseemedtobetheonlythingthatmattered;virtueandmoralitynolongermattered.ThisishowMozi墨子describesthesituation:Eversincetheancientsagekingspassedawayandtheworldlosttheorderofjustice(yi義),thefeudallordshavereliedupontheforce(li力)ofarmstoattackoneanother.TotheSouththerearethekingsofChuandYue,andtotheNorththerearetherulersofQiandJin.Theyallmercilesslydrillandtraintheirtroopswiththeaimofattackingandabsorbingoneanother,andtherebygainingcontroloftheempire.(Wu:265;IvanhoeandvanNorden:802)Shangseestheworldinthesameway.Hesays,“Thosecountriesthathavenostrength(li)willnecessarilybedismembered”(ShangJunShu,31185).ForMoziandShang,thecentralquestioninpoliticsisastrategicone:howcanastateincreaseitspowerinaworldwhereonlyphysicalforcematters?Thisis5TheconnectionbetweenMencius’politicalphilosophyandhismoralpsychologyhasbeenunderexploredbycontemporaryscholars.AmongthesignificantrecentstudiesofMencius’moralpsychologyareShun,Chan2002,LiuandIvanhoe,Liu,andBehuniak.6ShangJunShuisnotabookwrittenbythehistoricalfigureSHANGYang;thereisevidencethatsomechapterswerewrittenafterhisdeath.However,somechaptersmighthavebeencomposedbyShanghimself.Xiao:ExpressivismintheMencius263howShangputsit:Acountryofathousandchariotsisabletopreserveitselfbydefendingitself,andacountryoftenthousandchariotsisabletorounditselfoffbyattackingothers;even[abadrulerlike]Jiewouldnotbeabletotwistwordstosubduehisenemies.Ifacountryisincapableofattackingothercountries,ordefendingitself,then[evenabenevolentrulerlike]Yaowouldhavetosurrendertostrongercountries.Basedonthisobservation,weknowthatwhetheracountryistakenseriouslyandrespectedbyothercountriesdependsentirelyonitsforce(li力).Therefore,forceisthebasisonwhichacountrygainsbothprestigeandrespect.(ShangJunShu,182325)However,asweshallsee,Menciusdoesnotbelievethatthequestionshouldbeunderstoodasastrategiconeintermsofforce.Ratherheseesitasanethicalquestionintermsofbenevolentgovernance(renzheng仁政).Inthispartofthearticle,wediscussShang’smilitaristpoliticalphilosophyandthemoralpsychologythatgoeshandinhandwithit;inthenextpart,weshalldiscussMencius’idealofbenevolentgovernanceanditsconnectiontohisexpressivistmoralpsychology.III.2.SHANGYang’sPoliticalPhilosophyofForceFortwentyoneyears(359BCE—338BCE),Shangwasthearchitectofwhathaslaterbeenknownas“SHANGYangBianfa商鞅變法”(SHANGYang’sReform);hewasmainlyresponsibleforhavingmadeQin秦intothemostpowerfulcountryamongthewarringstates.HeindeedlaiddownthefoundationforQin’seventualunificationofChinain221BCE,thefoundingofthefirstunifiedempire.Inotherwords,Shangwastheprimarytheoristandstrategistofempirebuildingofhistime.7TheempirethatShangenvisionedwasanempireofforce.OneofthemoststrikingfeaturesofShang’stheoryofgovernanceisthatitisessentiallymilitarismappliedtodomesticpolitics.AsVitaliiRubinobserves,“Itiswithinthearmythattheprinciplesofgoverningthroughasystemofrewardsandpunishments,laterproclaimedbytheLegalistsasthesolemethodofrulingsocietyingeneral,arefirstworkedout”(citedinAmes:231).Shangseeswarandpunishmentastwosidesofthesamecoin.QIANZhongshu錢鍾書hasmadetheobservationthatShangbelievedthat“xing刑meansweapon”(wu武)(ShangJunShu,110261),andthatShangdescribedpunishmentandwaras“usingswordandsaw[topunishpeople]athome,usingarmorandsoldier[toattackpeople]abroad(neixindaoju,weiyongjiabin內行刀鋸,外用甲兵)”(ShangJunShu,136285).QianconcludesthatShangregardedmilitaryaffairsandpunishmentasthesameviolentforceapplieddifferently—itiswarwhenappliedoutside,andpunishmentwhenappliedinside(Qian:285).ForShang,domesticpoliticswerethecontinuationofwarbythesamemeans,i.e.,physicalforceandviolence.Shang’sreform(bianfa)consistedmainlyingettingridoftheexistingCon7SIMAQianwrotethefirstbiographyofShang,seeSima:22272239.Dao:AJournalofComparativePhilosophyV.2264fucianprogramsofmoraleducation,andreplacingtheConfucianmodelof“governingbyvirtue”(dezhi德治)withhisnewmodelof“governingbypunishment”(xingzhi刑治orxingzheng刑政)(ShangJunShu,77229,136284).Hearguedthatphysicalforceandviolence,ratherthanthesupposedtransformingpowerofvirtue,isthemosteffectivemeanstoachievethefollowingfourgoals:zhi治(makingthecountryorderly),fu富(makingthecountryprosperous),qiang強(makingthearmystrong),andwang王(attainingsupremacy,becomingaking).ShangsawtheConfucianmodelofgoverningbyvirtueasamajorobstacletoachievingthesegoals:Ifacountryhasthefollowingtenevils—theBookofRites,theBookofMusic,theBookofOdes,theBookofDocuments,virtue,sagehood,filialpiety,brotherlyduty,integrity,andargumentation—thentherulercannotmakethepeoplefightinawar,andthecountrywillinevitablybecomeweakandeventuallycollapse.Ifacountrydoesnothavethesetenthings,therulercanmakethepeoplefight,andthecountrywillbesoprosperousthatitwillattainsupremacy(wang)amongalltheothercountries.(ShangJunShu,45199)WhatShangassaultshereistheConfucianidealofmoraleducation.Thefirstfour“evils”(theBookofRites,theBookofMusic,theBookofOdes,andtheBookofDocuments)arethemaintextsoftheConfuciancanon,andtheremainingsix“evils”onthelist(virtue,sagehood,filialpiety,brotherlyduty,integrity,andargumentation)arethemaingoalsofConfucianselfcultivation.AccordingtotheConfucianideal,rulersandthosewhoaspiretobecomegovernmentofficialsshouldreceivesuchamoraleducation,becausetheConfucianidealistogovernbymoralexemplars.Underthetransforminginfluenceofthesevirtuousexemplars,thecommonpeoplewillbecomevirtuousaswell,andthecountryinturnwillbecomeanorderlyonewithoutanyneedforlawsorpunishments.ThisisthewellknownConfucianmodelof&ldqu