我国商业银行个人金融业务创新策略研究3

山东理工大学本科毕业论文 Monetary Policy Strategy:The International Experience Frederic S. Mishkin Getting monetary policy right is crucial to the health of the economy. Overly expansionary monetary policy leads to high inflation, which decreases the efficiency of the economy and hampers economic growth. The United States has not been exempt from inflationary episodes, but more extreme cases of inflation, in which the inflation rate climbs to over 100% per year, have been prevalent in some regions of the world such as Latin America, and have been very harmful to the economy. Monetary policy that is too tight can produce serious recessions in which output falls and unemployment rises. It can also lead to deflation, a fall in the price level, as occurred in the United States during the Great Depression and in Japan more recently. As we have seen in Chapter 8, deflation can be especially damaging to the economy, because it promotes financial instability and can even help trigger financial crises. In Chapter 18 our discussion of the conduct of monetary policy focused primarily on the United States. However, the United States is not the source of all wisdom about how to do monetary policy well. In thinking about what strategies For the conduct of monetary policy might be best, we need to examine monetary policy experiences in other countries. A central feature of monetary policy strategies in all countries is the use of a nominal anchor (a nominal variable that monetary policymakers use to tie down the price level such as the inflation rate, an exchange rate, or the money supply) as an intermediate target to achieve an ultimate goal such as price stability. We begin the chapter by examining the role a nominal anchor plays in promoting price stability. Then we examine three basic types of monetary policy strategy—exchange-rate targeting, monetary targeting, and inflation targeting—and compare them to the Federal Reserve’s current monetary policy strategy, which features an implicit (not an explicit) nominal anchor. We will see that despite the recent excellent perFormance of monetary policy in the United States, there is much to learn from the Foreign 1 experience. The Role of a Nominal Anchor Adherence to a nominal anchor Forces a nation’s monetary authority to conduct monetary policy so that the nominal anchor variable such as the inflation rate or the money supply stays within a narrow range. A nominal anchor thus keeps the price level from growing or falling too fast and thereby preserves the value of a country’s money. Thus, a nominal anchor of some sort is a necessary element in successful monetary policy strategies. One reason a nominal anchor is necessary For monetary policy is that it can help promote price stability, which most countries now view as the most important goal For monetary policy. A nominal anchor promotes price stability by tying inflation expectations to low levels directly through its constraint on the value of domestic money. A more subtle reason for a nominal anchor’s importance is that it can limit the time-consistency problem, in which monetary policy conducted on a discretionary, day-by-day basis leads to poor long-run outcomes.1 The time-consistency problem of discretionary policy arises because economic behavior is influenced by what firms and people expect the monetary authorities to do in the future. With firms’ and people’s expectations assumed to remain unchanged, policymakers think they can boost economic output (or lower unemployment) by pursuing discretionary monetary policy that is more expansionary than expected, and so they have incentives to pursue this policy. This situation is described by saying that discretionary monetary policy is time-consistent; that is, the policy is what policymakers are likely to want to pursue at any given point in time. The problem with timeconsistent, discretionary policy is that it leads to bad outcomes. Because decisions about wages and prices reflect expectations about policy, workers and firms will raise their expectations not only of inflation but also of wages and prices. On average, output will not be higher under such an expansionary strategy, but inflation will be. (We examine this more formally in Chapter 28.) Clearly, a central bank will do better if it does not try to boost output by 2 surprising people with an unexpectedly expansionary policy, but instead keeps inflation under control. However, even if a central bank recognizes that discretionary policy will lead to a poor outcome—high inflation with no gains on the output front—it may still fall into the time-consistency trap, because politicians are likely to apply pressure on the central bank to try to boost output with overly expansionary monetary policy. Although the analysis sounds somewhat complicated, the time-consistency problem is actually something we encounter in everyday life. For example, at any given point in time, it seems to make sense For a parent to give in to a child to keep the child from acting up. The more the parent gives in, however, the more the demanding the child is likely to become. Thus, the discretionary time-consistent actions by the parent lead to a bad outcome—a very spoiled child—because the child’s expectations are affected by what the parent does. How-to books on parenting suggest a solution to the time-consistency problem (althou gh they don’t call it that) by telling parents that they should set rules For their children and stick to them. A nominal anchor is like a behavior rule. Just as rules help to prevent the timeconsistency problem in parenting, a nominal anchor can help to prevent the time consistency problem in monetary policy by providing an expected constraint on discretionary policy. In the following sections, we examine three monetary policy strategies— exchange-rate targeting, monetary targeting, and inflation targeting—that use a nominal anchor. Exchange-Rate Targeting Targeting the exchange rate is a monetary policy strategy with a long history. It can take the form of fixing the value of the domestic currency to a commodity such as gold, the key feature of the gold standard described in Chapter 20. More recently, fixed exchange-rate regimes have involved fixing the value of the domestic currency to that of a large, low-inflation country like the United States or Germany (called the anchor country). Another alternative is to adopt a crawling target or peg, in which a currency is allowed to depreciate at a steady rate so that the inflation rate in the 3 pegging country can be higher than that of the anchor country. Exchange-rate targeting has several advantages. First, the nominal anchor of an exchange-rate target directly contributes to keeping inflation under control by tying the inflation rate For internationally traded goods to that found in the anchor country. It does this because the Foreign price of internationally traded goods is set by the world market, while the domestic price of these goods is fixed by the exchange-rate target. For example, until 2002 in Argentina the exchange rate for the Argentine peso was exactly one to the dollar, so that a bushel of wheat traded internationally at five dollars had its price set at five pesos. If the exchange-rate target is credible (i.e., expected to be adhered to), the exchange-rate target has the added benefit of anchoring inflation expectations to the inflation rate in the anchor country. Second, an exchange-rate target provides an automatic rule for the conduct of monetary policy that helps mitigate the time-consistency problem. As we saw in Chapter 20, an exchange-rate target forces a tightening of monetary policy when there is a tendency for the domestic currency to depreciate or a loosening of policy when there is a tendency for the domestic currency to appreciate, so that discretionary, time-consistent monetary policy is less of an option. Third, an exchange-rate target has the advantage of simplicity and clarity, which makes it easily understood by the public. A “sound currency” is an easy-tounderstand rallying cry for monetary policy. In the past, this aspect was important in France, where an appeal to the “franc fort” (strong franc) was often used to justify tight monetary policy. Given its advantages, it is not surprising that exchange-rate targeting has been used successfully to control inflation in industrialized countries. Both France and the United Kingdom, for example, successfully used exchange-rate targeting to lower inflation by tying the value of their currencies to the German mark. In 1987, when France first pegged its exchange rate to the mark, its inflation rate was 3%, two percentage points above the German inflation rate. By 1992, its inflation rate had fallen to 2%, a level that can be argued is consistent with price stability, and was even 4 below that in Germany. By 1996, the French and German inflation rates had converged, to a number slightly below 2%. Similarly, after pegging to the German mark in 1990, the United Kingdom was able to lower its inflation rate from 10% to 3% by 1992, when it was Forced to abandon the exchange rate mechanism (ERM, discussed in Chapter 20). Exchange-rate targeting has also been an effective means of reducing inflation quickly in emerging market countries. For example, beFore the devaluation in Mexico in 1994, its exchange-rate target enabled it to bring inflation down from levels above 100% in 1988 to below 10% in 1994. Despite the inherent advantages of exchange-rate targeting, there are several serious criticisms of this strategy. The problem (as we saw in Chapter 20) is that with capital mobility the targeting country no longer can pursue its own independent monetary policy and so loses its ability to use monetary policy to respond to domestic shocks that are independent of those hitting the anchor country. Furthermore, an exchangerate target means that shocks to the anchor country are directly transmitted to the targeting country, because changes in interest rates in the anchor country lead to a corresponding change in interest rates in the targeting country. A striking example of these problems occurred when Germany reunified in 1990. In response to concerns about inflationary pressures arising from reunification and the massive fiscal expansion required to rebuild East Germany, long-term German interest rates rose until February 1991 and short-term rates rose until December 1991. This shock to the anchor country in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) was transmitted directly to the other countries in the ERM whose currencies were pegged to the mark, and their interest rates rose in tandem with those in Germany. Continuing adherence to the exchange-rate target slowed economic growth and increased unemployment in countries such as France that remained in the ERM and adhered to the exchange-rate peg. A second problem with exchange-rate targets is that they leave countries open to speculative attacks on their currencies. Indeed, one aftermath of German reunification 5 was the Foreign exchange crisis of September 1992. As we saw in Chapter 20, the tight monetary policy in Germany following reunification meant that the countries in the ERM were subjected to a negative demand shock that led to a decline in economic growth and a rise in unemployment. It was certainly feasible For the governments of these countries to keep their exchange rates fixed relative to the mark in these circumstances, but speculators began to question whet her these countries’ commitment to the exchange-rate peg would weaken. Speculators reasoned that these countries would not tolerate the rise in unemployment resulting from keeping interest rates high enough to fend off attacks on their currencies. At this stage, speculators were, in effect, presented with a one-way bet, because the currencies of countries like France, Spain, Sweden, Italy, and the United Kingdom could go only in one direction and depreciate against the mark. Selling these currencies before the likely depreciation occurred gave speculators an attractive profit opportunity with potentially high expected returns. The result was the speculative attack in September 1992 discussed in Chapter 20. Only in France was the commitment to the fixed exchange rate strong enough so that France did not devalue. The governments in the other countries were unwilling to defend their currencies at all costs and eventually allowed their currencies to fall in value. The different response of France and the United Kingdom after the September 1992 exchange-rate crisis illustrates the potential cost of an exchange-rate target. France, which continued to peg to the mark and was thus unable to use monetary policy to respond to domestic conditions, found that economic growth remained slow after 1992 and unemployment increased. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, which dropped out of the ERM exchange-rate peg and adopted inflation targeting (discussed later in this chapter), had much better economic performance: economic growth was higher, the unemployment rate fell, and yet its inflation was not much worse than France’s. In contrast to industrialized countries, emerging market countries (including the 6 so-called transition countries of Eastern Europe) may not lose much by giving up an independent monetary policy when they target exchange rates. Because many emerging market countries have not developed the political or monetary institutions that allow the successful use of discretionary monetary policy, they may have little to gain from an independent monetary policy, but a lot to lose. Thus, they would be better off by, in effect, adopting the monetary policy of a country like the United States through targeting exchange rates than by pursuing their own independent policy. This is one of the reasons that so many emerging market countries have adopted exchangerate targeting. Nonetheless, exchange-rate targeting is highly dangerous For these countries, because it leaves them open to speculative attacks that can have far more serious consequences For their economies than for the economies of industrialized countries. Indeed, as we saw in Chapters 8 and 20, the successful speculative attacks in Mexico in 1994, East Asia in 1997, and Argentina in 2002 plunged their economies into fullscale financial crises that devastated their economies. An additional disadvantage of an exchange-rate target is that it can weaken the accountability of policymakers, particularly in emerging market countries. Because exchange-rate targeting fixes the exchange rate, it eliminates an important signal that can help constrain monetary policy from becoming too expansionary. In industrialized countries, particularly in the United States, the bond market provides an important signal about the stance of monetary policy. Overly expansionary monetary policy or strong political pressure to engage in overly expansionary monetary policy produces an inflation scare in which inflation expectations surge, interest rates rise because of the Fisher effect (described in Chapter 5), and there is a sharp decline in long-term bond prices. Because both central banks and the politicians want to avoid this kind of scenario, overly expansionary, time-consistent monetary policy will be less likely. In many countries, particularly emerging market countries, the long-term bond market is essentially nonexistent. Under a flexible exchange-rate regime, however, if 7 monetary policy is too expansionary, the exchange rate will depreciate. In these countries the daily fluctuations of the exchange rate can, like the bond market in United States, provide an early warning signal that monetary policy is too expansionary. Just as the fear of a visible inflation scare in the bond market constrains central bankers from pursuing overly expansionary monetary policy and also constrains politicians from putting pressure on the central bank to engage in overly expansionary monetary policy, fear of exchange-rate depreciations can make overly expansionary, time-consistent monetary policy less likely. The need For signals from the Foreign exchange market may be even more acute for emerging market countries, because the balance sheets and actions of the central banks are not as transparent as they are in industrialized countries. Targeting the exchang e rate can make it even harder to ascertain the central bank’s policy actions, as was true in Thailand before the July 1997 currency crisis. The public is less able to keep a watch on the central banks and the politicians pressuring it, which makes it easier for monetary policy to become too expansionary. Given the above disadvantages with exchange-rate targeting, when might it make sense? In industrialized countries, the biggest cost to exchange-rate targeting is the loss of an independent monetary policy to deal with domestic considerations. If an independent, domestic monetary policy can be conducted responsibly, this can be a serious cost indeed, as the comparison between the post-1992 experience of France and the United Kingdom indicates. However, not all industrialized countries have found that they are capable of conducting their own monetary policy successfully, either because of the lack of independence of the central bank or because political pressures on the central bank lead to an inflation bias in monetary policy. In these cases, giving up independent control of domestic monetary policy may not be a great loss, while the gain of having monetary policy determined by a better-performing central bank in the anchor country can be substantial. Italy provides an example: It was not a coincidence that the Italian public was 8 the most favorable of all those in Europe to the European Monetary Union. The past record of Italian monetary policy was not good, and the Italian public recognized that having monetary policy controlled by more responsible outsiders had benefits that far outweighed the costs of losing the ability to focus monetary policy on domestic considerations. A second reason why industrialized countries might find targeting exchange rates useful is that it encourages integration of the domestic economy with its neighbors. Clearly this was the rationale For long-standing pegging of the exchange rate to the deutsche mark by countries such as Austria and the Netherlands, and the more recent exchange-rate pegs that preceded the European Monetary Union. To sum up, exchange-rate targeting For industrialized countries is probably not the best monetary policy strategy to control the overall economy unless (1) domestic monetary and political institutions are not conducive to good monetary policymaking or (2) there are other important benefits of an exchange-rate target that have nothing to do with monetary policy. In countries whose political and monetary institutions are particularly weak and who therefore have been experiencing continued bouts of hyperinflation, a characterization that applies to many emerging market (including transition) countries, exchangerate targeting may be the only way to break inflationary psychology and stabilize the economy. In this situation, exchange-rate targeting is the stabilization policy of last resort. However, if the exchange-rate targeting regimes in emerging market countries are not always transparent, they are more likely to break down, often resulting in disastrous financial crises. 9 货币政策策略:国际实践 弗雷德里克.s.米什金 预习推行适当的货币政策对经济的健康运行至关重要,过分扩张的货币政策会导致高通货膨胀,从而降低经济运行的效率,阻碍经济增长。即使是美国也不能避免通货膨胀,但是每年超过100%的恶性通货膨胀在世界的一些地区,比如拉美地区非常普遍,对经济造成了极大的破坏。过分紧缩的货币政策能够引起严峻的萧条, 表 关于同志近三年现实表现材料材料类招标技术评分表图表与交易pdf视力表打印pdf用图表说话 pdf 现为产出下降,失业率提高。它也可能导致通货紧缩,即价格水平下降。这种情况在大萧条期间的美国和近来的日本都发生过。如我们在第8章所学的,通货紧缩尤其能对经济造成破坏,因为它促使了金融动荡,甚至于引发金融危机。 在第18章货币政策实施的讨论中,我们主要关注了美国的情况。但是,美国不是如何有效地实施货币政策的全部智慧之源。在考虑什么样的货币政策实施策略可能是最好的过程中,我们需要考察其他国家的货币政策实践。 所有国家货币政策策略的一个核心特征是,使用名义锚 nominal anchor,货币政策制定者用来拴住价格水平的名义变量,例如通货膨胀率、汇率或者货币供给)作为中介指标,以实现最终的货币政策目标,如价格稳定。我们通过考察名义锚在推进价格稳定方面的作用,开始本章的分析。然后,我们考察货币政策策略的三个基本类型—以汇率为指标、以货币为指标以及以通货膨胀为指标—这些策略反映了隐含的(不是明确的)名义锚的特点。我们会看到,尽管近年来美国货币政策的成绩斐然,还是要学习许多外国的经验。 名义锚的作用 钉住名义锚迫使一国的货币当局必须实施货币政策,以保证名义锚变量,比如通货膨胀率或者货币供给,稳定在一个窄幅内。于是,名义锚防止了价格水平过快的上涨或下降,进而维持一国货币的价值。因此,一些种类的名义锚是成功的货币政策策略的必要组成部分。 名义锚对货币政策必不可少的一个原因是,它有助于促进物价稳定,而这.又被大多数国家当作是货币政策的最重要目标。名义锚通过直接控制本国货币的价值,把通货膨胀预期限制在低水平上,以此来促进物价稳定。名义锚重要性的一个更微妙的原因是,它能限制时间非一致性问题(time一incon-sistency problem )—建立在自由放任的、日常基础上的货币政策实施导致了长期的不良 10 后果。 自由放任政策引起的时间非一致性问题,是因为经济行为受公司和个人对货币当局未来行为预期的影响。假定公司和个人的预期保持不变,政策制定者认为他们可以通过推行比原来预期要扩张的货币政策来促进经济产出(或较低的失业),因而他们有动机实施这样的政策。不过,由于有关工资和价格的决策反映了政策的预期,工人和公司不仅会提高通货膨胀预期,还会提高工资和价格预期。在这样的扩张性策略下,产出一般不会那么高,但是通货膨胀会达到很高的水平。(我们将在第28章正式考察这个结论。) 即使中央银行认为它的政策非常明智,它也可能推行过分扩张的货币政策,并且产生不良的后果—高通货膨胀,而产出却没有增加。即使中央银行意识到了时间非一致性问题,它可能也难以避免这个问题,因为政治压力要求中央银行推行过分扩张的货币政策。 虽然这个分析似乎有点复杂,时间非一致性问题实际上是我们每天都要遇上的事。例如,父母可能为了防止孩子调皮而向他们屈服。不过,父母越是屈服,孩子可能变得越过分。于是,如果孩子的预期保持不变(也就是说,如果孩子开始指望父母会对不负责任的行为屈服),虽然屈服可能是恰当的行为,它最终会导致不好的结果,因为孩子的预期会受到父母行为的影响。这就是为什么父母指南通常建议父母给孩子制定规则,且自己要严格遵守。 名义锚就像行为规则:它通过对自由放任的政策提供预先的约束,有助于避免时间非一致性问题。在以下部分中,我们考察三种货币政策策略—以汇率为指标、以货币为指标以及以通货膨胀为指标—这些策略都使用了名义锚。 以汇率为指标 以汇率为指标是一个历史悠久的货币政策策略。它可以采用把本国货币的价值固定到一种商品比如黄金身上的形式,这是第19章所描述的金本位制度的重要特征。近几年来,固定汇率制度已经包括将本国货币的价值,与较大的、通货膨胀低的国家,如美国和德国(称为核心国)的货币的价值固定在一起。另一种方式是采用爬行指标或钉住指标,即允许货币以稳定的速率贬值,以使钉住国的通货膨胀率能够高于核心国的通货膨胀率。 以汇率为指标有几个优点。第一,汇率指标的名义锚通过将国际贸易商品的通货膨胀率和核心国该种商品的通货膨胀率相挂钩,直接有助于控制通货膨胀。能够做到这一点是因为,国际贸易商品的国外价格是由世界市场决定的, 11 而这些商品的国内价格由汇率指标固定住了。例如,在阿根廷,阿根廷比索对美元的汇率恰好是1,因此国际贸易中5美元1蒲式耳小麦的价格设定为5比索。如果汇率是可信的(也就是预计被固定住),那么汇率指标将通货膨胀预期和核心国的通货膨胀率固定在一起,就带来了额外的好处。 第二,汇率指标提供了货币政策实施的自动规则,这有利于减轻时间非一致性问题。如在第19章中所学的,当本国货币有贬值趋势时,汇率指标会促使推行紧缩的货币政策;当本国货币有升值的趋势时,汇率指标会促使推行宽松的货币政策。因此,就不会选择自由放任的、有时间非一致性的货币政策。 第三,汇率指标具有简单和明晰的优点,使得公众容易理解。“稳定的货币”是货币政策易于理解的战斗口号。过去,这一点在法国非常重要,建立“法郎堡垒”(坚挺的法郎)的要求经常被用来支持紧缩的货币政策。 由于以上优点,我们一点也不奇怪,在工业化国家,以汇率为指标已被成功地用于控制通货膨胀。例如,法国和英国,通过将它们货币的价值钉住德国马克,成功地使用了汇率指标来降低通货膨胀率。1987年,当法国首次将汇率钉住马克,它的通货膨胀率是3%,高于德国通货膨胀率3个百分点。到1992年,它的通货膨胀率降到2%,该水平可以被认为是与物价稳定相适应的,而且甚至低于德国的通货膨胀率。到1996年,法国和德国的通货膨胀率十分相近,达到稍微低于3%的一个数值。类似地,在1990年钉住德国马克之后,到1992年,英国将通货膨胀率从10%降到3%,但是它最终被迫放弃汇率机制(第19章已介绍过)。 在新兴市场国家,汇率指标也是迅速降低通货膨胀率的一种有效方法。例如,在1994年墨西哥货币贬值之前,汇率指标使墨西哥将通货膨胀率从1988年的100%以上,降到了1994年的10%以下。 尽管汇率指标有内在的优点,对这个策略还是有几个严厉的批评。问题(如我们在第19章所见的)在于,随着资本的流动,设定指标的国家不能再实施独立的货币政策,丧失了利用货币政策来应付国内突发事件—它们独立于那些冲击核心国的事件—的能力。而且,汇率指标意味着对核心国的突发冲击会被直接传递到指标国,因为核心国利率的变动导致指标国利率的相应变动。 最显著的例子是1990年德国统一时发生的事。为了应对由统一以及重建民主德国所需的大规模财政扩张引起的通货膨胀压力,德国在1991年2月之前一直在提高长期利率,在12月之前一直在提高短期利率。这次汇率机制中核心 12 国的突发事件直接被传递到ERM的其他国家,这些国家的货币钉住马克,它们的利率被迫跟着德国提高。连续的采取汇率指标会减慢这些国家的经济增长速度,导致失业率的升高,例如法国的例子,但它留在ERM机制之内,坚持汇率钉住制。 几平指标的第二个问题是,它使得那些国家为投机者冲击其货币敞开了大门。实际上,德国统一的一个后果就是1992年9月的外汇市场危机。如第19章所示,德国统一后的紧缩性货币政策意味着ERM国家受制于需求逆转的冲击,这种冲击会导致经济增长下降和失业率提高。对这些国家的政府来说,在这样的情况下维持汇率相对于马克固定不变,当然是切实可行的,但是,投机者开始琢磨,这些国家坚持汇率钉住的承诺是否会削弱?投机者断定,这些国家不会容忍为了抵挡对它们货币的冲击,保持足够高的利率所带来的失业率的上升。 在这个阶段,投机者实际上下了单方面的赌注,因为像法国、西班牙、瑞典、意大利和英国,这些国家的货币只能单方向运动,且相对于马克贬值。在可能的贬值发生之前,抛出这些货币给投机者带来了有潜在高预期收益的可观获利机会。结果是发生了第19章讨论的1992年12月的投机性冲击。只有法国严正承诺维持固定汇率,法郎才免于贬值。其他国家的政府不愿不惜一切代价保卫它们的货币,最终任由其货币贬值。 1992年9月汇率危机之后法国和英国的不同反应,证实了汇率指标的潜在成本。法国继续钉住马克,因而不能使用货币政策来应付国内状况,最终发现1992年之后它的经济增长缓慢,失业率提高。另一方面,英国退出ERM汇率钉住制度,采用了通货膨胀指标(本章后面介绍),却带来了较好的经济成就:经济增长率较高,失业率下降,而且通货膨胀没有法国那么严重。 与工业化国家不同,当新兴市场国家(包括所谓的东欧转轨国家)以汇率为指标,放弃了独立的货币政策时,它们可能没有损失太多。因为许多新兴市场国家没有建立起能够成功运用自由放任货币政策的政治或货币机构,它们可能从独立的货币政策中获益很少,反而失去很多。于是,实际上,它们通过定位指标于汇率而不追寻独立的政策,采取一个像美国那样的国家的货币政策,状况会更好一些。这是许多新兴市场国家采用汇率指标的原因之一。 不过,汇率指标对这些国家来说是高度危险的,投机性冲击之下,这些冲击给它们的经济带来的后果因为这导致它们暴露在,比起对工业化国家经济造成的后果,墨西哥和1997 要严峻得多。实际上,如第8章和第19章所述,1994 13 年对年对东亚的成功投机性冲击,使它们的经济陷人全面的金融危机,严重破坏了它们的经济。 汇率指标的另一个缺点是,它能够削弱政策制定者对外负责的能力,特别是在新兴市场国家。因为汇率指标固定住了汇率,它就消除了一个能够帮助防范货币政策过于扩张的重要信号。在工业化国家,特别是美国,债券市场提供了关于货币政策姿态的重要信号。过分扩张的货币政策或者要求实施过分扩张的货币政策的强大政治压力,会引起通货膨胀恐慌,导致通货膨胀预期率高涨,利率由于费雪效应(见第5章)上升,且长期债券价格急剧下降。因为中央银行和政治家都想避免这个情况,所以过分扩张的、有时间非一致性的货币政策就不大可能得到推行。 在许多国家,特别是新兴市场国家,长期债券市场本来就不存在。不过,在浮动汇率制度下,如果货币政策过分扩张,汇率会下降。在这些国家,汇率的日常波动能够像美国的债券市场一样,提供货币政策过分扩张的预警信号。就像对债券市场明显的通货膨胀恐慌的担忧阻止了中央银行推行过分扩张的货币政策,也阻止了政治家向中央银行施压要求实行过分扩张的货币政策一样,汇率下降的担优能够使过分扩张的、有时间非一致性的货币玫策不大可能推行。 从外汇市场获得信号的需要可能对新兴市场国家来说更为强烈,因为中央银行的资产负债表和行动不像在工业化国家那样透明。以汇率为指标可能使得人们更难判断中央银行的政策行动,如1997年7月货币危机之前的泰国那样。公众不能监控中央银行,再加上政治家的压力,使货币政策很容易就变得过于扩张。 有鉴于上述汇率指标的缺点,它在什么时候有意义呢? 在工业化国家,汇率指标的最大成本是,不能独立实行货币政策以处理国内事务。如果一项独立的本国货币政策能被负责任地实施,正如对照1992年后法国和英国的经历指出的那样,这实在是一个很大的成本。不过,或者由于缺少中央银行的独立性,或者由于对中央银行的政治压力导致通货膨胀倾向的货币政策,不是所有的工业化国家都发现它们能够成功实施自己的货币政策。在这样的情况下,放弃对国内货币政策的独立控制,可能不是很大的损失,而让货币政策由核心国的更有效运作的中央银行来决定,所带来的收益可能是相当大的。 意大利提供了这样的例子。意大利公众在欧洲国家中最赞成欧洲货币联盟 14 并不是偶然的。意大利货币政策的历史记录并不好,意大利公众意识到,让货币政策由更负责任的外人来控制,其收益远远大于失去采用货币政策来解决国内事务的能力所带来的成本。 为什么工业化国家可能发现以汇率为指标非常有用的第二个原因是,它促进了本国经济和邻国经济的融合。这可由一些国家,如奥地利和荷兰,长期将汇率钉住德国马克,以及先于欧洲货币联盟的汇率钉住的例子所证实。 总之,工业化国家以汇率为指标可能不是控制整体经济的最好的货币政策策略,除非国内货币和政治机构不利于良好的货币政策决策,或者存在其他重大的和货币政策无关的汇率指标利益。 在政治和货币机构特别软弱,因而遭受持续的恶性通货膨胀的国家,包括许多新兴市场(包含转轨国家)国家,以汇率为指标可能是打破通货膨胀心理、稳定经济的惟一途径。在这样的情况下,汇率指标是最后的稳定政策。然而,如果新兴市场国家以汇率为指标的制度没有一直保持透明,它们更有可能崩溃,通常导致灾难性的金融危机。 15