什么在阻止复苏？-双语

什么在阻止复苏？ 什么在阻止复苏？ （What’s Stopping Robust Recovery?） 全球经济的增长地图已经相对清晰。美国正在局部复苏之中，增长率为1.5—2%左右，但就业萎靡不振。欧洲作为一个整体只是略有增着那个，国家间差别很大，尽管有证据表明痛苦的再趋同正在发生，至少从名义单位劳动力成本看是如此。与此同时，中国的增长正在向7%靠近，其他发展中国家在准备提高利率。 许多发达经济体仍必须克服来自内需过剩的危机前增长模式的结束造成的后果。在这些经济体中，这一模式不仅往往依赖于杠杆；也常常扩大了经济中的不可贸易部门，压缩了可贸易部门。此外，由于不可贸易部门受其对内需的依赖，复苏——即使到来——将取决于可贸易部门的增长潜力。 为了实现潜力，可贸易部门必须在边际上重新扩张：随着货币贬值造成进口下降和实际单位劳动力成本因名义工资稳定而下降，失业的劳动力和资本将流向外部市场追求商品、服务和资源。 在美国，这一幕正在发生，出口已高于前期峰值，而进口仍然受到抑制；经常项目赤字在减少；甚至可贸易部门的净就业也在增加（为二十年来首次）。事实上，最新数据表明美国增长加速的一大半来自可贸易部门，尽管该部门仅占经济的三分之一。而可贸易部门的贡献可能仍被低估了，因为可贸易供给面形成的收入产生了成为不可贸易部门需求的收入，从而形成了跨越可贸易/不可贸易界线的乘数效应。 美国经济相对灵活，这种私人部门的结构性调整也因此较为迅速。但就业仍然萎靡不振，这主要是拜劳动力节约技术和全球供应链重构（低附加值细分市场和功能倾向于向低收入国家集中）等长期因素所致。 说美国复苏只是局部性的一个原因在于财政拖累，这是2008年衰退后一直无法摆脱的阴影，2008年衰退将一些杠杆转移到了公共部门，导致债务负担增加，需要立刻采取紧缩来纠正（这一点存在争议）。 但主要问题在于公共部门投资仍远远低于维持增长的水平。充分实现潜在增长的难点在于让内需的组成从消费转向投资而不增加杠杆。这意味着靠公共部门来偿付，通过征税和减少家庭消费（以及财富积累）实现。 这也意味着保持内需和外需的合理平衡，提高中期和长期对国内总需求的组成（和规模）的敏感性。在这样的背景下，货币 政策 公共政策概论形成性考核册答案公共政策概论形成性考核册答案2018本科2018公共政策概论形成性考核册答案公共政策概论作业1答案公共政策概论形成考核册答案 必须谨慎，因为低利率可能让增长模式重回杠杆和国内消费需求，阻碍正在发生的向可贸易部门转变的结构性变化。 一些欧洲国家还变得过度依赖于内需，需要偏向可贸易部门的再平衡。但它们的挑战要大得多，再平衡过程也慢得多。在欧元的第一个十年中，希腊、爱尔兰、意大利、葡萄牙和西班牙的名义单位劳动力成本大幅上升，而德国基本保持不变。在没有共同货币时，这一分化将伴随汇率调整——在过度杠杆和内需模式结束之后肯定会发生（甚至在之前就发生）。 但在货币联盟中不可能发生这样的调整，因此单位劳动力成本正在通过名义工资增长的长期停滞和实际工资的长期缓慢下降而缓慢地实现重新趋同（如果德国和北欧通胀更高一些，那么这个过程也会更快一些）。内需跟不上供给，因此这条慢路实际上通过可贸易部门的扩张延缓或妨碍了增长。 结构性调整的速度也深受就业是否能够轻易地从经济的不可贸易部门转移到可贸易部门以及是否能够轻易地在全球供应链的各个细分层次转移的影响。各国劳动力市场灵活度大相径庭，增加其灵活性的改革至关重要。比如，德国在2003—2006年的改革大大地增加了灵活性（尽管它所处的全球和欧元区条件更为有利）。 德国巨大的经常项目盈余意义重大。但是，正如欧元区深陷麻烦的经济体货币高估，德国面临着货币低估，这会造成外部盈余，根据定义，这必然导致储蓄超过投资。 低估的货币还会造成相反类型的失衡增长模式：庞大的贸易部门和国内总需求不足。由于发达经济体的不可贸易部门可以创造更多的就业，因此这一模式可能导致就业问题（即使这可以通过削减工时而非岗位而得到部分掩盖）。 原则上，德国可以通过增加杠杆提振内需；但是，除非汇率向上调整从而在边际上抑制可贸易部门，否则这会造成通货膨胀。欧洲央行将因此不得不出手干预以捍卫其对价格稳定的承诺（其主要使命）的信誉。毫不奇怪，德国发现它难以在当前的欧元区结构中实现可持续的平衡增长模式。 只要你熟悉中国从供给面向需求面的结构性变迁，就会对德国的情形感到似曾相识。 关键点在于，重塑增长需要对结构性平衡进行仔细分析，注意不可贸易部门的需求约束，并专注于扩张可贸易部门的阻碍因素。一些阻碍因素在于供给面刚性；一些阻碍因素与内需过剩关系更大。要实现更鲁棒的复苏，两者都不可忽视。 The growth map of the global economy is relatively clear. The US is in a partial recovery, with growth at 1.5-2% and lagging employment. Europe as a whole is barely above zero growth, with large variations among countries, though with some evidence of painful re-convergence, at least in terms of nominal unit labor costs. China’s growth, meanwhile, is leveling off at 7%, with other developing countries preparing for higher interest rates. Many advanced economies must still address the end of the pre-crisis growth pattern generated by excessive domestic demand. In such economies, that pattern not only typically depended on leverage; it also enlarged the non-tradable side of the economy and shrank the tradable side. And yet, given that the non-tradable sector is constrained by its reliance on domestic demand, recovery – if it comes – will depend on the tradable sector’s growth potential. To realize that potential, the tradable sector has to re-expand at the margin: as a weakening currency causes imports to fall and real unit labor costs decline as nominal wages flatten out, unemployed labor and capital flow toward external markets for goods, services, and resources. This is already happening in the United States, where exports are above their previous peak while imports remain subdued; the current-account deficit is declining; and even net employment in the tradable sector is increasing (for the first time in two decades). Indeed, recent data suggest that more than half of the acceleration in US growth is occurring on the tradable side, even though it accounts for only about one-third of the economy. And that contribution is probably an underestimate, because income generated on the tradable supply side produces income that becomes demand on the non-tradable side – a multiplier effect that crosses the tradable/non-tradable boundary. The US economy is relatively flexible, and this kind of structural adjustment in the private sector occurs reasonably quickly. And yet employment still lags, owing to longer-term factors like labor-saving technology and reconfigurations of global supply chains, in which lower-value-added segments and functions tend to be concentrated in lower-income countries. One reason the US recovery is only partial is fiscal drag, a lingering effect of the post-2008 downturn, which shifted some leverage to the public sector, resulting in a growing debt burden that has been addressed – controversially so – by immediate austerity. But the main problem is that public-sector investment remains well below growth-sustaining levels. The hard part of fully realizing potential growth is shifting the composition of domestic demand from consumption to investment without adding leverage. That means paying for it on the public-sector side, via taxes and a reduction in household consumption (and in wealth accumulation). It also means getting the balance between domestic and external demand right, and appreciating the sensitivity of medium- and long-term growth to the composition (and size) of domestic aggregate demand. Against this background, monetary policymakers must be cautious, because low interest rates can shift the growth model back toward leverage and domestic consumer demand, stalling the structural shift to the tradable side that is underway. Several European countries also became too dependent on domestic demand and need to rebalance toward the tradable side. But the challenge for them is much bigger and the process slower. In the first decade of the euro, nominal unit labor costs rose sharply in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, while virtually flatlining in Germany. Absent the common currency, these divergences would have been accompanied by exchange-rate adjustments – certainly after (and perhaps even before) the pattern of excessive leverage and domestic demand ended. But such adjustments cannot happen in a monetary union, so unit labor costs are slowly re-converging via a protracted process of flat nominal wage growth and slowly declining real wages (a process that would be quicker with higher inflation in Germany and Northern Europe). With domestic demand in short supply, this slow road essentially postpones or impedes growth via expansion of the tradable sector. The speed of structural adjustment is also strongly influenced by how easily employment can shift from an economy’s non-tradable to its tradable side and across segments of global supply chains. Countries’ degree of labor-market flexibility varies considerably, and the reforms that increase it are critically important. For example, the German reforms of 2003-2006 increased flexibility significantly (though in a more benign global and eurozone setting). Much is made of Germany’s large current-account surpluses. But, just as the eurozone’s struggling economies have an overvalued currency, Germany has an undervalued one, which tends to produce external surpluses and, by definition, an excess of savings over investment. An undervalued currency also tends to produce an unbalanced growth model of the opposite kind: an outsize tradable sector and insufficient domestic aggregate demand. Because the non-tradable sector in advanced economies tends to create more jobs, this model can lead to an employment problem (even if it is partly masked by cutting hours rather than workers). In principle, Germany could try to boost domestic demand by leveraging up; but, unless the exchange rate adjusts upward to shrink the tradable sector at the margin, doing so would be inflationary. The European Central Bank would then have to intervene to maintain the credibility of its commitment to price stability, which is its primary mandate. It is little wonder that Germany finds it difficult to achieve a sustainable pattern of balanced growth in the eurozone as it is currently configured. Anyone familiar with China’s structural shifts on the supply and demand side will recognize some similarities with the German case. The main point is that restoring growth requires a careful analysis of structural balance, attention to demand constraints in the non-tradable sector, and a focus on the impediments to expanding the tradable sector. Some of those impediments are supply-side rigidities; others have more to do with bloated domestic demand. Neither can be ignored if robust recovery is to be achieved. (Michael Spence, a Nobel laureate in economics, is Professor of Economics at NYU’s Stern School of Business.)