The Journal of Applied Business Research – January/February 2010 Volume 26, Number 1
45
Profit Maximization
In The National Football League
John P. Brunkhorst, Colorado College, USA
Aju J. Fenn, Colorado College, USA
ABSTRACT
This paper investigates if NFL teams maximize profits with respect to ticket price. We modify
Ferguson et al’s (1991) NHL paper as it pertains to the NFL. A profit function incorporating
variable revenue and cost factors such as gate receipts and player expenses is employed. A
systems model is used as the estimation procedure to identify the determinants of ticket prices for
NFL franchises. The model implies a Kuhn-Tucker based cross equation parameter restriction
that result from attendance capacity constraints. Results from the regression are then used in
conjunction with other data to numerically test the first order necessary profit maximization
conditions. The results indicate that over 80% of NFL teams set ticket prices in a manner
consistent with gate receipt and profit maximization.
Keywords: National Football League, Profit Maximization, Ticket Price Determination
INTRODUCTION
he theory of profit maximization has been a key economic concept for almost a century, Knight
(1921). Profit maximization occurs when firms adjust either the quantity or price of the goods they
produce in order to maximize the gap between revenues and costs. Professional sporting contests
have been one of the most significant branches of the entertainment industry. Szymanski (2003) reports that in 1997
the U.S. Census Bureau found 41% of the population, roughly 110 million people, attended a spectator sporting
event each year. He also states that Kagan Media estimated the annual household television viewing of sports
events to be 77 billion hours per year.
According to Scully (1995) the National Football League (NFL) is an economic enterprise where every
single team in the league is consistently profitable. Zimbalist (2003) states that individual owner’s economic
objectives differ due to the unique way each owner defines profit maximization. Some owners focus simply on
money, while others believe the best way to maximize profits is to maximize the number of wins. Even though
research conducted by Forbes shows that each team in the NFL makes a significant profit, it does not mean that each
team maximizes potential profits.
i
Constant sellouts and scalpers selling tickets above face value point to the fact
that NFL franchises could raise ticket prices in order to increase profits. Perhaps some owners are more interested in
winning championships than making the most money. As long as franchises are not losing money, their ultimate
goal could be the glory and prestige accompanying a Super Bowl victory. On the other hand, constantly increasing
ticket prices and television blackouts in local areas during non-sellout games all point to profit maximization as the
main objective. These conflicting empirical findings and stylized facts prompt the question: Do NFL franchises
conform to the practices of profit maximization? This paper will strive to answer that question.
The purpose of this study is to determine whether NFL franchises set ticket prices in a manner consistent
with the first order necessary profit maximizing conditions. The first section will provide a review of the pertinent
empirical literature on profit maximization. The second section will outline the modifications to the methodology
employed by Ferguson et al. (1991) and will develop empirical models for the maximization of gate receipts with
respect to ticket prices. Section three addresses the profit maximizing necessary conditions and presents the
numerical equations used to test whether these conditions hold. The fourth section will present the data and
regression model. The fifth section discusses the results for both the empirical model and the numerical testing of
T
The Journal of Applied Business Research – January/February 2010 Volume 26, Number 1
46
profit maximization. Finally, the implications of the results are presented in the concluding section.
CURRENT RESEARCH ON PROFIT MAXIMIZATION
While the theory of profit maximization has been around since the beginning of the 20
th
century there have
been relatively few studies that adapt this theory to professional sports leagues. Several studies have focused on the
economic design of these leagues and the relationship between variables affecting the business side of professional
sports.
There is a copious literature that covers studies on attendance, revenue, competitive balance, etc. Brook
(2006) provides an excellent summary of the literature on profit maximizing models and inelastic ticket pricing. El-
Hodiri & Quirk (1971, 1974, and 1975) present the first model of a sports league. Like us they focus on gate
receipts alone. Additional work by Heilmann & Wendling (1976) extended the El-Hodiri and Quirk effort to
include additional revenue streams. Marburger (1997) has modeled sports teams as multi-product monopolists that
sell both admission and concessions. Another vein of the literature examines the connection between ticket pricing
and home field advantage. The reader is directed to Brook (2006) for a review of these studies.
None of the above studies account for the fact that attendance constraints in the NFL are often binding. In
2006 the NFL set a record with every game for every team selling out through the eleventh week of the season.
Studies on game day attendance like the one by Welki and Zlatoper (1994) fail to account for the impact of such a
constraint in their empirical specifications. However, a study by Ferguson et al. (1991) examines if NHL teams
maximized profits with respect to ticket prices given a seating constraint.
Ferguson et al. (1991) investigate the issue of profit maximization in the National Hockey League (NHL)
by looking at the ticket pricing behavior of teams given a stadium capacity constraint. Their study asserts that
pricing differences between various packages of seating support the idea that owners use sophisticated practices to
earn profits. They assume that each team considers the fan’s willingness to pay for attendance. The team then
maximizes profits by setting seat prices accordingly to maximize its gate receipts. Each team will have a different
method for price setting due to unique franchise characteristics. The econometric results, which use Kuhn-Tucker
conditions through cross equation restrictions, offer considerable support for the notion that NHL teams do follow a
profit maximizing procedure in setting ticket prices.
The present study modifies the model proposed by Ferguson et al. (1991) to examine profit maximization
as it applies to ticket pricing in the NFL. To the best of our knowledge no economic studies conducted on profit or
revenue maximization pertaining to the NFL subject to seating capacity constraints exist. This study tests the
necessary (first order) conditions of profit maximization to see if in the presence of a capacity constraint firms
maximize gate receipts with respect to ticket prices. The following section outlines the mathematical models
derived for both profit and ticket prices which will serve as the foundation for testing profit maximization in the
NFL.
PROFIT MAXIMIZATION: DERIVATION
If owners maximize profits, they must pay close attention to the revenues generated and costs incurred
throughout the season. The revenue that a team receives accrues in two main forms. The majority of revenue is
collected from the gate receipts of each game. Additional revenues arise from the teams’ share of NFL broadcasts
and merchandise sales. Even though revenue sharing from NFL broadcasts and merchandise does make up a fairly
significant part of a team’s total revenue, it is approximately a fixed amount from team to team. The NFL signs
contracts with national and local broadcasting agencies, Szymanski (2003). The NFL allots a share of the revenue
produced from sales of NFL merchandise to be distributed among teams in the league. The revenues generated by
these contracts are divided equally among all teams. The teams have virtually no control over the revenue they
receive from league sharing. Therefore, owners focus on gate receipts, which they can control. Owners can set
ticket prices to maximize profits for the season.
The Journal of Applied Business Research – January/February 2010 Volume 26, Number 1
47
In keeping with Ferguson et al (1991), it is assumed that the costs varying with attendance at each
individual game are so small that operating costs and stadium costs should not play a large role in profit
maximization. The majority of costs for each team stem from factors such as players salaries. This implies that the
owners’ sole objective is to maximize the difference between total gate receipts in each year and total player
expenses. To do this owners will adjust ticket prices until they find a price that returns maximum profit, π, given the
amount spent on players. The revenue generated by gate receipts is simply ticket price, p, multiplied by attendance,
A. Equation (1) gives the profit maximization rule for NFL owners.
Max π = p*A - E subject to A < C (1)
E represents total player expenses. The maximum number of people that can attend any game is limited to the
seating capacity, C, of the stadium.
Ticket price itself is a function of other variables. In keeping with Ferguson et al (1991), this study will
define ticket price as a function of attendance and a vector of other variables. However, it will also incorporate
player expenses as a determinant of ticket price. Equation (2) gives the ticket price function.
p
x
= ƒ (A, E, z;θ) (2)
P
x
is ticket price raised to the power x, z is the vector of exogenous attributes of the team, and θ is the vector
parameters. It is believed that both attendance and player expenses are endogenous variables. Instrumental
variables will be used to handle this endogeneity to ensure that the estimates are unbiased and consistent. The
instrumental variables will produce theoretical values for attendance and player expenses, which will be called
and respectively. Therefore, the inverse demand function from equation (2) is represented by equation (3).
(3)
Combining equations (1), (2) and (3) yields the profit function presented in equation (4). Since profit
maximization corresponds to revenue minus costs, equation (4) will be the basis for testing empirical hypotheses
regarding profit maximization.
EzEA xk
)1(
210 )(* (4)
PROFIT MAXIMIZATION: TESTING METHODOLOGY
A first order necessary condition for profit maximization is that the first order derivative with respect to the
choice variable equals zero. Equation (5) states that, the derivative of profit function with respect to attendance
equals zero.
(5)
The second order condition states that the second derivative must be negative with respect to the choice
variable attendance A. The derivative of ∂π/∂ must be taken with respect to attendance. The resulting expression
is given by Equation (6).
(6)
The Journal of Applied Business Research – January/February 2010 Volume 26, Number 1
48
As noted previously, stadium capacity places a restriction on the number of people attending a game. This
constraint must be taken into account. To do this a univariate Kuhn-Tucker approach is used. A maximum profit
must be generated between zero and stadium capacity. Therefore at the profit maximizing attendance, the following
Kuhn-Tucker conditions must hold.
(7)
These conditions imply the capacity constraint is binding unless local concavity exists. This study uses the
third condition in (7) to represent the restriction on owners’ choices because it is able to represent both the first and
second conditions simultaneously. Thus the restriction equation is given by equation (8).
(8)
Ferguson et al. (1991) use a similar restriction approach in their paper. The effects of the theoretical
determinants on ticket prices in the NFL will be determined empirically by estimating the following system of
equations (9) and (10) that are the empirical versions of equations (3) and (8):
(9)
(10)
In equations (9) and (10) i represents the observation and and are unobservable errors terms.
Using the coefficients and determinants from these equations the first and second order derivatives can be
numerically calculated and evaluated for both sellout and non-sellout teams. The results of these calculations should
shed some light on the maintained hypothesis of profit maximization, in the context of this paper, by NFL owners.
DATA AND METHODS
The dataset is comprised of all 32 NFL football teams over three regular seasons from 2003 to 2005. The
unit of observation is a single regular season for each team. The left hand side dependent variable in this model is
the average ticket price by team for each season.
ii
Average ticket price was defined as a weighted average of season
ticket prices for general and club-level seats for each team during a given season. The weights used were the
proportion of seats in each pricing category. Ticket prices were then adjusted to 2003 dollars using the Consumer
Price Index. The explanatory variables are summarized in equation (11) and briefly defined in Table 1.
PRICE
X
= f(ATTEND, POP, WEALTH, PWIN, CWIN, ALTREC,
STAR, PEXP, HHI, DIVISIONAL DUMMY VARIABLES, (11)
YEAR DUMMY VARIABLES)
s.t. [(β1ATTEND/X)*PRICE^(1-X)+ PRICE] [CAP-ATTEND] = 0
The definitions of the variables presented in the above model are displayed in Table 1.
The Journal of Applied Business Research – January/February 2010 Volume 26, Number 1
49
Table 1: Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
X Exponent value that PRICE was raised by
PRICE Average game ticket price for season in 2003 dollars
ATTEND Season home attendance
POP Population of franchise’s home city
WEALTH Median income of franchise’s home city in 2003 dollars
PWIN End-of-year winning percentage for previous year
CWIN End-of-year winning percentage
ALTREC Alternative forms of local recreation available in home city
STAR Number of Pro Bowl selections
PEXP Total player expenses in 2003 dollars
HHI Yearly HHI in the NFL
CAP Stadium Capacity
NFCE Dummy for division NFC East
NFCN Dummy for division NFC North
NFCS Dummy for division NFC South
NFCW Dummy for division NFC West
AFCE Dummy for division AFC East
AFCN Dummy for division AFC North
AFCS Dummy for division AFC South
YEAR03 Dummy for 2003 season
YEAR04 Dummy for 2004 season
Attendance is also believed to be an endogenous variable in the model, and is therefore dependent on the
exogenous variables. The determinants that affect average ticket price also affect attendance. Attendance
(ATTEND) is defined as the total number of spectators at an NFL team’s home games for a given year. All
attendance data was found at the NFL’s website.iii Lower ticket prices will allow more people to attend games
through the usual income and substitution effects. Therefore, the theoretical prediction is that attendance will have a
negative relationship with price.
The costs of running a professional football team are not small. Most of these costs are either operating
expenses or player expenses. We assume that operating costs, such as stadium operation and general management
costs, do not vary by large amounts across NFL teams. Since these costs are assumed to be fixed, and that data for
them is not readily available, they are excluded from the model. However, expenses such as player and coach
salaries, benefits, and bonuses do differ throughout the league. Even though there is a salary cap in the NFL, player
expenses (EXP) vary significantly for each team. Like attendance, player expenses are believed to be endogenous in
the model. Player expense data was collected from the NFL Team Valuations conducted by Forbes.
iv
They were
then adjusted to 2003 dollars using the Consumer Price Index. When teams spend more on their players and staff
they should theoretically have to bring in more revenue to offset the increased cost. To accomplish this ticket prices
should increase. This is why we expect average ticket price and player expenses to be positively related.
El-Hordiri (1971) says that the league typically gives exclusive rights to organize a team in a 35-75 mile
geographical area around the home playing field. Particular demographics in each territory represented by a NFL
team are potential determinants of NFL ticket prices and other endogenous variables. The total population (POP) of
a territory should directly affect the number of fans wanting to attend home games. A larger population creates a
greater demand for tickets, allowing owners to raise prices, leading to greater revenue. Population may be positively
correlated with ticket prices in the NFL. Populations of the various NFL territories were collected from the US
Census Bureau’s 2000 census.v
Ferguson et al. (1991) find per capita income and ticket prices to be positively correlated in the NHL,
showing attending NHL games to be a normal good. We also expect wealth to have a positive correlation with
ticket prices because NFL tickets should be a normal good. Median income (WEALTH) data was collected from the
US Census Bureau’s 2000 census and then adjusted to 2003 dollars using the Consumer Price Index.vi
The Journal of Applied Business Research – January/February 2010 Volume 26, Number 1
50
The number of different professional sports teams in each territory (ALTREC) represents the possible
substitutes for attending an NFL football game. Multiple sports teams may act as substitutes for each other. NFL
football games are a source of entertainment and compete with other local entertainment for people’s time and
money. If this is the case the greater the number of sports teams in an area the lower the attendance of NFL games.
On the other hand multiple sports teams may be evidence of complementary preferences of consumers. Cities with
more sports teams may have a larger demand for sports and ceteris paribus, attendance at NFL events may be higher.
A priori it is uncertain as to what type of impact the number of sports teams in an area will have on the ticket prices
and revenue in the NFL. The measure of alternative forms of recreation is captured by the number of major league
teams in a particular territory from the four major U.S. professional sports leagues: MLB, NBA, NHL, and the NFL.
There is a significant literature on the connection between winning and attendance. People prefer to watch
winning teams because they attract attention. A winning team should have not only a consistent fan base but a
growing one because current fans will continue to support their team and people who were not previously fans might
now be attracted to the team. The success of an individual team should play a significant role in determining the
prices charge for game day attendance. In any given year, the greater the success of a team, the more people will
want to attend games. The performance of a team in the previous year will also affect attendance for the current
year. If a team did well last year, people will expect another good season and eagerne
本文档为【2010:NFL的利润最大化】,请使用软件OFFICE或WPS软件打开。作品中的文字与图均可以修改和编辑,
图片更改请在作品中右键图片并更换,文字修改请直接点击文字进行修改,也可以新增和删除文档中的内容。
该文档来自用户分享,如有侵权行为请发邮件ishare@vip.sina.com联系网站客服,我们会及时删除。
[版权声明] 本站所有资料为用户分享产生,若发现您的权利被侵害,请联系客服邮件isharekefu@iask.cn,我们尽快处理。
本作品所展示的图片、画像、字体、音乐的版权可能需版权方额外授权,请谨慎使用。
网站提供的党政主题相关内容(国旗、国徽、党徽..)目的在于配合国家政策宣传,仅限个人学习分享使用,禁止用于任何广告和商用目的。