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首页 *新书上架*合理的异议:政治道德理论

*新书上架*合理的异议:政治道德理论.pdf

*新书上架*合理的异议:政治道德理论

九月虺
2009-12-19 0人阅读 举报 0 0 0 暂无简介

简介:本文档为《*新书上架*合理的异议:政治道德理论pdf》,可适用于人文社科领域

ThispageintentionallyleftblankREASONABLEDISAGREEMENTThisbookexaminesthewaysinwhichreasonablepeoplecandisagreeabouttherequirementsofpoliticalmoralityChristopherMcMahonarguesthattherewillbea“zoneofreasonabledisagreement”surroundingmostquestionsofpoliticalmoralityMoralnotionsofrightandwrongevolveovertimeasnewzonesofreasonabledisagreementemergeoutofoldonesthuspoliticalmoralityisbothdifferentindifferentsocietieswithvaryinghistories,anddifferentnowfromwhatitwasinthepastMcMahonexploresthephenomenonofreasonabledisagreementindetailandtracesitsimplicationsforthepossibilityofmakingmoraljudgmentsaboutotherpolities,pastorpresentHisstudyshedslightonanimportantandoftenoverlookedaspectofpoliticallife,andwillbeofinteresttoawiderangeofreadersinmoralandpoliticalphilosophyandinpoliticaltheorychristophermcmahonisProfessorofPhilosophyattheUniversityofCalifornia,SantaBarbaraHispublicationsincludeCollectiveRationalityandCollectiveReasoning()REASONABLEDISAGREEMENTATheoryofPoliticalMoralityCHRISTOPHERMCMAHONCAMBRIDGEUNIVERSITYPRESSCambridge,NewYork,Melbourne,Madrid,CapeTown,Singapore,SãoPaulo,Delhi,Dubai,TokyoCambridgeUniversityPressTheEdinburghBuilding,CambridgeCBRU,UKFirstpublishedinprintformatISBNISBN©ChristopherMcMahonInformationonthistitle:wwwcambridgeorgThispublicationisincopyrightSubjecttostatutoryexceptionandtotheprovisionofrelevantcollectivelicensingagreements,noreproductionofanypartmaytakeplacewithoutthewrittenpermissionofCambridgeUniversityPressCambridgeUniversityPresshasnoresponsibilityforthepersistenceoraccuracyofurlsforexternalorthirdpartyinternetwebsitesreferredtointhispublication,anddoesnotguaranteethatanycontentonsuchwebsitesis,orwillremain,accurateorappropriatePublishedintheUnitedStatesofAmericabyCambridgeUniversityPress,NewYorkwwwcambridgeorgeBook(NetLibrary)HardbackForJanineContentsIntroductionpageThestructureofreasonabledisagreementTheproblemDisagreementaboutmattersofempiricalfactDisagreementamongepistemicpeersReasonabledisagreementandpoliticalmoralityMoralrealismandreasonablepoliticaldisagreementMoralnominalismWilliams’ssubjectivismDescriptivejudgmentEvaluativejudgmentMoraljudgmentMetaethicaldetailsAgreementanddisagreementThepressuretoagreeDeliberationanddisagreementConceptualidentityBroadfairnessThezoneofreasonabledisagreementTheresolutionofreasonabledisagreementAuthorityanddemocracyChangingmindsDominanceMillonpartialtruthTheevolutionofmoralnormativityLocalismRelativismandlocalismBordersandmigrationviiAppraisalwithoutcontactWesternandnonWesternThefutureofpoliticalmoralityMoralityandhistoryHistoricalknowledgeJudgingthepastHierarchyRectifyingpastwrongsApologyConclusionWorkscitedIndexviiiContentsIntroductionTalkofreasonabledisagreementisastapleofpoliticaldiscourseWeoftenhearthatapoliticalissueadmitsofreasonabledisagreementorisoneaboutwhichreasonablepeoplecandisagreeButtherehasbeenlittlephilosophicaldiscussionofreasonabledisagreement,anditisnotclearhowthephenomenonistobeunderstoodWhereverwefindpoliticaldisagreement,thepartieswilltypicallybepreparedtoofferreasonsforthepositionstheytakeThedifferentpositionswill,inthissense,bereasonedButtoassertthatdisagreementinaparticularcaseisreasonableistodomorethanacknowledgethatthepartieshavereasonsforthepositionstheytakeItistoimplythatatleasttwooftheopposingpositionscouldbesupportedbyreasoningthatisfullycompetentInmanycontexts,competentreasoningwithinagroupcanbeexpectedtoproduceaconvergenceofopinionWhentheexchangeofargumentsiscarriedoutingoodfaith,iteliminatesmistakesinreasoning,andweusuallysupposethatifeveryone’sreasoninghasbeenpurgedofmistakes,therewillbeagreementToofferandreceiveargumentsingoodfaithistorespondonlytotheforceofreason,ignoringthepossibilitythattheoptionsbeingconsideredwillimpingepositivelyornegativelyonone’spersonalinterestsortheinterestsofagroupwithwhichoneisaffiliatedIfthereistobesuchathingasreasonabledisagreement,however,itmustsometimesbethecasethatcompetentreasoningwithinagroupfailstoproduceaconvergenceofopinionCharlesLarmorediscussesreasonabledisagreementin“PluralismandReasonableDisagreement,”inhisTheMoralsofModernity(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,),pp–Larmorearguesthatreasonabledisagreement,notpluralism,isthedefiningfeatureofaliberalsocietyHesays,“Theinsightthathasprovensosignificantforliberalthoughtisthatreasonablenesshasceasedtoseemaguaranteeofultimateagreementaboutdeepquestionsconcerninghowweshouldlive”(p)OntheviewIshallpropose,thereisnothingpeculiarlymodernaboutreasonabledisagreement,althoughitmaybetruethatthepossibilityofreasonabledisagreementhasonlyrecentlybeenrecognizedReasonabledisagreementisdisagreementthatsurvivesthebesteffortsofagroupofreasonerstoansweraparticularquestion–thatis,tofindauniqueanswerthatisrequiredbyreasonInpoliticalcontexts,thequestionwillconcernhowsomeaspectofpoliticalcooperationoughttobeorganizedIndescribingwhathecallscommunicativeaction,“actionorientedtoreachinganunderstanding,”JürgenHabermasassertsthatitproceedsontheassumptionthatagreementcanbereachedifdiscussioniscarriedonopenlyenoughandcontinuedlongenoughButwhendisagreementisreasonable,itwillpersistnomatterhowopendiscussionisorhowlongitcontinues“Discussion,”here,meansthecollectiveexaminationoftheforceofagivenbodyofrationalconsiderationsTheconsiderationsavailabletothegrouparesuchthatnomatterhowcompetentlytheyareexamined,orforhowlong,agreementwillnotbeproducedSounderstood,reasonabledisagreementwithrespecttoaparticularissueneednotbeapermanentconditionDisagreementwhichhasbeenreasonablemayceasetopossessthischaracterifnewconsiderationscapableofguidingallcompetentreasonerstoadefiniteconclusionbecomeavailableIngeneral,disagreementamongcompetentreasonersismarkedbyacontinualsearchforconsiderationsthatwillhavethiseffectSometimes,however,theeffortfailsTheprincipalchallengewefaceinprovidinganaccountofreasonabledisagreementinpoliticsiscapturingbothaspectsofthephenomenon,thereasonablenessandthedisagreementWeusuallysupposethatcompetentlyreasonedviewswillagree,sopartofwhatisinvolvedinmeetingthechallengeisexplainingwhythisneednotalwaysbethecaseButinaddition,thepartiestopoliticaldisputesoftenviewatleastsomeofthosewithwhomtheydisagreeasseriouslymistakenabouttheappropriatewayoforganizingpoliticalcooperationAnadequateaccountofreasonabledisagreementinpoliticsmustpreservethisfeatureItmustexplainnotonlyhowreasonablepeoplecanreachdifferentconclusions,butalsohowtheycanfailtorecognizeotherreasonableconclusionsasreasonableThisbookconnectswiththreemaindiscussionsinphilosophyInthefirstplace,therehasbeenmuchdiscussioninpoliticalphilosophyofdeliberativedemocracyAshasbeenmentioned,reasonabledisagreementinpoliticscanbeunderstoodasdisagreementthatsurvives,orwouldsurvive,shareddeliberationconductedingoodfaithoveranextendedperiodoftimeThusifweaccepttheexistenceofreasonablepoliticaldisagreement,wemustacknowledgethatthereismoretopoliticaldecisionJürgenHabermas,TheTheoryofCommunicativeAction,volI,transThomasMcCarthy(Boston:Beacon,),pReasonableDisagreementmaking,evenunderidealconditions,thanshareddeliberationThisisnotparticularlycontroversialMostdeliberativedemocratswouldbepreparedtogivearoletovoting,forexampleButIbelievethatastrongerclaimiswarrantedConsiderationofthewaypoliticaldisagreementevolvesovertimemakesitplausiblethatshareddeliberationisnotthesoleengineofreasonableopinionformationinpoliticsSecond,reasonablepoliticaldisagreement,asIunderstandit,hasanimportantmoralelementItis,inthefirstinstance,disagreementaboutissuesofpoliticalmoralityAnaccountofreasonablepoliticaldisagreementmust,then,explainhowpeoplereasoningcompetentlyaboutmoralquestionscanneverthelessfailtoagreeThisrequiresanexcursionintometaethics,thebranchofphilosophythatstudieswhetherthereisalegitimateplacefortruthandknowledgeinconnectionwithmoraljudgmentsThetwomostfamiliarpositionsarerealistandantirealistRealistssupposethatweconfrontadomainofmoralfacts,andthatmoraljudgmentsaretrueiftheycorrectlyrepresentthesefactsSimilarly,wehavemoralknowledgeifwearejustifiedinmakingmoraljudgmentsthataretrueAntirealistsdenythatmoraljudgmentsplayafactstatingroleIarguethatneitherviewcanprovideanadequateaccountofreasonablemoraldisagreementIthusdevelopanintermediatepositionthatIcallmoralnominalismIuseittoexplainhowjudgmentsofpoliticalmoralitythatarecompetentlyreasonedcanneverthelessdisagree,butIbelievethatithassomeappealasageneralmetaethicalpositionThird,thebookmakescontactwithimportantissuesinthephilosophyofhistoryOnthenominalistviewthatIpropose,moraljudgmentsemploysociallyavailablenormativeandevaluativeconceptstoconstructmoralworldsButtheavailableconceptsofpoliticalmoralityvarysomewhatfromplacetoplace,andtheywerealsodifferentinthepastthantheyaretodayAnumberofphilosophicaltheoriesprovidefortheevolutionofmoralconceptsButsomeregardthemoralthinkingofpastperiods,andperhapsthepresentperiodaswell,asdeterminedbycontingentsocialforcesThemoralnominalismthatIproposeisdifferentItviewstheevolutionofmoralandpoliticalconceptsasnormativelyguidedWhatevolvesisthezoneofreasonabledisagreement,thesetofpositionsthatcompetentreasonerscanholdThismeansthattherequirementsofmorality–thegenuinerequirements–weredifferentinthepastthantheyarenowThesethemesareexploredinsixchaptersChapterbeginswithadiscussionofreasonabledisagreementaboutmattersofempiricalfactItthenproceedstothepoliticalcaseOntheviewofreasonabledisagreementinpoliticsthatIpresent,theconceptofreasonablenessisemployedintwoIntroductiondifferentwaysReasonabledisagreementisdisagreementaboutthepatternofconcessionsthatoughttocharacterizepoliticalcooperation,andthereasonablenessofthedifferentpositionsismanifestedintwodifferentwaysThepositionsdisplayawillingnesstomakeconcessions,anditispossibletosupportthepositionswithcompetentreasoningIbelievethatthesetwosensesofreasonablenessalsounderlieTMScanlon’sproposalthatmoralwrongnesscanbeunderstoodastheviolationofarulethatnoonecanreasonablyrejectScanlon’sformulagivesusawayofdescribingreasonabledisagreementinpoliticsWherethereisreasonabledisagreementabouthowpoliticalcooperationmorallyoughttobeorganized,everyproposalcanbereasonablyrejectedbysomebodyChapterdevelopsthetheoryofmoralnominalismAsIunderstandit,theroleofreasoninpoliticsisnotlimitedtoestablishingefficientoreffectivemeanstothesatisfactionofdesiresthatpeoplesimplyhappentohaveReasoncancriticizedesiresandestablishendsItcan,asIputit,settargetsGiventhis,providinganaccountofreasonabledisagreementinvolvesdevelopingametaethicscapableofexplaininghowcompetentreasoningaboutultimateendscanfailtoproduceagreementAsIhavesaid,themoralnominalismthatIproposesteersamiddlecoursebetweenantirealistviewsaccordingtowhichendsaresetbydesiresthatare,ultimately,beyondrationalcriticism,andrealistviewsthatpositmindindependentmoralfactstowhichcompetentreasonerscangainepistemicaccessIndescribinghisownnominalism,NelsonGoodmanspeaksof“worldmaking,”andaccordingtothemoralnominalismthatIshallpropose,inmakingmoraljudgments,wemakethemoralworldsweliveinWecandistinguishbetweenmoraljudgmentsthatarecompetentlymadeandmoraljudgmentsthatareincompetentlymade,butcompetentjudgmentswillsometimesdisagreeHavingdeveloped,inchapter,ametaethicaltheorycapableofprovidingforreasonablemoraldisagreement,IproceedinchaptertoexamineagreementanddisagreementinpoliticsThemembersofaparticularpoliticalsociety,orpolity,willtypicallyhaveavailableasetofnormativeandevaluativeconceptsthatcanbeemployedtoexpressclaims,ormorebroadly,toadvancereasonsfororagainstparticularwaysoforganizingpoliticalcooperationReasonabledisagreementwithinapolitycanbegroundedinthefactthatdifferentpeopledrawondifferentsubsetsoftheseconceptsinmakingpoliticaljudgments,inthefactthattheyinterpretTMScanlon,WhatWeOwetoEachOther(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,),pNelsonGoodman,WaysofWorldmaking(Indianapolis:Hackett,),espchReasonableDisagreementtheresultingreasonsdifferently,orinthefactthattheyresolveindifferentwaysconflictsamongthesereasonsReasonabledisagreementsurvivesopendebatecarriedoutoveralongperiodoftimeThereare,however,otherwaysofresolvingpoliticaldisagreements,ofsettlingonawayoforganizingpoliticalcooperationwhenthemembersofapolityreasonablydisagreeTheseareexploredinchapterOneimportantpointisthatwherewefindreasonabledisagreementabouthowsomeaspectofpoliticalcooperationoughttobeorganized,peoplewilloftenhaveopportunitiestoactunilaterallyonthejudgmentsofpoliticalmoralitythattheyregardascorrectTheseactionscan,inturn,createasocialenvironmentinwhichotherpeoplefeelcompelled,ascompetentreasoners,tomodifytheirmoralconceptsTheultimateresultmaybetheresolutionofdisagreementbyaforcethatisnottheforceofthebetterargumentYetthisoutcomeisnotmerelycausedTheconceptualchangescomeaboutbecausepeoplefindthattheirformerjudgmentsnolongermakesenseintheevolvingsocialsituationDifferentcommunitiescanoperatewithdifferentmoralconceptsChapterdiscussestheimplicationsofthisfactTraditionally,moralrelativismholdsthatwhatismorallyrightinaparticularcommunityisrelativetothesocialnormsinplacethereMoralnominalismdoesnothavethisconsequence,butitdoeshavearelatedoneNoonecanactuallyemployinmoralreasoningallofthenormativeandevaluativeconceptsassociatedwiththevariousculturesoftheworldEachpersonoperateswithasubsetAshasbeennoted,thiscanbeasourceofreasonabledisagreementwithinagivenpolityButthephenomenonismorepronouncedwhenthepartiestoadisagreementaremembersofdifferentpolities,andespeciallywhentheirconceptsareprovidedbydifferentculturaltraditionsThusontheviewIamproposing,thedifferencesinmoraljudgmentthatsomewritersregardassupportingmoralrelativismareinsteadexplainedasmanifestationsofaparticularlydeepformofreasonabledisagreementIcallthealternativetorelativismthatIsketchinchapter“localism”ThefinalchapterdiscussesitshistoricalimplicationsJustasthepeoplecomprisingdifferentcontemporarypolitiescanreasonablyreachdifferentconclusionsabouthowpoliticalcooperationshouldbestructured,socanpeoplelivingatearlierandlatertimesGivenmoralnominalism,thismeansthatearlierpeoplelivedinadifferentmoralworldMoralnominalismcanmakeaplaceforafewrequirementsofpoliticalmoralitythatallcompetentreasonerswillacknowledge,andwithrespecttothese,wecantellastoryoftheemergenceovertimeofthemoraltruthButmostrequirementsofpoliticalmoralityareconstitutedbycompetentjudgmentsemployingIntroductionsociallyavailablenormativeorevaluativeconcepts,andiftheconceptsweredifferentinanearlierera,soweretherequirementsChapterdevelopsthispictureandexploresitsimplicationsfortheenterpriseofmakingmoraljudgmentsaboutthepastDespitethefamiliarityofthephrase,somemightwishtodenythatthereissuchathingasreasonablemoraldisagreementinpoliticsTheymaybewillingtoconcedethattherecanbepoliticaldisagreementsinwhichallthepositionstakenareunreasonableBut,theywillinsist,wherewefindgenuinedisagreement,atmostoneofthepositionscanclaimthesupportofreasonInthisbook,IdonotarguedirectlyfortheexistenceofreasonablemoraldisagreementinpoliticsIproceedontheassumptionthatsomequestionsconcerninghowpoliticalcooperationmorallyoughttobeorganizedadmitofreasonabledisagreementIproposeawayofunderstandingsuchdisagreementandexplorewhatitimpliesforpoliticallifeandpoliticalmoralityPresumably,astudyofthissortmustbeundertakenbeforewecandecidewhethertoacknowledgetheexistenceofreasonablepoliticaldisagreementIhavetried,inwritingthisbook,tomaketheargumentaccessibletoreaderswhoarenotphilosophersbytrainingForsuchreaders,thepartsofthebookthatsetoutthemetaethicaltheoryofmoralnominalism,thefinalsectionofchapterandthewholeofchapter,arelikelytopresentthegreatestdifficultyThediscussionthereissomewhatremovedfromthesocialphenomenonofpoliticaldisagreementIurgereaderswhofindthesepartsofthebookheavygoingtoskiptochapter,possiblyreturningtothemlaterThewritingofthisbookhasbeenasolitaryproject,butIhavereceivedhelpfulcommentsonchapterfrommycolleague,AaronZimmerman,andonthewholemanuscriptfromtwoanonymousrefereesforCambridgeUniversityPressIhavealsoreceivedhelpfulcommentsfromtheCambridgephilosophyeditor,HilaryGaskinReasonableDisagreementchapterThestructureofreasonabledisagreementInthisinitialchapterIconsiderthecharacteristicfeaturesofreasonabledisagreementIhavesaidthatoneofthemarksofreasonabledisagreementisthatshareddeliberationaboutwhatisjustifiedbyagivenbodyofevidence,orsetofreasons,doesnotproduceconvergenceonasingleanswer,nomatterhowopenlyitisconductedorforhowlongAsIhaveindicated,myprimaryconcernisreasonabledisagreementinpolitics,disagreementconcerninghowpoliticalcooperationistobeorganizedThefocusofthebookisnormativeandevaluativedisagreementasitpertainstotheorganizationofpoliticalcooperationButdecisionsabouthowtoorganizepoliticalcooperationoftenturnontheanswerstoquestionsofempiricalfactSoafteraninitialsectionexplainingwhythephenomenonofreasonabledisagreementispu

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