A R T I C L E
What Is Strategy?
by Michael E. Porter
P R O D U C T N U M B E R 4 1 3 4
New sections to
guide you through
the article:
• The Idea in Brief
• The Idea at Work
• Exploring Further . . .
Rivals can easily copy
your improvements
in quality and efficiency.
But they shouldn’t be
able to copy your strategic
positioning—what
distinguishes your company
from all the rest.
HBR
OnPoint
F R O M T H E H A R V A R D B U S I N E S S R E V I E W
T myriad activities that go into creating,
producing, selling, and delivering a product or
service are the basic units of competitive advan-
tage. Operational effectiveness means perform-
ing these activities better—that is, faster, or
with fewer inputs and defects—than rivals.
Companies can reap enormous advantages from
operational effectiveness, as Japanese firms
demonstrated in the 1970s and 1980s with such
practices as total quality management and con-
tinuous improvement. But from a competitive
standpoint, the problem with operational
effectiveness is that best practices are easily
emulated. As all competitors in an industry
adopt them, the productivity frontier—the
maximum value a company can deliver at a
given cost, given the best available technology,
skills, and management techniques—shifts out-
ward, lowering costs and improving value at the
same time. Such competition produces absolute
improvement in operational effectiveness, but
relative improvement for no one. And the more
benchmarking that companies do, the more
competitive convergence you have—that is,
the more indistinguishable companies are
from one another.
Strategic positioning attempts to achieve sus-
tainable competitive advantage by preserving
what is distinctive about a company. It means
performing different activities from rivals, or
performing similar activities in different ways.
What Is Strategy?
T key principles underlie strategic
positioning.
1. Strategy is the creation of a unique and
valuable position, involving a different set
of activities. Strategic position emerges
from three distinct sources:
• serving few needs of many customers
(Jiffy Lube provides only auto lubricants)
• serving broad needs of few customers
(Bessemer Trust targets only very
high-wealth clients)
• serving broad needs of many customers in
a narrow market (Carmike Cinemas
operates only in cities with a population
under 200,000)
2. Strategy requires you to make trade-offs
in competing—to choose what not to do.
Some competitive activities are incompati-
ble; thus, gains in one area can be achieved
only at the expense of another area. For
example, Neutrogena soap is positioned
more as a medicinal product than as a
cleansing agent. The company says “no”
to sales based on deodorizing, gives up
large volume, and sacrifices manufacturing
efficiencies. By contrast, Maytag’s decision
to extend its product line and acquire other
brands represented a failure to make
difficult trade-offs: the boost in revenues
came at the expense of return on sales.
3. Strategy involves creating “fit” among a
company’s activities. Fit has to do with the
ways a company’s activities interact and
reinforce one another. For example, Van-
guard Group aligns all of its activities with
a low-cost strategy; it distributes funds
directly to consumers and minimizes port-
folio turnover. Fit drives both competitive
advantage and sustainability: when activi-
ties mutually reinforce each other, competi-
tors can’t easily imitate them. When Conti-
nental Lite tried to match a few of South-
west Airlines’ activities, but not the whole
interlocking system, the results were
disastrous.
Employees need guidance about how to deepen
a strategic position rather than broaden or
compromise it. About how to extend the com-
pany’s uniqueness while strengthening the fit
among its activities. This work of deciding
which target group of customers and needs to
serve requires discipline, the ability to set lim-
its, and forthright communication. Clearly,
strategy and leadership are inextricably linked.
T H E I D E A I N B R I E F
T H E I D E A A T W O R K
HBR OnPoint © 2000 President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved.
For almost two decades, managers have been
learning to play by a new set of rules. Companies
must be flexible to respond rapidly to compet-
itive and market changes. They must benchmark
continuously to
achieve best prac-
tice. They must
outsource aggres-
sively to gain ef-
ficiencies. And
they must nur-
ture a few core competencies in the
race to stay ahead of rivals.
Positioning – once the heart of strategy – is reject-
ed as too static for today’s dynamic markets and
changing technologies. According to the new dog-
ma, rivals can quickly copy any market position,
and competitive advantage is, at best, temporary.
But those beliefs are dangerous half-truths, and
they are leading more and more companies down
the path of mutually destructive competition.
True, some barriers to competition are falling as
regulation eases and markets become global. True,
companies have properly invested energy in becom-
ing leaner and more nimble. In many industries,
however, what some call hypercompetition is a
self-inflicted wound, not the inevitable outcome of
a changing paradigm of competition.
The root of the problem is the failure to distin-
guish between operational effectiveness and strat-
egy. The quest for productivity, quality, and speed
has spawned a remarkable number of management
tools and techniques: total quality management,
benchmarking, time-based competition, outsourc-
ing, partnering,
reengineering,
change manage-
ment. Although
the resulting op-
erational improve-
ments have often
been dramatic, many companies have
been frustrated by their inability to
translate those gains into sustainable profitability.
And bit by bit, almost imperceptibly, management
tools have taken the place of strategy. As manag-
ers push to improve on all fronts, they move farther
away from viable competitive positions.
Operational Effectiveness:
Necessary but Not Sufficient
Operational effectiveness and strategy are both
essential to superior performance, which, after all,
is the primary goal of any enterprise. But they work
in very different ways.
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW November-December 1996 Copyright © 1996 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved.
HBR
NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1996
I. Operational Effectiveness Is Not Strategy
What Is Strategy?
Michael E. Porter is the C. Roland Christensen Professor
of Business Administration at the Harvard Business
School in Boston, Massachusetts.
by Michael E. Porter
A company can outperform rivals only if it can
establish a difference that it can preserve. It must
deliver greater value to customers or create compa-
rable value at a lower cost, or do both. The arith-
metic of superior profitability then follows: deliver-
ing greater value allows a company to charge higher
average unit prices; greater efficiency results in
lower average unit costs.
Ultimately, all differences between companies in
cost or price derive from the hundreds of activities
required to create, produce, sell, and deliver their
products or services, such as calling on customers,
assembling final products, and training employees.
Cost is generated by performing activities, and cost
advantage arises from performing particular activi-
ties more efficiently than competitors. Similarly,
differentiation arises from both the choice of activi-
ties and how they are performed. Activities, then,
are the basic units of competitive advantage. Over-
all advantage or disadvantage results from all a
company’s activities, not only a few.1
Operational effectiveness (OE) means performing
similar activities better than rivals perform them.
Operational effectiveness includes but is not limit-
ed to efficiency. It refers to any number of practices
that allow a company to better utilize its inputs by,
for example, reducing defects in products or devel-
oping better products faster. In contrast, strategic
positioning means performing different activities
from rivals’ or performing similar activities in dif-
ferent ways.
Differences in operational effectiveness among
companies are pervasive. Some companies are able
to get more out of their inputs than others because
they eliminate wasted effort, employ more ad-
vanced technology, motivate employees better, or
have greater insight into managing particular activ-
ities or sets of activities. Such differences in opera-
tional effectiveness are an important source of dif-
ferences in profitability among competitors be-
cause they directly affect relative cost positions
and levels of differentiation.
Differences in operational effectiveness were at
the heart of the Japanese challenge to Western com-
panies in the 1980s. The Japanese were so far ahead
of rivals in operational effectiveness that they
could offer lower cost and superior quality at the
same time. It is worth dwelling on this point, be-
cause so much recent thinking about competition
depends on it. Imagine for a moment a productivity
frontier that constitutes the sum of
all existing best practices at any giv-
en time. Think of it as the maximum
value that a company delivering a
particular product or service can cre-
ate at a given cost, using the best
available technologies, skills, man-
agement techniques, and purchased
inputs. The productivity frontier can
apply to individual activities, to groups of linked
activities such as order processing and manufactur-
ing, and to an entire company’s activities. When a
company improves its operational effectiveness, it
moves toward the frontier. Doing so may require
capital investment, different personnel, or simply
new ways of managing.
The productivity frontier is constantly shifting
outward as new technologies and management ap-
proaches are developed and as new inputs become
available. Laptop computers, mobile communica-
tions, the Internet, and software such as Lotus
Notes, for example, have redefined the productivity
62 HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW November-December 1996
Operational Effectiveness
Versus Strategic Positioning
N
on
pr
ic
e
bu
ye
r v
al
ue
d
el
iv
er
ed
Relative cost position
low
lowhigh
high
Productivity Frontier
(state of best practice)
A company can outperform
rivals only if it can establish
a difference that it can preserve.
This article has benefited greatly from the assistance
of many individuals and companies. The author gives
special thanks to Jan Rivkin, the coauthor of a related
paper. Substantial research contributions have been
made by Nicolaj Siggelkow, Dawn Sylvester, and Lucia
Marshall. Tarun Khanna, Roger Martin, and Anita Mc-
Gahan have provided especially extensive comments.
Japanese Companies Rarely Have Strategies
frontier for sales-force operations and created rich
possibilities for linking sales with such activities as
order processing and after-sales support. Similarly,
lean production, which involves a family of activi-
ties, has allowed substantial improvements in
manufacturing productivity and asset utilization.
For at least the past decade, managers have been
preoccupied with improving operational effective-
ness. Through programs such as TQM, time-based
competition, and benchmarking, they have changed
how they perform activities in order to eliminate
inefficiencies, improve customer satisfaction, and
achieve best practice. Hoping to keep up with
shifts in the productivity frontier, managers have
embraced continuous improvement, empowerment,
change management, and the so-called learning
organization. The popularity of outsourcing and
the virtual corporation reflect the growing recogni-
tion that it is difficult to perform all activities as
productively as specialists.
As companies move to the frontier, they can often
improve on multiple dimensions of performance at
the same time. For example, manufacturers that
adopted the Japanese practice of rapid changeovers
in the 1980s were able to lower cost and improve
differentiation simultaneously. What were once be-
lieved to be real trade-offs – between defects and
costs, for example – turned out to be illusions cre-
ated by poor operational effectiveness. Managers
have learned to reject such false trade-offs.
Constant improvement in operational effective-
ness is necessary to achieve superior profitability.
However, it is not usually sufficient. Few compa-
nies have competed successfully on the basis of op-
erational effectiveness over an extended period, and
staying ahead of rivals gets harder every day. The
most obvious reason for that is the rapid diffusion
of best practices. Competitors can quickly imitate
management techniques, new technologies, input
improvements, and superior ways of meeting cus-
tomers’ needs. The most generic solutions – those
that can be used in multiple settings – diffuse the
fastest. Witness the proliferation of OE techniques
accelerated by support from consultants.
OE competition shifts the productivity frontier
outward, effectively raising the bar for everyone.
But although such competition produces absolute
improvement in operational effectiveness, it leads
to relative improvement for no one. Consider the
$5 billion-plus U.S. commercial-printing industry.
The major players – R.R. Donnelley & Sons Com-
pany, Quebecor, World Color Press, and Big Flower
Press–are competing head to head, serving all types
of customers, offering the same array of printing
technologies (gravure and web offset), investing
heavily in the same new equipment, running their
presses faster, and reducing crew sizes. But the re-
sulting major productivity gains are being captured
by customers and equipment suppliers, not re-
tained in superior profitability. Even industry-
WHAT IS STRATEGY?
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW November-December 1996 63
The Japanese triggered a global revolution in opera-
tional effectiveness in the 1970s and 1980s, pioneering
practices such as total quality management and con-
tinuous improvement. As a result, Japanese manufac-
turers enjoyed substantial cost and quality advantages
for many years.
But Japanese companies rarely developed distinct
strategic positions of the kind discussed in this article.
Those that did – Sony, Canon, and Sega, for example –
were the exception rather than the rule. Most Japanese
companies imitate and emulate one another. All rivals
offer most if not all product varieties, features, and ser-
vices; they employ all channels and match one anoth-
ers’ plant configurations.
The dangers of Japanese-style competition are now
becoming easier to recognize. In the 1980s, with rivals
operating far from the productivity frontier, it seemed
possible to win on both cost and quality indefinitely.
Japanese companies were all able to grow in an ex-
panding domestic economy and by penetrating global
markets. They appeared unstoppable. But as the gap in
operational effectiveness narrows, Japanese compa-
nies are increasingly caught in a trap of their own
making. If they are to escape the mutually destructive
battles now ravaging their performance, Japanese
companies will have to learn strategy.
To do so, they may have to overcome strong cultural
barriers. Japan is notoriously consensus oriented, and
companies have a strong tendency to mediate differ-
ences among individuals rather than accentuate them.
Strategy, on the other hand, requires hard choices. The
Japanese also have a deeply ingrained service tradition
that predisposes them to go to great lengths to satisfy
any need a customer expresses. Companies that com-
pete in that way end up blurring their distinct posi-
tioning, becoming all things to all customers.
This discussion of Japan is drawn from the author’s
research with Hirotaka Takeuchi, with help from
Mariko Sakakibara.
leader Donnelley’s profit margin, consistently
higher than 7% in the 1980s, fell to less than 4.6%
in 1995. This pattern is playing itself out in indus-
try after industry. Even the Japanese, pioneers of
the new competition, suffer from persistently low
profits. (See the insert “Japanese Companies Rarely
Have Strategies.”)
The second reason that improved operational
effectiveness is insufficient – competitive conver-
gence – is more subtle and insidious. The more
benchmarking companies do, the more they look
alike. The more that rivals outsource activities to
efficient third parties, often the same ones, the
more generic those activities become. As rivals im-
itate one another’s improvements in quality, cycle
times, or supplier partnerships, strategies converge
and competition becomes a series of races down
identical paths that no one can win. Competition
based on operational effectiveness alone is mutu-
ally destructive, leading to wars of attrition that
can be arrested only by limiting competition.
The recent wave of industry consolidation
through mergers makes sense in the context of OE
competition. Driven by performance pressures but
lacking strategic vision, company after company
has had no better idea than to buy up its rivals. The
competitors left standing are often those that out-
lasted others, not companies with real advantage.
After a decade of impressive gains in operational
effectiveness, many companies are facing dimin-
ishing returns. Continuous improvement has been
etched on managers’ brains. But its tools unwitting-
ly draw companies toward imitation and homo-
geneity. Gradually, managers have let operational
effectiveness supplant strategy. The result is zero-
sum competition, static or declining prices, and
pressures on costs that compromise companies’
ability to invest in the business for the long term.
WHAT IS STRATEGY?
64 HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW November-December 1996
II. Strategy Rests on Unique Activities
Competitive strategy is about being different. It
means deliberately choosing a different set of activ-
ities to deliver a unique mix of value.
Southwest Airlines Company, for example, offers
short-haul, low-cost, point-to-point service be-
tween midsize cities and secondary airports in large
cities. Southwest avoids large airports and does
not fly great distances. Its customers include busi-
ness travelers, families, and students. Southwest’s
frequent departures and low fares attract price-
sensitive customers who otherwise would travel by
bus or car, and convenience-oriented travelers who
would choose a full-service airline on other routes.
Most managers describe strategic positioning in
terms of their customers: “Southwest Airlines
serves price- and convenience-sensitive travelers,”
for example. But the essence of strategy is in the ac-
tivities – choosing to perform activities differently
or to perform different activities than rivals. Other-
wise, a strategy is nothing more than a marketing
slogan that will not withstand competition.
A full-service airline is configured to get passen-
gers from almost any point A to any point B. To
reach a large number of destinations and serve pas-
sengers with connecting flights, full-service air-
lines employ a hub-and-spoke system centered on
major airports. To attract passengers who desire
more comfort, they offer first-class or business-
class service. To accommodate passengers who
must change planes, they coordinate schedules and
check and transfer baggage. Because some passen-
gers will be traveling for many hours, full-service
airlines serve meals.
Southwest, in contrast, tailors all its activities
to deliver low-cost, convenient service on its par-
ticular type of route. Through fast turnarounds
at the gate of only 15 minutes, Southwest is able
to keep planes flying longer hours
than rivals and provide frequent de-
partures with fewer aircraft. South-
west does not offer meals, assigned
seats, interline baggage checking, or
premium classes of service. Auto-
mated ticketing at the gate encour-
ages customers to bypa
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