French Tanks of World War II (1): Infantry and Battle Tanks (Osprey New Vanguard 209

STEVEN J. ZALOGA ILLUSTRATED BY IAN PALMER FRENCH TANKS OF WORLD WAR II (1) Infantry and Battle Tanks © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com NEW VANGUARD 209 FRENCH TANKS OF WORLD WAR II (1) Infantry and Battle Tanks STEVEN J. ZALOGA ILLUSTRATED BY IAN PALMER © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com CONTENTS THE LEGACY TANK: RENAULT FT 4 THE OTHER LEGACY TANK: CHAR DE RUPTURE 2C 6 MODERNIZING THE FT 7 CHAR LÉGER D1 8 THE ARMS RACE OF THE LATE 1930S 10 INFANTRY TANK ORGANIZATION IN 1940 12 UNIT ORGANIZATION: THE FRENCH DCR 14 CHAR PUISSANT D2 16 CHAR LÉGER MLE. 1935 R (RENAULT R35) 18 CHAR LÉGER FCM 36 23 CAVALRY TANK FOR THE INFANTRY: THE HOTCHKISS H35 AND H39 26 CHAR B 31 CHAR B1 BIS 33 RENAULT UE INFANTRY VEHICLE 38 CHENILLETTE LORRAINE 42 THE SHAPE OF THINGS TO COME 43 FURTHER READING 46 INDEX 48 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com 4 THE LEGACY TANK: RENAULT FT In the wake of World War I, the French army demobilized much of its tank force.1 The obsolete Schneider CA and Saint-Chamond tanks were mothballed and eventually scrapped. The hundred newly arrived British Mark V* heavy tanks remained in service until 1929–30. The modern Char Léger Renault FT became the basis for the postwar French tank force. During the interwar years, the French tank force was dominated by the legacy of the Renault FT tank. As of the armistice day of November 11, 1918, 1 Steven Zaloga, French Tanks of World War I, Osprey New Vanguard 173, 2010. FRENCH TANKS OF WORLD WAR II (1) INFANTRY AND BATTLE TANKS The Renault FT was modernized in the mid-1930s by refitting the turret with the Reibel 7.5mm machine gun in a new mount, as seen on the tank to the right. The tank on the left is a standard Char Canon, armed with the 37 SA18. (NARA) © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com 5 a total of 3,187 Renault FT tanks had been delivered, of which 2,720 had been received by the army, 220 not yet delivered, and 530 exported, mainly to the American Expeditionary Force (514). Total wartime casualties had been 440 tanks. Production of the Renault FT continued at several of the factories after the armistice to fulfill existing contracts. In total, some 4,517 were manufactured, including the major variants such as the TSF radio tank (100 delivered), and the Char Canon de 75S (40 delivered). As of December 1921, the French army counted some 3,588 Renault FT ready for mobilization, and at the time of the occupation of the Rhineland there were still nine tank regiments, each with three battalions of 72 tanks each. A report at the end of 1934 indicated that 3,499 were still ready for mobilization. Many Renault FT tanks were exported in the interwar years and it became the seed of many tank forces around the world, including the USA, Russia, Poland, and China. With such a large inventory on hand, there was very little incentive for further production of infantry tanks through the 1920s. Organizational changes in the French army undermined much enthusiasm for heavy expenditures on new tanks. In 1914–18, tanks had been fostered by the Artillerie d’Assaut under Gén Jean-Baptiste Estienne. This special branch was dissolved in May 1920 and the tanks handed over to a small tank section (STCC: section téchnique de chars de combat) within the infantry department. Gén Estienne remained as the tank inspector through 1930, and continued to foster new tank concepts, albeit with little enthusiasm from the infantry. The demilitarization of the German army after the Treaty of Versailles removed France’s most obvious foreign threat, further undermining any rationale for modernization of the tank force. A tank program was studied by the Research and Armament Inspectorate in 1920, but its July 1920 report proposed a bewildering variety of specialized tank types at a time when there was simply no money. The chief of the general staff, Gén Edmond Buat, rejected the The Renault FT remained in service through 1940 and continued to see combat in France’s colonies in the years after. This is a Renault FT Char Canon, built by Delaunay- Belleville in one of the postwar batches, which took part in the fighting against the US Army in Morocco in November 1942 during the Operation Torch landings. (NARA) © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com 6 findings and recommended that the future tank program be confined to the development of an improved infantry tank and a breakthrough tank (char de rupture). There was a proliferation of experimental designs and paper design studies in the 1920s, but very little new manufacture until the mid-1930s. THE OTHER LEGACY TANK: CHAR DE RUPTURE 2C The most impressive tank to have emerged from World War I was the Char de Rupture 2C. This massive land-battleship had been assigned to the FCM ship-builders and constructed in the Chantiers Navals de la Seyne dockyard. The firm had completed a pilot FCM 1A heavy tank prior to the end of the war, and on February 21, 1918 was given a contract to build 300 improved Char 2C by March 1919 for a final offensive against Germany. With the war’s end, the contract was trimmed back to ten tanks. The complexity of the design caused manufacturing delays, and the tanks were not delivered until 1921. The Char 2C was remarkable for its size and complexity. It weighed 70 metric tons, and used hybrid propulsion consisting of two conventional engines that powered electric generators which in turn supplied electricity to a pair of electric traction motors. The original plan was to use a pair of 100hp engines, but these were not adequate. Once the war ended, FCM had access to German Zeppelin engines, which had been acquired as war reparations, and used 250hp Maybach engines. The tank was armed with a 75mm M1897 gun in the main turret, two sponson machine guns, and a separate machine- gun turret in the rear. In 1923, one of the tanks was converted into the Char 2C Bis, armed with a short 155mm howitzer instead of the usual 75mm gun. The tank was so massive that normal transport means were out of the question. Instead, the Char 2C was moved long distances by means of a  special railroad system. The tank itself was attached to a pair of special transport bogies. Each company of three tanks traveled in a special railroad convoy consisting of two  locomotives and 30 other railcars for the crews, supplies, and supporting vehicles. The Char 2C remained in service through 1940 and was mobilized with the 511e RCC in June 1940. Two of the tanks broke down with mechanical problems, so two company trains with the six remaining tanks departed their base northwest of Metz on June 12. After surviving an air attack on June 14, the two trains became trapped on June 15 between advancing German units and a section of damaged track northeast of Langres. To prevent their capture, Commandant Fournet decided to sabotage the tanks using explosive charges. As a result, these old dinosaurs never saw combat. The six remaining Char 2C tanks were lost when their special transport trains were trapped northeast of Langres; they were sabotaged by their crews on the evening of June 15, 1940. This image provides a good view of the rear machine turret on the Char 2C, as well as details of the special rail carriage. (NARA) © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com 7 MODERNIZING THE FT One of the main drawbacks of the Renault FT was its slow speed and jarring cross-country ride. As a result, there were several schemes to improve the suspension. The first effort involved the use of a new Kégresse suspension with a metal/rubber band track. A pilot was completed in late 1922 and 23 were converted in 1924. About half of these were deployed to Morocco during the Rif War in 1925. In 1928, a further six were converted using an improved track. One of the main problems undercutting Renault FT modernization was the lack of funds. From 1920 to 1929, French spending on tanks totaled only FF4.1 million (~$160,000). Work on further suspension improvements continued in 1924 as the Renault NC 1. The intention of this program was to develop a tank capable of road travel comparable to an automobile, while not sacrificing cross-country performance. Unlike the Kégresse option, the baseline NC 1 used metal track. An alternative was built with Kégresse suspension as the NC 2. Aside from the three pilots, 25 tanks were manufactured, one each BOTTOM LEFT The first attempt to modernize the Renault FT, starting in 1924, substituted the Kégresse suspension to provide better road speed. (NARA) BOTTOM RIGHT A second batch of ten modernized Renault-Kégresse tanks was sold to Yugoslavia in 1930 and saw combat with the 1.bataljona bornih kola during the fighting with the Wehrmacht in Macedonia in 1941. This rear view shows the drums that replaced the earlier tail-skid as a trench-crossing aid. (NARA) No doubt the most impressive tank to have emerged from World War I was the FCM Char 2C breakthrough tank. This was a popular subject for press coverage in the 1930s, and this shows tank 97 “Normandie” on public display. (NARA) © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com 8 going to Poland and Sweden, and 23 being sold to Japan. A final attempt to develop a dedicated export tank, the NC 3, was undertaken in 1928. In spite of the improvement offered by the suspension alterations, there was little urgency to upgrade the vast tank fleet of Renault FT through the early 1930s. The one area where modernization was approved was in the tank armament. The Char FT Mitrailleuse (machine gun) had been armed with the Hotchkiss 8mm machine gun, and there was some interest in replacing this weapon with the Reibel 7.5mm MAC, which used a more practical drum magazine instead of the clip used with the Hotchkiss. Although this was approved in 1929, a contract was not awarded until 1933. This required a new mantlet and a new internal ammunition stowage system, which was finalized in 1934. In total, some 1,000 Renault FT tanks were approved for conversion. These were sometimes called FT Mle. 1931 or FT 17/31. CHAR LÉGER D1 The first effort substantially to improve the basic Renault FT began in 1927, due to the recognition that Renault NC only addressed the suspension and not other characteristics such as armor or firepower. A new “NC modifié” light tank was developed in 1928 with thicker 30mm armor, a more powerful 47mm gun with coaxial machine gun, and a more powerful Renault 25CV (74hp) engine, which permitted a higher road speed of 18km/h (11mph). The new design resembled the FT in general layout, but was significantly larger and heavier. The hull accommodated a third crewman to operate the new radio. Trials continued through 1929 and the new design was accepted for service in October 1929 as the Char Léger D1. The decision to proceed The Renault NC substituted a vertical spring suspension. A total of 23 NC 2s were exported to Japan and they were used by Captain Shigemi’s 2nd Independent Tank Company during the fighting in Shanghai in 1932. (NARA) © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com 9 with manufacture required a major expansion of French army tank funding. It increased more than twentyfold from the previous decade to FF81.5 million (~$3.2 million) between 1930 and 1934. Production began in 1931, with the first tank delivered in October that year and the final example of the 160 tanks in May 1935. Production problems with the new cast turret led to the temporary adoption of Renault FT Char Canon 37mm gun turrets. The first batch of ten Schneider ST1 turrets proved to be poorly balanced, requiring the addition of rear turret counterweights. This original batch remained in service as training tanks. The definitive Schneider ST2 turret was adopted on the rest of the tanks. Since these were the only modern French tanks available in the early 1930s, the three D1 battalions saw extensive usage. By 1937, many of the D1 tanks were already worn out, and they were rather old- fashioned compared to new types that were appearing. As a result, they were sent to Tunisia in 1937 except for some school tanks. Of these units, the 67e BCC returned to France in 1940, where it took part in the June campaign. When the Char D1 was first delivered in 1931, the turret was not yet ready. As a result, it was temporarily fitted with Renault FT turrets, as seen here during the summer 1931 army maneuvers. (NARA) The definitive version of the Char D1 used the new ST2 turret. This is an example in service in Tunisia in 1943. (NARA) © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com 10 THE ARMS RACE OF THE LATE 1930S As of January 1, 1937, the three D1 tank battalions were the only ones in French army service equipped with modern tanks, and these were largely worn out from extensive use. Ominous developments in Germany made it clear that a major rearmament program would be necessary. The Nazi rise to power in Germany in 1933, the renunciation of the Versailles treaty limits on German armaments in May 1935, and the remilitarization of the Rhineland in March 1936 were all hints that a new German threat was on the rise. This began an arms race that played a critical role in the 1940 Battle of France. With regard to infantry tanks, in 1933 the army decided to replace the entire Renault FT inventory with a new design. In 1934, Gén Maurice Gamelin set the goal as 16 battalions (800 tanks) by January 1938 and 46 battalions (2,500 tanks) by 1940. In terms of the char puissant, the plans aimed to provide 500 B1 and D2 tanks. This required a very substantial industrial investment since it was based on a goal of manufacturing about 80 infantry tanks per month. Until 1936, there was hardly any tank industry in France. The Renault automotive firm based at Billancourt near Paris had retained a small cadre of engineers for tank development underwritten by corporate funding. Renault maintained the small AMX tank assembly workshop nearby in Issy-les-Moulineaux. Production methods were artisanal and depended on a scattered network of subcontractors to provide parts. Between 1931 and 1935, French industry had only been producing about three tanks per month. In May 1936, the Popular Front came to power in France, a coalition of center and leftwing political parties. The Popular Front supported a French rearmament program, but at the same time its domestic policies created an enormous amount of turmoil within the French industry that hindered a  timely implementation of such a program. Due to public clamor over alleged “war-profiteering,” the new government decided to nationalize several of the commercial firms involved in tank development and production, including Renault’s tank research bureau, the Hotchkiss armaments research The 67e BCC returned to France from Tunisia in 1940 and took part in the summer campaign. This D1 tank was lost in the fighting near Suippes in June 1940. This photo accentuates the large frame on the right side used to mount the antenna for the tank’s ER51/ ER52 radio sets. (NARA) © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com 11 bureau, Schneider’s armor plate plant (ACT/Atelier des Locomotives) at Le Creusot, and the Renault AMX tank assembly workshop. Labor reforms introduced by the government further increased the disruption. The adoption of a 40-hour working week and accompanying labor unrest often meant that armament plants were limited to a 40-hour week, since the trade unions were unwilling to permit multiple shifts. This led to delays in the completion of tank orders. For example, of the 1,315 new infantry tanks that were contracted for delivery by August 1938, only 767 (58 percent) were delivered on time. Another impact of the labor reforms was a steady escalation in labor costs and a resultant inflation in tank prices. Combined with the decline in the value of the franc after the government dropped the gold standard in 1936, tank prices skyrocketed. For example, the first batches of Renault R35 tanks ordered in 1936 cost about FF180,000, but this climbed steadily to FF285,000 in 1938 and to FF355,000 by 1940. Renault was trapped in a “cost scissors” between the prices fixed in the original contracts and rising labor and material costs. These issues were not resolved until after 1937 and added further delays. While political interference and labor unrest were partly responsible for the problems in army modernization, the French army itself was another source of delay. Army procurement policy was a leftover from the threadbare days of the 1920s and led to adversarial relations with the industry. The army usually issued tank production contracts in small batches rather than as a multi-year program. This was done to impose quality control over tank deliveries, with the result that the subsequent contract was not issued until the previous contracts were satisfactorily fulfilled. In practice, these policies created more bureaucratic impediments to time-critical modernization efforts. The outcome of these various impediments was to slow the delivery of tanks to the French army, which in turn delayed the timely formation and training of new tank units. This would significantly undermine the tank force in 1940, since so many tanks were not delivered until a few months before the German attack. While France produced more tanks than Germany by May 1940, it lost the arms race since the deliveries were too late. Most French tank units were formed so late that they were poorly trained and inexperienced with their new tanks. The initial production series of the Char D2 was fitted with the APX-1 turret with the short 47 SA34 gun, as seen in this corporate publicity photo of tank no. 2006 “Rocroi” in 1937 with the early camouflage scheme. (Patton Museum) © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com 12 INFANTRY TANK ORGANIZATION IN 1940 The French army was an enthusiastic proponent of tanks, but its mechanization effort was split between the infantry and cavalry. Tanks played a vital role in the 1918 French victory, and so remained a central element of infantry doctrine. The inspector general of the infantry in 1938 remarked that my profound conviction is that these machines are destined to play a decisive role in a future conflict; the infantry was unable to do without tanks in the last war and will be able even less in future operations. The tank must be the preferred arm in a nation poor in personnel. War is a question of force where the advantage rests with the most powerful machine and not with the most rapid machine. France’s development of an armored force was shaped by its profoundly defensive strategic outlook in the 1930s. Infantry tanks were primarily intended to accompany the infantry into battle, much as in 1918, and not to serve as an offensive strike force comparable to German panzer divisions. The bulk of the French army’s tank force in May 1940 was located in the separate battalions of accompanying tanks, numbering 1,540 tanks in May 1940, or about half the tank force. Under the new French tactical doctrine formulated with the creation of the new armored divisions in 1939, two basic roles for infantry tanks were recognized, the char d’accompagnement (accompanying tank) and the char de manoeuvre (maneuver tank). The accompanying tanks were deployed in  tank battalions subordinated to infantry corps and divisions, while the maneuver tanks were deployed with the armored divisions. The basic infantry tank organization was the tank battalion (BCC: bataillon de chars de combat). By 1940, there were 41 tank battalions in metropolitan France and eight more in the colonies in North Africa and the L