关于影响会计制度原因的 书单例举

1 The Chinese University of Hong Kong ACCT7110 Issues in Financial Accounting “New Institutional Accounting Research” Professor T.J. Wong Center webpage: http://www.baf.cuhk.edu.hk/research/cig/ Personal webpage: http://www.baf.cuhk.edu.hk/acy/tjwong.html E-mail: tjwong@cuhk.edu.hk Tel: 852-2609-7750 Professor Tianyu Zhang Email: tyzhang@cuhk.edu.hk Tel: 2609-7841 1. Objectives The main objective of the course is to provide students a framework, based on institutional economics, to study the capital market, financial accounting and auditing issues using international or non-US settings. Particularly, this framework would be useful for studying accounting topics in transition economies or emerging market setting such as China and other East Asian economies. We will study the recent literature in financial accounting, auditing, corporate governance and corporate transparency using this research framework. These papers illustrate how economic institutions shape the role of accounting and auditing, which serve as a foundation for our pursuit of accounting and auditing research in a non-US country setting. We hope that by going through these papers, you will have the research tools and a more complete framework to identify and embark on a new research agenda in financial accounting research. To better understand each discussed paper, you should try to address the questions like “What did the author do?”, “What’s the motivation of the paper?”, “What’s the theoretical background of the paper?”, “What’s the finding of the paper?”, “What’s the contribution of the paper?”. Based on understanding of these elements of the paper, you should push further by asking the following questions to develop your own research ideas. “What’s alternative way to address the same topic in the literature?” “Is there any new way to address the same topic?”, “What’s the limitation of the methodology?”, “What’s the remaining unsolved issue in the same area?”, “What’s the expected outcome if the issue was put in a different setting, say China?”, “What’s the fundamental factor driving the difference in output?”, “Will this be a relevant issue, say in China, given the expected difference in finding?”, “Shall we address a even more fundamental question before touching this issue in other settings, such as in China?” 2 2. Requirements The course includes seminar-type discussions of the assigned topics. Each student is expected to read the assigned papers and participate actively in class. Later on in the course, students will be asked to make presentations of assigned papers in class. As a final assignment for the course, each student has to write a research proposal and present in class. We will provide more details of the final assignment later. 3. Grading The purpose of grading is twofold. One is the usual evaluation of your performance of academic purposes. The second is to encourage active discussion in the classroom, so that everyone achieves a deeper understanding of the topics. In line with these objectives, your grade will be based on the following components: Class participation 20% Class presentation 20% Written questions for papers 20% Research proposal 40% Class participation – You are expected to participate in discussions and ask intelligent questions in the seminar. Class presentation – You need to help the class to understand the assigned paper. You are in charge of presenting the motivation, objectives, theory, hypotheses, results and conclusion of the paper and facilitate all the discussions. Written questions for papers – For each assigned paper (see * in the course outline below), you must generate at least three insightful and critically penetrating questions. These questions can be about the paper’s research question, methodology, and/or conclusions. You must bring copies of your questions to class and distribute them to your classmates before class begins. Research proposal-Within the framework delivered in the lecture, you need to submit a proposal with original research idea. This proposal should have some potential to be developed into a working paper. 4. Outline I. Theoretical Foundation-Agency Framework a. Organization Economics A. Alchian. Corporate Management and Property Rights. Economic Forces at Work. *A. Alchian and H. Demsetz. Production, Information Costs, and Economic of Organization. American Economic Review (1972). 3 *R.Coase. The Nature of the Firm. Economica (1937). *M. Jensen and W. Meckling. Specific and General Knowledge, and Organizational Structure,” in Lars Werin and Hans Wijkander, eds., Main Currents in Contract Economics (Blackwell, Oxford University Press), 1991. b. Corporate Ownership and Agency Costs H. Demsetz and K. Lehn. The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences. Journal of Political Economy (1985). *E. Fama and M. Jensen. Separation of Ownership and Control. Journal of Law and Economics (1983). *M. Jensen and W. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics (1976). *R. Morck, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny. Management Ownership and Market Valulation: An Empirical Analysis. Journal of Financial Economics (1988). c. Agency Theory and Accounting *Watts. Corporate Financial Statements, A Product of the Market and Politcal Processes,” Australian Journal of Management 1977. *Watts and Zimmerman. Positive Accounting Theory: A Ten Year Perspective. Accounting Review 1990. Watts and Zimmerman. The Positive Theory.1986 (Background) II How are earnings properties measured? a. Role of accruals Dechow, P., Ge, W., Schrand, C.. 2010. Understanding earnings quality: A review of the proxies, their determinants and their consequences. Journal of Accounting and Economics 50, 344-401 *Jones, J. . 1991. Earnings Management During Import Relief Investigations. Journal of Accounting Research 29(2): 193-228. Burgstahler and Dichev. Earnings Management to Avoid Earnings Decrease or Losses. Journal of Accounting and Economics 1997. *Kothari, Leone and Wasley. Performance Matched Discretionary Accrual Measures. Journal of Accounting and Economics 2005. *Dechow and Dichev. The Quality of Accruals and Earnings: the Role of Accrual Estimation Errors. The Accounting Review 2002. 4 Dechow and Skinner. Earnings Management: Reconciling the Views of Accounting Academics, Practitioners, and Regulators. AH 2000. (Background) Healy and Wahlen. A Review of Earnings Management Literature and its Implications for Standard Setting. AH 1999. (Background) *Sloan, R.. 1996. Do stock prices fully reflect information in accruals and cash flows about future earnings? The Accounting Review 71, 289-316. b. Timely loss recognition *Basu. The Conservatism Principle and Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 1997. *Ball and Shivakumar. The Role of Accruals in Asymmetrically Timely Gain and Loss Recognition. Journal of Accounting Research 2006. Bushman, R. M. and J. D. Piotroski. 2006. "Financial Reporting Incentives for Conservative Accounting: The Influence of Legal and Political Institutions." Journal of Accounting and Economics 42: 107-148. *Khan, M. and R. L. Watts (2009). "Estimation and empirical properties of a firm- year measure of accounting conservatism." Journal of Accounting and Economics 42: 132-150. c. Earnings response coefficient Ball, R., and Brown, P.. 1968. An empirical evaluation of accounting income. Journal of Accounting Research, 159-178. *Easton, P., and Zmijewski, M. 1989.Cross-sectional variation in the stock market to accounting earnings announcement, Journal of Accounting and Economics 11, 117- 141. d. Earnings management through real activities *Roychowdhury, S. (2006). "Earnings management through real activities manipulation." Journal of Accounting and Economics 42(3): 335-370. *Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullanaithan. Ferreting out Tunneling: An application to Indian Business Groups, Quarterly Journal of Economics 2002. Jian and Wong. Propping and Tunneling through Related Party Transactions. Review of Accounting Studies. 2010. Atanasov, V., B. Black, et al. (2010). "How does law affect finance? An examination of equity tunneling in Bulgaria." Journal of Financial Economics 96(1): 155-173. Cheung, Y.-L., P. R. Rau, et al. (2006). "Tunneling, propping, and expropriation: evidence from connected party transactions in Hong Kong." Journal of Financial Economics 82(2): 343-386. 5 Dyck, A. and L. Zingales (2004). "Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison." The Journal Of Finance 59(2): 537-600. *Chen, K., Yuan, H.Q., 2004. Earnings Management and Capital Resource Allocation: Evidence from China's Accounting-based Regulation of Rights Issues. The Accounting Review 79, 645-665 e. Economic consquence of earnings quality *Baker, George P. and Thomas N. Hubbard. (2004) “Contractibility and Asset Ownership: On-Board Computers and Governance in U.S. Trucking,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(May): 1443-79. Beatty, A., J. Weber, et al. (2008). "Conservatism and Debt." Journal of Accounting and Economics 45: 154-174. *Graham, J. R., S. Li, et al. (2008). "Corporate misreporting and bank loan contracting." Journal of Financial Economics 89(1): 44-61. Nikolaev, V. (2009). "Debt Covenants and Accounting Conservatism." Journal of Accounting Research 48: 137-176. Zhang, J. (2006). "The contracting benefits of accounting conservatism to lenders and borrowers." Journal of Accounting and Economics 45: 27-54. Biddle, G., Hilary, G., 2006. Accounting quality and firm-level capital investment. The Accounting Review 81, 963–982. *Bushman, R., Piotroski, J. and A. Smith. 2010. Capital Allocation and Timely Accounting Recognition of Economic Losses. Journal of Business, Finance and Accounting (Forthcoming). Biddle, G., G. Hilary, et al. (2009). "How does financial reporting quality relate to investment efficiency?" Journal of Accounting and Economics 48: 112-131. Fich, E. M. and A. Shivdasani (2007). "Financial fraud, director reputation, and shareholder wealth." Journal of Financial Economics 86(2): 306-336. Karpoff, J., S. Lee, et al. (2008). "The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books." Journal Of Financial And Quantitative Analysis 43(03): 581-611. *Karpoff, J. M., D. Scott Lee, et al. (2008). "The consequences to managers for financial misrepresentation." Journal of Financial Economics 88(2): 193-215. 6 III. How do country institutions affect accounting? a. Background La Porta, R.， F. Lopez-De-Silanes, et al. (1997). "Legal Determinants of External Finance." The Journal Of Finance 52(3): 1131-1150. *La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, et al. (1998). "Law and Finance." The Journal of Political Economy 106(6): 1113-1155. b. Effect of institutions on accounting Robert Jacobson and David Aaker. Myopic Management Behavior with Efficient, but Imperfect, Financial Markets: A Comparison of Information Asymmetries in the US and Japan. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1993. Alford, Jones, Leftwich, and Zmijewski. Relative Informativeness of Accounting Disclosure in Different Countries. Journal of Accounting Research 1993. *Ali and Hwang. Country-specific Factors Related to Financial Reporting and Value Relevance of Accounting Data. Journal of Accounting Research 2000. *Ball, Kothari, and Robin. The Effect of Institutional Factors on Properties of Accounting Earnings: International Evidence. Journal of Accounting and Economics 2000. *Hung. Accounting Standards and Value Relevance of Financial Statements: an International Analysis. Journal of Accounting and Economics 2001. c. Law and accounting *Bushman, Piostroky, and Smith. What Determines Corporate Transparency? Journal of Accounting Research 2003. *Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki. Investor Protection and Earnings Management: International Investigation. Journal of Financial Economics 2003. *Bhattarcharya, Daouk and Welker. The World Price of Earnings Opacity. The Accounting Review 2003. Bailey, W., Karolyi,A., and Salva,C.. 2006. "The economic consequences of increased disclosure: Evidence from international cross-listings." Journal of Financial Economics 81(1): 175-213. IV. What’s the function of accounting standards? Ball. Infrastructure Requirements for an Economically Efficient System of Public Financial Reporting and Disclosure. Brooking-Wharton Papers on Financial Services. 2001. 7 *Ball, Robin, and Wu. Incentives versus Standards: Properties of Accounting Income in Four East Asian Countries. Journal of Accounting and Economics 2003 Leuz. IAS versus US GAAP: Information-Asymmetry Based Evidence from Germany's New Market. Journal of Accounting Research 2003. Bradshaw, Bushee, and Miller. Accounting Choice, Home Bias, and U.S. Investment in Non-U.S. Firms. Journal of Accounting Research 2004 He, Wong and Young. Challenges for the Implementation of Fair Value Accounting in Emerging Markets: Evidence from China. Working paper, The Chinese University of Hong Kong. 2010. *Ramanna, K., 2008. The implications of unverifiable fair-value accounting: Evidence from the political economy of goodwill accounting. Journal of Accounting and Economics 45, 253-281. V. How is accounting associated with stock return distribution? a. Synchronicity Durnev, Morck, Yeung, and Zarowin. Does Greater Firm-Specific Return Variation Mean More or Less Informed Stock Pricing? Journal of Accounting Research 2003 *Morck, Yeung, and Yu. The Information Content of Stock Market: Why do Emerging Markets Have Synchronous Price Movements? Journal of Financial Economics 2000. Piotroski and Roulstone. The Influence of Analysts, Institutional Investors and Insiders on the Incorporation of Market, Industry and Firm-specific Information into Stock Prices. The Accounting Review 2004. *Khanna, T. and C. Thomas (2009). "Synchronicity and firm interlocks in an emerging market." Journal of Financial Economics 92(2): 182-204 b. Crash risk Chen, J., H. Hong, et al. (2001). "Forecasting crashes: trading volume, past returns, and conditional skewness in stock prices." Journal of Financial Economics 61(3): 345-381. *Hutton, A. P., A. J. Marcus, et al. (2009). "Opaque financial reports, R2, and crash risk." Journal of Financial Economics 94(1): 67-86. *Jin, L. and S. C. Myers (2006). "R2 around the world: New theory and new tests." Journal of Financial Economics 79(2): 257-292. 8 Gul, F. A., J.-B. Kim, et al. (2010). "Ownership concentration, foreign shareholding, audit quality, and stock price synchronicity: Evidence from China." Journal of Financial Economics 95(3): 425-442. VI. How does ownership shape accounting scheme? a. Background Bortolotti, B., Faccio, M., 2009. Government Control of Privatized Firms. Review of Financial Studies 22, 2907-2939 Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Lang, L.H.P., 2000. The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations. Journal of Financial Economics 58, 81-112 Morck, R., 1996. On the Economics of Concentrated Ownership. Canadian Business Law Journal 26, 63-85 *La Porta,R., F., Lopez-De-Silanes, And A. Shleifer. 1999. Corporate Ownership Around The World. The Journal Of Finance 54, 471-517 *Anderson and Reeb. Founding-Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500. Journal of Finance 2003. Bhattacharya and Ravikumar. Capital Markets and the Evolution of Family Businesses. Journal of Business 2000. *Burkart, Panunzi, and Shelifer. Family Firms. Journal of Finance 2003. b. Ownership concentration and accounting properties *Fan and Wong. Corporate Ownership and the Informativeness of Accounting Information. Journal of Accounting and Economics 2002. Warfield, Wild, and Wild. Managerial Ownership, Accounting Choices, and Informativeness of Earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 1995. Haw, Hu, Hwang and Wu. Ultimate Ownership, Income Management and Legal and Extra-Legal Institutions. Journal of Accounting Research 2004. *Ball and Shivakumar. Earnings Quality in UK Private Firms: Comparative Loss Recognition Timeliness. Journal of Accounting and Economics 2005. Burghstahler, Hail and Leuz. The Importance of Reporting Incentives: Earnings Management in European Private and Public Firms. The Accounting Review 2006. C. Family ownership and accounting properties *Wang, Dechun. Founding Family Ownership and Earnings Quality. The Accounting Review 2006. 9 Ali, Chen, Radhakrishnan. Corporate Disclosures by Family Firms. Journal of Accounting and Economics, forthcoming. Chen, Shuping, Xia Chen and Qiang Cheng. Do Family Firms Provide More or Less Voluntary Disclosure? 2007. Chen, H., Chen, J.Z., Lobo, G.J., Wang, Y., 2010. Association Between Borrower and Lender State Ownership and Accounting Conservatism. Journal of Accounting Research 48, 973-1014 *Fan, J., Wong, T.J., Zhang, T.. 2010. Founder succession and accounting properties. Contemporary Accounting Research, Forthcoming VII. What is the impact of political forces on corporate transparency? a. Value of political connection Shleifer and Vishny. Politicians and Firms. Quarterly Journal of Economics 1994. *Fisman. Estimating the Value of Political Connections. American Economics Review 2001. Claessens, S., Laeven, L., 2008. Political connections and preferential access to finance: The role of campaign contributions. Journal of Financial Economics 88, 554- 580 Faccio, M., 2006. Politically Connected Firms. The American Economic Review 96, 369-386 Faccio, M., Masulis, R.W., McConnell, J.J., 2006. Political Connections and Corporate Bailout. The Journal of Finance LXI, 2597-2635 *Khwaja, A.I., Mian, A., 2005. Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 120, 1371-1411 Calomiris, C.W., Fisman, R., Wang, Y., 2008. Profiting from Government Stakes in a Command Economy: Evidence from Chinese Asset Sales. Journal of Financial Economics b. Political connection and corporate transparency *Leuz, C., Oberholzer-Gee, F., 2006. Political relationships, global financing, and corporate transparency: Evidence from Indonesia. Journal of Financial Economics 81, 411-439 Chaney, P.K., Faccio, M., Parsley, D.C., 2010. The quality of accounting information in politically connected firms. Journal of Accounting and Economics 10 *Ramanna, K., Roychowdhury, S., 2010. Elections And Discretionary Accruals: Evidence From 2004. Journal Of Accounting Research 48, 445-475 *Piotroski, J., Wong, T.J., Zhang, T., 2010. Political Incentives to Suppress Negative Financial Information: Evidence from China. Working Paper VIII. What’s the role of auditing? *DeFond, Wong, and Li. The Impact of Improved Auditor Independence on Audit Market Concentration in China. Journal of Accounting and Economics 1999. *Wang, Q., Wong, T.J., Xia, L., 2008. State ownership, the institutional environment, and auditor choice: Evidence from China. Journal of Accounting and Economics 46, 112-134 Choi, J.-H., Wong, T.J., 2007. Auditors' Governance Functions and Legal Environments: An International Investigation. Contemporary Accounting Research 24, 13-46 *Fan and Wong. Do External Auditors Perform a Corporate Governance Role in Emerging Markets. Journal of Accounting Research 2005. Francis, Khurana, and Pereira. The Role of Accounting and A