基于博弈论环境责任保险制度的实施分析（英文）

Analysis on the Implementation of Environmental Liability Insurance System Based on the Game Theory LI Ying College of Management and Economics Northeast forestry university Harbin, Heilongjiang, P. R. China lyfly68@163.com ZHANG Rui-ling Jiangsu Hengshen Fiber Material Co., Ltd. Zhenjiang, Jiangsu, zhangruilinghenan@163.com Abstract—This paper, from the perspective of the theory, analyses the implementation of environmental liability insurance system. Using static game to analyse the pairwise game process for the government department of environmental protection, potential pollution enterprise and insurance company, studied the yield of the potential pollution enterprise on two kinds of situations in pay insurance and not pay insurance, and the occurrence probability of environmental accident how to affect government, potential pollution enterprise and insurance companies, This paper demonstrates the necessity of the government environmental protection department force the potential polluted enterprises to pay environmental liability insurance, and the most reasonable decision is that government must give certain subsidy to the insurance companies that accept the environmental liability insurance, proved that the accident probability play an important role in the enterprise decision- making. Keywords-Environmental Liability Insurance;Insurance Premium;The Game Analysis;The Government Subsidy I. INTRODUCTION Game theory also called game theory, its meaning can be expressed as follows: In the restraint of certain environmental conditions, some persons, teams or other organizations in the face of certain environmental conditions choose a behavior or strategy from the allowed ones and carry it out simultaneously or successively, once or more times, based on the information mastered, and then, they obtain corresponding results or incomes respectively. Nowadays, because of its guiding significance to the reality, Game theory has been widely used and influenced a lot in economics, sociology, psychology, political science and other fields of social science. This paper attempts to introduce the game theory into environmental liability insurance system and use it to analyse the feasibility of the implement of the environmental liability insurance system and the specific game of the stakeholder involved during the implementing process. The participator during the implementation of environme- ntal liability insurance system under the perspective in game theory includes:the government's environmental protection department,potential environmental pollution enterprise env- ironmental liability and insurance insurance institutions. Therefore,the specific game relation includes:(1) The relationship between the government department of environmental protection and environmental pollution enterprise; (2) The relationship between the potential environmental pollution enterprise and environmental liability insurance covers institutions; (3) The relationship between the government department of environmental protection and environmental liability insurance covers institutions. II. THE SPECIFIC ANALYSIS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY INSURANCE SYSTEM UNDER THE PERSPECTIVE IN GAME THEORY On the basis of game theory, we apply Static game model to analyze the specific game relationship. A. The Relationship between the Government Department of Environmental Protection and the Potential Environmental Pollution Enterprise In this game, The the government department of environmental protection has two kinds of strategies: forcing the potential environmental pollution enterprises to pay the environmental liability insurance premium or not forcing them to pay the environmental liability insurance premium. As the government departments, the environmental protection bureau have the obligation to do something for the public welfare of society and protect social public safety of life and property, so the revenue function of the government department of environmental protection relates to the confidence level(C) of social public to the government department of environmental protection. Besides, good governance of the environment can bring a lot of social benefits, such as attracting foreign investors, boosting the development of tourism and improving the resident health of body and mind and so on. We note these social benefits for (S) and note the economic benefits social benefits bringing us for (E), so the revenue function of the government department of environmental protection can be expressed as: U1=C+S+E,0 ≦ C ≦ 10,0 ≦ S ≦ 10,0 ≦ E ≦ 10. （1） Predictably, 0 ≦ U1 ≦ 30.Namely, revenue of the environmental protection department is minimum 0, maximum 30. The potential environmental pollution enterprises have two kinds of strategies: Participating in environmental insurance or ___________________________________ 978-1-61284-365-0/11/$26.00 ©2011 IEEE 838 not, in other words, paying the environmental liability insurance premium or not. Now we will discuss the factors influencing the profit function of the potential environmental pollution enterprise, there are two factors: Firstly, if not paying the environmental liability insurance premium, we suppose the losses enterprise suffered when environmental accident happens as (R). Secondly, if the enterprise has participated in environmental insurance, when environmental accident happens the losses can be be lowered to 0.4R(Here we set the weight casually just for conveniency). Thirdly, supposing the environmental liability insurance premium the enterprise pays as (a). The revenue of the potential environmental pollution enterprises we are talking about here is actually a loss, the larger absolute value of the function means more losses of the enterprise. Then, if the potential environmental pollution enterprises have paid the environmental liability insurance premium, we can got the formula 2: If the potential environmental pollution enterprises have not paid the environmental liability insurance premium, we can got the formula 3: We suppose that the probability of environmental accidents was P, and the probability of no accident was 1-P, on the basis of formula2 and formula3, we can show the profit function of the potential environmental pollution enterprise as formula4: So far, we can show the game between the government department of environmental protection and the potential environmental pollution enterprise as figure-1: From the above game tree we can see that it is appropriate for the government department of environmental protection to force the enterprise paying the environmental liability insurance premium, the proceeds under force is more, therefore the environmental protection department will definitely select mandatory measures to make enterprises pay environmental liability insurance premium. To the enterprises, they should measure the size of -0.4PR- a and –PR, if -0.4PR-a＜-PR，namely P＜5a/3R，they should select payment, if -0.4PR-a ＞-PR, namely P＞5a/3R, they should not select payment. Now it is necessary to evaluate the probability of the environmental accidents, insurance premium, and the the losses of the environmental accidents. Owing to space limit, here we will not do the further research. B. The Game between Potential Contaminated Enterprises and the Insurance Company In according to the analysis above, we know that the decisions made by the environmental protection department are mandatory, then as the auxiliary sector of the implementation of environmental liability insurance system, the main job of the insurance company is to determine the premium a reasonably, however, the determination of insurance premiums should not only think about environmental accidents Probability P, the extent of the harm incidents, but also taking into account their own profit margins, therefore the insurance company's game strategy (coverage, or exclusions). The extent of the harmful environmental accidents, refer that the fees R of the recovery of plant or equipment and compensation for victims ,to the insurance companies, the loss of environmental accident hazards is 0.6R, the insurance company's earnings Function can be expressed as follows: U3=P(-0.6PR+a)+(1-P)a=-0.6PR+a （5） When the U3> 0,ie,P <5a/3R, insurance companies are profitable. When the U3 <0, ie, P> 5a/3R, insurance companies can not get profit. However, by the preceding analysis, we know that when P<5a/3R,the potential contaminated companies would not pay the environmental liability insurance fees, when P> 5a/3R, the potential companies will choose to pay. Therefore, there is a interest conflict between the business and insurance companies, when companies choose to pay the insurance premium when the company get a loss, this is why government subsidies should be introduced, the subsidies to the U2 2 = -R (when environmental accident happens) 0 (when no environmental accident happens) （3 ） U2 1 = -a (when no environmental accident happens) -0.4R-a (when environmental accident happens) （2 ） No force unpay pay unpay pay Force U2 = -0.4RP-a (paying the liability insurance premium) -RP (not paying the liability insurance premium) （4 ） Government Enterprise Enterprise (30,-0.4PR-a) (15,-PR) (10,-0.4PR-a) (0,-PR) Figure-1:the game between the government department and the enterprise 839 insurance company's fee is B, then insurance company's profit functions can be expressed as: U3=-0.6PR+a+B （6） When P <5 (a + B) / 3R when, U3> 0, insurance companies are profitable. When P> 5 (a + B) / 3R when, U3 <0, insurance companies can not get profit. Potential contaminated with the insurance company's game tree shown in Figure-2： Figure-2. The game tree of the potential contaminated enterprise and the insurance companies The result of the game of potential contaminated enterprises and the insurance companies is that when 5a/3 5a/3R, the potential contaminated companies should choose to pay premiums. The driving force of the insurance institutions involved in environmental liability insurance system is the subsidies from the government. If there is no government subsidies, the insurance companies will get no profit if they cover the environmental liability insurance. Therefore, the implementation of environmental liability insurance system can not do without the great support of the government. REFERENCES [1] XIE Zhi yu, Economy game:the third edition, Shanghai fudan university press,2009. [2] DONG Zhi qiang, Around the game, Beijing: mechanical industry press.2007. [3] YAN Jian,CHEN Jian xian, “Game theory from the perspective of government office border relations,”Theoretical Exploration Vol. 2,2010,pp.115-123. [4] LIN Tian Lun CHEN Guo xiang, “Analyzing the conflict between teachers and students Based on the game theory,”Education scientific research ,Vol. 4,2010, pp.69-71. unpay pay pay unpay exclusions coverage Insurance companies companies companies (-0.6PR+a+B, -0.4PR-a) (B, -PR) (0, -PR-a) (0, -PR) 840