2008年公共管理国际会议论文集-反腐败、公共腐败、监督专题（45页WORD版）Corruptions

2008年公共管理国际会议 论文 政研论文下载论文大学下载论文大学下载关于长拳的论文浙大论文封面下载 集-反腐败、公共腐败、监督专题（45页WORD版）Corruptions Part Eleven Corruptions Anti – Corruptions in Public Sector Bureaucratic Problems Governmental Supervision System Overcoming the Existing Bureaucracy Defects of China by Referring the Administrative Theory and Practice of the Contemporary Europe and the United States 1. ZHANG Xiao-zhong 2.SONG Xiang-li School of Humanities and Social Science Jiangsu Teachers University of Technology, P.R. China, 213001 Abstracts The Western contemporary Administrative theory in main of New Public Management theories, and new public service theory and the post-modern Western-oriented public administrative thought criticizing and reflecting the phenomenon Of hierarchy, bureaucracy , hierarchy failure and Low efficiency ,etc, at the core of Webbers bureaucracy model as well as under the guidance of this theory in Europe and the United States , Western administrative reform and administrative practice beyond reality of the bureaucracy so far since the 1970s represents the inevitable direction of the administrative development all the world in the future. Chinese existing the bureaucracy exists as an ancient heritage of the bureaucratic system, and has many defects, and is stunting and is not fully developed compared to the Western modern bureaucracy. In Western countries, even some developing countries has been emerging wave of reform against the bureaucratic system, we can not simply abandon and renovate the traditional bureaucracy during the Chinese administrative development , we can not also exclude all the modern bureaucracy theory and can not more reject and deny the Contemporary Western the theory and practice. We must fully understand the profits from the significance of the administrative contemporary theory and practice in Europe and the United States on the Chinese administrative system, to develop by leaps and bounds of Chinese public administration model in the era of globalization, that is to learn rational bureaucratic system and new public management theories, etc, to overcome defects of the existing the bureaucracy. Key words The theory of contemporary Western, Chinese bureaucracy defects, Reference, Overcome 1 Introduction All kinds of defects in the traditional bureaucracy of management have brought about a crisis of faith, management, financial, and management crisis also involves professional crisis, obedient crisis, democratic crisis and the information crisis, therefore, at first in the West Theoretical circles also will have the call beyond the bureaucracy and reject. In recent years, New Public Management has been a guiding theory of the Western government reform, creating a model of New Public Management to become the most fundamental the trend of contemporary Western government reform. 2 The contemporary Western theory and practice of the bureaucracy and beyond criticism 2.1 Criticism and reflection of the newest Administrative Theory on the bureaucracy in Europe and the United States The bureaucracy as an important part of Western civil service system came into being in the 19th century and early 20th century. It is designed by the German scholar Max Weber and is an organization as the characteristics of empower - hierarchical, centralized–unified, command - subordinate. As a management model it provided an effective tool for the modern organization and management, and has become the dominant mode of organization since the industrial society. But since the late 1970s, Western countries has been gradually from the industrial society into the post-industrial society, and information technology, knowledge-based economy, and so on bring tremendous impact on all levels of society, government and enterprises is mutual infiltration, the traditional bureaucracy can not answer and resolve the increasingly serious problems and difficulties which the government is facing, and its limitations is more and more obvious in the West. Firstly, flaws of the hierarchy. In the management system, highly centralized power and the political elite is contrary to the modern democratic development of civic participation, the principle of popular sovereignty. Meanwhile, the rigid awareness in the hierarchy and resources monopoly in the values is also significant differences from democracy and the emancipation of the mind, the value of diverse and autonomous self-government. Secondly, lack of accountability mechanisms. The traditional bureaucracy is only in charge of the higher authorities, rather than the lower level, citizens in particular. The responsibility to safeguard mechanism of Bureaucracy model is indirectly for the characteristics, and the public control the election of Administrative Officer through the voting, and Administrative Officer entrusted to use political power by the people to control the civil service. In theory, any problems may result in liability protection mechanism moves out of order, but in fact the problems are in both of them. Thirdly, only focusing on process and input without results. This model is too much pursuit of the process in the form of reasonable and ignored the performance of the output, the government administrative staff follow the beaten track and toe the line just not to make mistakes, and reduce the efficiency ，and suppress creativity and innovation. Fourthly, the growing machinery and Overstaffed management. The traditional bureaucracy model emphasis on hierarchy and bureaucracy too much, resulting in more towering organizational structure, the information is the more, the communication will be more difficult and distortion. The increase of the hierarchy caused the expansion of the main management, overstaffing, a waste of resources and decision-making power Operating system also makes the highly centralized and rigid conservative, authoritarian and formal, leading to low quality of the policy. Fifthly, defects in response. The Officials in Bureaucratic model lack the ability in dealing with external affairs, at the same time, this model does not allow civil servants to play a role in dealing with external groups or improve response. In the criticism of the bureaucracy, new public management theory from the basic starting point which the private sector is more than the public sector in management efficiency stands to reduce the size of government through expansion of the free market forces, and introduce the market principles to operate the government, and a written contract between upper and lower layer is replaced the bureaucratic hierarchy to upgrade lower bureaucratic discretion, so that the managers is attention to performance and monitoring. The new public service put forward on the basis of the new direct reflection of public management theory, and emphasis on participation, justice, equality and civic spirit, the main value of government agencies is in response and democracy. The bureaucracy is the civil at first, followed by the public officials. New Public Management biased management and a new public service theory more tends constitutionalism. Post-modern public administration thought stands public energy field replace the bureaucracy, or the bureaucracy is for one of the diverse forces. Although these views are different, but they are that the traditional bureaucracy is the main target of administrative reform. 2.2 The practice of the administrative reform and development beyond the bureaucracy As the new public management the representative of the European and American the contemporary administration theory is the product of social specific political, economic, scientific and technological development in Europe and the United States since the 1980s, and reflects the trend and direction of development of the Western public administration, meanwhile, it is one of the main guiding principle of the administrative reform in the West On an unprecedented scale. It broke the traditional boundaries of public administration in the disciplines and the related knowledge and methods of the modern economics, science policy, management, political science and sociology is integrated into public administration, and there have been a major breakthrough and Innovation in the area of research on the topic, involving a large number of new themes such as public goods, external, public services supply and rational people, the exchange paradigm, the system of choice, public choice, the failure of multiple organizations and so on. Western developed countries, newly industrialized countries and even some developing countries have successively carried out various forms of reform because of all kinds of defects of the bureaucracy. New Public Management campaign launched in Britain and the United States, and Madame Thatcher in 1979 and in 1993 Clinton adopted a public administration reform after he was in power. British Government introduced the new public management reforms by competition mechanism and customer-oriented for characteristic; a large-scale ―Reinventing Government movement‖ was launched in United States. New Zealand and Australia were seen as the most rapid, the most systematic, the most comprehensive and the most radical countries in the new public management reform. In particular, in New Zealand, a sweeping reform of public administration was in advance, it was called ―New Zealand model‖ because of the depth, breadth, duration and effectiveness of the academic community. After the 1990s, some of newly industrialized and developing countries have begun to join the tide of public administration reform, such as South Korea, the Philippines and other countries. To a great extent, it improved their level of public management, and promoted economic and social development, and satisfied the demand for more public services, meanwhile also enhanced competitiveness of these countries in the world. Of course there were also some problems are required urgent solution in advance when the new management theory was popular in Western countries, such as responsibility for the vague and abuse of power, massive unemployment in developing countries, rich and poor differentiation, crony capitalism and so on. It must be noted that public sector management can not be equated with the private sector, and the provision of public services is more complex than the general market behavior. This management model is very possible to result some problems such as fairness, justice, representation and participation in democratic and constitutional values and responsibility and ethical values. But in general, it represents the natural choice of administrative development of the countries in the world in the future, and is being able to obstruct the new thing, is based on the reflection and critical of the traditional administrative model namely defects of modern bureaucracy, reflecting the efforts which academic community and politicians were made to solve practical problems. To some extent, these reforms practice has been beyond the bureaucracy defects. The first, the role of government is changing and its functions are re-defined as ―the helm‖ rather than ―paddle.‖ Government should do well in decision-making, and attract competitors by policies, and recognize the wider possibility and adjust resources and the need to maintain maximum flexibility to cope with the changing environment. Government should be good at authority, decentralization, deregulation, to encourage the public to participate in the management, and decentralized the power of public administration, to streamline the hierarchy in its internal structure through participation and cooperation. The second, the marketability orientation function brands the government. Government introduced the management techniques of the concept of market and the private sector to change the Governments bureaucratic style of work and changed in the government and the market to play the markets role in promoting public administration. The third, results-oriented function should be implemented in government. The government has focused on the results, performance, a clear objective management, performance assessment and cost accounting, and pursuing the maximization budget. Governments should work to achieve substantive public objectives or results, rather than strictly control spending public resources which the completion of the work needs. This does not mean that the Government can waste resources, nor slash the public projects, but asks the government to seek innovative ways to do more things by less the cost and to make the biggest gains by investing at least. The fourth, the decentralization of organizational structure and the flexibility of administrative machinery and staff should be also implemented. New Public Management stressed that a flat level, decentralization of authority, to adopt policies independent of the executive departments, and advocated the establishment of ―flexible government,‖ to break the career of civil service for life, and to implement the employment contract and the performance pay. The fifth, the government has foresight and focuses on prevention rather than treatment. The Government should focus on a prevention-oriented, proactive, rather than restore lost services through the post. The government should do everything possible to consider the future when it decides a policy. In short, the New Public Management model insists on shaping the government by the entrepreneurial spirit. The sixth, customer-oriented. New public management theory citizens as customers, and think that the Government is subject to customer-driven, its purpose is to satisfy the needs of customers, rather than bureaucratic needs. Government should have ―customer awareness‖ and a ―customer-driven‖ system like the enterprises. The seventh, the privatization. Government power should be kept out of the market area and implement the large-scale privatization of the state-owned enterprises which participate in fair market competition like private enterprises. Many countries have practices the reform of the privatization or the tendency of privatization. Especially large state-owned enterprises will sell or transfer shares, such as New Zealand has abandoned almost all of the public service regulations, has restructured the core public sector, has established the dozens of budget performance by running small-scale sector, over 50 billion dollars worth of public Industrial has been privatization, and other public sector has became a fully state-owned enterprises made their own decisions. The public sector has been gradually from direct economic activities out, and has been from direct intervention in the economy into macro-control. The views which the contemporary Western administrative theory criticized and reflected the hierarchy, the bureaucracy, bureaucratic failures and low efficiency of the model hierarchy at the core of Webber paradigm, bureaucracy and the practice of the Western reform and the development is beyond the bureaucracy in reality under the guidance of this theory in Europe and the United States Since the 1970s are not uniform in domestic and foreign and are still in heated debates. For example, the Organization theorists in the United States Woburn Nice in the ―The Demise of the Bureaucracy for the Upcoming‖ predicted: ―In the scope of 20 to 50 years since 1960s, people will witness and join the 1funeral teams of the bureaucracy themselves‖. It was also suggested that surpassing the bureaucracy was only utopia, and currently only expressed the further improvement of the bureaucracy either in theory or in practice, rather than abandoned the basic institutional framework and organizational 2structure of the bureaucracy itself, the vitality of the bureaucracy still existed. Some people even think that there has not been a new organization and management theory and successful practice models that can replace bureaucracy so far. ―Examples of successful reform almost can not been found in the 3economically backward countries‖. We believe that the contemporary Western administrative theory criticized and reflected the bureaucracy is progression significance of the times and its practical model of exploration represents the inevitable direction of the administrative development of the Western countries even all the ones in the world in the future. The movement of the public administration reform which Western countries set off overcome the shortcomings of the traditional bureaucracy in a sense, and is conducive to the healthy and social development of government and society to become a new driving force to promote social development. 1 Wang Qiang: The global wave of administrative reform and administrative modernization in China, social science in Jiangsu, 2000 (2). 2 Tang Huangfeng: Beyond the bureaucracy: reality or utopia, Journal of Zhejiang Provincial Party Committee Party School.2003，(6):81-84. 3 Chu Dejiang: The risk of the new public management theory apply in China, Journal of Tianshui School of Administration.2007，(4):56. 3 Chinese current bureaucracy and the development trend of history At present, Chinese bureaucracy is non-rational pre-modern bureaucracy and China should be a multiple simultaneous development way out creatively such as a rational bureaucracy model and the new public management model. 3.1 Historical position of Chinese current bureaucracy Chinese bureaucracy has exists as a continuation of the ancient bureaucracy and has a long history, and even Webber proposed to the modern bureaucracy on the basis of the Chinese ancient bureaucracy. Weber believes that Chinese ancient bureaucracy is the ―Hereditary bureaucracy‖ and its most obvious characteristic is ―relatively non-rational.‖ Although Socialist Transformation was carried out and a new kind of Democracy was established after the founding of the PRC, the basic form of this bureaucracy was not changed basically. Since reform and opening up, especially in 1993 the National Civil Service has taken effect, and a lot of modern connotation has been added, but it still not very standardized, and was a big gap from the modern Western rational bureaucracy and did not establish a full sense of the bureaucracy. We believe that the bureaucracy is still in the transitional period from the pre-modern bureaucracy to the modern bureaucracy in China. We simply do not agree that Chinese current bureaucracy classified as the traditional bureaucracy that fully opposed to the modern bureaucracy, but located in the modern bureaucracy that it is only in the low-level stage, which is judged the history of the world from the historic development when combined with the community in terms. Thus, it has not only traditional bureaucratic feudal traces, but also modern factors, and it has not only its own inherent weaknesses and stunted of the development, but also features of the modern bureaucracy in common, even including certain limitations of the modern Western bureaucracy. On the one hand, Chinese bureaucracy has the specific lack and defects compared to Western modern bureaucracy. Firstly, tendency of personification is obvious. It represents parents legacy system still exists to build and handle interpersonal by the idea of blood relationship; Official Standard, ―what I say goes‖ phenomenon and ―relationship network‖ which is complicated, mutual use of constraint, and political and economic power symbiotic has existed widely and righteousness does not overwhelm evil influence; regardless of party and government and the excessive concentration of power lead to breeding corruption. Secondly, the rational spirit is missing. In our country there is not no rationality that is often constrained by moral belief systems and the ecological environment such as power, interests, relations, thus it lacks technical and scientific forces and the tension that Webber said in bureaucracy, Which seriously hindered the development of the organization toward the efficiency and scientific, leading to the inefficiency and rigidness of the government. It is not is due to excessive restraints of the bureaucracy like the Western countries, but because of the inadequate bureaucracy. Thirdly, National Civil Service System is imperfect. The Civil Service System is typical modern bureaucracy, but there are still serious problems whether the system or the operation in China, which the Civil Service is defined unreasonable, the job classification is not standardized, employment mechanism through examination is not unimpeded, evaluation lacks an effective method, formalism is full in operation and so on, and agencies are overstaffed and overstaffing, man who has right does not do things and man who does things does not have the right, administrative efficiency is low. Fourthly, the respect of system and the Legal norms is lack. In China supremacy of the power, Official Standard and the rule of man has deep-rooted tradition, and the system, the legal concept is weak to make the obedience more inclined to the personal charm and interpersonal relationships in the organization, personal authority and duties authority is more than legal authority, and the respect of the system and the law was written off to the side. The Western modern bureaucracy is based on the Legal authority and stressed that respecting the system and the norms exceeding human beings. In other words, the bureaucracy in the Western countries, the subject is not because of personal, but those non-personal systems, that is to say, a system empower the individual authority. On the other hand, China and the Western countries are in an era of globalization, although the bureaucracy is at different stages of development, and have different social nature, the bureaucracy itself should have the same general characteristics. They do not only contain the common development of the modern factors, such as a common market economy, modern democratic politics, but also are facing the common difficulties and problems, which the extent and manifestations is different. As mentioned above, many problems in the Western modern bureaucracy also in China embody such as the shortcomings of the system, the lack of accountability mechanisms, process and only re-investment rather than a result, machinery and management agencies increasingly bloated and the lack of response and so on, some of them are even more serious, which are more twisted and deformed patterns and more renovation with the traditional Chinese bureaucracy disadvantages growing integration. Of course, many good things have not been learned by us, and the deeper problems have not yet appeared in China. It must be stressed that, when the bureaucracy is still in the transitional period from the pre-modern bureaucracy to the modern bureaucracy in China, developed Western countries and even some developing countries have been in transition from the modern bureaucracy to a new higher mode. This constitutes two different historical starting point and goals that the modern administration model are changing in Western countries and China. The establishment of bureaucracy of rational norms and surpassing the bureaucracy itself moderately is compressed in specific time and space to achieve at the same time. This huge contrast make us face more arduous tasks and more tough choices, is it the modern bureaucracy or the Western administration model? The footsteps or leapfrog development? We believe that Chinese current administrative development must put the dual task of studying and going beyond the bureaucracy into a uniform process. 3.2 Choice of the modern bureaucracy and new public management in China Webers bureaucracy is known as the ―traditional bureaucracy‖ compared to the Western contemporary administrative theory, but it is named as the modern bureaucracy compared to Chinese bureaucracy. Weber thinks that, as a form of the administrative organization, the modern ideal and rational ―bureaucracy‖ should have the following characteristics: Firstly, a reasonable division of labor and specialization. In the bureaucracy, regardless of management or tasks both should have a clear division of work to a high degree, the specialization of the work is the result of clear division. Organizations prescribe that every position own specific powers and responsibilities according to requirements of division, the positions within the organization itself should be taken on by corresponding professionals in accordance with the need of organization and be arranged and managed depend on expertise. Therefore, bureaucratic organizations must provide a comprehensive and systematic professional training to urge the administrative staff to improve the working manner and elevate work efficiency, and ultimately become an expert of a special field. Secondly, the level of the system. The organization is arranged as grade-level structure from above to below according to the power, the executive power is decompounded level by level from top to bottom to satisfy the need of work, authority and responsibility of superior-subordinate is demarcated by grade strictly. Thirdly, non-personification. In the bureaucracy, peoples conducts are regulated through laws, rules, regulations and official documents, the circumscription of official and private matters is clear, official activities and private life in the aspect of relation and the scope separate completely, Official activities shall not be doped by personal feelings, preferences and other irrational factors, in the official relations between members of organization the only things existing should be the relation towards things rather than people, the staff should only consider legitimacy, rationality and effectiveness, but not the person-to-person relation. Fourthly, institutionalization. The organization must form a system of strict and written rules and regulations, administrative staff must exercise authority and responsibility orderly within the purview of the regulations and rules. Fifthly, formal decision-making writ. In the bureaucracy, all important decisions and orders should be issued as a formal document and put on record. Therefore, the bureaucracy should set up ―Archives‖ to keep all records and documents properly. Weber believes that this characteristic of the bureaucracy makes this organization independent of the characteristics of individuals. In an organization, its leadership may change due to operational needs and its members may also come or go due to one reason or another, its documents and rules has a relatively stable. We can see that this ideal model has not fully achieved even in the western countries. There are great differences between the Western realistic or obsolete and substitution bureaucracy and Webers ideal model, let alone in China. These ideal characteristics of the bureaucracy still show unclearly in China and there is still a great room for the development, which need to nurture and develop in the long time. When we continue to improve the modern bureaucracy, reshape the Chinese government with rational, lawful and scientific spirit, improve the civil service system and strengthen the building of the legal system, we must not repeat the mistakes of western bureaucracy and accept the modern bureaucracy completely, but steer clear of the crooked road they came through and accept critically. Western New Public Management movement need critical social conditions ,such as the consummate market, the powerful economic strength, the perfect social security system, the full development of civil society organizations, the stronger capacity for self-government and so on, but these conditions are not yet fully possessed and developed in China, therefore, it can not be blindly implemented. However, under the condition of new administrative model reform carried through on a large scale in a big way in the West, we must have transcending vision and opening mentality at the time of improving the modern bureaucracy and strive to learn from the outstanding achievements of Western New Public Management to promote the Chinas Administrative Reform. Furthermore, with a longer-term perspective, once Chinas market economy, democratic political system and cultural conditions develop to a certain extent, the new public management is likely to become the best choice for the developing mode of Chinas administration. 4 Reference and beyond in the choice Chinas public administration mode in the future New public management reform movement has a positive reference to the contemporary Chinese government. In the era of globalization, Chinas model of public administration must achieve development from pre-modern bureaucracy to the new public management by leaps and bounds. 4.1 Administration theory and practice of contemporary Europe and the United States to Chinas administrative reform for implications Many scholars Chinese believe that China should learn from Western New Public Management movements successful experience and implement this model. Looking at the new public management of Western thought and theory, Chinas public administration reform at least can imply in the following aspects: The first, New Public Management stressed t the Governments enterprise management and the management efficiency. The reason why the Chinese Governments efficiency is not high for a long time, on the one hand, it is a result of planned economy resulting in excessive concentration of power, and Imperfect regulations and legal system; On the other hand, it is due to the irrational and overlapping agencies organizational structure. New Public Management stressed that the Government should be managed as enterprises, which takes the efficiency in the first place. Our government should establish a sense of efficiency, enhance vitality, and use the limited resources to create more public goods. The second, New Public Management takes a number of science and business management methods to the area of public administration to improve the efficiency of government management. Although the Government the private enterprises have different target and purposes in the public management, the Governments public management should learn scientific management and paying attention to market enterprise demand and customer feedback from enterprises management. From using of rental contracts, public-private partnerships, such as paying users to expand and improve the capacity of government service and to reduce costs and improve efficiency. At the same time, by putting the input-output analysis and cost accounting methods to the management of Chinas government departments, managers can improve the sense of responsibility and conduct more scientific performance appraisal. The third, New Public Management introduces competition mechanism to the governments public service areas, so the Government exclusive monopoly of public services has been broken. On the one hand, this can improve the quality of public services and efficiency; on the other hand, the Government can ease the financial pressure. To improve our Governments management efficiency and management level in public service fields, especially in infrastructure sector, and to give better play to the role of market mechanisms, we should learn from the West in strengthening macro-management of public services, and introduce competition mechanism Service areas, open up some public services market, allow and encourage the private sector into the provision of public services areas in a certain area. The fourth, New Public Management develops from focusing on compliance with established laws and regulations to paying attention to actual work performance, and provides quality service-oriented direction. Because Chinas current legal system is not sound, a sound legal and regulatory framework will be an important aspect the future work of Chinas government. However, it must be aware that the system is the completion of public management objectives and tasks of the means. Therefore, it should be considered how to implement and enforce it when formulating the system and regulations. This needs to strengthen in Chinas administration. If failure to abide by the lax enforcement, it will be only empty talk even if we have perfect law and management system. The fifth, New Public Management pays attention to the political management of administrative, civil servants and political system of administration of the impact. Administrative reforms needs to Combined with the reform of the political system and other aspects of conduct. The performance of public administration and political structure are closely related, if the political system can not guarantee that various political responsibility system effectively established and improved, can not guarantee that the Government have authority, then public administration will fail to political risk. In a system lack of political authority and political responsibility, government policy formulation and implementation of policies can not be guaranteed. Thus, although the aim of reform of government institutions is to enhance the performance, it must be combined with the reform of the political system to allow the staff aware of their political responsibility, strengthen the political sensitivity of a conscious policy to maintain the response and faithfully carry out administrative duties to the purpose. Of course, we must acknowledge that the new public management in the West has produced its complex social and political background. It is to meet Western political and social development requirements of the product. There are huge differences and gaps between China and the in the political, economic, cultural and many other areas, which decided that China have risks in to the economic and even political areas when learning this theory and practice. Therefore, attention should be paid to Chinas national conditions. West New public management theory can not be copied completely. But using this as an excuse to reject this model of the absorption and use for reference is not desirable. 4.2 The development by leaps and bounds of Chinese public administration model in the age of globalization The emergence of globalization is the background of new public management sports. The competition of comprehensive national strength becomes the focus of attentions of all nations, and the ability of a country is dominant factor of national comprehensive strength and competitiveness. All government departments and even local government departments must have ability to track, understand and deal with international problems. Government must be more flexible to operate colleges and universities to strengthen the governments contingency management capabilities, and enhance government capacity to respond to the citizens. All these require changes in government management. The development of economic globalization bound to Chinas administrative reforms in the above-mentioned have a comprehensive and profound impact of globalization request of the Government, China will certainly pose a severe challenge to reform with the introduction of the new public management of inevitability. As mentioned above, the traditional model of bureaucratic administrative system increasingly has become obvious shortcomings. It is an important Significance to learn new public management experience set off in the reform movement from Western countries, and to choose a new mode of development and progress choice fitting Chinas national conditions of the society. We must use the vision of globalization, from the height of the times, comprehensive study administrative reform and the development model of exploration and practice in todays China and countries in the world, to achieve development model of Chinas public administration, that is, from a pre-modern bureaucracy System to the new public management by leaps and bounds in the era of globalization. Chinese society is undergoing from traditional to modern changes for 30 years of reform and opening-up, and public administration model changes from an ―emperor administration‖ of agricultural society to ―right administration‖ of industrial society. With the current scientific concept of development proposed and implemented, and the imminent arrival of the industrial society to an 4. information society changes, public administration model is changing to the ―people administration‖ It was summed up that Chinas model for 30 years is changing from ―public authority‖ to ―public service‖, from ―single‖ approach to ―diversity‖ and from direct administration to indirect and direct the 5development of both the track. Even someone proposed that the transition of Chinese modern government model of public administration structure is changing to the exploration and put forward a ―people first‖ doctrine of administrative services and ―the primacy of law‖ as the criteria for the rule of law; ―by things decentralization‖ The characteristics of the separation of powers; to a fair and just for the purpose of the public administration; information as the core of electronic administration; to focus 6on budgetary reform of public finances; career goal into the technical and administrative seven goals. It can be said that these changes and goals tend to have a flavor and characteristics of the times, the bureaucracy is perfect, but also can be seen as the Western public administration, even the new public management experience of successful absorption and use for reference. From the globalization of the total, environment, China is also in the context of the information society, also is moving toward a sound market economy, improve democracy, and in-depth development of economic globalization to contemporary China and the outside world of mutual interdependence and the degree of integration Continues to deepen, in addition to the economic complete harmony, you have me, and I have you, a mutual penetration, as well as cultural exchanges on the rapid development, but also in the political life of close contact. Therefore, as we continue to fully participate in the determination of the principle of economic globalization, with the frequent exchanges with the outside world and the increasing dependence on foreign, as Chinas reform of the administrative system and the reform of the political system of in-depth exploration and practice forward, the new public management must China will have a profound impact. We should at least take the following measures to draw on: first, building a service-oriented government should learn from the new public management experience. It is necessary to transform government functions and change to the situation of ―big government, small community‖, the Government will turn from the management of specific extricate themselves further from the fundamental solution to the bureaucracy of the disease. Second, most institutional reform of the system must learn from the new public management experience. We should learn from Western countries most reform experience, to implement a thorough reform of institutions, explore the functions of the organic unity of the sector institutions, to improve inter-departmental coordination mechanism, to streamline and standardize the procedure of coordinating body and its various offices, and to reduce administrative levels, reduce administrative costs and strive to resolve the overlapping agencies, cross-duty, more doors to political issues. Third, straighten out the relationship between the government and the market to draw new public management experience, to accelerate the separation of government and enterprises, government funding separate from the conduct of public affairs, to separate government and the market intermediary organizations, standardized administrative actions, to strengthen the building of administrative law enforcement departments, reduce and standardize administrative examination and approval, to reduce government micro-economic intervention, to introduce the mechanism of competition to management of the Government, to encourage private investment and operation of public services, and break the provision of public goods in the monopoly and increase the efficiency of public services quality. Fourth, the concept needs to achieve real change. The ―people-oriented‖ scientific concept of development should applicant to the field of public administration, to achieve the new public management advocated by the movements ―customer-oriented‖ concept, to give the state civil service Truly become a ―public servant of the people‖, and to abandon the ―official position‖ of the old traditions. Fifth, to learn new management method from public management, to introduce management by objectives, performance evaluation, cost accounting, and other means of public 4 QI Ming Shan: Public administration reform model - to the people of this model, Journal of Yunnan Institute of Administration.2006，(3):8(in Chinese). 5 Li Xin: social transformation in the public administration pattern of change, Journal of Capital Normal University (Social Sciences).2003，(3):44(in Chinese). 6 Cheng Xiasheng: transition model of modern public administration structure of the Government, Journal of the University of Western Fujian career.2002，(6):1. management of operating costs, and improve the performance of the Government to prevent the corruption of public power. From the facts, we try to have a new public management practices, such as the recycling of the government Shunde in Guangdong province is on the basis of understanding of the exploration theory of ―the helm‖ and ―Pulp zoned‖ in the West, and the water supply campaign of Lianyungang in Jiangsu province is using Urban Services to break the monopoly of public utilities for privatization and market-oriented experiment. And so on, there are many such examples some experience in this respect. As Chinas regional imbalance in economic development, it can be first piloted in developed regions, the ripe conditioned provinces, of municipalities and individual industries, then gradually to promote the country, and to promote Chinas development model and the diversification of the economy, diversification of the diversified pattern of adaptation, and to create an ideal new open-up model bureaucracy combined of Chinese traditional bureaucracy to the model of new public management model, to keep up with the pace of development of the world. Of course, it is also necessary to achieve this path in practice for difficult explore and long-term experiment. Therefore, we must not only see the risk of the new public management in China application, but also see feasibility of a part of its initiatives and ideas be able to absorb and draw on in china, thus, we will create conditions to achieve improvement by leaps and bounds from the traditional bureaucracy to the new public management under the globalization background. 5 Conclusion New exploration of the contemporary Western development model by New public management theories for representative represents the natural choice of administrative development all the world in the future, therefore, the bureaucracy in the West and beyond criticism at the same time, we should be based on the current conditions in China and can not simply abandon traditional bureaucracy, we can not also renovate the modern bureaucratic system by footsteps and can not more exclude and deny the contemporary Western theory. We should learn the contemporary western administrative theories, movement and model, such as rational bureaucracy and new public management theories, etc, to overcome defects of the existing bureaucratic system and develop by leaps and bounds of Chinese public administrative model from the bureaucracy to the New Public Management in the era of globalization. References [1] David Osborne and Ted Gaebler. Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector. New York: Plume, 1993 [2] Osborne David, Plastrik Petersuch. Banishing Bureaucracy: The Five Strategies for Reinventing Government. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., 1997 [3] Woodrow Wilson. The Study of Administration. The Academy of Political Science, 1886 [4] Owen E. Hughes. Public Management and Administration: an Introduction - 3rd ed., Palgrave Macmillan, 2003 [5] Barzelay Michael. Breaking Through Bureaucracy. A New Vision for Managing in Government--1st ed., University of California Press, 1992 [6] Max Weber. Economy and Society. edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, Berkeley: University of California Press, reissue, 1978, Vol.II(in German) [7] Jin Taijun. New Public Management: New Trend in Contemporary Western Public Administration. Social Sciences Abroad, 1997, (1) (in Chinese) [8] ZhaoJinglai. Summarization of Several Problem Researches on ―New Public Management‖. Journal of China National School of Administration. Journal of the National School of Administration, 2001, (5) (in Chinese) [9] Zhang Qingyun. Comprehensive Review on the Study of Public Management [J].The Chinese Administration, 2000,(7) (in Chinese) [10] Yu Jianxing. Globalization: A Critical Study. Zhejiang University Press, 2003 (in Chinese) [11] Jin Taijun. Case Study of Public Management. East China Normal University Press, 2006 (in Chinese) [12] Jin Taijun. The New Public Administration. East China Normal University Press, 2006 (in Chinese) Measuring Corruption—An Empirical Re-testing on Correlations between Multiple Political-economic Factors and Corruption *KO, Chuan-yu Ernie Financial & Economic Law Department, Yu Da College of Business, Miao-Li County, Taiwan, P.R. China Abstract This paper replicates Budak & Goel (2004)s model on the correlations between 8 variables and corruption. These independent variables include economic growth, government size, government quality, law enforcement, political freedom, economic freedom, political transition, and former soviet legacy (a dummy variable). A number of critiques are provided to address Budak & Goel’s methodological limitations and shortcomings. This paper finds that a large amount of missing data seriously discredits the reliability of their sample. Only 38 to 50 observations were reported in their statistical testing out of the total 125 observations. The time series from 1998 to 2002 in their panel study revealed a problem of autocorrelation, which resulted in high values of adjusted R-square. A revised mean model accompanied by rescaling the World Bank corruption index is provided to enhance the reliability and validity of the statistical testing. This paper finds that only one independent variable, prosperity, is robustly correlated with corruption. Other variables are invalid to explain corruption due to statistical insignificance, high multicollinearity, and endogeneity. This paper concludes that based on 25 former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries data in the post-Cold War era, economic growth is indeed in positive correlated with political integrity in those countries. The more prosperous these countries are, the lower their corruption levels are at and vice versa. As to other testing variables, no statistically significant evidence supports their impact on corruption. Key words Corruption, Economic growth, Prosperity, Multicollinearity 1 Introduction There is an ongoing debate over the decisive factors affecting the level of a state’s public servant’s integrity, which is measured by corruption. This paper aims to improve the measurement of corruption and institutional factors by replicating a panel study previously conducted by Budak & Goel (2004). 7They argued that the role of the government in twenty-five transition economies in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe has a direct causal link to the level of illegal activities. The general equation of illegal activities is specified as follow: [1]Illegal activity = f (Potential benefits, Potential costs, State of the world) One of the most prominent illegal activities is corruption, which was used by Budak & Goel (2004) as the dependent variable for testing purpose. First of all, this paper reviews frequently cited journal articles regarding institutions and corruption in order to frame the causal relationships between political-economic factors and corruption. Secondly, this paper replicates the Budak & Goel (2004)s model by using updated and refined data, and provides a number of critiques on their methodology and * Lecturer of Fianancial & Economic Law Department, Yu Da College of Business (Taiwan Province of P. R. China) and Ph.D. candidate of Dept. of Diplomacy, National Chengchi University. 7 Budak & Goel (2004) excluded observations for Bosnia and Herzegovina and for Serbia and Montenegro due to unavailability of data. See Budak & Goel (2004): Transition, Government and Corruption, Economia Internazionale, Vol; 57 Issue; 4, December 2004. testing results. Finally a revised model based on mean number of the variables is proposed as an improvement over the Budak & Goel (2004)s model. 2 Literature review Studies of corruption in the early Post World War II era explained why newly-independent nation-states in Asia, Africa, and Latin American struggled with a painstaking transition from authoritarianism to democracy (Huntington 1968). They found that the common syndrome of corruption in developing countries is rooted in weakness of institutions, with institutions defined as the set of rules in a society which shapes human interaction, including constitutions and codes of behavior (North 1990). Samuel Huntington (1968) suggests weak institutions hurt economic prosperity and political democratization in developing countries. 2.1 Institutional factors In the Budak & Goel (2004)s article, eight institution-related variables such as economic prosperity, government size, government quality, the rule of law, political freedom, economic freedom, transition progress, and Soviet heritage (a dummy variable) are included. The coauthors cited several previous studies that conflicted with each other regarding the relationship between institution (such as government size and government effectiveness) and corruption. This paper provides a more comprehensive overview of existing literature, which suggests a mixed result of corruption and institutions but supports a strong correlation between corruption and economic growth. Two methods of corruption measurements are discussed and used separately to test the correlations with eight institutional variables. 2.2 Measuring corruption To benchmark corruption, there are two major indices: (1) Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) published by Transparency International and (2) Graft Index by Kaufmann, Kraay and Zioto-Lobaton 8(1999), which is also known as the World Bank Institutes Control of Corruption Index (CCI) (You and Khagram 2004). Both indices, the CPI and the CCI, are highly correlated at Pearsons r=0.98 and widely cited by scholars and news media but also equally criticized for their subjective bias and lack of precision and validity (Swamy et al. 2001 10, Johnston 2000 12). The most serious flaw of both indices resides in its methodology—a poll of polls based on expert surveys. Critics say that the same score for two countries does not necessarily reflect the same level of corruption or the same form of briberies, and therefore it is highly inappropriate to equate ―perceptions‖ with corruption itself. (Johnston 2000 17). However, given the elusive nature of corruption, these perceptions indices are the best substitute for the reality. Budak & Goel (2004) applied both indices, the CCI and the CPI, separately as two dependent variables to regress with eight independent variables. Their data was collected from 1998 to 2002. They reported missing data in these two corruption indices, which resulted in variation of the number of observations in Budak & Goel’s paper. But they did not mention other missing data in eight independent variables, when corrected, resulted in significant differences between their and this papers statistical analysis. This paper discusses the discrepancies in detail in sections 3 and 4. In addition, this paper takes a three-phase incremental approach to conduct data refinement and statistical testing. In phase one, this paper rebuilds original dataset and compares the values of each independent variables average, minimum, and maximum values with those of Budak & Goel (2004). In phase two, this paper uses the replicated dataset to run testing in comparison with Budak & Goel’s (2004)s output. In phase three, this paper refines the model by using mean number across twenty-five countries and reports testing results. Statistical software package STATA 9 is used to run all testing in 8 The World Bank provides CCI only on a bi-annual basis for 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004. See this paper. 3 Data replication and refinement Drawing on equation (1), Budak & Goel (2004) proposed an estimating equation for corruption in 25 transition countries as follows: CORRUPTION = f (Economic Prosperity, Government Size, Government Quality, itititit Policing, Economic Freedom, Political Freedom, Transition Progress, Soviet Heritage) itititit [2]i =1,…,25; t =1,…,5 (i.e. 1998-2002) Statistics shows the original data specifications by Budak & Goel (2004). This paper replicates and presents the updated data by using latest publications values of all variables from 1998 to 2002. These publications include online data from UNDP, the World Bank, and print editions of the annual Transition Report from 1999 to 2005 by European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Most average values of independent and dependent variables between Budak & Goel (2004) and this paper are different, except average values for economic prosperity, economic freedom, and Soviet heritage. These discrepancies are siginificant. Two possible reasons for discrepancies are: one, there is constant annual data refinement from original sources; or, two, more unreported missing data existed in Budak & Goel (2004)s original dataset. 3.1 Redefining variable Budak & Goel (2004) claimed to use EBRDs Transition Index as one of the independent variables—Transition Progress—in their journal article. However, there is no ―Transition Index,‖ or single score assigned to each transition economy under this index. Instead EBRD annually publishes ―Transition Indicators,‖ which encompass nine variables as follows: large-scale privatization, small-scale privatization, governance and enterprise restructuring, price liberalization, trade and foreign exchange system, competition policy, banking reform and interest rate liberalization, securities markets and non-bank financial institutions, and infrastructure reform (Transition Report 2005, p. 202). In order to replicate the model of Budak & Goel (2004) as accurately as possible, this paper uses ―Legal Transaction Indicators: Commercial Law‖ as the substitute for Transition Index for two reasons. One, Professor Goel did not provide their original dataset under repeated requests of the author of this paper. It is impossible to make a direct comparison between the original values of their transition index and this papers reconstituted index. Second, competition policy, under the loose definition of transition index, has already been picked by Budak & Goel (2004) as an independent variable—Economic Freedom. To avoid perfect multicollinearity, this paper substitutes EBRDs legal transition indicators—commercial law—as an appropriate substitute for both replication and testing purposes. (Transition Report 1999, p. 44) 3.2 Searching original sources—an intellectual searching exercise Collection and replication of Budak & Goel (2004)s original dataset was an unexpected, tedious and time-consuming process. The long journey began with repeated rejection by Professor Goel who refused to provide their original dataset and complete testing results. Instead, professor Goel mentioned that all data are available online or from the print edition. Absent the original dataset, this paper can only rebuild an approximation of the original data but cannot compare the reconstituted dataset with the original dataset on a cell-by-cell basis, nor identify specific discrepancies caused by the missing data. The data collection process for this paper explored various online databases provided by George Mason Library, Washington Research Libraries Consortium (WRLC), and the Library of Congress, and consulted a dozen reference librarians from these organizations. While indicators from UNDP and the World Bank are available online, three indicators—government size, competition policy, and transition index—from the Transition Report published by EBRD are not available from its official website nor any other online source. All librarians from these different libraries confirmed that there is no hard copy available in the greater Washington area. The Library of Congress stopped collecting Transition Report after 1997 for unknown reason. A business librarian at GMU Arlington library suggested procurement of an electronic copy from EBRD. But the bureaucratic process required for GMU to procure the e-copy of the Transition Report may take months. In early April, a reference librarian in Fenwick Library of George Mason discovered that the Transition Report is categorized under different titles in different libraries. Searching by ISSN (1356-3424) is the only viable method to ferret out the complete list of collections in this region. He also found that Georgetown University library is the only organization in this region which collects the latest editions of Transition Report (1999-2005). From making initial inquiry to checking out hard copies from Georgetown seven weeks has passed. 4 Output discussion—comparison and critiques Tere are original testing results in Budak & Goel (2004). Critiques of their statistics are followed immediately. This paper provides additional sets of testing results by using updated data which is manually collected and listed in this author’s file. Data is available upon request. There are three problems in Budak & Goel (2004). First, the number of observations (N) is problematic. Based on equation (2), there is supposed to have 125 observations in Budak & Goel (2004)s original dataset. However, Budak & Goel (2004) only shows very small number of observations, ranging from 38 to 50. There are apparently a lot of missing data which Budak & Goel (2004) did not report. A more serious problem resides in the increasing number of observations across five regressions. As the number of independent variables increases in the multiple regressions, the number of observations is supposed to be equal to or no greater than preceding regressions. For example, the first regression in Budak & Goel (2004) used three variables, prosperity, economic freedom, and Soviet heritage. These three variables were included in the last regression which encompassed six variables. Ironically the number of observations rose from 38 to 50. An increasing N violates the assumptions of regression. The high values of adjusted R-square are also problematic. Budak & Goel (2004) did not report the possibility of mulitcollenearity, which happens when two or more independent variables are inherently correlated. Given the value of adjusted R-square is as high as 0.90, it is suspicious that multicollinearity exist between two or more independent variables (King 1986). The evidence of high multicollinearity is presented in Section V of this paper. Budak & Goel (2004) shows more problems. The statistics of government size, government quality, and the number of observations present serious challenges to the validity of Budak & Goel (2004)s study. The statistics of government size is statistically significant at 5% level in Budak & Goel (2004). Previous studies were conflicting and contradictory in explaining the size of government relative to the level of corruption (You and Khagram 2004; Treisman 2002; Paldam 2002). Budak & Goel (2004) argued for a negative correlation between government size and corruption but their testing results did not support this argument. The statistics of government quality in Budak & Goel (2004) are incoherent and therefore inconclusive to infer any linear relationship between government quality and corruption. The number of observations is also problematic. Although the number of observations decreases as independent variables increases in Budak & Goel (2004), the pattern of small N, ranging from 30 t0 50, reveals a serious flaw—a large missing data of the total 125 observations—in the Budak & Goel (2004)s original study. This paper’s testing results are very different from Budak & Goel (2004) based on this papers updated dataset in twenty-five transition economies from 1998 to 2002. The number of observations has significantly increased, ranging from 50 to 89, to strengthen the reliability of statistical testing. The statistics show a strong positive correlation between economic prosperity and corruption at 5% level of statistical significance. Another positive correlation exists between policing (rule of law) and corruption. However, there is a serious flaw—autocorrelation in the time series—in this model specification. Every country under the same independent variable has serious autocorrelation from 1998 to 2002. These values are repeatedly calculated in multiple regression equations, which result in high R-square and high adjusted R-square. For example, Bulgaria has an incremental increase of CPI score from 2.9 to 4 between 1998 to 2002, while Czech Republic has a steady decrease of CPI score from 4.8 to 3.7 in the same period of time. The incremental change of any given year in these countries is closely related to previous years. To avoid autocorrelation, this paper averages each variable across five year period [9] and generates a refined dataset. 5 My contribution to a revised model This mean model aims to improve the reliability and validity of the Budak & Goel (2004)s model. Any missing data is skipped and all values are calculated only once before taking the mean for each variable. Under the mean model, there are only twenty-five observations representing twenty-five transition economies across years from 1998 to 2002. Two additional efforts are made to improve the validity of this modeling. First, the World Bank corruption index. A has been transformed from scale -2.5~2.5 to 0~10 by adding 2.5 and being multiplied by 2. This data rescaling uniforms the scale of both corruption indices and enables us to compare results between two testing (Gurr 1972). Second, an additional regression testing is presented to illustrate the variable policing which is taken out in order to test the correlations between corruption and other independent variables. Budak & Goel (2004) stressed that their contribution was a comprehensive ―scope and type‖ of variables explaining corruption. However, based on this mean model this paper finds only two variables, prosperity and policing (rule of law), are correlated in a statistically significant manner to the level of corruption. Both prosperity and policing are positively correlated with corruption scores. In other words, a transition country with a higher level of prosperity and strong rule of law tends to be less corrupt. This paper further finds that GDP and life expectancy are two crucial factors contributing to lower corruption. The measurement of prosperity is the composite index—Human Development Index (HDI) by UNDP—which is an average value of three indicators: literacy rate, life expectancy, and GDP 10(Anand and Sen 1994). According to UNESCO (2005) these twenty-five transition countries have a literacy rate of 99.4% on average, including 99.7% for males and 99.1% for females. Holding their high literacy constant, the other two indictors—life expectancy and GDP—play an important role in alleviating corruption in these countries. This paper also finds that government size, government quality, political freedom, economic freedom, and transition progress are not statistically significant to the level of corruption in these transition countries. This finding contradicts Budak & Goel (2004)s findings. The only common finding between this paper and Budak & Goel (2004) is the irrelevance of Soviet heritage relative to corruption. A possible explanation is that all of these transition economies were former communist regimes, which supersedes Soviet heritage. It would be appropriate in future studies to ignore this dichotomous distinction between constituent Soviet republics and other former communist states in Eastern Europe. This paper also confirms that there is high multicollinearity between variables under the correlations test. Statistics shows correlations between any two independent variables. Of which, three World Bank variables—government quality (goveff), policing (law), and political freedom (vacc)—are highly correlated with each other at least at the coefficient level of 0.93. The correlation coefficient between law and goveff is 0.9668. The high coefficients indicate high multicollinearity, which violates the assumptions of multiple regressions and results in lack of validity of the statistical testing. Finally this paper finds that there is a possible endogeneity problem between corruption and policing (rule of law). Engogeneity happens in a regression model when there is a backward or circular relationship between dependent and independent variables. Since corruption is measured by expert 9 Only twenty-two observations are available for Corruption Index 2. No data for KYRGYZ REPUBLIC, TAJIKISTAN, and TURKMENISTAN due to systematic missing data in Transparency Internationals Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). See (3/25/2006 visited). 10 According to the UNDP, the working definition of these tree indicators of HDI is ―(1) life expectancy at birth, (2) the proportion of literacy among the adult population, and (3) the logarithm of the gross national product (up to the level of the internationally fixed poverty line),‖ Anand, Sudhir and Amartya Sen (1994): Human Development Index: Methodology and Measurement, Human Development Report Office, Occasional paper, UNDP, p.3. surveys based on people’s perceptions, a high level of corruption inevitably implies weak rule of law. The enforcement of law and corruption are arguably a matter of debate over ―chicken and egg.‖ By taking policing out, government quality becomes statistically significant to corruption. This is because policing, government quality, political freedom, and corruption index 1 are from the same source of expert surveys of the World Bank (World Bank Institute 2005). When the independent variable with highest coefficient is taken out, the second highest coefficient variable will emerge in statistical significance, which is meaningless in explaining the real correlations between dependent and independent variables. 6 Conclusion In conclusion, Budak & Goel (2004) failed to report large missing data which resulted in serious selection bias in their model of panel study. Their report of the number of observations, ranging from 38 to 50 out of the total 125 observations, revealed a serious selection bias. A small number of observations seriously discredit their sample reliability. The autocorrelation problem in their time series for each country from 1998 to 2002, the high multicollinearity among three World Bank indicators, and the possible endogeneity problem between corruption and policing are three major deficiencies which violate the assumptions of multiple regressions. Future studies should exercise caution in selecting variables to avoid multicollinearity and endogeneity problems. This paper identifies and confirms the linear relationship between prosperity and corruption. But it does not exclude any possibility of non-linear relationship between other independent variables and corruption. Some institutional factors, such as government size and government effectiveness, may have a bell-shape relationship with corruption. Countries in transition may have high corruption as they experience adjustment of government structure. It is plausible to explore the non-linear relationships between corruption and various institutional factors. Future empirical studies are needed to test this hypothesis. In addition, the causal relationship between prosperity and corruption is constantly subject to a chicken and egg debate. The causal effect can be argued in both ways. Indeed, it is the limitation of linear regression models, which only tests the causality but provides no explanation to the sequence of cause and effect. Further studies are needed to address this statistical weakness. References [1] Anand, Sudhir, Amartya Sen. Human Development Index: Methodology and Measurement, Human Development Report Office, Occasional paper, UNDP, 1994 [2] Becker, Gary S. If You Want to Cut Corruption, Cut Government. in Business Week issue,1995,3454:26 [3] Becker, Gary S., George J. Stigler. Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Employees.Journal of Legal Studies, January 1974, 1-18 [4] Budak J., R. K. Goel. Transition, Governance and Corruption. In Economia Internazionale, 2004, 57:395-406 [5] Boswell, Nancy Zucker. Prepared Statement by Nancy Zucker Boswell.In Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Unites States Senate, 2nd session, May 13, 2004, Part I: 46-52 [6] European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Transition Report (multiple editions 1999-2005), 2005 [7] Friedman, Eric, Simon Johnson, Daniel Kaufmann, Pablo Zoido-Lobaton. Dodging the Grabbing Hand: the Determinants of Unofficial Activity in 69 Countries.In Journal of Public Economics, 2000, 76:459-493 [8] Gurr, Ted Robert. Politimetrics: an Introdution to Quantitative Macropolitics, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1972: 106-111 [9] Johnston, Michael .The New Corruption Rankings: Implication for Analysis and Reform. Prepared for Research Committee 24, International Political Science Association, World Congress, Quebec City, Canada, August 2, 2000 [10] King Gary. How Not to Lie with Statistics: Avoid Common Mistakes in Quantitative Political Science.In American Journal of Political Science, August 1986, Vol. 30 No. 3:666-687. (Also available online www.jstor.org 3/23/2006 visited) [11] LaPalombara, Joseph. Structure and Institutional Aspects of Corruption.In Social Research, 1994, LXI (2): 325-350 [12] La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Schleifer, Robert W. Vishny. The Quality of Government. In Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 1999, 15(1): 222-279 [13] Mauro, Paolo. Corruption and Growth.Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1995, 110(3):681-712 [14] Mauro, Paolo. The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment, and Government Expenditure: a Cross-Country Analysis. In Kimberly Ann Elliot, ed. Corruption and the Global Economy. Washington: The Institute for International Economics, 1997 [15] North, Douglas C. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990 [16] Kaufmann, Daniel. Research on Corruption: Critical Empirical Issues. In Arvind K. Jain, ed. Economics of Corruption .Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998 [17] Swamy, Anand, Stephen Knack, Young Lee, Omar Azfar. Gender and Corruption.Journal of Development Economics, 2001 :803/Economics/wp/Swamy_gender.pdf (3/26/2006 visited) [18] Tanzi, Vito (1998). Corruption and the Budget: Problem and Solutions. In Arvind K. Jain, ed.Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers .Transparency International, 2005: Corruption Perceptions Index 1999-2002 (3/25/2005 visited) [19] UNDP.United Nations Human Development Report, New York, 2003 [20] UNESCO Institute for Statistics (United National Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) (2005). Correspondence on Adult and Youth Literacy Rates. April. Montreal, cited by Human Development Index 2005 ;y= 1&z=1 (5/8/2006 visited) [21] You, Jong-Sung and Sanjeev Khagram. A Comparative Study of Inequality and Corruption in Faculty Research Working Papers Series, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, January 2004, RWP04-001 [22] World Bank (1997). Helping Countries Combat Corruption-the Role of the World Bank, Washington World Bank Institute (2005): Governance Indicators: 1996-2004 (5/5/2006 visited) Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Transitional Period of China: An *Institutional Perspective 1. GAO Yong-qiang 2. CHEN Lei School of Management, Huazhong University of Science & Technology, Wuhan, P.R. China, 430074 Abstract During the social and economic transition, corruption has becoming a serious social problem in China. However, given the seriousness of corruption in China, little attention has been paid to it in international academia. This study acts as an attempt to attack this problem. It analyzes the underlying causes of corruption and anti-corruption measures from institutional perspective. We contend that the deinstitutionalization and imperfectness of existing institutions (including regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive systems) lead to the severe corruption phenomenon in China. As a result, some countermeasures from the angle of institutional construction are proposed to control corruption. They include: (1) initiate business and role-based ethics education; (2) formulate corresponding sunshine laws; (3) improve existing regulative systems; and (4) strengthen punishment against corruption. Key words China, Corruption, Deinstitutionalization, Institutional theory, Rearrangement 1 Introduction Corruption has been widely identified as a severe social problem in most countries. It is defined as ―using illicit behavior to lure political or public officials to take or accept inadequate compensation (e.g., bribes)‖ (Klitgaard, 1988), or ―activities by state personnel who use their positions to personally acquire public property…‖ according to the Supreme Peoples Court and the Supreme Peoples Procuratorate in China (Levy, 1995: 4). China has attracted on-going criticism for reportedly high levels of corruption and inappropriate business practices (Brand and Slater, 2003). Transparency International, a body which compiles an annual index of corruption perceptions (CPI) around the world, ranks China at 72 among 180 nations in its 2007 index (Transparency International, 2007). Moreover, the CPI scores of China always keep relative low since their publication (see Table 1). Table 1 Chinas corruption perception index (CPI), 1998-2007 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 CPI Rank /Score 52/3.5 58/3.4 63/3.1 57/3.5 59/3.5 66/3.4 71/3.4 78/3.2 70/3.3 72/3.5 Notation The CPI is calculated in a 10-point score system (10 is the best) Source: Transparency International. Corruption Perception Index, Form 2003 to June 2007, national procuratorates detected totally 169.2 thousand corruptions and 196.6 thousand governmental officials are investigated and taken measures, which rescues the potential direct economic loss more than 23.8 billion Yuan (Song and Li, 2007-9-17). China pays dearly for corruption, according to Political Science Professor Yan Sun (Johnson, 2007). Citing reputable Chinese estimate, she says that Chinas annual corruption-related loss of state revenue is approximately 4% of its GDP and also that Chinas corruption-related capital flight each year is about 2% of GDP. In fact, ―The economist Fan Gang estimated that [corruption related] capital flight in 2000 surpassed Chinas capital inflow for the year, $48 billion versus 41 billion‖ (Sun, 2005:258). * Financed by the National Social Science Foundation of China (No. 07CZZ023) and Science Foundation of Huazhong University of Science & Technology (HUST) (No. 2006Q031B). The causes of corruptions have been extensively studied in academia (Caiden, 2001; Fijnaut and Huberts, 2002; Graaf, 2003, 2007). However, the phenomenon is so complicated that it is impossible to provide a comprehensive account of the causes of political corruption (Heywood, 1997). Caiden (2001: 21) expressed the similar opinion, ―Just as there are many varieties of corrupt behavior, so there are multitudinous factors contributing to corruption … So many explanations are offered that it is difficult to classify them in any systematic manner‖. Fijnaut and Huberts (2002: 8) also remarked, ―Research shows that a conglomerate of social, economic, political, organizational and individual causal factors are important to explain cases of public corruption‖. In an attempting to integrate the existing researches, Graaf (2007) proposes six theories (six kinds of causes) of corruption based on Western countries. They include: public choice theory, bad apple theories, organizational culture theories, clashing moral values theories, the ethos of public administration theories, and correlation theories. It is easy to find that almost all of the six theories have something to do with institutional theory. Therefore, to study corruption within an integrated institutional framework acts as a new and helpful attempt in discovering the underlying reasons of corruption. The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The following section proposes the theoretical foundation of the study: institutional theory. Then, the potential reasons of corruption are discussed from the viewpoint of deinstitutionalization. The relative institutional construction aiming at anticorruption is analyzed in the forth section. Finally, conclusion and discussion are proposed. 2 Theoretical foundation: institutional theory Institutional theory, which developed from the behavioural theory of the firm, has been widely used to study organizational behaviour in business academy. It deals with choices made in response to or in compliance with an organizations institutional environment (Bluedorn et al., 1994). The so-called institution refers to the multi-level and the continuous social frame consisted by the elements of symbols, the social activities and the physical resources, including the reduction of various unpredictable behaviors and opportunism behavior rules (Scott, 2001). They ―define conditions and set limits for maintaining a stable system; they regulate social relations to maintain conformity with existing value patterns and consistency among these patterns themselves‖ (Oberman, 1993). Institutionalists emphasize that rules, laws and regulations, norms of behaviour, and cultural-cognitive orientations all but determine behaviour more than do contingency and competitive factors (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). As Giddens (1984) states, ―Institutions by definition are the more enduring features of social life … giving solidity [to social systems] across time and space‖ (p.24). Table 2 Three pillars of institutions Pillar Regulative Normative Cultural-Cognitive Basis of compliance Expedience Social obligation Taken-for-grantedness Shared understanding Basis of order Regulative rules Binding expectations Constitutive schema Mechanisms Coercive Normative Mimetic Logic Instrumentality Appropriateness Orthodoxy Indicators Rules Certification Common beliefs Laws Accreditation Shared logics of action Sanctions Basis of legitimacy Legally sanctioned Morally governed Comprehensible Recognizable Culturally supported Source: Scott, W.R. Institutions and organizations (second edition), 2001: 52. According to the institutional theory, regulative elements, normative element, as well as culture-cognitive element are important component of the institution, known as the three-pillars of the institutions (Scott, 2001, see Table 2). The regulative pillars mainly appeared in the form of laws or government policies, using legal authoritys enforcement or threat to guide organizational activities and organizational concepts. Organizations have to comply with these laws and regulations due to their own interests, because they are unwilling to suffer punishment. Normative pillars refer to introducing the conventional, the appraisal and necessary contents to the social criterion, generally appears in the form of empirical principles, standard operational procedures, professional standards as well as education experiences, the capacities of guiding organizational activities and the beliefs by the institution mostly come from the social responsibility and professionalism. Culture-cognitive pillars refer to the aggregates of the shared values, beliefs and cognitive framework. It could provide a model of thinking, feelings and reactions for the members of organization to guide their decision-making and to develop other acts. It has decided peoples shared values, beliefs and behavior orientation (Hirsch, 1997). The institution has provided rules for individual and organizational behaviors, the regulative pillar, normative pillar and the culture-cognitive pillar supplement mutually, which constitute a common behavior rule for social individuals and organizations. Precisely because of the institutions existence, social individuals and organizations will act with a predictable manner, which has greatly reduced individual and organizational unpredictable and opportunistic behaviors occurrence, and has saved lots of transaction cost. However, persistence of institutional beliefs and practices can not be presumed. They are destined to weaken and disappear, the so-called deinstitutionalization process (Scott, 2001). The possible causes of deinstitutionalization come from the ―imperfect transmission‖ and modification of rules under the functional, political, and social pressures (Zucker, 1988; Oliver, 1992). Deinstitutionalization leads to the weakness or even loss of existing institutions in shaping social behavior. As a result, social disorder and peoples opportunistic behavior appear, such as bribery and corruption. Besides, the imperfectness of existing institutions (especially the regulative systems) also leads to the weakness of institutions. For the purpose of simplification, we integrate the imperfectness of institutions into the deinstitutionalization. In addition, we argue that the deinstitutionalization acts as the main source of corruptions and social disorder in China. In the following section, we discuss the deinstitutionalization of existing institutions and corruption in transitional China. 3 Deinstitutionalization and corruption in China The deinstitutionalization of existing institutions results in severe corruption in China. In this section, we discuss the deinstitutionalization of institutions from the angle of three pillars and how they induce misconducts of individuals or organizations. 3.1 Deinstitutionalization of regulative systems Laws, policies and regulations construct the basic rule and boundary of social behavior. So far Chinese government has issued a large number of laws and rules to anti corruption. The Criminal Law of China (1997) prohibits State staff from seeking for or accepting improper interest by taking advantage of his/her position. It prohibits also any individual from bribing State staff for self interests. Similarly, Provisions of not Giving and Accepting Gift for National Administrations and Staffs in Domestic Official Business (1988), the Provisions of Income Declaration for Partys and Administrative County-level or above Leading Cadres (1995), the Disciplinary Regulations of the CPC (2004), Civil Servant Law of China (2005), and Discipline Regulations of Administrative Civil Servant (2007) all are issued to control corruption. Besides, some special laws or regulations, such as Law of the Peoples Republic of China against Unfair Competition (1993) and Interim Provisions on Forbidding Commercial Bribery Behaviors (1996), contribute to anti corruption by prohibiting businessperson from bribing governmental officials. However, corruptions in China are still popular and severe, partly due to the problems existing in anti-corruption regulative systems (Xiao, 2007). At first, the regulative construction of anti-corruption always falls behind the evolution of corruption. In the transitional period of Chinese economy, new corruption means and behaviors emerge endlessly. Meanwhile, regulative construction aims at controlling and eliminating the existing corruption behaviors, and has limited consideration of the future. As a result, some corruptions fall ―in the vacuum‖ of regulations. This problem is not unique in China, but widespread in all nations employing continental law systems. Secondly, the existing anti-corruption regulations are of ambiguity (Li, 2007). Most of the regulations are too symbolical and in principle to practice. For example, Chinese regulations often use such adjectives as ―light, severe, and especially severe‖ to describe the different extent of corruption, and give different punishments accordingly. The legal/regulative validity is alleviated because of a lack of quantification on corruption. Therefore, it is popular in China that the same regulation can be comprehended and interpreted and carried out by different people. Thirdly, state servants who involved in corruption can be punished in terms of laws, Partys disciplines and administrative disciplines. Three types of punishments seem to supplement but in fact conflict with each other. In certain circumstances, the Partys and administrative disciplinary punishments have replaced the legal punishment, and as a result, laws are defied. Finally, the strength of identifying and punishing corruptions is limited. At first, the corruptions are so popular and widespread in China that regulatory bodies have no energy and money to identify majority of corruptions, which foments the opportunism behaviors of some governmental officials. Secondly, punishment against corruption is somewhat gentle. Corrupt officials are often punished by Partys or administrative discipline other than law. They are oral warned or recorded demerits that have little influence on their succession or promotion. ―Promotion with illness‖ is popular in China that means corrupt officials are promoted as usual. 3.2 Deinstitutionalization of normative systems Shared norms and values are regarded as the basis of a stable social order. Routines, procedures, conventions, beliefs, codes and the like construct the normative systems imposing constrains on social behavior (Scott, 2001). Different from regulative systems that control social behaviors by formal laws and regulations, normative systems control social behaviors mainly by conferring responsibilities and duties on actors. However, the norms and values in China are confronting problems. At first, after experiencing ten years of Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) and the ―invasion‖ of capitalism thoughts and values since implementing reform and opening up in the late 1970s, Chinese feudal values and beliefs are weakening and differentiating. ―Money-oriented‖ view has becoming the leading values of the majority in recent years in China. This thought, together with lacking of effective governance and low income, has obviously influenced the behavior of governmental staffs negatively. Some officials use their public position in exchange of money. Secondly, the role ethics about public officials are never fully developed in China. The ethical requirement of governmental officials is no more than the common people. In fact, governmental officials in China often enjoy more privileges than the shared duties. Low moral demand for governmental officials leads to the lacking of standard procedures and behavioral norms in official business. Finally, the moral education in China is still relatively weak in spite of the weakening and differentiating of Chinese traditional values and morality. The moral education is only opened during the primary school and junior middle school. Role-based moral education has never been launched. 3.3 Deinstitutionalization of culture-cognitive systems Culture-cognitive systems shape social behavior by shaping peoples subconsciousness. People do things in this way other than that way because they take it for granted. However, social culture in China shows her deficiency in shaping and controlling social behavior. At first, Chinese traditional culture is a typical ―guanxi‖ culture. Guanxi generally refers to relationships or social connections based on mutual interests and benefits (Yang, 1994). Specifically, it refers to a special type of relationship that bonds the exchange partners through reciprocal exchange of favors and mutual obligations (Alston, 1989; Luo, 1997). The process of guanxi building and maintaining often involves some corruptions such as gift giving, because it is very hard to distinguish morally proper gift giving from bribery and corruption (Steidlmeier, 1999). Therefore, there is guanxi, there is corruption. Secondly, the impact of Chinese Confucianism culture is gradually weakening since the introducing of Western democratic values after the reform and opening up policy in 1978 (Chaibong, 2000; Rozmn, 2002). As a result, multicultural coexistence has gradually been emerging in China. The youth hold very different opinions from the elderly on many things. They often hold the viewpoint that ―everything in existence is reasonable‖, even for corruption. The cognitive disaccord on social things provides existing space for corruptions. Finally, China is lack of unified and strong religious beliefs that are considered to be one of sources and foundations of morality and ethics. Religions implant the usual ethical and moral notions into peoples mind gradually through special religious activities, which in turn helps to keep social order by peoples self discipline. However, in China, the ethical and moral values are infused into peoples mind by forceful education and the positive propaganda. Those values are hard to be internalized and to act as the norms of behavior. Thus, it is very hard to form a strong moral force against corruptions in China due to the lack of unified and strong religions. 4 Anti-Corruption: rearrangement of institutions Deinstitutionalization and imperfectness of existing institutions contribute to corruption in China mainly by the following ways: (1) Accompanying with the introduction of Western democratic thoughts and societal transition in China, peoples cognition and attitude corruptions are differentiating. As a result, some people (including some governmental officials) think that some of corruptions such as gift giving and attending banquets are morally acceptable and practice. (2) Confucianism underscores mutual gift giving and entertainment so as to keep long-run guanxi. Undoubtedly, bribery often takes the chance of morally proper gift giving. (3) Existing laws and regulations have loopholes in controlling corruptions, which is utilized by some governmental officials. (4) The punishment prescribed by existing institutions is too weak to threaten corruptions. Accordingly, anti corruption by rearrangement of institutions should aim at making up the above flaws. At first, business and role-based ethics education should be initiated in China. A multi-layer and systematic ethical education system should be built to strengthen the ethical construction of the whole society. Ethical education should be opened not only in primary and high schools, but also in colleges and workplaces. Graduates should receive professional ethics education before they go into society to work. Besides, recruits not matter in public sections or in private businesses should receive role-based ethical education. They should be taught what behaviors are acceptable and what are not. Ethical education should aim at forming consistent ethical values in society. Secondly, corresponding sunshine laws should be formulated to restrain corruption. Since the Confucianism values the mutual gift giving and banquet so as to build and maintain a good guanxi, it is unwise to prohibit them. But China should refer the American Lobbying Disclosure Act (1995) and formulate the relative sunshine laws. The sunshine laws do not prohibit gift giving and banquet between governmental officials and others, but they do require officials to declare the corresponding information about ―who gives gift or provide banquet, what is the gift or banquet, who are on the spot‖ and the like. The sunshine laws help to prevent bribery to take chance of morally proper gift giving. Thirdly, the existing regulative systems should be improved from three aspects: (1) The construction of regulative rules should look ahead and be predictable so as to control not only present corruptions but also the potential corruptions. Besides, China should learn from common law system and give courts the right to judge the corruptions that are not recorded in existing laws or regulations. (2) The existing rules should be clear and quantificational and coordinate each other. Meanwhile, a uniform ―anti-corruption act‖ should also be put on the agenda. (3) Building a multi-layer supervision system of corruption. Judicial authorities (such as procuratorates), committees of discipline investigation, the media and the public should cooperate effectively in monitoring and discovering corruptions. Finally, punishment against corruptions should be strengthened. Regulative rules should give all governmental officials the expectation that any one who involved in corruptions should be excluded in governmental departments in his/her lifetime. Besides, Partys and administrative discipline punishment should not replace the legal punishment. In controlling corruption, not only the bribery receivers-governmental officials but also the givers should be punished simultaneously. Only when the possible corruption cost times the probability of being caught exceeds the potential benefit, the corruption can be eliminated. 5 Conclusion This article analyzes the underlying reasons and the anti-corruption measures from the institutional perspective in transitional China. We contend that the deinstitutionalization and imperfectness of existing institutions (regulative systems, normative systems and cultural-cognitive systems) lead to the severe corruption phenomenon in China. Based on this knowledge, rearrangement of institutions is proposed to control corruption. It includes initiating business and role-based ethical education, formulating sunshine laws, improving existing regulative systems, and strengthening punishment against corruption. As the literatures indicate, the underlying causes of corruption are various. Some scholars have argued that ―bad characters‖ of human beings (just as the bad apple theory holds) such as greed acts as one of causes of corruption. However, such bad characters cause corruption only when they have chance-provided by the imperfectness and loopholes in existing institutions. A good institutional environment helps to control humans bad characters, while a bad institutional environment provokes humans bad characters. Therefore, bad characters of human beings are not core of corruption, but the institutions are. ―Bad characters‖ are innate and hard to control or get rid of, but the institutions help to control the bad characters, which in turn help to control corruption. As a result, the institutional theory should be the most suitable theory to discuss corruption. Besides, governmental officials can be taken as rational actors. They make the corruption behavior within a benefit-cost framework. Only when the potential benefit exceeds the possible cost (the cost times the probability of being caught), governmental officials will corrupt. Attacking corruption from institutional perspective does help to increase the possible cost of corruption, but it can not lower the potential benefit. To lower the potential benefit of corruption should proceed with the administrative reform with an eye to reducing governments intervention in economic activities in China. 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China, 400030 Abstract Street-level bureaucrats are those civil servants who confronted with the public; they have been given authorities by owners of public power, they have free discretion in the course of law enforcement, so they actually are able to make many policies as they wish. The Street-level bureaucrats in China are some different from those of western countries. For the different administrative culture, their free discretion is often constrained by their superiors. So, for street-level bureaucrats in our country there are a series of defects in the process of making policies, which destroy the generalized trust of government, and obstruct the construction of harmony society in China. This paper tries to find out the sources of the deficiencies of their administrative behaviors, and the effective ways to control Street-level bureaucrat. Key words Street-level bureaucrat, Free discretion, Urban administration patrol member, Decision- making deficiencies 1 Introduction In recent years, China’s urban administration patrol has triggered many conflicts; the public has the ―urban management‖ issues of a round of another round of arguments. Some people think that as an informal law enforcement agencies，the urban administration patrol should be revoked , and some people think that it would be retained for the needs of urban development and management. Why people hold these two different positions? This inspired the author to try to research the urban administration patrol by the ―street-level bureaucratic‖ theory. What is the street-level bureaucrat? Western scholars named the public servant of enforcing regulations who facing the public directly as street-level bureaucrat. As far as concerned concretely, street-level bureaucrats are those public servants who are in the basic level of pyramid in the governmental bureaucracy, and face the public directly, such as the police, taxation officials， governmental officials, the welfare workers as well as some public power agents. These are one of the focuses which the west administration is studying. West administration scholars have made many researches into the street-level bureaucrat, especially their effort in the process of policy initiation and their discretion in administration，In our country, the street-level bureaucrats are conspicuous. Although a few scholars think that the street-level bureaucrat theory originating from the west，and whether it [1] applies to the peculiar administration environment in Chinastill needs to be discussed gradually, but their existence in our country is an objective phenomenon. As far as Chinese reality being concerned, the Chinese street-level bureaucrat group is different with that abroad in some characters. However, at present, urban administration patrol is the most representative and attractive group which often give rise to dispute and induce side-effect. They are often pushed to the outlet of media, their action have a major impact on our government’s credibility and the whole society , but their presence is the objective needs at this stage in accordance with China’s national conditions. Therefore, how to regulate their behaviors and reduce their negative impact is particularly important. This paper intended to take ―urban administration patrol‖ for an example, from the particularly characters of China’s ―street-level bureaucrat‖ to discuss the deficiencies, hazards and treatment which in their activities of in the process of decision-making. 2 On “Street-level Bureaucratic” theory The concept of street-level bureaucratic comes out in the 1970s. In 1971, Michael Lipsky contributed Street-level bureaucracy and the analysis of urban reform in the Urban Affairs Review, in this paper, he pointed out ―street-level bureaucrats,‖ as I call them, ―represent‖ American government to its citizens. They are the people citizens encounter when they seek help from, or are controlled by, [2] since then, he also published the paper Towards a Street-level the American political system. Bureaucratic Theory. In 1980, he published street bureaucrats, in this book, he point out ―A street-level bureaucrat is a public employee whose work is characterized by constant interaction with citizens, a bureaucratic structure in which the street-level bureaucrat can exercise broad discretion and independence, and a potential to have a great impact on citizens.‖ formally established the street-level bureaucratic theory. After that, many scholars joined in the research on the bureaucratic, such as Moore, Scott, Moody and Bovens. Their study focused on the status and free disposal of bureaucrats in the process of street administration, those two are the core of the street-level bureaucratic theory. Lipsky point out for the character of street administration-it needs bureaucrats’ judgment in the course of service providing, and it is difficult to planning and it can not be replaced by machines, the street-level [3] bureaucrats must keep free disposal.At the same time, ―street bureaucrats will use their free disposal in their hands to manage their work environment, so that their work has become relatively easy and ?safe.‖ However, Moody, Steven M & Suzanne Leland’s latest research indicated that ―not all the street –level bureaucrats are the same, in some cases; some of them are very responsible managers. Their free discretion is widespread, and they can not be out reforms, because it is impossible to [4]disappear for the improvement of management.” From their exposition, we can see that Lipsky thought that street-level bureaucrats use discretionary power negatively, Moody and others are seen on both sides of the street-level bureaucrats, the positive side is the basis of its existence and our treatment measures of their conduct. 3 What factors dominate street-level bureaucrats’ decision-making in China Since its possession of the free discretion, in the course of law enforcement, the street-level bureaucrats have a significant policy-making capacity, which itself is up to the characteristics of the decision in the street administration. But, for China’s special conditions, China’s street-level bureaucrats are different from Western countries which have sound legal system. For example, the administrative ideas and the perform capacity, especially, their own complexity, the defects of law enforcement system and other factors, have led to the deficiencies in the process of decision-making of China’s street-level bureaucrats. In order to find out the factors dominate the street-level bureaucrats’ decision-making, we choose the most typical one-urban administration patrol as a case. Specifically, we have the urban administration patrol of Z County in Chongqing Municipality, which once occurred some wounding Conflicts, to investigate and study this. 30 members in urban administration patrol of Z County are all Quasi-civil servants, 9 of them are Bachelors, 17 members graduated from colleges and 4 were technical school student. Through questionnaires, interviews and on-site observation, we find there are four kinds of typical problems in their law enforcement process: own personal feelings and environmental factors; influence of superiors’ decision-making; the abuse of law enforcement power and bending the laws for personal gain and engage in fraud. In order to identify them and members of their own characters, we assume that the gender difference, age and educational relate to members of urban administration patrol, and have a Pearson correlation test. The test results showed that variable ―own personal feelings and environmental impacts‖ and variables ―age‖ are of correlation, the result of t-test shows p = 0.048<0.05, at 0.05 level, the significant level rejected 0 assumption, Can determine the difference between a significant correlation between them. Specifically, smaller member of urban administration patrol are easily influenced by their own personal feelings and on-site environment, while older at their restraint. Older members tend to bend the laws for their own personal gain and engage in fraud, the two are significant correlated (p = 0.048 <0.05), older members due to have a larger social network, more prone to favoritism. It is worth noting that, regardless of differences on gender, age or level of education, the decision-making of law enforcement officers are all easily controlled by superiors, the Chinese traditional concepts that superiors are the supremacy to do with this. In addition, between the possibility of abuse of law enforcement power and gender, educational level have significant correlation, their t-test was significant the probability is 0.43 and 0.19, respectively, were less than 0.05. Male law enforcement officers more easily than females have the Possibility to abuse enforcement powers, low education levels are also easy to abuse enforcement powers. (Table 1) Table 1 gender age education personal feelings and environmental Pearson Correlation ,.173 ,.364(*) .129 factors Sig. (2-tailed) .360 .048 .496 influence of superiors’ decision-making Pearson Correlation .012 .033 ,.037 Sig. (2-tailed)) .948 .847 .862 bending the laws for personal gain and Pearson Correlation ,.129 ,.363(*) .308 engage in fraud Sig. (2-tailed) .497 .048 .098 the abuse of Law enforcement power Pearson Correlation .373(*) .425(*) ,.029 Sig. (2-tailed) .043 .878 .019 *Correlation is at the 0.05 level(2-tailed) 4 Defects of Street-level bureaucrats’ decision-making: sources and negative effects According to the above test, it is not difficult to identify the faults of decision-making of urban administration patrol members. Here we only analysis the two most important faults, and their sources and negative effects. 4.1 The defects and negative effects 4.1.1 Arbitrary of decision-making In the interview, parts of urban administration patrol members admit that they have a certain degree of arbitrariness in non-collective law enforcement. For example, they treated the street vendors with their ―feelings and sometimes based on personal likes and dislikes,‖ rather than in accordance with the regulations for processing. This arbitrary decision-making is not directly linked to the education level of urban administration patrol members, but to their age. In the questionnaire, 90 percent of the team members who are under 30 years of age select ―fully in accordance with the regulations‖, and more members selected ―as appropriate disposal.‖ However, it is this ―as appropriate disposition‖ of their decision-making has led to the arbitrary, and result injustice. Such arbitrariness of the considerable harm, on the one hand, because of the different treatment of different objects, it aroused the dissatisfaction to law enforcement officers, even provocation, or confrontation. It is an important factor to weaken the credibility of public power, and intentionally or unintentionally overdrafts the government’s social capital, causing one of the most important factor —the generalized trust to government becomes less and less. On the other hand, As far as administrative objects reality is concerned, it is really unfair. 4.1.2 Limited free discretion From the statement of the urban administration patrol members, their decisions are often influenced by superiors’ intent, money (mainly prize) and their ―position‖ in the urban administration patrol. In other words, their free discretion is constrained by factors mentioned above. On the one hand, it is deprived by their superior; in fact, it is universal and difficult to detect in the process of law enforcement, for insistence, they have to fine the administrative objects to meet superiors’ intent. Such fine tasks interfere and obstruct the members’ own decision-making. In China, many street-level bureaucrats have to commit fine tasks more or less, some of them for making up for lack of administrative expenses, and part of them just for making bonus for themselves. One article pointed out that ― having absolute right on collection and disposition of the decision-making, fining, collecting fees, which also lack of effective supervision and control, so that some law enforcement agencies or law [5]enforcement staff run out of control.‖ in this sense, some street –level bureaucrats have no control over themselves, when they face this dilemma: is flexible enforcement or to meet their superiors’ intent? They often opt for the latter. This is perhaps an instinct which based on the considerations: flexible enforcement maybe obtains the praise from administrative objects, and sometimes not-some street venders often feel lucky that this is the street-bureaucrats based on the consideration of their living to do so. But as far as the street-level bureaucrats concerned, however, ―Individuals own, and not any [6] the superior’ order can not be ignored, external forces, is the best decision-maker of their interests‖, as it relates to their own personal interests: promotion or prize - in Chinese people’s thinking, power and interests comes from a higher-level, especially their immediate supervisors. Therefore, in considering the interests of such circumstances, the street-level bureaucrats’ discretion is under the restriction, so, it is not difficult to understand the unreasonable and barbaric act in course of the law enforcement. 4.2 The sources of the decision-making deficiencies 4.2.1 Their own quality Internal factors are the decisive factors; one of the most important roots of the decision-making deficiencies is the street-level bureaucrats’ own quality. Z County is a more developed county in Chongqing in this paper; the staffs in urban administration patrol are with higher educational structure and quality than other undeveloped areas in China. A reporter had a survey on the members of urban administration patrol in a county in Sichuan province, which once had a violent conflict with street venders. He found that most of the 40 members in the urban administration patrol are temporary [7]workers; 60% of them did not go for higher education, and about 70% of them are Veterans. Such qualifications and the quality of urban administrative groups have become one of the reasons for frequent incidents. The lower quality of them indirectly results that they can not make a rational decision when they are in the face of administrative objects. Because, in their administrative and law enforcement in a very short time to make a decision, if not higher quality, and this may be the lack of scientific decision-making, with a certain degree of arbitrariness. If in the course of this conflict, it is easy lead to their extreme behavior, violence and law enforcement. 4.2.2 Inefficient supervision The current problem is the ineffective supervision on street- bureaucrats. On the one hand, their superiors’ supervision is very weak; they even condone the acts of subordinates. On the other hand, the regulatory path is too narrow, although in recent years, the supervisory role of the media has significantly enhanced, but the media monitoring capacity is limited. The lack of an effective system of supervision is the ―ankle of Achilles‖, which often leads to two possibilities, one is the abuse of authority for rent-seeking, because difficult to supervise, street-level bureaucrats often tend to use decision-making power in their hands to the extreme, in the course of law enforcement, they bend the laws for their personal interests and sometimes even wallow in the mire with the law enforcement objects. The second is the street-level bureaucrats will use their free discretion to serve for their own interests rather than serving the people. They will use their power to improve the work environment, reduce the risk and difficulty; such idea might lead to ―during the mission, the commander could be himself‖, and be out of supervision. 5 Out of the predicament: the remedy of decision-making deficiencies The free discretion is born with the street-level bureaucrats, it’s impossible to disappear with the improvement of means of administration. Fortunately, these deficiencies could be remedy, even if we can not remove it disappear completely, we can also minimize its negative effects. 5.1 Strengthening the quality of street-level bureaucrats For street-level bureaucrats, that is, grass-roots public servant, a relatively common problem is that the quality is lower; some grass-roots level civil servants or even think themselves to be revered and respected exclusively, that is not adapt to China’s new administrative environment. We must raise awareness of running administration according to law, and develop reasonable administrative behaviors and consciousness, especially, in the course of law enforcement on the streets. In the vocational training, let the street-level bureaucrats knows that the authority are from the masses, so, their administrative actions should be always safeguard the people’s interests, and serve the people. This would guarantee they can self-restraint when they make decision. In 2006，Shanghai introduce the first [8] try to improve the quality of urban one urban administration patrol member, which has master degree, administration patrol groups, through updated the talents. This paper does not judge the yes or no of the news, but it is worthy of recognition that upgrade the quality of the bureaucrats to improve their law enforcement. However, Shanghai’s action is just a case; government should improve bureaucratic quality large-scale, so as to ensure their decision-making rational, fair and humanity. 5.2 Strengthening the building of administration procedure system Reasonable and effective administration procedure system is the guarantee of all administrative actions, the deficiencies in the process of street-level bureaucrats’ decision-making are related to that it does not have an effective administration procedure system. Only when we have it to standardize their behavior, all the above defects will be greatly reduced. At the same time, strictly regulate the conduct of the street-level bureaucrats. In addition, the government should make on the responsibility system of public servants. It is not only to call to account the adverse effects of the executive heads, can also carry it to the street-level bureaucrats, although they need not to commit direct responsibility, but through an internal form of accountability, it can clear the responsibility of the offender, and avoid powers’ rent-seeking. Practice and studies have shown that only when they need pay for their improper conduct, their decision-making will become rational. 5.3 Broadening the channels of supervision, and increasing the intensity of supervision As mentioned above, weak supervision, and the narrow path are major source of alienation of street-level bureaucrats’ power, so, it is necessary to broaden our current supervision path. On this issue, we should carry ―multipronged approach‖, including the party, the legislature, the government and so on, to establish an effective administrative and law enforcement supervision system, while strengthening the supervision of street-level bureaucrats’ superiors. Meanwhile, strengthening the supervision function of the media, so that put all the street-level bureaucrats’ administration in the eyesight of the public. In addition, the government should dredge the channels for the public to express their aspirations, and use their right to control street-level bureaucrats’ free discretion; so that they have the opportunity to reflect street-level bureaucrats’ bad conduct timely and assure their own rights and safety are protected effectively. 5.4 Reducing Street-level bureaucrats’ administrative burden Based on previous discussion, the superiors of street-level bureaucrats intentionally or unintentionally increase in their Subordinates’ administrative burden, and interfere with their decision-making; so that they have to do many works that are not belong to their field. To change this situation, the most fundamental thing is to ensure that their office expense and eliminate various non-tax revenues. We should see that there is a variety of extra-budgetary funds is the root of income-generating tasks, only to do so; it may remove the danger of industrializing the law enforcement entirely. Only in the non-profitable circumstances, the streets-level bureaucrats will be more likely to serve the people, and returned to the original state before. 6 Conclusion Street-level bureaucrats directly face the public as the public power agents, and their actions will have a direct impact on the public power’s authority, to a certain extent, they represent the government, so that their behaviors will affect the credibility of the Government. Some of our local government always be caught themselves out when they face special emergencies, but they do not know as long as they take precautions, it could be ease o a certain extent, and save the already weakened credibility of the Government. We also attributed our social disharmony to the gap between the rich and the poor, attributed it to unbalance development between urban and rural areas, but the fact is that, in a sense, we overlooked an important fact - people-oriented, the people are our public. References [1] Ye Juanli，Ma Jun. The Street-level Bureaucratic Theory in Public Administration. Wuhan University Journal [J]. 2003, (9): 612-613(in Chinese) [2] Michael.Lipsky, Street-level Bureaucracy and the Analysis of Urban Reform. Urban Affairs Review [J]. 1971; (6): 391 [3] Sun Jihai, Guo Linxiao. Discuss on Street-level Bureaucratic Theory，Public Management[J]. 2006, 7:8(in Chinese) [4] Moody.Steven.M & Suzanne.Leland. Stories from the Lines of Public Management: Street-level Workers as Responsible Actors [A]. Jeffrey Brudney, Laurence O’Toole J r & Hal G Rainey. Advancing Public Management: New Developments in Theory, Methods, and Practice[C]. Washington, D. C.: Georgetown University Press, 2000 [5] Yang Zhonghong, Li Song. Taking Cautious on Law Enforcement be Industrialized. Outlook Weekly[J]. 2007, (6): 30(in Chinese) [6] [America] Lan Zhiyong. Bureaucrats and Modern Society. Guangzhou, Zhongshan University press[M], 2003, (1): 61(in Chinese) [7] Yang Jianming. Issues of Urban Administration Patrol Members. Journalist of Law [J]. 2004-10- 15(in Chinese) [8] Lei Hui. First Master Degreed Urban Administration Patrol Member in Shanghai[O/L]. Chinanews.com.cn, 2006-9-20 ttp://www.chinanews.com.cn/edu/news/2006/09-14/789997.shtml (in Chinese) The Postwar Public Administration Model of Japan — Constitutional Government and Democratization of the Bureaucratic System 1. CHUNYU Miao-ling 2.FENG Xiao-yu 3. GUO Chun-fu 4. ZHU Wei 1. China Social Stability and Emergency Management Institute, Southwest University of Political Science & Law, Chongqing, P. R. China, 400032 2. Middlebury College, Middlebury, Vermont 05753, USA 3. 4. Politics and Public Affair School, Southwest University of Political Science & Law, Chongqing, P. R. China, 400032 Abstract The modern bureaucracy under the order of constitutional democracy is not antidemocratic, but rather serving the democratic politics within its control. ―Bureaucracy-oriented politics‖, a common dilemma encountered by constitutional democratic countries, is not the exceptional ―phenomenon of anti democracy‖ which seems to feature the later-modernizing nations like Japan. Similar to many other constitutional democratic countries, the postwar public administration model of Japan is greatly in need of continuous adjustment in fields of legislation, administration and judicature, under the frame of the constitutional democracy with the balance and check among the three. The Japan’s democratization of the bureaucracy can only develop constantly and soundly in its constitutional democracy. Key words Japan, Public administration, Democratization of the bureaucracy constitutional government 1 Introduction From 1970s, the new public administration raised by some western developed countries, which harshly attacked the bureaucracy, became a sweeping trend in the worldwide. Democratic administration arose to be the basic inclination of reformation in nations. However, it is obvious that the democratic administration intending to radically substitute for the current bureaucratic system lacks of consideration of the reality. The democratization of bureaucracy is a theorized discussion of realizing democratic administration before ideal and more efficient frame of democratic practice shows up. It aims to introduce democracy into the rational bureaucracy foundation, making administrative organizations, alongside the public decision process, open systems, to realize democratic administration. It is clear that the central bureaucracy located in government administration cores is a definite path to democratic administration. Therefore, democratic administration should establish the bureaucracy as research object, complement and correct the defects of bureaucracy as much as possible, rather simply deny its existence. This article that explores the origins, development and formation of the democratization of Japan’s bureaucratic system asks its readers to enter into new frames of knowledge about the actual content of bureaucracy contrary to Chinese understandings and the primary origins of bureaucracy in western culture, which are usually radically different from the commonsense. Under the analysis of the interaction between bureaucracy and constitutional democracy, the effective control of bureaucracy and the misunderstood ―oppositional connection of democracy and bureaucracy‖ consist of the rather sound perspective of both bureaucracy and public policy. Japan, in this realm, provides us with its special and charming points. Giving the historical data of laws and policies, along with the political systems, the development of Japan’s democratization of bureaucracy unfolds us a logical and reasonable track leading to the highlight of its postwar maturation with restrictions of certain Japanese society’s properties. However, Japan’s working bureaucracy also possesses its own crisis and limitations. Our constant challenge is to remain bureaucratic discretion under constitutional control. Japan, as the later modernized country, offers us its special insights and reference to the model of administration and public policy. 2 Bureaucracy and constitutional government 2.1 About the content of bureaucracy ―Bureaucracy is one of the most common systems in the modern world. The acquaintance by people with it covers its own complexity.‖ While discussing the connection between bureaucracy and constitutional government, there is need to clarify the ―bureaucracy‖. In daily life, or even in academic research, bureaucratism, bureaucracy, and bureaucratic politics are easily confusingly used. For instance, in Japan, the word ―bureaucratic‖ and ―bureaucratism‖ both with derogatory meaning are often mixed with ―bureaucracy‖ which possesses neutral value in sociologic studies. It is usually unpleasant to mention ―bureaucracy‖ and ―bureaucratic politics‖ in China, associating with an indifferent impression about the bureaucratic attitude. This is partially because China was long locked in the shackles of feudalistic bureaucracy, concerning with ―Bureaucratic attitude is the most commonly seen negative political attitude by the Chinese; the people also detest the bureaucratism.‖ In addition, the Soviet Union denied the ―bureaucracy‖ in the western sociology, defining its only fitness for the bourgeoisie ruling, which deserved the definite crack as the component of the old national machine. Influenced by this, the Chinese translate the ―bureaucracy‖ as the ―system of bureaucratism‖ or ―bureaucratic system‖, introducing into China with a strong color of ideology. In order to avoid the mixture of use, now ―Keceng-zhi‖ may substitutes the bureaucracy with ―Guanliao-zhi‖. Actually, the word ―bureaucracy‖ comes from the western world. In 1745, French scholar V Gonighted became the first person to employ it in the description of government form of administrative bureaucracy, to which public interests are subject. Since then on till the end of nineteenth century, people mainly regarded bureaucracy as the form of government with the opposition to monarchy, aristocracy and democracy, excessively controlled by bureaucrats, tending to destroy civic general liberty, then being criticized and prevented. Moreover, it is used to critique formalism, shifting responsibilities, indifference and low efficiency at the arena of politics. These attitudes not universally exist in government department, but also in political parties, enterprises and schools etc. This makes people to realize the negative influences first but ignore its necessary meaning to the modern society component, leaving the society the prejudice about bureaucracy, becoming the historical and realistic origin of mixing bureaucracy with bureaucratism together. The bureaucratic politics, ―which is usually applied by bureaucrats completely handling the government power, depends upon the system in which bureaucrats have rights to invade the liberty of citizens.‖ It is widely known that such political system exist since old times, counting China in the Qin Dynasty, Egypt in the New King’s Time and Roman Empire as the typical examples. This kind of bureaucracy is based on feudalistic personal dependence relation, established upon natural economics, autocratic imperial power, personal will, which is commonly named as ―the early bureaucratic model‖, which is relative to the modern bureaucratic model companied by the development of western bourgeois democratic revolution and industrialization production. The modern bureaucratic model nurtured in the late nineteenth century. The rise of Western Europe national countries, the development of monetary economy, the modernization of communication, the popularization of concept of legal system and the appearance of professional secretary class, all offered the relative conditions for the generation of the modern bureaucratic model. Meanwhile, the modern bureaucratic model has absorbed the rational spirit of scientific and industrial civilization, thus making administration under the control of laws. It requires knowledge to become the base of management decision, substituting feudalistic personal dependence relation and rule of man with legalization, specialization and im-personalization, meeting the needs of industrial society production and the complexion of the administration in national countries. Moreover, it realized the scientific process of organizational management, pursuing the organic combination of market-oriented economy chasing interests and benefits and its relatively suitable democratic political systems. Apparently, the bureaucratic model of the western developed countries became serving the public more strongly; in another hand, it left negative effects due to the defects of the system and the changes of its applying circumstances. Thus we witnessed the movement of new public management in the 1970’s, spreading among the western governments. Its object is to correct the bureaucracy’s defects and introduce management system which meets the needs of social development, but its substitutes such as decentralization division and forms of networks still mainly depended upon bureaucracy for management and governance. Though bureaucracy exists as the way to rule nations and manage societies for a long history, people did not present it with definition and systematic research, leaving it an unconscious natural th century, the research on bureaucracy has developed as a focus of the conscious process. Until the 20 process among the disciplines of politics, sociology, and management. Regarding to its own interest focus, each realm gives different of bureaucracy. For instance, in the comparative politics, bureaucracy is used to compare with democratic regime of representative government in order to reveal the features of autocratic regime of dictatorship. In the political economics, bureaucracy is regarded as non-market organization, emphasizing the origins of capitals and environment of function. However, these all are related to the son of European Civilization, German sociologist Max Weber. He presented his systematic analysis and summery of bureaucracy which long exist in nation’s political systems, proposing the conditions of its existence and development, theorizing and systematizing bureaucracy. The ―rational bureaucracy‖ in his description and explanation became an efficient tool of researching on bureaucracy as the definition of a regular, ideal type. The researches then on all depart from his rational bureaucracy, interpreting, supplementing or criticizing his theories. 2.2 Bureaucracy and constitutional democracy Technically, Weber praised highly the modern bureaucratic model for its superiority, equating with economic modernization: ―As since the Middle Age, the progress in capitalism is the only criteria of economic modernization; the progress in bureaucracy is the clear criteria of national modernization.‖ He believed that the continuous ―rationalism‖ in the Western history provided with inner motivations: rationalization, which expands to economics, politics, legislation and daily life of societies, thus pushing the traditional ones onto modernizations. One of the rationalizations in politics is expectable administration management, ―rational bureaucracy‖. Weber thought that the modern countries were not the results of capitalism, but showing up before capitalism and making contributions of its development. However, capitalism supplies great energy for the development of rational administrative management in public and personal lives. This kind of administrative management is based upon rational authority, featuring an ―exact, prompt, clear, archives-familiar, continuous, prudent, unifying, strictly subjective, friction-preventing, and material-and personnel-saving‖ rational bureaucracy. Concerning to problems of bureaucracy and democracy, Weber was in the broad perspective of historical sociology, believing the key role of rational bureaucracy in modernization process, pointing out that ―democracy unavoidably and unconsciously promotes bureaucratization. In certain circumstances, democracy would bring apparent obstacles in front of bureaucratic systems.‖ In another hand, he also emphasized that ―bureaucracy is a delicate machine, providing benefits for extremely different interests: pure politics, pure economics, and others. The combination of bureaucracy and democratization, no matter what good example has been set up, could not ever be exaggerated. ‖ Weber’s controversial thoughts seem to be a reflection of the dilemma between bureaucracy and democracy. Bureaucracy could offer democratic politics high efficient management, but only focusing on efficiency, it will handicap democratic politics, over-bureaucracy threatening the democracy. So, in Weber’s eyes, the problem is to restrict the bureaucracy, not to deny it. To solve the problem which might be mislead by rational bureaucracy in political life, Weber proposed the democratic model, which was call ―competitive elitism‖ by David Held, that is people has the right to vote for their own politicians and government in the form of liberty; ―resorting to public opinions, makes impression on the content and orientation of political events‖; guarantee people with the right to legally change or dismiss governance losing faith and trust. Weber hoped to maintain and to consolidate democratic politics by employing the systematic frame of check and balance, in which an active parliament balances nation’s bureaucrats, nation’s bureaucracy balances political leaders, politicians voted by people balance bureaucrats from political parties, and bureaucrats from political parties balance the attitude of the public. In sum, we could be least enlightened from historical and theories perspectives. Firstly, one crucial problem is to solve the conflicts between democracy and bureaucracy in constitutional system. In the trend of civic rights expanding, welfare stats forming, national administrative powers boosting, ―controlling the bureaucracy‖ is usually the most acute topic in democratic society. Secondly, ―that democracy and bureaucracy are contrary to each other is a misunderstanding.‖ The modern bureaucracy under the order of constitutional democracy is not antidemocratic, but rather serving the democratic politics within its control. The development of democratic politics itself contains the dynamic balance of employing but controlling the bureaucracy. As the American scholar Kennedy J M said, ―Bureaucratic divisions are never fail to be arena, where government departments realize check and balances. The control of bureaucracy should be understood under constitutional and governmental backgrounds. Lacking this point, the viewpoint of bureaucracy and public policies is incomplete and imprecise.‖ 3 Japan’s “bureaucracy-oriented politics” and constitutional democracy 3.1 Japan’s postwar constitutional democratic system The theory of constitutional democracy provides us with a historical and logical tool of analyzing bureaucracy. Whether a country possesses constitution is not necessarily related to its democratic or autocratic properties, for constitution could make legal the actual unrestricted power of legislators. However, constitutional democracy is completely different, ―it means using laws to regulate government, means action of government could not be determined by governors’ personal inclinations, instead should gain permit from people and follow correct process. Restricting the liberty of government is to guarantee the civic liberty; tyranny is usually due to unrestricted powers. ‖ Constitutionalism, whose focus point is personal liberty, is not only the ―democratic politics‖, containing the values of democracy, laws, liberty etc. In order to protect personal liberty and civil rights, to prevent citizens from the invasion of the government public powers, ―Theory of restriction is the basement of constitution.‖ After Japan’s unconditional surrender in World War?, the nation swiftly moved into the progress of political democratization under the pressure from the US. ―Mikado system, the autocratic power, broke up. By realizing the parliamentarian democracy, the people’s basic human rights and political liberty then gained assurance, accomplishing the bourgeois democratic revolution.‖ However, ―democracy only viewed by constitutional perspective possesses criteria meanings.‖ The Japan Constitution which became effective on May 2, 1947 radically changed the properties of Japan’s political powers, promoting Japan’s modern democratic politics. The implement of Cabinet Law, National Administrative Organization Law, and Civil Servant Law marked ―Japan’s entry into the time of scientific and democratic bourgeois civil servant institution.‖ Japan’s new constitution fully reflects the basic thoughts of constitutional democracy, ―depending upon the three theories: doctrine of sovereign rights, pacifism, and respect of human rights, it efficiently embodies the bourgeois thoughts theory system. It is a rather complete bourgeois constitution, thus first establishing the political system of bourgeois democracy in Japan.‖ Comparing with the Meiji Constitution, the new constitution constructed the constitutional principles of the separation of powers. Under the system of Meiji Constitution, all powers, including the commandership of land and navy forces in Japan belonged to the Mikado. Though there were independent congress, cabinet and legislation divisions, they were all Mikado’s assistant mechanism; the three powers were not really separated nor even check and balance. The postwar new constitution denied the feudalistic dictatorship of Mikado System, setting up the congress, cabinet and Supreme Court, which are independently legal, separate, balanced, to exercise the national political power. The new constitution is not only the evidence of law which shows the properties of the country’s political powers, but also the rigid institutional bottom line of restricting its legislation, administration, and judicature. Political life in Japan since the new constitution released including voting, cabinet, government budget, forming of public policies and local autonomy functioned all within the limitation of the order of constitutional democracy. Its bureaucracy definitely would not surpass the new constitution becoming an outside special power; its boundary of power and functional border unavoidably receive the restriction of democratic politics. Otherwise, it is hard for us to explain the postwar bureaucratic model serving as part of the constitutional democracy, when the national political system changes, still preserve the subjective property under Meiji Constitution. If denying the restrictive function of postwar Japan political power and its bureaucracy acting by Japan Constitution, it is denying logically the effect of Meiji Constitution which contributed to the prewar Japan politics and its bureaucracy, ignoring the institutional basement of bureaucratic existing and functioning and its relating connection with the outer circumstances, resulting in research objective placed among a complex condition being a single constant. 3.2 The postwar Japan’s democratization of the bureaucratic system Regarding to the Japan Constitution, whenever dabbling into political, social, economic events required to presenting the Congress through government proposition or parliament projects by the Constitution, they should be reviewed and passed the Congress via voting, becoming laws, and implemented by government, thus forming the characteristic of Parliament Center in Japan constitutional democracy. It shows up in applying national powers in legislation, administration and judicature; the Congress is the supreme power division; all the governors are voted by the public. As the No. 41 item of Japan Constitution regulates: ―the Congress is the only legislative division in the country‖, ―all the nation’s legislation should only be established via the passage of the Congress‖; excepting the legislative power, the Japan Congress ―also possessed the speak right of national politics and controlling capacity of national powers, able to conduct the dismiss of the Cabinet and widely investigate the national politics.‖ However, some scholars proposed that propositions proposed by governors are only 30 percents, others are prepared by the governmental departments, then presenting to the Congress. Take the No. 145 regular congress from January 19, 1999 to August 13 for an example. The 61.2% of the legislative propositions were proposed by the Cabinet; 38.8% were proposed by governors. That the 88.9% of the Cabinet legislation were passed and 19.1% of the Parliament propositions were passed is regarded as one of the characteristics of the bureaucracy-oriented government of postwar political culture in Japan. From this point, Japan’s administrative bureaucrats played a crucial role in the formation of public policies and implement process. However, ―the institutional restriction of public administration can only be finally judged based on the constitutional principles.‖ The Japan Constitution’s basic principles of national sovereignty, democratic liberty determine the realm of its public administrative management and functions of bureaucracy; the Cabinet is responsible to the legislative division and independent judicature voted democratically; the Constitution also provide the political speaking and journalism with liberties. Moreover, we need to pay attention to the differences between administrative power in power separations and the dichotomy of politics and administration. The separation of the three powers structures a feasible, manageable and functional mechanism. However, the dichotomy, under the separation condition, makes a logical distinction between the functions of politics and administrations, in order to make administrative management function fully and solve the controversy of democracy and efficiency. In the political practice and research, fossilized politics and administrative dichotomy could not be of any use, nor be correctly understood about the connection between politics and administrations, because the representative government is an indirect democracy, a union of value and instrumental rationality of politics and administrations. During making public policies, administrative bureaucrats unavoidably join the draft, decision and implement of policies, so the border of politics and administrations is never exact. The value of dichotomy is contributing to define administrative management dissimilar with a democratic form. Some research pointed out that Japan’s bureaucracy possessed a wide range of powers, ―because politicians from Jiminto Party were willing to rely on bureaucrats to deal with the technical details during the process of decision making. Regarding to Japan party system, Jiminto Party is pleased to authorize powers to bureaucrats, then influencing them when applying these powers.‖ It reflects the core status of Japan’s ruling party in public decision making and some features of public decision making mechanism. The explanation about this from a representative scholar in Japan is reasonable. He believes that the independence of Japan bureaucracy becomes gradually limited accompanied by postwar Japan democratic political development. Facing the critique and pressure from society, bureaucrats added their functions. When the scandal of securities appears, the securities management committee should form. When the call of limiting price of land arises, the general of land also rise etc. However, the representative scholar of ―bureaucracy-oriented theory‖ Tsuji Kiyoaki believes that during the postwar political revolution of the prewar Japan bureaucracy, its property of privileges does not disappear but being maintained and enforced due to the US’s indirect ruling during occupation, thus preventing the development of Japan’s political democratization. Actually, this is a problem of instrumental rationality. The Weber’s classical description of bureaucratic instrumental rationality could powerfully explain the instrumental characteristics of the bureaucracy in Meiji Constitution and Japan Constitution. Weber says that ―once bureaucratic institution establishes, objective indispensability and its impersonal feature make it, compared with feudalistic and personal loyal order, easy to serve anyone, who knows how to rein it.‖ Furthermore, the bureaucracy-oriented theory of Japan public administration is fairly vague, not clarifying the origins, properties, effects and boundary of the power oriented by bureaucrats. If the border of the orientation does not surpass the bureaucratic functions, this kind of orientation would not rise to a democratic political problem; if the bureaucracy-oriented power comes from politicians’ recognitions, which mainly includes technically laws, education and technology, this kind of orientation is politically legal without doubts. Moreover, any party would not easily give up its powers in hands, not except the parties in Japan. In fact ―Japan’s administrative decision has never been a process dominating with only governmental participation, but rather relating to party’s politics.‖ The functioning of the postwar Japan public administrative model and its bureaucracy, from perspectives of proposal approach and procedure, Japan’s every department possesses democratic drafting process of presenting-discussion and itinerant judgement; all the draft proposal would pass the democratic procedures like ruling party and cabinet conference deliberation, then finalized by the Congress. That means the administration and bureaucrats don not invade upon the right of proposal via illegal approaches, for the technological advantages of government and bureaucrats improves the feasibility and professions. Proposals presented by one governors or a few more often become restricted by the politicians’ professional knowledge, inconsistent with legislation process or against certain laws, resulting in denial. In another hand, from the angle of the Japan’s public policy’s actual effects, though the possibility of Japan’s bureaucratic divisions’ expansion at any time it is undeniable, while discussing the tremendous success of postwar economy, ―Civil Servant System of Japan received high praises for it played an important role in Japan’s modernization and later economic development.‖ The reasons why Japan Civil Servant System could contribute this far is abundant. From the perspective of the relation between economic and political development, ―while the economy is a great success, then the political system of check and balanced powers is reasonable and contributing to economics.‖ This basement of promoting economics and social stability is the institutional arrangement of constitutional democracy. 4 Results ―To construct and maintain a responsible bureaucratic organization is one of the difficult problems of modernized or modernizing, bourgeois or communist, developed or developing societies.‖ In western society of original democratic politics, the phenomenon of bureaucratic discretion exists for long. The principle of democratic politics requires powers in the hands of voted politicians. However, the development of western society made the politician-oriented system which is necessary for civil sovereign the bureaucracy-oriented one. The structure of national powers evolves from administrative centralization to congress centralization, the back to administrative centralization. Of course, under the circumstances of constitutional democracy, constantly adjusting the border of national public powers is a process, during which western politicians and scholars continuously warn about the unbalance of the three-power divisions and the appearance of dictatorship, calling for control of bureaucracy. It is clear that ―bureaucracy-oriented‖ not only exist in Japan, a nation of successful modernization, as an ―anti-democracy phenomenon‖, instead a common dilemma of constitutional democratic countries. The positive effect of Japan bureaucracy in pubic policy is due to the new Japan Constitution and ―efficient and democratic administrative management serving the people‖ like the National Servant Law etc., these kind of exact and clear law and regulations. It is also the needs and results of Japan as a later modernized country. 5 Conclusion Analyzing the power boundary of various political entities and Japan public administration model, we could not only focus on the percentage of the passage of proposals passed by the Congress, not depart from the inner connection between constitutional democracy and bureaucracy and the trend of postwar political democratization of Japan. That the ―bureaucracy-oriented‖ is the model of Japan public administration should not effect on the recognition and evaluation of Japan bureaucratic democratization. The status and effect of politics and policy-making process should be discussed from the property of the public power origins, service objects, etc. In surpassing western developed countries, Japanese government enforced its functions on different economic and social affairs, thus enlarging its administrative functions. Though constrained under Japan constitutional democracy, ―bureaucracy-oriented‖ and administrative centralization could not be completely avoidable. However, Japan’s ―bureaucracy-oriented‖ does not intrude upon the basic principles of Japan constitutional democracy, for under the restriction of Japan constitutional democracy system, personal or group autocracy loses possibility with the unchangeable orientation of democracy development. The Japan’s public administration model, as the many others of constitutional democratic nations, is facing the constantly adjustment of legislation, administration and judicature under the frame of constitutional democracy, making them check-and-balanced. In this way the democratization of Japan’s bureaucracy would only improve and develop soundly in its constitutional democracy. References [1] Max Weber. Economy and Society. Eds. G. Roth and C. Wittich; trans. E. Fischoff etal. New York. 1986: 587 (in English) [2] Wang Zhensuo. The Postwar Fifty Years of Japan. World Knowledge Press, 1996: 46 (in Chinese) [3] David Beetham. Bureaucracy. Jilin Renmin Press, 2005:100 (in Chinese) [4] Max Weber. The Domination of Sociology. Guangxi Normal University Press. 2004 (in English) [5] Fujiwara Akira. Modern Japanese History. Shangwu Press, 1983 [6] Tsuji Seimei. The Perseverance and Maintenance of Bureaucratic Department. Iwanamishoten Press, 1985 (in Japanese) [7] He Qinhua, Fang Lehua. The Development of Japanese Laws. Shanghai Renmin Press, 1999 (in Chinese) [8] Muramatsu Michio. Administration of Japan. Tyuokouruosya Press, 1994 [9] William F.West. Controlling Bureaucracy. Chongqing University Press, 2001 [10] Miyazaka Jyunyichi. The Operation and Management Theory. Beijing Enterprise Management Press, 1996 [11] Alan Rosenbaum. The Philosophy of Constitutional Politics. SanlianShudian Press, 2001 The Dilemma in the Development of China’s Administrative Accountability System and Possible Solutions 1. DAI Gang-shu 2. LIU Ya-ling 3. HUANG Bo School of Political Science and Public Administration, UESTC, Chengdu, P.R.China, 610054 Abstract Administrative accountability system is modern Chinese socialist political civilization construction in the system innovation. The Chinese government in 2003 launched the administrative accountability system, and set off a series of ―accountability crisis. In 2007, Premier Wen Jia-bao’s government work report stated‖: ―To establish a sound administrative accountability system, to improve the implementation of the Government and credibility‖, which also contributed greatly to the construction of the accountability system. This paper analyses on what China’s administrative accountability system has been achieved and on some of the current problems and the solution to these problems. Key words Administrative accountability system, Dilemma, Solutions 1 Introduction In recent years, the officials’ dereliction of duty brings the public irreparable loss. In 2003, Chinese government began to carry out the administrative accountability system. While some officials are punished, Chinese government constitutes series of accountability system, from the central government to local government. Administrative accountability system is a kind of modern administrative system. As the actors of governmental affairs, all of the officials’ personal conducts and their performance must be supervised. The government and the officials must be open and at the same time be responsible for what they have said and done. What’s more, they must receive the judgment or even recall and prosecution of their superiors and the public. The punishment to the officials’ mistake has concentrated adequate public attention. Although the legislation, justice, and administration all concern the administrative accountability, the official accountability can’t be implemented affectively because of deficient regulation. Fortunately, Chinese government has issued some regulations such as State Civil Service Law, which is the symbol of administrative accountability’s institutionalized law. Chinese government should be a responsible government, as an important system design, administrative accountability system is indispensable. The practice of administrative accountability system manifests that Chinese government has made rapid progress in political civilization, and the government has changed from control oriented to service oriented, which fully embodies tenet of ―Serve the people heart and soul‖, and conduce the officials to change their style of administration to be incorruptible officials. 2 What has achieved in the development of China’s administrative accountability system During all the dynasties in China, there were many systems of punishing negligent officials. Only in 2003 does China put the administrative accountability system completely. The minister of health and the mayor of Beijing were both removed for their dereliction of duty. The events that broke out in Tian’men city of Hubei Province in 2007 gave us a good lesson. In fact, great changes have taken place in the administrative accountability system. 2.1 The way of accountability changed In the past, the senior officials decided the way of accountability. They were able to punish the persons according to their wishes. It is ambiguous. Now it has changed. In 2004, Prime Minister Wen Jia-bao pointed out in his government work report that the government must perform these Principles Strictly. The government must perform their authority with corresponding responsibility. The public can supervise them. The government must compensate for their fault. In addition, at the same time, a stipulation was passed that the officials must resign for their grievous mistake. 2.2 The main body of accountability changed In the past, the main body of accountability is the senior authority. If something misfortunate took place, the officials would shirk their responsibility and let the direct responsibility be punished. During these years, the public and the media participate in the establishing of the accountability system, they supervise officials effectively. Based on practice all the local governments constitute corresponding regulations to restrict the main body of accountability. The efficiency of the government improved. They deal with the affairs more rapidly and compensate the victims more quickly. 2.3 The object of accountability changed For many years, the government punished the officials only when they made bad mistake. They would not penalize the officials without any contribute to the public, and the officials may think they will keep the positions as long as they like if they did not make big mistake. In 2004, Zhejiang province government constitutes regulation, which is about the punishment of the officials above. From then on, the officials cannot stay all day with only a cup of tea and a piece of paper. They must do something useful to the voters; otherwise, others will replace them. 2.4 The range of accountability extended From the cases before 2003, only when severe accidents occurred, can the leading officials to be punished by Law. Now it ranges from the safety sectors to the public service sectors, decision-making areas and the field of law enforcement. For example, the secretary of the state environmental protection administration resigns for Songhua River pollution. At the same time, besides the executive fields, the Party organizations and enterprises are all included. It is beneficial to improve the efficiency of the government. 3 The dilemma in the development In China, administrative accountability has come into forces for only a few years. It is natural when it confronts many problems. Altogether, there are four aspects as followed: 3.1 Officials have a weak sense of responsibility and accountability China has a history of 2,000 years of absolute monarchy, the concept of ―The supremacy of power‖ and ―official position‖ is deeply rooted. As the impact of such ideas and concepts, the current sense of responsibility in Chinese society generally is weak. On the one hand, Chinese official groups have weak sense of responsibility. First, they are not responsible for the state. Some officials in locality work for their own sake, in spite of the public’s benefits. Secondly, they are not responsible for the masses. To get a higher position, some officials make ―image projects‖ at the cost of vast waste of resources. Thirdly, they are not responsible for the community. Indeed some cadres have forgotten the responsibility as government officials and their responsibilities. On the other hand, Chinese society has a weak sense of public accountability. In the influence of traditional sovereignty, the public still adore the authority. They consider the officials will serve them heart and soul and prepare them everything with pleasure. 3.2 Insufficient corresponding law to serve the system In China, administrative accountability system only began with the policy that central government developed, and there is not specific laws. On February 18, 2004, the central government had enacted ―the regulations of Inner-Party Supervision‖, which told about ―question the authority, and remove‖. Then another policy is passed. ―Regulations on Disciplinary Punishments of the Communist Party of China‖, it gave corresponding punishment to the officials who were dereliction of duty. However, the two regulations were not concern the liability and political responsibility. Even though some local government develops certain kind of law, it may turn out to be ambiguous when it is put into practice. 3.3 Government power and responsibility inconsistency The co-existence of powers and responsibilities is a basic principle of administrative accountability system. When the leaders receive the powers, they receive corresponding responsibilities. If they don’t commit corresponding responsibilities, they will not be eligible to the power. In fact, during the process of administration, people usually don’t know who should be responsible for it. As a result, when something severe happens, the officials can shirk their responsibility. In fact, the responsibility includes four aspects: The first is the moral responsibility to the victims and the public; the second one is political responsibility to the government and the party; the third one is democratic responsibility to the voters; the last one is liability according to the law. 3.4 Hard access to government message After China joins in WTO, Chinese government has done much work to make the government work more clarity based on the corresponding regulations of the world trade organization. Generally, the message they tell the public is very limited. They have kept so many secrets! The media have difficulty in reporting some news. The audience knows very limited information. Some news is reported according to the wishes of some officials. Above all, there is not special system for them. Even if some local governments publish some regulations, they will never put them into practice. 4 The possible solutions To improve the system, certain social condition is required. Some readers pointed out that to establish the administrative accountability system, the public, and the media should play leading role. While at the same time, the officials should supervise themselves. We should do as follows: 4.1 Strengthen the ideas of responsibility and develop the culture of administrative accountability system The culture of administrative accountability system is indispensable for the running of the system. To improve the development of the administrative accountability system, the ideas of the culture and the regulations should be known to the government and the officials, and at the same time, the public and the media supervise them. In order to develop the culture of administrative accountability system, we could do like this: First, strength the ideas of responsibility of the officials. We must make them known that their authority comes from the public so they must serve them heart and soul and they should change their attitude consciously. Second, what the public think is very import. They should have civic awareness and civic spirit that they are the main part of politic life, not slaves. Secondly, they have our own independent right and they should use it. What’s more, law keeps the right. If someone violates it, he must do what he can to protect it. Last but not the least, encourage the public join in the activity to supervise the government. Only in this way, can the government’s become more legitimate, transparent, and effective. Only active participation of citizens, can the government have legitimacy, transparency, responsiveness, effectiveness. Then national political and the good cooperation between civil society, and ―good governance‖ status will come into being. 4.2 Crystallize responsibilities and consolidate administrative accountability system To make it clear the powers and responsibilities is a principle of administrative accountability system. We must know explicit everyone’s duty. First, it is very important to know the relationships between the public and the government. The government is deputy of the public, so the officials should do according to the public will. Differentiate responsibility among various departments authority and improve the relevant government department controversial coordination mechanism. Every official do what they should do serve their citizen heart and soul, and responsible for them well. Finally, make it clear the relationships between lower-level administrative bodies to let the responsibilities more specific. In another words, let every government knows what they should do and how to do, when some case unexpected takes place, everyone is on his position. Then the public will rely more on the government and more trust the government, which is good to the construction of harmonious society. 4.3 Standardize procedures for accountability and increase the effectiveness of the operation of the accountability system To improve the accountability process is to enhance the efficiency of the key accountability. To establish the responsible government, we must establish a clear set of norms to facilitate the operation of the accountability process. Strictly, just and legitimate process of accountability should include the start of accountability, investigation, the Ombudsman review, such as procedures for monitoring the implementation of the system. Specifically, the following aspects should be improved: First, accountability process should reflect the principles of democracy and participation. Second, accountability in the investigation and handling should be carried out standardized and orderly. It should be enacted relevant laws and regulations, according to accountability situation. Third, the reviewing of the complaint should maintain accountability excuse targets of complaints and the legitimate rights and interests. Fourth, in the monitoring implementation, we should take effective measures to ensure that the implementation of the accountability decision. 4.4 To develop sound legal system for administrative accountability First, we must strengthen the recognizing of administrative responsibility. It is an estimate whether the main responsibility should be responsible. It plays the role of the implementation of the accountability system for the primary conditions. It is the foundation we should base on to decide whether the officials should be taken charge. Secondly, we must strengthen the administrative responsibility of accountability to punish the main responsibility according to corresponding law and regulations. It is good not only to the officials who have made the mistake, which can make them serve the people more reasonable, but also to the others officials, for it tells them what should do and should not do, reducing the possibility of the same mistake. Thirdly, consummate the rescue of administrative accountability. Regulate the procedure of administrative rescue to make it more rapid and efficient. Enlarge the domain of administrative reconsideration, and allow the official to search for rescue through administrative reconsideration when the deed concerns his own right. 4.5 Make the government affair open to the public and be supervised Administrative accountability is on the premise that it is open and informed. It must be responsible for the people. It means that they must let people know what had happened and what the government has done .Therefore, setting up a system of accountability is to let the government information open to the public. If they do not involve state secrets, they should be open to the public. It makes the public better understand administrative activities. It is also working to strengthen the accountability of the foundation and source of power. Only the government open to the public, can they supervise the government affair and officials. Then the government’s behaviors can be more legitimate and be much cleaner. The public supervision make the government implement what they lack and exert what they specialize. Only in this way, can we establish the administrative accountability system well. 5 Conclusion In short, implementation of the accountability system of government means that the government is a responsible government and a government is accountable to the public. It has also become one of the important factors for legitimacy of modern responsible government. China’s administrative accountability system has made much progress, but from the institutionalization and standardization of the goals, there is a long way to go. A fundamental sense, when a government really perform its responsibilities in line with rational, it is legal. Administrative accountability system is one of effective system to consolidate the legitimacy. The implementation of administrative accountability system is China’s modern development in line with international one in its reforming way. As the accountability system in the understanding and practice aspects of deficiencies, we should address these issues, and strive to explore and deepen their understanding of the accountability system in order to better enrich and improve the system. References [1] Zhou Ya-yue. Research on The Administration Accountability System. 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