关闭

关闭

关闭

封号提示

内容

首页 Damodaran On Valuation. Security analysis for i…

Damodaran On Valuation. Security analysis for investment and corporate finance.pdf

Damodaran On Valuation. Securit…

上传者: nwguru 2012-12-16 评分 0 0 0 0 0 0 暂无简介 简介 举报

简介:本文档为《Damodaran On Valuation. Security analysis for investment and corporate financepdf》,可适用于经济金融领域,主题内容包含dePreface…………………………………………………………………………………………………………Chapter:IntroductiontoVal符等。

dePreface…………………………………………………………………………………………………………Chapter:IntroductiontoValuation……………………………………………………………………………DiscountedCashflowValuationSectionChapter:EstimatingDiscountRates………………………………………………………………………Chapter:EstimatingCashFlows…………………………………………………………………………Chapter:EstimatingGrowthandTerminalValue…………………………………………………………Chapter:EquityDCFModels:DDMandFCFEModels……………………………………………Chapter:FirmDCFModels:CostofCapital,APVandExcessReturnModels………………………RelativeValuationChapter:RelativeValuationFirstPrinciples………………………………………………………………Chapter:EquityMultiples……………………………………………………………………………………Chapter:FirmandEnterpriseValueMultiples……………………………………………………………LooseEndsinValuationChapter:ValuingCashandCrossHoldings………………………………………………………………Chapter:EmployeeOptionsandRestrictedStock………………………………………………………Chapter:TheValueofIntangibles…………………………………………………………………………Chapter:TheValueofControl……………………………………………………………………………Chapter:TheValueofLiquidity……………………………………………………………………………Chapter:TheValueofSynergy……………………………………………………………………………Chapter:TheValueofTransparencyChapter:TheCostofDistress……………………………………………………………………………Chapter:ClosingThoughts…………………………………………………………………………………deAcknowledgmentsToallthosepeoplewithwhomIhavedebatedvaluationissuesovertimeandwhohavepointedouttheerrors(oratleastthelimitations)ofmywaysdePreface"Thereisnothingsodangerousasthepursuitofarationalinvestmentpolicyinanirrationalworld"JohnMaynardKeynesLordKeyneswasnotaloneinbelievingthatthepursuitof'truevalue'baseduponfinancialfundamentalsisafruitlessoneinmarketswherepricesoftenseemtohavelittletodowithvalueTherehavealwaysbeeninvestorsinfinancialmarketswhohavearguedthatmarketpricesaredeterminedbytheperceptions(andmisperceptions)ofbuyersandsellers,andnotbyanythingasprosaicascashflowsorearningsIdonotdisagreewiththemthatinvestorperceptionsmatter,butIdodisagreewiththenotionthattheyareallthatmatterItisafundamentalpreceptofthisbookthatitispossibletoestimatevaluefromfinancialfundamentals,albeitwitherror,formostassets,andthatthemarketpricecannotdeviatefromthisvalue,inthelongtermFromthetulipbulbcrazeinHollandinthemiddleagestotheSouthSeaBubbleinEnglandintheeighteenhundredstothestockmarketsofthepresent,marketshaveshownthecapacitytocorrectthemselves,oftenattheexpenseofthosewhobelievedthatthedayofreckoningwouldnevercomeThefirsteditionofthisbookwasmyfirstattemptatwritingabookandIhavehopefullygainedfrommyexperiencessinceInfact,thiseditionisverydifferentfromtheprioreditionforasimplereasonMyotherbookoninvestmentvaluation,alsopublishedbyJohnWiley,wasdesignedtobeacomprehensivevaluationbook,andrepeatingwhatwassaidinthatbookhere,incompressedform,strikesmeasawasteoftimeandresourcesThisbookhastwopartstoitThefirstpart,whichstretchesthroughthefirstchaptersisacompressedversionofbothdiscountedcashflowandrelativevaluationmodelsandshouldbefamiliarterritoryforanyonewhohasdoneorreadaboutvaluationbeforeThesecondpart,whichcomprisesthelastchapters,isdedicatedtolookingatwhatIcallthelooseendsinvaluationthatgetshortshriftinbothvaluationbooksanddiscussionsIncludedherearetopicslikeliquidity,control,synergy,transparencyanddistress,allofwhichaffectvaluationsButthenagain,asKeyneswouldhavesaid,"Inthelongterm,wearealldead"designificantly,butaredealtwithineitherapiecemealfashionortaketheformofarbitrarypremiumsanddiscountsYouwillnoticethatthissectionhasmorereferencestopriorworkintheareaandisdenser,partlybecausethereismoredebateaboutwhattheevidenceisandwhatweshoulddoinvaluationIdonotclaimtohavetheanswertowhatthevalueofcontrolshouldbeinafirmbutthechapteroncontrolshouldgiveyouaroadmapthatmayhelpyoucomeupwiththeansweronyourownThefourbasicprinciplesthatIlaidoutintheprefacetothefirsteditioncontinuetoholdonthisoneFirst,Ihaveattemptedtobeascomprehensiveaspossibleincoveringtherangeofvaluationmodelsthatareavailabletoananalystdoingavaluation,whilepresentingthecommonelementsinthesemodelsandprovidingaframeworkthatcanbeusedtopicktherightmodelforanyvaluationscenarioSecond,themodelsarepresentedwithrealworldexamples,wartsandall,soastocapturesomeoftheproblemsinherentinapplyingthesemodelsThereistheobviousdangerthatsomeofthesevaluationswillappeartobehopelesslywronginhindsight,butthiscostiswellworththebenefitsThird,inkeepingwithmybeliefthatvaluationmodelsareuniversalandnotmarketspecific,illustrationsfrommarketsoutsidetheUnitedStatesareinterspersedthroughthebookFinally,Ihavetriedtomakethebookasmodularaspossible,enablingareadertopickandchoosesectionsofthebooktoread,withoutasignificantlossofcontinuitydeCHAPTERINTRODUCTIONTOVALUATIONKnowingwhatanassetisworthandwhatdeterminesthatvalueisaprerequisiteforintelligentdecisionmakinginchoosinginvestmentsforaportfolio,indecidingontheappropriatepricetopayorreceiveinatakeoverandinmakinginvestment,financinganddividendchoiceswhenrunningabusinessThepremiseofthisbookisthatwecanmakereasonableestimatesofvalueformostassets,andthatthesamefundamentalprinciplesdeterminethevaluesofalltypesofassets,realaswellasfinancialSomeassetsareeasiertovaluethanothers,thedetailsofvaluationvaryfromassettoasset,andtheuncertaintyassociatedwithvalueestimatesisdifferentfordifferentassets,butthecoreprinciplesremainthesameThischapterlaysoutsomegeneralinsightsaboutthevaluationprocessandoutlinestherolethatvaluationplaysinportfoliomanagement,acquisitionanalysisandincorporatefinanceItalsoexaminesthethreebasicapproachesthatcanbeusedtovalueanassetAphilosophicalbasisforvaluationApostulateofsoundinvestingisthataninvestordoesnotpaymoreforanassetthanitisworthThisstatementmayseemlogicalandobvious,butitisforgottenandrediscoveredatsometimeineverygenerationandineverymarketTherearethosewhoaredisingenuousenoughtoarguethatvalueisintheeyesofthebeholder,andthatanypricecanbejustifiedifthereareotherinvestorswillingtopaythatpriceThatispatentlyabsurdPerceptionsmaybeallthatmatterwhentheassetisapaintingorasculpture,butwedonotandshouldnotbuymostassetsforaestheticoremotionalreasonswebuyfinancialassetsforthecashflowsweexpecttoreceivefromthemConsequently,perceptionsofvaluehavetobebackedupbyreality,whichimpliesthatthepricewepayforanyassetshouldreflectthecashflowsitisexpectedtogenerateThemodelsofvaluationdescribedinthisbookattempttorelatevaluetothelevelof,uncertaintyaboutandexpectedgrowthinthesecashflowsTherearemanyaspectsofvaluationwherewecanagreetodisagree,includingestimatesoftruevalueandhowlongitwilltakeforpricestoadjusttothattruevalueButdethereisonepointonwhichtherecanbenodisagreementAssetpricescannotbejustifiedbymerelyusingtheargumentthattherewillbeotherinvestorsaroundwhowillpayahigherpriceinthefutureThatistheequivalentofplayingaveryexpensivegameofmusicalchairs,whereeveryinvestorhastoanswerthequestion,"WherewillIbewhenthemusicstops”beforeplayingTheproblemwithinvestingwiththeexpectationthattherewillbeabiggerfoolaroundtosellanassetto,whenthetimecomes,isthatyoumightendupbeingthebiggestfoolofallInsidetheValuationProcessTherearetwoextremeviewsofthevaluationprocessAtoneendarethosewhobelievethatvaluation,doneright,isahardscience,wherethereislittleroomforanalystviewsorhumanerrorAttheotherarethosewhofeelthatvaluationismoreofanart,wheresavvyanalystscanmanipulatethenumberstogeneratewhateverresulttheywantThetruthdoesliessomewhereinthemiddleandwewillusethissectiontoconsiderthreecomponentsofthevaluationprocessthatdonotgettheattentiontheydeserve–thebiasthatanalystsbringtotheprocess,theuncertaintythattheyhavetograpplewithandthecomplexitythatmoderntechnologyandeasyaccesstoinformationhaveintroducedintovaluationValuefirst,Valuationtofollow:BiasinValuationWealmostneverstartvaluingacompanywithablankslateAlltoooften,ourviewsonacompanyareformedbeforewestartinputtingthenumbersintothemodelsthatweuseandnotsurprisingly,ourconclusionstendtoreflectourbiasesWewillbeginbyconsideringthesourcesofbiasinvaluationandthenmoveontoevaluatehowbiasmanifestsitselfinmostvaluationsWewillclosewithadiscussionofhowbesttominimizeoratleastdealwithbiasinvaluationsSourcesofBiasThebiasinvaluationstartswiththecompanieswechoosetovalueThesechoicesarealmostneverrandom,andhowwemakethemcanstartlayingthefoundationforbiasItmaybethatwehavereadsomethinginthepress(goodorbad)aboutthecompanyordeheardfromanexpertthatitwasunderorovervaluedThus,wealreadybeginwithaperceptionaboutthecompanythatweareabouttovalueWeaddtothebiaswhenwecollecttheinformationweneedtovaluethefirmTheannualreportandotherfinancialstatementsincludenotonlytheaccountingnumbersbutalsomanagementdiscussionsofperformance,oftenputtingthebestpossiblespinonthenumbersWithmanylargercompanies,itiseasytoaccesswhatotheranalystsfollowingthestockthinkaboutthesecompaniesZacks,IBESandFirstCall,tonamethreeservicesamongmany,providesummariesofhowmanyanalystsarebullishandbearishaboutthestock,andwecanoftenaccesstheircompletevaluationsFinally,wehavethemarket’sownestimateofthevalueofthecompanythemarketprice–addingtothemixValuationsthatstraytoofarfromthisnumbermakeanalystsuncomfortable,sincetheymayreflectlargevaluationerrors(ratherthanmarketmistakes)Inmanyvaluations,thereareinstitutionalfactorsthataddtothisalreadysubstantialbiasForinstance,itisanacknowledgedfactthatequityresearchanalystsaremorelikelytoissuebuyratherthansellrecommendations,ie,thattheyaremorelikelytofindfirmstobeundervaluedthanovervaluedThiscanbetracedpartlytothedifficultiesanalystsfaceinobtainingaccessandcollectinginformationonfirmsthattheyhaveissuedsellrecommendationson,andpartlytopressurethattheyfacefromportfoliomanagers,someofwhommighthavelargepositionsinthestock,andfromtheirownfirm’sinvestmentbankingarmswhichhaveotherprofitablerelationshipswiththefirmsinquestionTherewardandpunishmentstructureassociatedwithfindingcompaniestobeunderandovervaluedisalsoacontributortobiasAnanalystwhosecompensationisdependentuponwhethershefindsafirmisunderorovervaluedwillbebiasedinherconclusionsThisshouldexplainwhyacquisitionvaluationsaresooftenbiasedupwardsTheanalysisofthedeal,whichisusuallydonebytheacquiringfirm’sinvestmentbanker,whoalsohappenstoberesponsibleforcarryingthedealtoitssuccessfulconclusion,cancometooneoftwoconclusionsOneistofindthatthedealisseriouslyoverpricedandrecommendrejection,inwhichcasetheanalystreceivestheeternalgratitudeoftheThereareapproximatelyfivetimesasmanybuyrecommendationsissuedbyanalystsonWallStreetastherearesellrecommendationsdestockholdersoftheacquiringfirmbutlittleelseTheotheristofindthatthedealmakessense(nomatterwhattheprice)andtoreaptheamplefinancialwindfallfromgettingthedealdoneManifestationsofBiasTherearethreewaysinwhichourviewsonacompany(andthebiaseswehave)canmanifestthemselvesinvalueThefirstisintheinputsthatweuseinthevaluationWhenwevaluecompanies,weconstantlycometoforksintheroadwherewehavetomakeassumptionstomoveonTheseassumptionscanbeoptimisticorpessimisticForacompanywithhighoperatingmarginsnow,wecaneitherassumethatcompetitionwilldrivethemarginsdowntoindustryaveragesveryquickly(pessimistic)orthatthecompanywillbeabletomaintainitsmarginsforanextendedperiod(optimistic)ThepathwechoosewillreflectourpriorbiasesItshouldcomeasnosurprisethenthattheendvaluethatwearriveatisreflectiveoftheoptimisticorpessimisticchoiceswemadealongthewayThesecondisinwhatwewillcallpostvaluationtinkering,whereanalystsrevisitassumptionsafteravaluationinanattempttogetavalueclosertowhattheyhadexpectedtoobtainstartingoffThus,ananalystwhovaluesacompanyat$pershare,whenthemarketpriceis$,mayrevisehisgrowthratesupwardsandhisriskdownwardstocomeupahighervalue,ifshebelievedthatthecompanywasundervaluedtobeginwithThethirdistoleavethevalueasisbutattributethedifferencebetweenthevalueweestimateandthevaluewethinkistherightonetoaqualitativefactorsuchassynergyorstrategicconsiderationsThisisacommondeviceinacquisitionvaluationwhereanalystsareoftencalledupontojustifytheunjustifiableInfact,theuseofpremiumsanddiscounts,whereweaugmentorreduceestimatedvalue,providesawindowonthebiasintheprocessTheuseofpremiums–controlandsynergyaregoodexamples–iscommonplaceinacquisitionvaluations,wherethebiasistowardspushingvalueupwards(tojustifyhighacquisitionprices)Theuseofdiscounts–illiquidityandminoritydiscounts,forinstance–aremoretypicalinprivatecompanyvaluationsfortaxanddedivorcecourt,wheretheobjectiveisoftentoreportaslowavalueaspossibleforacompanyWhattodoaboutbiasBiascannotberegulatedorlegislatedoutofexistenceAnalystsarehumanandbringtheirbiasestothetableHowever,therearewaysinwhichwecanmitigatetheeffectsofbiasonvaluation:Reduceinstitutionalpressures:Aswenotedearlier,asignificantportionofbiascanbeattributedtoinstitutionalfactorsEquityresearchanalystsinthes,forinstance,inadditiontodealingwithallofthestandardsourcesofbiashadtograpplewiththedemandfromtheiremployersthattheybringininvestmentbankingbusinessInstitutionsthatwanthonestsellsideequityresearchshouldprotecttheirequityresearchanalystswhoissuesellrecommendationsoncompanies,notonlyfromiratecompaniesbutalsofromtheirownsalespeopleandportfoliomanagersDelinkvaluationsfromrewardpunishment:AnyvaluationprocesswheretherewardorpunishmentisconditionedontheoutcomeofthevaluationwillresultinbiasedvaluationsInotherwords,ifwewantacquisitionvaluationstobeunbiased,wehavetoseparatethedealanalysisfromthedealmakingtoreducebiasNoprecommitments:DecisionmakersshouldavoidtakingstrongpublicpositionsonthevalueofafirmbeforethevaluationiscompleteAnacquiringfirmthatcomesupwithapricepriortothevaluationofatargetfirmhasputanalystsinanuntenableposition,wheretheyarecalledupontojustifythispriceInfartoomanycases,thedecisiononwhetherafirmisunderorovervaluedprecedestheactualvaluation,leadingtoseriouslybiasedanalysesSelfAwareness:ThebestantidotetobiasisawarenessAnanalystwhoisawareofthebiasesheorshebringstothevaluationprocesscaneitheractivelytrytoconfrontthesebiaseswhenmakinginputchoicesoropentheprocessuptomoreobjectivepointsofviewaboutacompany’sfuturedeHonestreporting:InBayesianstatistics,analystsarerequiredtorevealtheirpriors(biases)beforetheypresenttheirresultsfromananalysisThus,anenvironmentalistwillhavetorevealthatheorshestronglybelievesthatthereisaholeintheozonelayerbeforepresentingempiricalevidencetothateffectThepersonreviewingthestudycanthenfactorthatbiasinwhilelookingattheconclusionsValuationswouldbemuchmoreusefulifanalystsrevealedtheirbiasesupfrontWhilewecannoteliminatebiasinvaluations,wecantrytominimizeitsimpactbydesigningvaluationprocessesthataremoreprotectedfromovertoutsideinfluencesandbyreportourbiaseswithourestimatedvaluesItisonlyanestimate:ImprecisionandUncertaintyinValuationStartingearlyinlife,wearetaughtthatifwedothingsright,wewillgettherightanswersInotherwords,theprecisionoftheanswerisusedasameasureofthequalityoftheprocessthatyieldedtheanswerWhilethismaybeappropriateinmathematicsorphysics,itisapoormeasureofqualityinvaluationBarringaverysmallsubsetofassets,therewillalwaysbeuncertaintyassociatedwithvaluations,andeventhebestvaluationscomewithasubstantialmarginforerrorInthissection,weexaminethesourcesofuncertaintyandtheconsequencesforvaluationSourcesofUncertaintyUncertaintyispartandparcelofthevaluationprocess,bothatthepointintimethatwevalueabusinessandinhowthatvalueevolvesovertimeaswegetnewinformationthatimpactsthevaluationThatinformationcanbespecifictothefirmbeingvalued,moregenerallyaboutthesectorinwhichthefirmoperatesorevenbegeneralmarketinformation(aboutinterestratesandtheeconomy)Whenvaluinganassetatanypointintime,wemakeforecastsforthefutureSincenoneofuspossesscrystalballs,wehavetomakeourbestestimates,giventheinformationthatwehaveatthetimeofthevaluationOurestimatesofvaluecanbewrongforanumberofreasons,andwecancategorizethesereasonsintothreegroupsdeaEstimationUncertainty:Evenifourinformationsourcesareimpeccable,wehavetoconvertrawinformationintoinputsandusetheseinputsinmodelsAnymistakesormisassessmentsthatwemakeateitherstageofthisprocesswillcauseestimationerrorbFirmspecificUncertainty:ThepaththatweenvisionforafirmcanprovetobehopelesslywrongThefirmmaydomuchbetterormuchworsethanweexpectedittoperform,andtheresultingearningsandcashflowswillbeverydifferentfromourestimatescMacroeconomicUncertainty:Evenifafirmevolvesexactly

职业精品

用户评论

0/200
    暂无评论

精彩专题

上传我的资料

热门资料

资料评价:

/49
仅支持在线阅读

意见
反馈

返回
顶部

Q