关闭

关闭

关闭

封号提示

内容

首页 THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE ORIGINS OF JAPAN\'S ECONOMI…

THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE ORIGINS OF JAPAN\'S ECONOMIC SLUMP.pdf

THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE ORIGINS OF …

哈尼 2012-12-16 评分 0 浏览量 0 0 0 0 暂无简介 简介 举报

简介:本文档为《THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE ORIGINS OF JAPAN\'S ECONOMIC SLUMPpdf》,可适用于经济金融领域,主题内容包含JuneTHEFOREIGNEXCHANGEORIGINSOFJAPAN'SECONOMICSLUMPANDLOWINTERESTLIQUIDITY符等。

JuneTHEFOREIGNEXCHANGEORIGINSOFJAPAN'SECONOMICSLUMPANDLOWINTERESTLIQUIDITYTRAPbyRonaldMcKinnonandKenichiOhnoAbstractJapan’smacroeconomicproblemhasyettobeproperlydiagnosedThroughoutthes,policymakerscouldnotdecideonthepropermacroeconomicmeasurestocombatthecountry'ssevereeconomicslumpWeproposeaunifiedexplanation,withdeephistoricalroots,ofwhyaggregateprivatedemandfailedtorecoverafterJapan’sstockandrealestatebubblesburstinanddeflationarypressurecontinuesTheproblemisnotpurely“madeinJapan”ItarisesfromJapan’sunbalancedmercantilerelationshipwiththeUnitedStatesStartingintheearlys,numeroustradedisputesbetweenthetwocountriescreatedtensionsthatwere(temporarily)resolvedbytheyengoingeverhigheragainstthedollaruptoInthelasttwodecades,thispersistentpressurefortheyentorisewasfurtheraggravatedbyJapan’slargecurrentaccount(saving)surplusesasthecounterpartofAmerica’slargecurrentaccount(saving)deficitsThelegacyistheexpectationthattradeandfinancialtensionswillrecursothattheyenwillbehigher,,oryearsfromnowwithJapan’s(wholesale)pricelevelforcedcorrespondinglylowerandnominalinterestratesonyenassetsremainingmorethanfourpercentagepointslessthanthoseondollarassetsThisfearofyenappreciation,whosetimingiserraticandunpredictable,nowinhibitsprivatedomesticinvestmentbybothJapanesefirmsandhouseholdsOurtheoryalsoexplainswhy,inthelates,nominalinterestratesonshorttermyenassetswerecompressedtowardzerosoastodestroythenormalprofitmarginsofthebankingsystemInthisliquiditytrap,theBankofJapanwhosemonetarypolicyhasbeenquite“expansionary”ispowerlesstostimulatetheflaggingeconomyTospringtheliquiditytrap,eliminatedeflationarypressure,andrestoremacroeconomicbalanceinJapan,theAmericanandJapanesegovernmentsmustactjointlytoquashtheexpectationthattheyenwillbehigherinthefuturethanitistodayMcKinnonisprofessorofeconomicsatStanfordUniversity,CaliforniaInTokyo,OhnoisprofessorattheNationalGraduateInstituteforPolicyStudiesTheargumenthereupdatesandextendstheirrecentbook,DollarandYen:ResolvingEconomicConflictbetweentheUnitedStatesandJapan(MITPress,Japanesetranslation,NihonKeizaiShimbunsha,)ButthebookprovidesnecessarysupportingempiricalandanalyticaldetailWewouldliketothankRishiGoyalofStanfordUniversityforhisresearchassistanceAkiyoshiHoriuchioftheUniversityofTokyo,andKunioOkinaandHiroshiFujukioftheBankofJapan,madehelpfulcommentsalthoughtheymaynotagreewithourmainargumentIJAPAN’SDOMESTICECONOMYINTHEsBeforeconsideringthestronginternationalinfluencesonJapan’seconomy,letussketchtheevolutionofJapan’sslumpinthesfromapurelydomesticperspectiveWhenJapan’sbubbleeconomyburstin,thesharpfallinthestockmarketandlandvaluesmadeasignificanteconomicdownturnoratleastaperiodofsluggishgrowth(byJapanesestandards)inevitableBadloansinthebankingsystem,associatedwiththecollapsingvalueofrealestateandequitycollateral,proliferatedandimpairedbankcapitalThesharpdeclineinhouseholdwealthcausedconsumerexpenditurestofallExcesscapacityinducedbusinessfirmstocurtailinvestmentSucheconomictravailishardlysurprisingwhenassetbubblesburstMoresurprisingisthat,almostadecadelater,Japan'seconomyhasyettorecoverFigureshowshowsluggishJapaneseGDPgrowthhasbecomeinthesExceptforwhenannualizedgrowthtouchedpercent(moreonthisbelow),GDPgrowthsincehasaveragedlessthanonepercentperyearandwassharplynegativeinwithnegligiblegrowthinYet,amongindustrialcountries,JapanhadbeenthepremiergrowtheconomyforthepreviousfourdecadesWiththeworld’shighestsavingratesandseeminglyendlesscapacitytoadaptto,anddramaticallyaugment,thelatestindustrialtechnologies,Japan’sGDPgrewattopercentinthesandsandatarobusttopercentinthesands,whentherestoftheindustrialworldwascomparativelystagnantMoreover,thesebasicvirtuesofprivateindustryandthrift,andahighlyskilledlaborforcewithunmatchedengineeringcapabilityinhitechmanufacturing,remainintactHowever,throughoutthesinto,domesticaggregatedemandbothprivateinvestmentandconsumptionfailedtorecoverTheFiscalResponseOnthefiscalside,theJapanesegovernmentrespondedwithmassivepublicexpenditureprogramsdesignedtoprimethepumpofaggregatedemandConsequently,Japan’sfiscaldeficitinexceededpercentofGNPTableshowsthatJapanesegovernmentgrossdebtrosefrompercentofGDPinandtheOECDprojectedittoincreasetomorethanpercentofGDPin,andpercentinThisupwardtrendiscompletelyoutofstepwithotherGcountriesEvenItalyhassucceededinputtingitssimilarlylargedebtratioonadownwardtrajectory(table)Offsettingthisfiscal“expansion”,theyenappreciatedsharplyin–peakingoutatahighlyovervaluedtothedollarinAprilanddepressedbothexportsandprivatedomesticinvestment(Moreonthecausesofthisappreciationbelow)However,inwhentheyenfellandbecamelessovervalued,outputgrowthspurtedtopercentRecoveryseemedathandOECDEconomicOutlook,December,pInApril,believingthatthisfiscalpumppriminghadworkedbutconcernedwiththeoutofcontroldebtbuildup,thegovernmentofthethenPrimeMinisterRyutaroHashimotoseizedtheopportunitytoincreasethegeneralsalestaxfromtopercentandtocloseothertaxloopholesThistaxincreasesentthestillsluggisheconomyintoaseveretailspinfrommidthroughFigureshowstheremarkablefallsinoverallJapaneseconsumptionaswellasinthesubcategoriesofdepartmentstoreandnewcarsalesthroughfromAprilthroughFigureshowsthesharpriseinJapaneseunemploymentinthelatesBecauseofhisparty'selectorallossesfromtheslumpingeconomy,theunfortunateHashimotohadtoresigninJulySincethen,newpublicspendingprograms,largelyinfrastructureinvestments,havebeencontinuallyintroducedJapanisstillunderpressurefromtheUSTreasury,andfromsomecommentatorsseePosentoengageinyetmoreKeynesianstylefiscalstimuliBecauseJapanisalreadyinaseriousdebttrap,severalmoreyearsofpublicsectorfiscal“stimulus”issimplynotsustainableTakingamoreconsolidatedapproachtopublicsectorgrossdebtbyincludingthedeterioratingpositionoflocalgovernments,andthenpresumingthatfiscaldeficitscontinueasinoutto,DavidAsherandRobertDugger()producetheresultsshowninTableAssumingapercentinterestcharge(asubjecttowhichwewillreturn)onexistingpublicdebt,theycalculatethattotalpublicsectordebtGDPwillreachoverpercentbyanumbernotyetseeninpeacetimeinanyindustrialcountry!EvenTabledoestellthewholestoryJapanhasanagingpopulationandanunderfundedsocialsecuritysystem,whoseliabilitieswerenotcountedaspartofthegrossdebtfiguresshownintablesandNorwerethehugecontingentgovernmentliabilitiesfrombadprivatebankloans,nowestimatedtobeintheneighborhoodof$trillion,countedNoristhebadloanportfolioofthegovernmentitselfthroughitsFiscalInvestmentandLoanProgramforhousing,agriculture,economicdevelopment,andsoon,countedThus,furtherfiscal“expansion”,whichwouldaddmassivelytotheexistingpublicdebteventhoughvirtuallyallpublicdebtisinternallyheldwithinJapanbecauseofmassiveprivatesectorsavingistooriskyWithhugeliquidsavingsbalances,Japan’shouseholdsarenotcurrentlyliquidityconstrained(moreontheliquiditytrapandongoingdeflationbelow)incontrasttowhatastaticKeynesianpublicspendingmultiplier,whichsupposesthatmostagentsareliquidityconstrained,wouldprojectNevertheless,ordinaryJapanesestillworryaboutthedisarrayinthepublicfinancesfortheirsocialsecuritypensions,medicalcare,andsooninthelongerrunThus,inthefaceofhugepublicsectordeficitsandunsustainabledebts,currentprivatespendinghasweakenedfurtherie,personalsavinghasincreasedaspeopledecidetoprotecttheirownsocialsecurity:aformofRicardianequivalenceThushasthestringhasrunoutonfurtherfiscal“expansionism”NewYorkTimes,July,TheMonetaryResponseMonetarypolicyisalsoatanimpasseasJapanentersthenewmilleniumHowever,adecadeearlier,theBankofJapan’s(BoJ)tightmoneypolicyhadbeeneffectiveinburstingtheassetbubbleThesharpcontractioninthemonetarybaseinacontractionthathadmoredrasticandprolongeddeflationaryconsequencesthantheBoJintendedisshowninFigureBy,however,Figurealsoshowsthatmonetarypolicybecameexpansive:basemoneysubsequentlyhasgrownbetweenandpercentperyearBecausethismonetarygrowthhasbeenmuchfasterthanthesluggishgrowthinnominalGDP,thevelocityofbasemoneyhasfallensharplyseeFigureThatis,thisresurgenceofstrongmonetarygrowthfailedtorestimulateincomegrowthTheoldadmonition,fromtheGreatDepressionofthes,against“pushingonstring”shouldberecalledMonetarypolicycanrestrainoverheatingbutitislesseffectiveinstimulatingaweakeconomy,withstrongdeflationarymomentum,intorecoveryFrom,thestimulativeeffectoftheBoJ’sstrongexpansioninbasemoneywasultimatelyfrustratedbyabreakdowninthemonetarytransmissionmechanismFromapurelydomesticperspective(theallimportantimpasseintheforeignexchangesisdiscussedlater),Japan’sbrokenmoneyhasthreecloselyrelatedaspects:()ThelowinterestratetrapStartingwithshortterminterestratesofalittleoverin,theBoJreducedtheovernightbanklendingratetojustinandthenannounceditsnowfamouszerointerestratepolicyinAprilallshowninFigureWiththezerointerestfloor,theBoJhasnofurtherleverageovertheeconomyinthisdimension()ThefallinbanklendingDespite(becauseof)theultralowinterestrates,commercialbanklendingwasstagnantgrowinglessthanperyearafterandthenfallinginandsubsequentlyInthes,bycontrast,banklendinghadgrownmuchfasterthanthemonetaryaggregates(Figure)()ExcessreserveholdingbyfinancialinstitutionsAsinterestratesoninterbanklendingfalltonearzerolevels,andthedemandbynonbanksforcreditremainsweakandunprofitable,theopportunitycostofcommercialbanksandtanshibrokers(whoarealsoauthorizedtoholddepositswithBoJ)toholdexcessreserveswiththeBoJ(Figure)alsofallstozeroTheupshotistheinfamousliquiditytrapformonetarypolicyNotonlycanshortterminterestratesnotbecutfurthertostimulatetheprivatesector,butthedemandfor(velocityof)basemoneyitselfhasbecomeindeterminateThetraditionalmultiplierlinkfromthecreationofbasemoneytobankcreditcreationhasbeenbroken(Problemswiththemarketforlongtermbondswheninterestratesbecomelowareconsideredbelow)Whenmonetarypolicyiscaughtinaliquiditytrap,increasedpublicexpendituresisthetextbooksolutionforovercomingaslumpbecausegovernmentexpenditurecanincreasewithoutbiddingupinterestratesBut,giventheparlousstateofJapan’spublicfinancesandworriesofthepopulaceabouttheirfuturesocialsecurityasdescribedabove,thefiscalrouteisnotsustainableFromthispurelydomesticperspective,nowonderJapaneseleadersarediscouraged:Japan’seconomyisstillfragilebuttheJapanesegovernmenthasrunoutofpolicyoptions,aleadingofficialintherulingcoalitionhasadmitted“Itisverydifficulttoknowwhattodotoachievecleareconomicrecovery”saidChikaraSakaguchi,policychiefoftheNewKomeitoparty,amemberoftherulingcoalitionFinancialTimes,May,PageTHESYNDROMEOFTHEEVERHIGHERYENBeforedecidingonpoliciestosustaineconomicrecoveryinJapan,onemustfirstproperlydiagnosewhathasgonewrongHere,amoreinternationalperspectiveiscalledforAmongindustrialcountries,JapanisuniqueinhavingrelativedeflationandtheexpectationsofcontinueddeflationarisingoutofitspeculiarpoliticaleconomicrelationshipwiththeUnitedStatesoverthepastthreedecadesIntextbooksoninternationalfinance,nationalmonetarypoliciesareusuallypresumedtobeindependentlydetermined,andthenexchangeratesadjusttothesepoliciesFormostindustrialcountrieswithfloatingexchangerates,thisprevailingtextbookviewissurelyrightInEurolandforexample,iftheEuropeanCentralBank(ECB)announcedamassiveeasingofmonetarypolicyabigexpansionofcommercialbankreserveswiththeintentionofdrivingshortterminterestratestowardszerothentheeurowouldfallprecipitouslyintheforeignexchangemarketsSimilarly,iftheBankofEnglandannouncedamajormonetaryexpansionbeyondanymeasureconsistentwithitsinternalinflationtarget,thepoundsterlingwouldfalllikearockButJapanisdifferentInApril,theBankofJapan(BoJ)announceditsnowfamouszerointerestratepolicywithamonetaryexpansionthathasleftcommercialbanksswimminginexcessreserves(seeabove)Yet,evenastheeconomyhasremaineddepressed,theyenhasremainedverystrongintheforeignexchangesFromAprilthroughApril,theyenrosefromabouttotothedollardespitemassiveinterventionbythegovernmenttosellyenandbuydollars:Japan’sofficialexchangereservesincreasedbyover$billionasthegovernmentdesperatelystruggledtokeeptheyenfromrisingTheyendollarrateremainsunpredictablyvolatileintheshortandmediumtermsandtheyenhasdepreciatedsubstantiallyfromitspeakinNevertheless,thecontinualpressureintheforeignmarketsfortheyentoriseisofverylongstandingThisexpectationgeneratesafearofdeflationthatdampscurrentspendingbyJapanesehouseholdsandbusinesseswhiledrivingnominalinterestratestowardzeroHowtheseperverseexchangerateexpectationscameaboutisdeeplyrootedinthehistoryofmercantileinteractionbetweenJapanandtheUnitedStateswhatwecalledthe"syndromeoftheeverhigheryen"McKinnonandOhnoAsdefinedbyWebster'sTenthNewCollegiateDictionary,asyndromeis“agroupofsignsandsymptomsthatoccurtogetherandcharacterizeaparticularabnormalityandasetofconcurrentthings(asemotionsoractions)thatusuallyformanidentifiablepattern”Butpeopleensnaredinasyndrome,say,policymakersinJapanandtheUnitedStates,neednotrealizewhathashappenedtothemnorunderstandtheeconomicconsequencesUndertheoldBrettonWoodsparitysystemforexchangeratesfromto,Japan’sexchangeratewasfixedatyendollarInthiseraofJapan’shighesteconomicgrowthunmatchedbeforeorsince,theparityregimewashighlycrediblewithnoevidenceofexpectedyenappreciationdespiteJapan’ssubstantialencroachmentonAmericanmarketsIndeed,startingwiththeDodgeLineProgramintostabilizethehighlyinflationaryJapaneseeconomyof,keepingtherateatwaswidelyseenasthenecessaryanchorforJapan’smonetarypolicyformorethanyearsMercantilePressurefromtheUnitedStatesThentheexchangerateregimechangedWorriedaboutAmerica’sdeclininginternationalcompetitiveness,PresidentNixonabrogatedthedollar’slastlinkstogoldinAugustandhealsoimposedasurchargeonallimportsofmanufacturedgoodsintotheUnitedStatesHeinsistedthatthissurchargewouldremaininplaceuntiltradingpartnersinEuropeandJapanappreciatedthedollarvalueoftheircurrenciesSimilartootherindustrialcountries,JapanlettheyenappreciatebypercentbytheendofandthesurchargewasremovedAfter,AmericanmercantileconcernsbecamemoreandmorenarrowlyfocussedontherapidlygrowingJapaneseeconomywithitslargetradesurplusesWhileJapandisplacedtheUnitedStatesasthedominantsupplierinmanymanufacturingindustriesworldwide,Japan’shomemarketsremainedrelativelyclosedtoforeigncompetitionThisAmericangrievancethatJapanwasanunfairinternationalcompetitorwascompoundedbytheemergenceofJapan’stradesurplusesinthemidsTheresultwasinnumerabletradedisputesbetweenthetwocountriesThen,theyenappreciatedenormouslyifepisodicallyfromuntilitbrieflytouchedtothedollarinAprilFigureshowsthefourmainepisodes,,,andofupwardratchetsintheyenOurbookhypothesizedthattheinteractionsoftheAmericanandJapanesegovernmentsintheirconductofcommercial,exchangerate,andmonetarypoliciesresultedintheongoingexpectationthattheyenwould"normally"appreciateifonlyerraticallyinthelongerrunWhatmechanismpropagatedthissyndromeandcontinuestheexpectationthattheyenwillriseNomatterhowmuchthedollarfell,atleastsomeUSofficialstypicallylookedattheJapanesetradesurplusandsawfurtherroomforyenappreciationSincetheNixonshockin,varioussecretariesoftheTreasurynotablyBlumenthalin,Bakerin,andBentseninhavesuggestedthatthedollarwastoohighagainsttheyenOftentheseattemptsto"talk"thedollardownwereaccompaniedbyintensenegotiationsaimedatforcingtheJapanesetoopenorsharethisorthatmarket,ortoimpose"voluntary"restraintsonJapaneseexportsTradedisputeswereparticularlyintenseduringthefourepisodeswhentheyenratchetedupwardForexample,inthefirstfourmonthsof,whentheUSTradeRepresentativetriedtonegotiatenumericaltargetsforJapantobuyAmericanautomobilesandcomponentsbythreateningtoimposehightariffsonAmericanimportsofJapaneseautos,thedollarfellparticularlysharply,fromtoyen(figure)Inadditionto"talk"bysecretariesoftheTreasury,whyshouldtradedisputesthemselvescausetheyentoappreciateInthemiddleofadispute,foreignexchangetradersseeahigheryenamelioratingorperhapsforestallingprotectionistthreatsfromtheUnitedStatesAnd,intheshortrun,arisingyendoesindeedimproveAmericancompetitivenessvisàvisJapanalthoughitwashesoutinthelongrunwhenpurchasingpowerparityisrestoredastheJapanesewholesalepricelevelfallsrelativetothe

用户评论(0)

0/200

精彩专题

上传我的资料

每篇奖励 +1积分

资料评分:

/10
仅支持在线阅读

意见
反馈

立即扫码关注

爱问共享资料微信公众号

返回
顶部

举报
资料