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Government 1183 – Final Study Guide - MK2ReviewGovernment 1183 – Final Study Guide - MK2Review Government 1183 – Final Study Guide Unit B: Political Integration Why do people unite under polities? , Security o Protection from violent attacks by both foreigners and neighbors , Wealth o We acquire wea...

Government 1183 – Final Study Guide - MK2Review
Government 1183 – Final Study Guide - MK2Review Government 1183 – Final Study Guide Unit B: Political Integration Why do people unite under polities? , Security o Protection from violent attacks by both foreigners and neighbors , Wealth o We acquire wealth: , 1: sale of our labor on the market , 2: depend upon family, ancestors to give it to you , 3: welfare state provides poorest members with a minimum amount of necessities and conveniences , Identity o Individuals look to polities to provide them with a name, an identity Theories of Integration , Causes o War-internal and external o Economic well-being o (Identity) is generally an obstacle of integration, not cause for integration o Example: Failure of Articles of Confederation , Proved difficult for a decentralized polity to defend itself , British warships would raid American merchant ships and would ―impress‖ sailors into the British Navy , The British would play off one colony off another , Methods o Neo-functionalism (“Monnet Method”) , Monnet realized that if you were going to create a unified Europe, you couldn‘t go up to people and say let‘s get rid of France and Germany , Monnet realized that if you arranged this in a certain way, it would create spillovers, that also need regulation, and thus expansion of the regulating body o Intergovernmentalism , European states came together in intergovernmental bodies and struck deals , Example: Treaty of Rome (1957) , Signed by Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands , The opening line says that they want to lay the foundations for an ―ever closer union‖ , Interpretation 1: from the outset, Europe had in mind a integrated Europe , Interpretation 2: but it also acknowledges the ―peoples of Europe‖ , Thus you could argue that it meant to preserve individual autonomy Tocqueville Democracy in America, pp. 123-189 Chapter 4 - The Principle of the Sovereignty of the People of America The principle of the sovereignty of the people is frequently abused in most countries In the US, this principle is not concealed, but is upheld and proclaimed by laws This was a fundamental principle of the British colonies – but faced internal and external obstacles Forced to obey the mother country and aristocratic influence in power Sovereignty of the people came out of the American Revolution Improved as the nation modified the elective qualification – means that it will eventually be abolished because modification increases demands US is only of the only societies that governs itself for itself – no rulers outside of the people forcing the country to do one thing or another US citizens participate in the creation of laws through elections Chapter 8 – The Federal Constitution This chapter is mostly a review of how the US government is set up – I seriously doubt it will be important on the midterm. Nevertheless, I have made a couple notes about things important stuff at the end that are interesting, useful and/or not immediately apparent – of the chapter though! At the Revolution, the 13 colonies were united by religion, language, customs, and common enemy – these reasons united and consolidated them into a nation But also had separate interests, customs, etc as states – opposing tendencies The war kept the union alive despite the imperfect common ties nd The weaknesses of the constitutions became apparent after the war – created 2 Summary of the Federal Constitution States maintained power over internal prosperity, union provided for exigencies Government of the states was the rule, rule of the confederation was the exception A Federal court was created to maintain the balance of power between the 2 govs Powers of the Federal Government Fed gov has powers of declaring war, making peace, levying general taxes, etc. US was not only a republic, but a confederation, yet national authority was more centralized than several absolute monarchies in Europe (ex. France and Spain) Legislative Powers of the Federal Government Development of the House and Senate as a middle course for those who want independent states where the reps meet to discuss points of common interest (S) and those who want the gov as the sole representative of the nation (H) Object of Fed. Const. not to destroy state independence, but restrain it The Executive Power - Dependent on the majority of the people, but can act strongly in his own sphere - Still checked by other branches How the President Differs from a Constitutional King (ex. France) President shares sovereignty with states, King does not King sanctions and executes laws, President execute laws but doesn‘t help make King appoints members of chambers, president doesn‘t form legislative body President has a limited term, the King rules for life – hereditary sovereign President is subject to jealous supervision, King has absolute power Accidental Causes that May Increase the Influence of Executive Government Foreign relations – but, because the US is separated from the rest of the world, too weak to dominate seas, and no enemies – rarely comes into contact with others Laws allow the prez to be strong, but circumstance keeps him weak Election of the President Dangers of private ambition Monarchies have an advantage because the interest of the ruling family is intimately connected with that of the state – in elective states, the government stops functioning as efficiently as an election approaches Prez thinks about the election, not governing, or knows his term is over The dangers of the elective system, applied to the head of state, are augmented or decreased by the peculiar circumstances of the people who adopts it Mode of Election – basic info about how presidents are elected Elections should be considered a crisis in the affairs of the nation Prez may be unimportant to each citizen, but is of great importance generally Calm returns after a leader is chosen Re-Election of the President – Why the US chose to allow this and its limitations Feeds self-interest, but also ensure greater responsibility towards the majority Federal Courts of Justice Tocqueville is most concerned about the American judicial institutions Federal government needs the support of judicial institutions because it is naturally weak and exposed to opposition, and judiciary needs to be separate from but also important that the state power should be the powers of the state – correlative and homogenous Should not entrust the execution of union laws to tribunals instituted by other political bodies – allows foreign judges to rule over the nation Also bad to have 24 judges interpret laws for a state, too many interpretations Therefore, the Supreme Court was created – appointed by Prez Means of Determining the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts How to decide the competency of state and federal courts – S.C. invested with the right to determine all questions of jurisdiction Fed courts – ambassadors, two states, etc. High Rank of the Supreme Court among the Great Powers of State No nation has ever constituted so great a judicial power as the US Repugnance with judiciaries increases with government absoluteness The courts are only as powerful as the power of public opinion If the people do not respect the law, courts would fail In What Respects the Federal Constitution is Superior to that of the States Two causes – 1. US constitution formed after the states – additional experience 2. (more importantly) Character of the legislators who composed it The people chose men who most deserved the esteem rather than who had gained the affections of the people – these men said what they believed and from a love off liberty Same branches in state and fed constitutions, but different conditions of eligibility and mode of election States too frequently yield to democratic propensities, unlike federal body Characteristics of the US Constitution vs. All Other Federal Constitutions Other federal constitutions in Switzerland, Germanic Empire, etc. But are weak and inefficient compared with the US Ex. Others agreed to obey federal gov but enforce laws themselves, the US allows the federal government to execute the laws – important consequences US subjects are not states, but individuals – in others its communities, not people The US is no longer a federal government, but an incomplete national government Not exactly either, but no word exists for what it is Advantages of the Federal System in General and Its Special Utility in America Small nations have historically been the cradle of liberty and lose this liberty as they get larger – larger republics face more dangers than small ones Size increases individual ambitions, party strength, but not love of country BUT, large nations develop a love of glory, leading too increased knowledge and the advance of civilization, and suffer less from the calamities of war Political strength is a condition of national prosperity Affluence and freedom matters little if a state is exposed to being pillaged or subjugated – physical strength is a condition of happiness and the existence of nations – IMPORTANT ARGUMENT FOR EU SECURITY? American republican government started in townships, like small states, then applied to the country at large No common center in the country means that wealth is more evenly dispersed, revolutions are unknown, etc. Why the Federal System is not Adapted to All Peoples, and How the Anglo-Americans were Enabled to Adopt It Natural cause of union must exist between people outside of laws Maine and Georgia are more united than Normandy and Brittany Therefore Europe would be in danger if it adopted the American federal system 1st important problem with the federal system – complex nature of the means they use Two sovereignties together - Will always come into collision at certain points, cannot be totally combined The foundation of governments must be clearly explained to the public Govs founded on a single principle are not best, but strongest and most durable US gov structure relies on its adaptation by a people accustomed to conducting its own affairs and is appreciated by all levels of society – everyone knows the laws US has the most perfect federal constitution ever US Constitution is great for the US, but unlikely to work in other countries (ex. Mexico) nd 2important problem with the federal system – relative weakness of the government of the union – rests on a divided sovereignty, with will always be less powerful than an entire supremacy Union possessed money and troops, but affections and prejudices are at state level Sovereignty of the union is factitious, while the state‘s is natural The love of one‘s native country is instinctive Legislators cannot get rid of collisions between these two sovereignties, therefore must dissuade states from warfare and have them promote peace The union of states is supported by common origin, tongue and same stage of civilization Geographic position of the country contributed to its ability to create a union Also that it is geographically insulated from the rest of the world Makes war less likely War can either ruin states or create despotism by success Federal system weak in centralized administration and central gov is imperfectly organized – weaker in the face of governments controlled by a single authority Summary – lots of advantages to a federal system, but few countries could successfully adopt the system and remain in contest with a nation of similar strength with a centralized government Robert O. Keohane “Ironies of Sovereignty The European Union and the United States” Argument: ―the concept of sovereignty – and divergences with respect to sovereignty between Europe and the United States – can help us understand both the opportunities for troubled societies and regions, and the problems facing the European-United States relationship‖ Conjectures: 1) the EU might be a good model for conflict-prone regions where classical sovereignty hasn‘t worked 2) different trajectories between the EU and US may increase tension and conflict, undermining world order in the long run The conclusion is a good summary of the article Sovereignty was invented in sixteenth-century Europe – has changed over time Looking at these changes can help us understand attitudes and policy preferences Originally meant ―a state must have control of its external policies and be free of external authority structures‖ US still follows this model, but EU does not EU now uses limited and pooled sovereignty, while also pursuing relatively autonomous policies, influencing world politics and having good conditions for its population (this change does not cause strains, but indicates divergences) Most important source of disagreements between EU and US – MILITARY US – supports presidents who take strong military measures EU – different histories, so politicians stress foreign policy issues that reinforce common European values, make them feel good about themselves and the EU Focus on attractive issues like human rights and the environment – moral equivalent of nationalism, reinforces internal cohesion Section I - Ironic that the EU invented sovereignty, and now moves away from it DEFINITIONS: (p. 746) External sovereignty – state is not subject to another state Sovereignty – ―both internal supremacy over all other authorities within a given territory, and external independence of outside authorities‖ Unitary sovereignty – ultimate authority in a state must reside in one place, cannot be divided (Ex. King) Devised as explicitly anti-democratic – later included parliaments Found that arbitrary and absolute power was not possible – states must conduct relations with each other – creation of embassies and diplomats Classical definition of external sovereignty (―Westphalian sovereignty‖) prevents the delegation of powers over the state to an external authority According to classical definitions – a state cannot agree ―to rules defining a process, over which it does not have a veto, that can confer obligations not specifically provided for in the original agreement‖ EU does just this in the UN Charter, World Bank, IMF, etc. Mostly after WWII Sovereignty in Europe is now pooled – states authority over internal and external affairs is transferred to the community, ―authorizing action through procedures not involving state vetoes‖ Formal sovereignty is no longer a barrier, but a bargaining chip Ability to pool and limit sovereignty in favor of interdependence has increases with institutional capacity BUT – EU acts like a sovereign state as a whole (ex. uses economic power) Section II - Ironic that US sparked the first republican critique of sovereignty, now strongest defender US was born without unitary sovereignty, but decentralization was a weakness The lack of external sovereignty was a key reason for a constitution Constitution upholds external, but not unitary sovereignty – didn‘t want a single, absolute authority like Parliament or a king – sep. of powers, state vs. national governments, etc. BUT, state sovereignty obstructed external sovereignty (ex. Impressments, p. 751) US couldn‘t negotiate an agreement to guard its external sovereignty because it lacked authority over state officials – ―safeguards against unitary sovereignty undermined external sovereignty‖ After Civil War – national government reasserts power over states Growing unitary power – during Cold War and war on terrorism Since 1945 – US has entered many international agreements, limiting its legal freedom of action BUT, US is much more reluctant to limit its external authority than the EU (ex. International Criminal Court, p. 753) Important exception – WTO, no US veto (though rulings rarely enforced) Why different conceptions of sovereignty? When Britain and France were world powers in 1787 Europe was classically sovereign, but now that the US is the only power it follows a more classical model Europe relies strongly on a network of interdependence, better to pool Differences may reflect different interests, societies, histories, etc. Section III - The concept of sovereignty should be altered to enable at-risk societies to resolve their problems effectively – outside of the ―straitjacket of sovereignty‖ ―Europe‘s experience provides a path towards such a resolution‖ EU is not a model for political integration (ex. Failures in Americas and Africa), but shows that ―movement away from classic conceptions of external sovereignty may create some space for institutional innovation elsewhere‖ May not need state sovereignty for success Accepting norms, rules, etc. is no longer a weakness, but can be a strength Troubled societies often need external help for stability – internal measures won‘t work – European model can be helpful in two ways… 1. Shows there are gradations of sovereignty 2. Demonstrates that regaining sovereignty is not always the end goal Ex. Cyprus, Somalia, Afghanistan – sovereignty was bad Section IV - Warning – the divergence between EU and US may threaten this partnership th September 11 – Reinforced US commitment to classical sovereignty US view – needs a military and political response Europe – needs more emphasis on policing and criminal justice systems Different b/c US is protagonist and different conceptions of sovereignty EU tends to have reactive, disjointed policy – hard to have decisive strategic action outside of EU borders (ex. Milosevic in ‘95) Different conceptions of sovereignty lead to different conceptions of legitimacy Normative legitimacy – belief that a rule/institution should be obeyed Power is socially legitimized, doesn‘t require coercion Classical sov. – Legitimacy of the gov over its citizens, requires voluntary support from citizens in foreign affairs – cares about domestic concerns Pooled sov. – Legitimacy of one‘s practices with one‘s partners – encourages bureaucratic compromise – cares about relationships These differences are a marker of fundamental divergences between EU and US James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States Main point: Madison discusses several problems with the Articles of Confederation, many of which were addressed in the Constitution of the United States, which all have to do with the balance of power between states and the Federal Government. Summary: Madison mainly argues that the States do not respect the Articles of Confederation and fail in a number of ways to comply with the regulations of the Federal Government. He mainly discusses the areas of commerce, states concluding their own treaties, etc. He also claims that the Articles are too weak in a number of areas, including the military and matters of ―internal violence‖, lack of coercion and sanction in the government, etc. Basically the details of this article are not important, mainly the idea that Madison thought the Articles of Confederation were too weak. Relevance/Lecture: This was hardly discussed in lecture. It was mainly brought in to demonstrate how the United States dealt with the issue of division of power between the state level (analogous to the member states of the EU) and the Federal Government (analogous to the EU). Prof. Morgan wanted to make the basic point that the EU needs to learn from the US how to divide powers with the member states. Federalist No. 10 (Federalist Number 10) is an essay by James Madison and the tenth of the Federalist Papers, a series arguing for the ratification of the United States Constitution. It was published on November 22, 1787, under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all the Federalist Papers were published. The essay is the most famous of the Federalist Papers, along with the Federalist No. 51, also by James [1]Madison, and is among the most highly regarded of all American political writings. No. 10 addresses the question of how to guard against " factions.,‖ groups of citizens with interests contrary to the rights of others or the interests of the whole community. In today's discourse the term special interest often carries the same connotation. Madison argued that a strong, large republic would be a better guard against those dangers than smaller republics—for instance, the individual states. Opponents of the Constitution offered counterarguments to his position, which were substantially derived from the commentary of Montesquieu on this subject. Federalist No. 10 continues a theme begun in Federalist No. 9; it is titled, "The Same Subject Continued: The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection." The whole series is cited by scholars and jurists as an authoritative interpretation and explication of the meaning of the Constitution. Jurists have frequently read No. 10 to mean that the Founding Fathers did not intend the United States government to be partisan. Federalist No. 10 continues the discussion of a question broached in Hamilton's Federalist No. 9. Hamilton had addressed the destructive role of faction in breaking apart a republic. The question Madison answers, then, is how to eliminate the negative effects of faction. He defines a faction as "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a minority or majority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." He identifies the most serious source of faction to be the diversity of opinion in political life which leads to dispute over fundamental issues such as what regime or religion should be preferred. However, he thinks "the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society." He saw direct democracy as a danger to individual rights and advocated a representative democracy (also called a republic) in order to protect what he viewed as individual liberty from majority rule, or from the effects of such inequality within society. He says, "A pure democracy can admit no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will be felt by a majority, and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party. Hence it is, that democracies have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have, in general, been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths." Like the anti-Federalists who opposed him, Madison was substantially influenced by the work of Montesquieu, though Madison and Montesquieu disagreed on the question addressed in this essay. He also relied heavily on the philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment, especially David Hume, whose influence is most clear in Madison's discussion of the types of faction and in his argument for an extended republic. The Idea of a European Superstate: Public Justification and European Integration Glyn Morgan , Man was convicted of selling one pound of bananas because of a European Union directive requiring all loose fruit to be sold in kilos and grams , He argued that the British Weights and Measures Act of 1985 permitted the sale of goods in both imperial and metric measures , As a member of the EU, however, Britain is required to recognize both the ―direct effect‖ and ―supremacy‖ of European law of competing national laws , District judge found the man guilty and applied the law correctly , How and by whom do you wish to be governed? , Nationalist and many euroskeptics are nationalists answer the question by t saying ―we wish to be governed by those we trust, those like us, people with whom we share a common nationality‖ , Proponents of European integration or Europhiles have more trouble with the question since it is difficult to label a person as a European since European identity is relative thin compared to national identities and there is no agreement about where boundaries of Europe lie. They want to be governed effectively (effective government is no longer possible at the level of the nation-state) , European Council meeting in 2001 decided that European integration could proceed no further without a Constitutional Convention to reexamine Europe‘s existing political architecture , Examine challenges of incorporating ten and possibly thirteen new members, many of them impoverished, ex-communist countries and the challenge of a crisis of popularity (euroscepticism was showing signs of spreading) , Convention was broad in that it sought to propose a new framework and structures for the European Union , The eurpesceptic challenge to the very idea of a European level of government was thus never confronted , The Preamble of the Constitution, which would ordinarily list some account of the reasons why a European polity is desirable brushed aside basic questions of Europe‘s existence in favor of vague generalities designed to balance the concerns of those seeking tighter and those seeking looser forms of political integration , The Convention and the negotiations over the Constitutional Treaty have exposed new divisions within Europe, including those between smaller states, and between pro- and anti-US states. , Even if the treaty is rejected by one or more national electorates, the effort to bring some coherence to Europe‘s current legal and political institutions is unlikely to disappear , Proponents of European political integration need to pay more attention to eh fundamental question posed by eurosceptics: What is the justification for European political integration? Unless this question can be answered satisfactorily, there is no good reason for citizens to lend their support to parties, governments, and political leaders who favor European political integration. , Eurosceptics: remain attached to one or another Europe‘s nation-states, seek to maintain a Europe of relatively independent nation-states , Postsovereignists and federalists favor the transfer of political authority away from Europe‘s nation-states, both see a Europe that distributes political authority among local, national, and European levels of government , Postsovereignists seek a radically new multilevel, decentered polity, European federalist favor a United States of Europe PROJECT, PROCESS, AND PRODCUCT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION , The project of European integration refers to the efforts of intellectuals, political elites, and popular movements to create some form of European polity , The process of European integration refers to the actual step-by-step transformation of Europe‘s separate-nation states into a more integrated political, legal, and economic system , The product of European integration refers to the current outcome of this process, the political institutions, policies, and practices of the EU itself , European leaders had remained fairly silent about the project of integration until 2001 , Federalist project of European integration spells the disappearance of sovereign nation-states in Europe (like states in US) , Postsovereignist project is a complex political entity that distributes political authority among various levels (local, national, and European) depending on the policy issue in question , Principle of subsidiarity requires policy making to take place at that level closest to those affected by that policy, favor of local against fed. government , Principle of asymmetrical incorporation allows that the local and national communities that make up the constitutive elements of the European polity can have different rights and responsibilities , Principle of constitutional flexibility allows that the application of the principles of subsidiarity and asymmetrical incorporation must itself remain open to further revision and contestation , European project never reaches a fixed and final destination , Process has gone from the European Coal and Steel Community to the European Economic Community to the European Community to now the European Union , Product of the process of European integration is the EU itself , Constitutional Treaty of 2004 will not take effect until it has been ratified— whether by the approval of national parliaments or in national referendums— by all twenty five member states , Institutional disagreements over the division of competences and distribution of power , Policy disagreements over the question of market-constraining regulatory policies and over Europe‘s foreign and security policies and its relationship with the US , The EU is a joint creation of citizens and member states, it is they who confer competences on it , For the eurosceptic, a federalist favors a European superstate, a United States of Europe, and the abolition of Europe‘s independent nation-states , Federalist describes anyone favoring any form of European political integration , Federal polity versus unitary state , Eurosceptics fear that the nation-states will become like a California or a Texas in the United States of Europe , Book argues that the much decried European superstate is actually a more justifiable goal than either he so-called Europe of nation-states (favored by eurosceptics) or the postsoveregin form of governance (favored by Europe‘s self-described federalists) , The question of justification of European political integration concerns the point or purpose of a European polity , The question of legitimacy concerns the rightful claim of European institutions to issue binding commands , A cause of the EU‘s problems is that proponents of the European political integration have failed to provide the European project with a compelling justification , One of the principal implications of my security-based argument for a unitary European state is the existing normative debate over European political integration needs to pay a lot more attention to issues typically left in the hands of international relations scholars , Democracy does not provide a reason for preferring a Europe of nation-states to some form of federal Europe , An adequate political theory of European political integration require a shift of attention away from the current preoccupations with Europe‘s ―legitimacy‖ and its alleged ―democratic deficit Quiggen ―The Idea of a European Superstate: Military power and soft power‖ Morgan is dismissive of soft power, but this is, like it or not, Europe‘s comparative advantage. And, whereas the experience of the 1990s seemed to point up the need for US hard power, the debacle in Iraq, and the obvious impotence of the US in dealing with Iran, North Korea and even Syria have pointed up its limitations. Cases when large-scale projection of military power is actually feasible and useful seem to be quite rare (not that the cases mentioned are particularly amenable to soft power either, but it seems to be the only feasible option on offer). Situations calling for peacekeeping with more robust rules of engagement than we have seen in the past are more common, but, there‘s no obvious reason that Europe can‘t manage this with its existing structure. Given Morgan‘s central concern with the future state of Europe, the obvious question to ask is what kind of structure will most enhance Europe‘s soft power, by increasing the appeal of membership or close association, and the willingness of states to make constructive changes to increase this goal. It seems to me that the answer is something more like a post-sovereign federal system than the unitary state favoured by Morgan. On the other hand, it seems clear that a mere customs union or free trade area, the kind of deal offered by the US to its allies, is unlikely to be enough to generate substantial political leverage over policies in areas such as foreign policy and human rights. The Great Deception Booker and North Chapters 1-3 thMAIN IDEA: Background of European history from the end of WWI to the mid-20 century that explains the movement towards the creation of the EU. Chapter 1: The Birth of an Idea 1918-1932 - WWI showed that there can never be such another suicidal clash of national armies and that the war had been shaped more than anything else by industrial power. - It also showed that there needed to be enormous economic cooperation between the Western allies for modern warfare to be successful. - Post-war idealism was symbolized by Woodrow Wilson with his ―Fourteen Point Declaration‖ and the League of Nations. However, the US withdrew from the League and retreated into isolationism and France was determined to get its revenge on Germany by destabilizing them which undermined this utopian idealism. - Western Europeans began thinking about building a ―United States of Europe‖ during the 1920s and Count Richard Coudenhove Kalergi wrote Pan Europa which was a movement to maintain peace by merging the German coal and French steel industries into a pan-European industry while celebrating the spirit of Europe. - The idea of intergovernmental cooperation gained popularity in the 1920s and in 1925 the ―International Steel Agreement‖ was brokered which was Europe‘s first move towards a common market. Chapter 2: The Nazi Cul-de-Sac 1933-1945 - Hitler was completely against the European unity movement but many lower down in the Nazi hierarchy believed in a type of European identity that unified all of Europe. - In occupied countries resistance movement emerged and they were united in their belief in a united Europe to help rebuild the continent after the war. Italian communists were big supporters of this idea and Altiero Spinelli wrote one of the basic texts of the European federalist movement, Towards a Free and United Europe. - He wanted an all-powerful, supranational authority and a socialist European revolution. Chapter 3: Two Tries That Failed 1945-1949 - Official history of the EU begins immediately after WWII. Winston Churchill gave his historic speech at 1946 that called for a United States of Europe. - Churchill was looking at the internationalist idealism of the 1920s that was an alliance of sovereign states. The founders of the EU however saw this inter- governmentalism as their greatest obstacle. Churchill also saw the main partnership between France and Germany and not Britain. - The Truman Doctrine was established in 1941 and was a turning point in the division between the Communist east and the non-Communist west. The Marshall Plan was announced in 1947. The Great Deception – Christopher Booker and Richard North Chapter Four – ―An Almost Mystical Conception: 1950-1951‖ , 1949 – Germany emerges under self-government under Chancellor Konrad Adenauer under consent of the Lander , August 1949 – Churchill suggests Germany be given a warm welcome o Contention still over the Ruhr – coal and steel industries o 1950 – US Secretary of State Dean Acheson lost patience – offered an ultimatum – unless agreement was reached, USA would impose solution o Monnet jumped in , Monnet wanted a European entity, couched it in this time to prevent nat‘l gov‘ts from being scared tho May 4, got Robert Schuman on board, France‘s foreign minister o With great secrecy, told German chancellor Konrad Adenauer o Dean Acheson also in on the secret plan o Schuman announced it very vaguely in a radio address on 9 May 1950 – Europe Day o ―Schuman Declaration‖ – ―led to the creation of what is now the European Union,‖ actually part of the dealings of Monnet, not Schuman o Adenauer was forced to endorse the plan, but Monnet assured him of absolute equality among nations o To prevent England‘s protests, set the deadline incredibly soon, and made sure Attlee, Pm, was out of London o Many later bemoaned Britain‘s lack of involvement. , ―The Six‖ – Italy, three Benelux countries, Monnet, etc o Monnet chaired the negotiations o Set the agenda o Part of the agreement was German support of the Belgian coal mines, ore supply arrangement with Italy, conceded concept of equal treatment o Introduced ―qualified majority voting‖ – combined power of France and Germany can not outweigh other countries. o Final agreement in the signing of the Treaty of Paris on 19 April 1951 o Signed in an atmosphere of doubt Chapter Five – ―The Rocky Road to Rome: 1950-1957‖ , Model that emerged was almost identical to that which Salter outlined 20 years previously , United States of Europe o High Authority with supranational powers o Council of Ministers representing national governments o Assembly representing national parliaments o Court of Justice , Schuman – (wrongly) represented as father of Europe, Spinelli as the man who made the EU democratic , 1950 Pleven Plan won approval in the French Assembly, but not well received abroad o Another creation of Monnet o Americans, in the form of supreme commander of NATO land forces, intervened, agreeing that a European army would reconcile Germany and France o 25 October 1951, British gov‘t fell in the final stages of negotiations , European Defence Treaty was signed on 27 May 1952, along with general treaty restoring German sovereignty. Far from what Monnet wanted. , Opposition was so great in the French government that Pinay gov‘t fell, Monnet became unpopular , Finally, the fall of Dien Bien Phu in May 1954 finally killed the idea of EDC (European Democratic Community) , Still, problem of German rearmament remained , New game plan – the ―project‖ went underground o Monnet resigned as the president of the ECSC o New ally was Spaak o Sent new plan out to Germans and French through letter, negative reactions o Out of three strategies, a combination of Beyen and Monnet strategy emerged, named junktim , Common market and merge sector by sector o Therefore, political integration disguised under economic integration , OEEC working party, in December 1955, wanted to build a plant to give Europe self-sufficiency in enriched uranium. o Originally planned as intergovernmental venture, opposed to Monnet‘s supranational plants o Monnet called on the parliaments of the six to give it support o Eisenhower pushed it by announcing that the US would release 20 tons of enriched uranium for peaceful use by friendly states, making it clear that it was backing supranationalism. Chapter 5: Franco-German musical chairs -During the first ten months of 1956, France and Germany (the two major players in the ―European drama‘) went through and elaborate role reversal that resulted in an inverted version of the original impasse -Year began with an upset in French politics: Gaullists lost 100 of 120 seats in the Assembly, new Socialist prime minister, Guy Mollet, was a committed supranationalist -April 21, Spaak Committee published its report: largely followed the line of Messina, still kept it impossible for Great Britain to accept -Highly significant new feature of the report was a common agriculture policy at French insistence (farmers a quarter of France‘s workforce and an overrepresented group in government); France remained opposed to common market, insisted on ―linkage‖ of reduction of tariffs and harmonization of social cost b/c knew social costs would be too divisive to allow tariff reduction to pass -Negotiations began at Chateau Val Duchesse near Brussels; the Euratom issue is what bogged talks down; sticking point was ―military question‖ that would prevent France from becoming a nuclear power, would prevent French ratification -Erhard welcomed Euratom against the wishes of much of his Cabinet; majority of Adenauer‘s Cabinet supported Erhard‘s wish for a free-trade association rather than a common market (to Adenauer‘s frustration) -The French had, ironically, begun to warm to the idea of a common market, total role reversal Britain‘s ―destructive embrace‖ -Becoming alarmed by the prospect of a ―customs union‖ among the Six -Given French and German internal political instability, Britain was banking on the failure of Euratom and the common market -Working group led by Burke Trend published report in 1955 that made a free trade association attractive to Britain -Macmillan felt that failure could no longer be counted on; attempted a diplomatic offensive that would divert the common market initiative into the embrace of OEEC, where is could be diluted -Of available options after failure of diplomatic offensive, Britain went with ―Plan G,‖ Free Trade Area (FTA) for manufactured goods only -looked positive, Germany, US, France, all sounded amenable Suez: The watershed -Nasser nationalizes canal; Britain and France choose to respond by sending Israel to war with Egypt and then intervening in a ―police action‖ -Simultaneously, Britain is in crisis over sterling silver, massive sales of which caused a collapse in the currency reserves; huge international backlash over Britain‘s action; Soviet Union even threatened nuclear action; Eden unilaterally decided to abort Suez mission -Suez crisis changed everything (energy independence offered by Euratom became very attractive) -Nasser ―federator of Europe;‖ Euratom and common market treaties signed on March 25, 1957 Chapter 6: European Economic Community started work in Brussels; Brussels as headquarters somewhat accidental; one problem of start-up was staff for the Council of Ministers; language barrier was also a huge problem (30% of entire staff expenditure was for translators); French eventually became primary language; March 19, 1958, European Assembly met in Strasbourg and elected Robert Schumann president; with all his plans in place, Monnet sets out to solve one last problem: Britain The supranationalists‘ revenge: -Eden resigns over Suez crisis; after Treaty of Rome, Britain‘s FTA idea not met with enthusiasm; widespread suspicion of Britain growing; economy faltering; feared trade exclusion; pushed for EFTA -Monnet had a reform of the OEEC in mind, which was really abolition; planned an ―ambush‖ post-NATO summit December 1959, proposed set-up of OECD -Hallstein proposed that low-tariff countries would have to levy higher duties on imports from outside world, including EFTA members; this incensed the EFTA; eventually quieted down; British unsuccessfully delayed initiative, a major defeat Britain‘s crisis of confidence/America lets Macmillan off the hook -Influence dwindling; losing position of one of the ―Big Three‖ -Losing territory, starting with granting of Ghana‘s independence; Suez crisis crippling; strain of having to support sterling standard Thinking the unthinkable -Macmillan began test-ballooning joining the Six to the US; Kennedy was amenable, having been talked into it by Ball, a friend of Monnet -Breakdown in Franco-German relations after Soviets shot down American U-2 spy plane left Britain an opportunity; -To great public astonishment, Macmillan announced decision to join the Six on July 31, 1960 after the Cabinet voted in the affirmative Unit C: Europe‘s Legal and Political Institutions Booker and North, The Great Deception This book is a very long history of the EU, filled with details that are doubtlessly unnecessary for any final. Thus, I will focus on the two main ideas of the book, and use brief summaries of the chapters to illustrate these ideas. I should also add that Prof. Morgan essentially views these authors as hysterical lunatics, overreacting to the dangers of the EU tremendously. Morgan, being for a superstate, thinks these authors provide a good example of the fear of euroskeptics, a fear he thinks is exaggerated and crazy. Two Main ideas: The European Union was formed and expanded under heavy secrecy, with most people, and in particular the general public, having no idea what was going on. The second idea is that the EU has always been moving towards a superstate, and each development has moved closer to that. Superstates are bad, and they take power from legitimate national governments elected by the people. Chapter 7: Why de Gaulle Kept Britain Out: 1961-1969 , People think that Charles de Gaulle, the leader of France, was trying to keep Britain out of the EEC because he thought Britain was not sufficiently ―European‖ in its outlook and was too closely tied to the US. This common view is rubbish. , The real reason de Gaulle didn‘t want Britain to join was de Gaulle first wanted to pass the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). If Britain joined before the CAP was in place, Britain would block the CAP because its farming sector was far more efficient than France‘s. , De Gaulle kept the real reason for not letting Britain in largely secret. , France‘s economy was very dependent upon farming, and de Gaulle feared a riot if these interests were not protected. Therefore, he pushed for the CAP. , The CAP was essentially a giant subsidy program paid for by other European countries. , The CAP greatly increased the power of the EEC, making it more supranational, as well as paving the way for future expansions. , France, under de Gaulle and his successor, secured the CAP, and then let Britain in because Britain, according to the principles of acquis communautaire had to accept the CAP. , Because of acquis communautaire, Britain when joining lost a lot of national power, but no one told the people. Chapter 8: The Real Deceit of Edward Heath: 1970-1975 , Edward Heath was the leader of Britain who got Britain to join the EEC. , He was determined to do so, even though he knew that doing so would lead Britain on a path to becoming part of a ―United States of Europe.‖ , Heath didn’t tell the public how much power Britain would be giving up by joining the EEC, even though he knew it was substantial. He didn’t mention the moves toward an economic or monetary union, common currency, or common foreign policy. And through a tricky Parliamentary move, he made it so only the executive had to enact any European community law, greatly reducing the power of the Parliament. Chapter 9: Britain Stays In: 1973-1975 , There was a referendum where the British people voted in support of membership in the EEC, but it was a ―sham,‖ as the people thought the current leader of Britain had renegotiated the terms of membership for Britain to Britain‘s advantage. The leadership‘s negotiations had, in fact, achieved little. Again, the public is bamboozled. , There are two paragraphs at the end that talk about how British courts had to change their rulings based on the Treaty of Rome, showing the fundamentally changes caused by the EEC that no one was talking about. Chapter 10: ―The Awkward Partner:‖ 1975-1984 , The French have always used the EEC/EU to their own national advantage (see the above chapter on CAP and de Gaulle). , The British, on the other hand, have been royally screwed by the EU, particularly in farming and fishing, mostly because British leaders wouldn‘t fight back and other European countries let France work for its own interests, but wouldn‘t let Britain. , When Thatcher was elected and did fight back, she did get some more money for Britain, but it did not help British farmers, and this helped lead to Britain‘s eventual agricultural collapse. Chapter 11: Enter Mr Spinelli: 1979-1986. , The late 1970s are often viewed as a time when European integration stalled. This is misleading. The Commission and the European Court of Justice expanded the EEC‘s power. The Commission replaced national laws, under the guise of eliminating non-tarrif barriers. This was ―extending its supranational tentacles in every nook and cranny of economic life.‖ , The ECJ attacked financial assistance countries gave to their own industries and struck down national government monopolies. , The early 1980s are also often dismissed as a period of inaction. This is wrong. This is the period when the ground work for the Single European Act and the Treaty of Maastricht are laid. , The genius of the integrationists was splitting up integration into these two aforementioned treaties. , The Single European Act was mistakenly viewed at the time as a success for Thatcher and Britain, as it helped establish a single market. This view is incorrect, as the treaty greatly expanded the EU‘s competencies, most notably in the area of environmental policy. It also added substantially to the supranational nature of the European Community by extended majority voting. And this treaty was merely paving the way for a second. The key hint being the important inclusion of language that stated that Europe intended to develop and ―economic and monetary union.‖ The Great Deception: The Secret History of the European Union Booker and North Chapter 12: In a Minority of One: 1986-1988 (225-242) I. Introduction a. Britain‘s economic situation was in the gutter, Thatcher got it out b. Lawson wanted to impose ―monetary discipline on Britain‘s economy‖— joining the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM)—Lawson was idealistic about it, thought it was a way member‘s of the community could help Britain‘s economy c. Howe supported him, however, not for the same reason—knew it was a political tool to promote integration d. Thatcher didn‘t want to join the ERM—thought it would negatively affect the price of silver e. Everyone over-ruled Thatcher—she wouldn‘t budge, ended up losing 2 cabinet members II. A New Enemy a. Heseltine was enemy number 1 b. Enemy number 2 was Delors: Thatcher asked him to comment on one of her answers which he zoned out for and therefore had nothing to say— Thatcher treated Delors like a civil servant, he actually had more power than she did III. Taking on the Community: Phase One a. 7 yrs after Thatcher took her position, she had transformed the economy b. British industry had grown remarkably—could parallel most anywhere‘s c. Unemployment was dropping by the month in 1987—Britain was in the ―Lawson boom‖ d. Chirac told Thatcher if she continued to block a settlement on agriculture wanted by France and Germany, Britain would be isolated e. She told him that she wouldn‘t be bullied—said agricultural surpluses should be brought under control IV. Phase Two: At Odds With Everyone a. A common currency was Thatcher‘s downfall—she didn‘t want 1 European bank Chapter 13: ‗No! No! No!‘: 1988-1990 (243-261) I. Introduction a. Lawson wanted to join the ERM, thought it was about cooperation, not subordination, lead the UK and Thatcher down the path to ruin b. Delors‘ Report i. Should be 3 stages to monetary union 1. all countires joint eh ERM 2. establishment of institutions necessary to run the currency headed by the European Central Bank 3. exchange rates should be irrevocably fixed, Central Bank would have responsibility for monetary policy 4. had a clause that said by starting phase one, you are irrevocably committed to economic and monetary union II. The End of Howe and Lawson a. Howe and Lawson plotted to force Britain to join the ERM, tried to blackmail Thatcher into it b. Thatcher demoted Howe, replaced him with John Major as Foreign Secretary c. Her cabinet became Euro-enthusiasts, without her meaning for them to d. She finally agreed to joint he ERM, but refused to join the EMU— wouldn‘t do anything that would jeopardize Britain‘s future as a democratic, sovereign state III. Diversion from the east a. Mitterand set a date by the end of 1990 that there be an IGC on economic and monetary union b. Thatcher went along with it b/c she knew Germany and France were in on it together IV. End game a. Delors proposed 2 IGC‘s—one on EMU and the other on ‗institutional questions‘ b. Secretly wanted to head them both c. Thatcher ultimately resigned—succeeded by John Major Chapter 14: ‗At the Heart of Europe‘: 1990-1993 (262-290) I. The gulf that divides a. Europe initially had a united front about the Gulf War—France and Britain supported it, Germans did not b. France acted independently with the UN w/o telling Britain or America, Major was furious c. Attention went to the Yugoslav debacle, instead of focusing on developing a gov‘t for the EU II. The Yugoslav debacle a. Slovenia and Croatia declared independence form the Federation of Yugoslavia—wanted away from communism, to set up democratic states b. Member states of the EU didn‘t support their bid for democratization, instead thought the Federation should stay together c. Bad, bad mediation III. Countdown to Maastricht a. Foreign policy, internal affairs were brought into the Community framework by the Dutch proposed treaty IV. Maastricht: the birth of the EU a. Britain got an agreement: they could take a hang in framing legislation under the Chapter and British MEPs could vote on it, but Britain would take no part in Council decisions and they wouldn‘t apply in the UK V. The selling of Maastricht a. Major surrendered huge power and authority, noone knew at first VI. The rise of ‗euroscepticism‘ a. Huge recession in Britain, unemployment was up and interest rates were abominably high VII. Subsidiarity to the rescue a. Common defense policy created VIII. ‗Black Wednesday‘ radually state currency‘s were being taken over a. G b. Countries needed to raise their interest rates to save their currency, some refused to IX. Major‘s nightmare begins a. 71 of his back-benchers signed a thing saying they shouldn‘t go down the path of economic unity Chapter 15: Theory and Practice: 1992-1993 (291-306) I. The façade of democracy a. At first, the European Community had no power, only 7,000 people worked for it, this gradually grew II. The unlevel playing field a. Opening of a ―single market‖ was supposed to open market to 340 million more people III. CAP ‗reform‘ a. Industry was engulfed in ‗red tape‘ b. CAP reforms were taking effect, compulsory set-aside and a new system of linking subsidy payments to the acreage under cultivation rather than the quantity of crops grown IV. A watershed moment a. Single market claimed to be an act of liberation and deregulation but was instead incredibly constrictive regulations J.H.H. Weiler, Transformation of Europe - Community has become constitutionalized and acquired a character that resembles a federal state more closely than an international organization - Weiler explains this transformation on the basis of three distinct phases - ―unlike any earlier era in the Community, and unlike most of their other international and transnational experience, MS are now in a situation of facing binding norms, adopted wholly or partially against their will, with direct effect in their national legal orders.‖ (2462) Foundational Period: 1958 – mid-1970s - paradox of the foundational period (1958-mid-1970s): from a legal-norms- perspective, the Community developed supranationally, while from a political- decisional-procedural perspective it moved toward intergovernmentalism - based on Hirschman‘s Exit and Voice notion as possible responses to institutional malperformance (exit is the ―organizational abandonment‖ contrasted with voice as the ―intraorganizational correction and recuperation‖), Weiler argues that the Community has the option of ―selective exit,‖ that is the possibility of ―retaining membership, but seeking to avoid their obligations under the Treaty‖ (2412) - however, the option of selective exit became closed over the years o constitutionalization of the Community , doctrine of direct effect (introduced in 1963): Community laws that are clear, precise and self-sufficient become the law of the land in all member states; individuals may invoke these norms before their state courts (unlike in cases of public international law where individuals cannot invoke international obligations in their own courts) , doctrine of supremacy (after a series of cases in 1964): any Community norm trumps national law whether enacted before or after the Community norm; thereby member states are prevented to enact conflicting national measures to reduce the impact of Community norms , doctrine of implied powers: in 1971, the ECJ concluded that internal competences implied external treaty-making power, a power which prior to this decision had been limited to a few specified cases; thereby the ECJ deviated from the practise of international law that stipulated that treaties should be interpreted to minimize the encroachment on state sovereignty; exclusivity doctrine for commercial policy (barring member states from action per se) and preemption doctrine (barring member states from action only if positive Community legislation exists) , doctrine of human rights: human rights scutiny applied to Community norms , even though the above doctrines do exist in international law, their magnitude is much greater in Community o system of legal/judicial guarantees: a double-limbed system , judicial review at the Community level: either the Commission (very unusual in int. law!) or a MS may bring an action against a MS; but the capacity of the Commission to do so is limited (limited human resources, action limited to bigger violations, no real enforcement, political more than legal procedure) , judicial review at the member state level: national courts may request preliminary rulings from the ECJ regarding the interpreation of the Treaty (and must do so if the national court is the court of last resort); even though theoretically the ECJ may not rule on the application of Community norms, it does so in practice; individual citizens become the guards of Community norms!!! - the dynamics of voice in the foundational period: every MS with veto powers on Community proposed legislation; Commission reduced to secretariat status given the power of the European Council of Ministers; thus, politically, MS took control over decision-making (increased voice) - the relationship between exit and voice in the foundational period o as the option of selective exit became closed, the MS realized that they were limited to voice, thus they aimed at taking control of the creation of Community norms; however, not a simple cause and effect, but a circular relationship b/w legal and political developments Mutation of Jurisdiction and Competences: 1973 – mid-1980s - largely unnoticed, the principle of enumerated powers lost its significance for Community jurisdiction during the 1970s - typology of jurisdiction in the EC: no / autonomous / overlapping jurisdiction - categories of mutation o extension is mutation in the area of autonomous Community jurisdiction; eg. human rights or the standing of the European Parliament (to be sued and allowed to sue others) o absorption is the often unintentional encroachment on areas where MS used to have exclusive authority; eg. Casagrande case o incorporation is the option to formally integrate policy in the Treaty (like the Bill of Rights in the US context) o expansion occurs when the Community‘s jurisdictional limits are actively broken o a variety of factors may explain this radical reinterpretation of Community powers , incrementalism: no single event or landmark case for mutation, rather a gradual process of reinterpretation / cog-and-wheel fashion , a strategy of revival between 1969 (end of de Gaulle era) and 1973 (UK, Ireland, DK accession) , structuralism: in the post-foundational period Community, MS perceived any mutation as beneficial to their interests b/c the control of the decision-making process lay in their hands - the erosion of strict enumeration in the 1970s evades democratic control (which would have been provided in official treaty revision) 1992 and beyond - neither the Single European Act nor the 1992 Treaty differ substantially from previous treaties, rather they provide a more specific legislative timetable regarding the creation of a common market - however, there are a few important changes with 1992: faster decision-making, Commission with greater political role - unanimous voting became increasingly difficult with more MS, thus key to the success of the 1992 strategy occurred with consensus on qualified majority voting; even though today most decisions are reached by consensus, the significance of QMV should not be underestimated because ―reaching consensus under the shadow of the vote is altogether different from reaching it under the shadow of the veto‖ (2461) - remaining challenges: compliance, democracy, legitimacy Europe Before Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration Anne-Marie Burley; Walter Mattli Abstract: This article presents an argument for neofunctionalism-a theory describing the motives for European integration occurring right now. He describes the theory then applies to the current dynamics of the European Court. Pundits are quick to observe two facts when discussing the political and economic integration of Europe: ―1992‖ program to create a single market is really just a basic fulfillment of the 1958 treaty of rome and the monetary plan agreed upon at the maastrict intergovernmental conference actually provided more ways to break apart monetary policy than to unify it. Yet, European integration moves on…why? 1) The European Court of Justice is working quietly to change the Treaty of Rome into a constitution-which would be a large step in direction of a legally greater unified Europe. 2) The point of this article is to further discuss how community law and legal procedure is a focal point in the process of European integration. A few introductory points mentioned are vital to understanding the article. First, it is asserted that legal integration is the penetration of EC law into domestic law of member states. Furthermore, it states that this legal integration corresponds to the neofunctionalist model developed by Ernst Haas-neofunctionalism states that the drives of the integration process are supranational and subnational actors pursuing self-interest within a politically insulated sphere. The law is then needed to circumvent the clash of political interest. Furthermore, he states that even now lawyers are given free hand to speak for the EC commission, EC council of ministers, and national governments. Many of the important political outcomes established by national governments or the EU are decided in the language of law-makings legality essential in this process of integration. Legal and Political Theories of ECJ contribution to EU integration This section of the article is discussing legality in EU integration from a legalist standpoint (legalism-discussing legal procedures from a pure law standpoint where ideological and sociopolitical influences are not implemented into thought or theory) 1) one theory of the benefits of the ECJ is called the ―ruin‖ justification. It states that the court steps in during conflict b/t community actors who are unwilling to stick to treaty obligations to prevent erosion of community. Their influence is completely legal and stay within limits of jurisdiction-thereby not only helping enormously but also not overstepping the court‘s boundaries. 2) Contextualism-relationaship b/t legal and political spheres of Euro. Integration. According to Hjalte Raussman and Weiler, the law and court are clearly pro-EC policymaking (which has resulted in the increase in EC law (normative supranationalism) but decrease in political/decisional supranationalism and countries have become more unwilling to entrust execution of policies to EC commission. Raussman believes court had negative effect during 60s and 70s b/c their pro-integration policies did not correspond with preferences of the majority of member states which alienated the court from the countries and disrupted the political decision-making process and endangered court‘s legitimacy. After this dynamic emerged, articles states court has retreated from activist stance to assume more traditional functions. Political Science Theories Realism: realism is antithesis of legalism-courts cannot accelerate pace further than the countries desire for integration. ECJ‘s role is really a ―technically serviant role.‖ Courts merely provide the operational language (devoice of political context and consequence) of policy making. Realism asserts primacy of national politics over community law. Stuart Scheingold states that court of justice has been validator of decisions rather than policymaker. No hard evidence that the court has contributed directly to the capacity of imposing ―constitutional‖ solutions on difficult problems. Court can have indirect effect by asserting federal prerogatives which encourages the relationship between community institutions and existing national structures. Neorationalism-the maintenance of community legal system is consistent with interests of member states (member states value gains from participation in the internal market more highly than the potential benefits of defecting from community rules) Neofunctionalism in historical perspective: theory of political integration Neofunctionalism describes a process whereby political actors in several distinct national setting are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new and larger center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states. Neofunctionalism based on preexisting factors (which are applicable to Europe as a whole): 1) primary players in the integration process are above and below the nation state. Below are interest groups and political parties and above are supranational regional institutions. Suprnational units develop relationships with interest groups to encourage integration. 2) An unambiguously utilitarian concept of interest politics that stands in sharp contrast to the notions of unselfishness or common good. Actors driven by self-interest. (exemplified by denial of constitution) The Process must include incremental expansion with three related concepts which are the core dynamics of integration: 1) Functional Spillover-the different sectors of the economy are highly interdependent and that any integrative action in one sector creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions in related sectors, which creates incremental integration 2) Political spillover-adaptive behavior where the incremental shifting of expectations, changing of values, and coalescing at the supranational level of groups and parties as a response to sectoral integration. 3) Upgrading common interests-member states experience difficulties in arriving at a common policy while acknowledging the necessity of reaching some common stand to safeguard other aspect of interdependence among them-so they swap concessions in related fields Benefits of Neofunctionalism theory-boasts enduring relevance as a description of the integrative process within a sector-sector here in European community. Application of neofunctionalism in EU properties: Actors-thirteen ECJ judges, the commission legal staff, the six advocates general, official members of the court. Treaty of Rome suggests founders intended the Court and its staff to interact primarily with other community organs an dmember states. Article says that the actors within the legal community and its effectiveness flourishes. Moreover, the glue that binds the community of supra an subnational actors is self-interest. It speaks that the private practioners aware of the ―opportunities‖ offered to them by the community legal system provides personal incentives for individual litigants, their lawyers,a nd lower national courts to participate in the construction of the community legal system. Giving individual litigants a personal stake in community law-the court created a pro-community constituency of private individuals by giving them a direct stake in promulgation and implementation of community law. Reform has created a practical set of incentives pushing toward integration. Importers around the community who objected to paying customs duties on their imports could now invoke the treaty of rome to force their government to live up to their commitment to create a common market. The court constructed a utilitarian mechanism and put it to work in the service of community goals. Citizens who stand to gain have constant incentive to push their government towards integration. (that article states this is essential because individuals are the best means of dealing with their member states) Courting National Courts-Courts tried to appeal to the self-interest of the lower national courts. This succeeded in creating a European legal system where lower courts recognize two higher powers: their own national supreme courts and the ECJ on questions of European law. ECJ gained national court loyalty on all questions of community law which appealed to national courts in teir role as protectors of individual rights. (construction of the European legal system as a continuation of the traditional role of liberal court everwhere to protect the individual rights against the state.) the ECJ through its respect of the national courts it has strengthened its own legal legitimacy by making it appear that its own authority flows from the national courts. It also empowers all those who make their living by analyzing and critiquing its decisions-creating more self-interest for integration. Process Functional spillover-the evolution of communit law has manifested functional spillover. EC law is no longer as dominantly economic in character as in the 60s. It now deals with issues such as health and safety at work, social welfare benefits, mutual recognition of educational and professional qualification, and political participation rights. The court has gradually extended its reach by grounding each new decision on the necessity of securing a common market. Each infiltration of sector effects other sectors. Political spillover-one some of the highest courts of member states endorses the new constitutional construct, their counterparts in other member states heard more arguments that those courts should do the same, and it became more difficult for national courts to resist the trend with any modicum of credibility. Upgrading common interests-the court continually justifies its decisions in light of the common interests of the members as enshrined in both specific and general objectives of the original Rome treaty. Context: the separation of law and politics The effectiveness of law in the integration process depends on the perception that it is a domain distinct and apart form politics. The court, for instnac,e has derived enormous advante from denying the existence of policy discretion and instead hewing to the fiction, bolstered by the style and retroactivity of its judgment. Maintaining a distinction between law and politics, the court gains power: ―In heeding widespread advice to maintain a careful balance between applying community law and articulating and defending community ideals, the Court is really preserving its ability to camouflage controversial political decision in ―technical‖ legal garb. Transforming the political into the legal-the ECJ look to the commission‘s position as an indicator of political acceptability to the member states of a particular result or a line of reasoning. From the Court‘s own perspective, the chief advantage of following the commission is the ―advantage of objectivity‖ resulting from the commission‘s supranational perspective. The Court‘s removal from the overt political sphere of direct conflicts between member states, or even between the commission and member states-which again can camouflage its influence. Yet, its indirect penetration of the political by way of legal is still everpresent. Law as a mask-to the extent that judges of the European court do in fact remain within the plausible boundaries of existing law, they achieve a similar leve of effectiveness in braoder sphere of economic, social, and political integration The judicial legitimacy shields an entire domain of integrationist processes, hence permitting the accretion of power and the pursuit of individual interest by specified actors within a dynamic of expansion. The law ―masks‖ the courts involvement and influence in other spheres. Conclusion The Maastrict Treaty-represents the member states trying to limit the ECJ. It explicitly prohibits the harmonization to ensure the expedited decision-making procedures cannot be interpreted to apply to addictional substantive areas. Neofunctionalism offers a genuine political theory of an important dimension of European integration. Lecture 5- February 15, 2007 Why do we occupy political entities? -security -wealth -identity European Union set up post-WWII to manage inter-state conflict 1.) Schuman Plan of 1950 2.) Treaty of Rome 1957 3.) Single European Act 1986 4.) Treaty of European Union 1993 5.) Constitutional Treaty 2004 (Not ratified) 1.) Project of European Integration -was the design of intellectuals from European polity 2.) Process of European Integration -actual step-by-step legal, political, economic integration through various treaties 3.) Product of European Integration -expanded EU from 6 to 27 -changes shape in terms of functions and forms -becoming progressively more influential -becoming ever closer to complete integration, increased federalization -as EU acquires more power, people become worried by further integration -Treaty of Rome guaranteed four freedoms: 1. goods 2. services 3. people 4. capital -European economic growth from 1945-75 was much higher than the US -Europe adopted new economic model of mixed economy or social market -theorists have argued that economic growth is stifled by the welfare state -Hayek argues that government expenditure will lead to serfdom, a drag on the economy, leading to communism -people thought EU proved Hayek wrong -opposite of Hayekian=Keynesian who believe gov should play substantial role in the economy -Europe‘s economic success changed with oil crisis -Britain becomes a mess, but rescued by Hayekian liberal Margaret Thatcher -supported deregulation and exposed country to competitive markets -coupled economic theory with nationalism (disagrees with Hayek) -though EU would be valuable in creation of vibrant market -Europe is a regulatory body -enacts policy to harmonize practices -national laws get struck down in favor of European-wide legal practices -European law trumps national law (Treaty of Rome) - EU does not have to go through national congresses to pass a law -3 pillar Europe 1.) Old economic community 2.) Foreign security/defense policy 3.) Criminal Justice system Lecture 6- February 20, 2007 -EU funded through tariffs, sales tax, .069% of GNP for each country -EU budget is substatially smaller than individual state budgets -Why is the EU so controversial if funding is so limited? Where does the money go? - 45% goes to farmers, common agricultural policy...countries with inefficient agricultural sector - structural and cohesion funds (redistributing money from wealthy areas to poor shift money from Germany to Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland) -flow of funds to Ireland and Spain was substantial in 80s and 90s -EU played a key role in modernization -After 1986, introduced common regulatory regime -more controversial than predicted -some find it too lax; allows bad products, poor services -means of regulation also controversial -circumvents national governments -diminishes importance of national governments -Philosophical issues about the role of EU law 1.) When does regulation in one country apply to another? -services are not deregulated -pro-integrationists want to abolish national exams 2.) Can individuals complain to European courts if their country is not abiding by EU law? -can national courts be circumvented? - Common monetary policy important for federalists -German monetary policy has crucial role of EU policy when it was booming economically in 80s -German Bank emerges as principle determinant of EU policy - dealt with problem by creating European bank Why did Germans give up running their bank? - -did so by putting up a stringent set of rules of who could belong -Convergence criteria- no state could run a budget deficit more than 3% E.U. Treaties 1951: Treaty Establishing European Coal and Steel Community (Treaty of Paris) -signed April 18, 1951 to take effect July 23, 1952 and expire July 23, 2002 - signed by France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg -plan developed by French economist Jean Monnet - established to bring peace to Europe after World wars–enemies during the war now shared production of coal and steel - allowed free market b/w countries for coal and steel with no subsidies, tariffs 1957: Treaty of Rome - signed March 25, 1957 to take effect Jan 1, 1958 - established European Economic Community - created wider common market covering a whole range of goods and services. - Customs duties between the six countries were completely abolished on 1 July 1968 and common policies, notably on trade and agriculture, were also put in place during the 1960s. - Treaty establishing European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) signed at same time 1965: Merger Treaty - signed April 5, 1965 to take effect July 1, 1967 - created single Commission and a Single Council of the then three European Communities. 1987: Single European Act - entered into force on 1 July 1987 - first major revision of the Treaty of Rome that formally established the single European market and the European Political Cooperation. - The goal was to remove remaining barriers between countries, increase harmonization, thus increasing the competitiveness of European countries. 1992: Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) -signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992, entered into force on 1 November 1993. - changed the name of the European Economic Community to simply "the European Community" - introduced the Three pillars of the European Union (the European Communities pillar, the Common Foreign and Security Policy or CFSP pillar, and the Justice and Home Affairs pillar). - introduced the Euro -designed to add competencies in foreign policy, military and criminal matters to the European Community 1997: Treaty of Amsterdam -signed on 2 October 1997, entered into force on 1 May 1999 -amended and renumbered the EU and EC Treaties 2001: Treaty of Nice -signed on 26 February 2001, entered into force on 1 February 2003 -dealt mostly with reforming the institutions so that the Union could function efficiently after its enlargement to 25 Member States - increased number of seats in the European Parliament to 732 - created subsidiary courts below the European Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance European Constitution - signed in 2004, but rejected in referenda by France and the Netherlands - France concerned that it would threaten the European Social Economic model - Eurosceptics afraid that constitution brought Europe closer to a superstate -Main aim was to replace the overlapping set of existing treaties -Once the Treaty of Nice was signed, EU law was based on 8 treaties and more than 50 protocols and annexes. This made EU law very difficult for European citizens to comprehend. STRUCTURE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY -The Constitutional Treaty is divided into four main parts: - Part I is devoted to the principles, objectives and institutional provisions governing the new European Union. Divided into nine Titles, Part I covers: * the definition and objectives of the Union; * fundamental rights and citizenship of the Union; * Union competences; * the Union's institutions; * the exercise of Union competence; * the democratic life of the Union; * the Union's finances; * the Union and its neighbours; and * Union membership. Part II of the Constitutional Treaty comprises the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. It contains seven Titles, preceded by a Preamble: * dignity; * freedoms; * equality; * solidarity; * citizens' rights; * justice; * general provisions. Part III comprises the provisions governing the policies and functioning of the Union. The internal and external policies of the Union are laid down, including provisions on the internal market, economic and monetary union, the area of freedom, security and justice, the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), and the functioning of the institutions. Part III also contains seven Titles: * provisions of general application; * non-discrimination and citizenship; * internal policies and action; * association of the overseas countries and territories; * the Union's external action; * the functioning of the Union; and * common provisions. Part IV groups together the general and final provisions of the Constitution, including entry into force, the procedure for revising the Constitution and the repeal of earlier Treaties. A certain number of protocols have been annexed to the Treaty establishing the Constitution, in particular the: * Protocol on the role of national parliaments in the European Union; * Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; * Protocol on the Euro Group; * Protocol amending the Euratom Treaty; * Protocol on the transitional provisions relating to the institutions and bodies of the Union. MAIN ACHIEVEMENTS In the interests of clarity, the main innovations in the Constitutional Treaty have been grouped together in four chapters, as summarised below. The founding principles of the Union: * The values and objectives of the Union are enshrined, as are the rights of European citizens, thanks to the incorporation into the Constitution of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. * The Union is accorded a single legal personality (merger of the European Community with the European Union). * The competences (exclusive, shared and supporting) and their distribution between the Member States and the Union are defined clearly and permanently. * For the first time, with the introduction of a voluntary withdrawal clause, Member States may withdraw from the Union. * The instruments of action simplified, reducing their number from 15 to six, as is the terminology, with the introduction of European laws and European framework laws. * For the first time, the democratic underpinnings of the Union, including participatory democracy, are defined, and a genuine right of popular legislative initiative is introduced. The institutions * The seats in the European Parliament are distributed on a degressively proportional basis. * The European Council, which will be chaired by a President elected for two and a half years, is is formally institutionalised, and the rotating Presidency of the European Council is discarded. * The size of the Commission will be reduced from 2014, to make the number of Commissioners equal to two-thirds of the number of Member States. * The President of the Commission is to be elected by the European Parliament based on a proposal from the European Council. * A Minister for Foreign Affairs is to be appointed, taking over the tasks of the External Relations Commissioner and the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy attached to the Council. Decision-making * A new qualified majority system is established, under which 55% of the Member States representing 65% of the population will constitute a qualified majority. * Qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers is being extended to cover around 20 existing and 20 new legal bases. * The joint adoption of European laws and framework laws by the European Parliament and the Council is to become the norm (ordinary legislative procedure). * Several bridging clauses are created for facilitating subsequent extensions of qualified majority voting and switchover to the ordinary legislative procedure. Union policies * Economic coordination between the countries that have adopted the euro is to be improved, and the informal role of the Euro Group is to be recognised. * The pillar structure is abolished. The second (common foreign and security policy) and third (justice and home affairs) pillars, which were hitherto subject to the intergovernmental method, are brought within the Community framework. * The common foreign and security policy is strengthened with the creation of a European Minister for Foreign Affairs and the progressive definition of a common defence policy through * A genuine area of freedom, security and justice is to be created through the planned implementation of common policies on asylum, immigration and external border control, in the field of judicial and police cooperation, and through the development of Europol and Eurojust actions and the creation of a European Public Prosecutor's Office. Europe‟s Institutions The EU has three decision-making bodies: 1.)The Council of the European Union - The Council of the European Union (also known as the Council of Ministers) is the EU‘s main decision-making body - member states take turns holding Council Presidency for a six-month period - Every Council meeting is attended by one minister from each country. Which ministers attend a meeting depends on which topic is on the agenda: foreign affairs, agriculture, industry, transport, the environment, etc. - The Council has legislative power, which it shares with the European Parliament under the ‗co-decision procedure‘ -Council and the Parliament share equal responsibility for adopting the EU budget - Council also concludes international agreements that have been negotiated by the Commission. -Council has to take its decisions either by a simple majority vote, a ‗qualified majority‘ vote or unanimously, depending on the subject to be decided. -The Council has to agree unanimously on important questions such as amending the Treaties, launching a new common policy or allowing a new country to join the Union. -In most other cases, qualified majority voting is used - A minimum of 255 votes out of 345 (73.9 %) is required to reach a qualified majority -The number of votes allocated to each country reflects the size of its population - a majority of member states (in some cases two thirds) must approve the decision 2.) European Parliament - EP is the elected body that represents the EU‘s citizens - directly elected, by universal suffrage, every five years - The European Parliament normally holds its plenary sessions in Strasbourg and any additional sessions in Brussels -The Parliament takes part in the legislative work of the EU at three levels: * Under the „cooperation‟ procedure , introduced by the Single European Act in 1987, the EP can give its opinion on draft directives and regulations proposed by the European Commission, which is asked to amend its proposals to take account of Parliament‘s position. * Since 1987, there has been the „assent‟ procedure , under which the European Parliament must give its assent to international agreements negotiated by the Commission and to any proposed enlargement of the European Union. * The 1992 Treaty of Maastricht introduced the „co-decision‟ procedure , which puts the Parliament on an equal footing with the Council when legislating on a whole series of important issues including the free movement of workers, the internal market, education, research, the environment, trans-European networks, health, culture, consumer protection -The EP can reject proposed legislation in these fields if an absolute majority of members of Parliament vote against the Council‘s ‗common position‘ - shares, with the Council, equal responsibility for adopting the EU budget. - can reject the proposed budget...entire budget procedure has to be re-started. - The European Commission proposes the draft budget, which is then debated by the Council and the European Parliament - exercises democratic supervision over the Union - has the power (with 2/3 majority) to dismiss the Commission by adopting a motion of censure - supervises the day-to-day management of EU policies by putting oral and written questions to the Commission and the Council. - the President of the European Council reports to the Parliament on the decisions taken by the Council. 3.) The European Commission - EU‘s executive arm, made up of one commissioner from each member state - members appointed for five-year term by agreement between the member states, subject to approval by the European Parliament - Commission is answerable to the Parliament, and the entire Commission has to resign if the Parliament passes a motion of censure against it - job is to uphold the common interest, which means that it must not take instructions from any national EU government - ‗Guardian of the Treaties‘– ensure that the regulations and directives adopted by the Council and Parliament are being implemented in the member states - implements the decisions taken by the Council in areas such as the common agricultural policy - has powers to manage the EU‘s common policies, such as research and technology, overseas aid, regional development, etc. It also manages the budget for these policies. Other EU institutions: (a) The Court of Justice - located in Luxembourg -made up of one judge from each EU country, assisted by eight advocates-general - appointed by joint agreement of the governments of the member states for a renewable term of six years - The Court‘s role is to ensure that EU law is complied with, and that the Treaties are correctly interpreted and applied. (b) The Court of Auditors - has one member from each EU country, appointed for a term of six years by agreement between the member states following consultation of the European Parliament. - checks EU‘s revenue and all its expenditure and that the EU budget has been managed soundly (c) The European Economic and Social Committee - When taking decisions in a number of policy areas, the Council and Commission consult the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC). - Its members represent the various economic and social interest groups that collectively make up ‗organised civil society‘ - appointed by the Council for a four-year term. (d) The Committee of the Regions - established under the Treaty on European Union and consists of representatives of regional and local government proposed by the member states - appointed by the Council for a four-year term - Council and Commission must consult the CoR on matters of relevance to the regions (e) The European Investment Bank - provides loans and guarantees to help the EU‘s less developed regions - help make businesses more competitive. (f) The European Central Bank - responsible for managing the euro and the EU‘s monetary policy ―The Maastrict-Urteil: Sovereignty Now‖ by Neil MacCormick This article questions the relationship between European Union and Member State laws. The article seeks to answer whether or not there is a hierarchical relationship between the two. The article also questions the ECJ‘s competence to determine the competence of EU law. In other words, does the ECJ have the power to interpret the relationship between EU and national law in cases of conflict? The author spends some time discussing legal theory, and basically concludes that ―the very idea of governmental roles supposes some kind of systemic normative conferment of competences within some kind of constitutional framework.‖ However, in the cases of the EU law, its powers are restricted to a few limited spheres (namely issues regarding economic policy); therefore, it cannot function as a sovereign body of law. This means that EU law relies upon Member State law, and the two require ―mutuality of recognition.‖ The basic conclusion of the article is summarized in the following quote: ―The relations of legal systems is pluralistic rather than monistic, and interactive rather than hierarchical. The legal systems of Member States and their common legal system of EC law are distinct but interacting systems of law, and hierarchical relationships of validity within criteria of validity proper to distinct systems do not add up to any sort of all-purpose superiority of one over the other.‖ Additionally, the author believes that Europe needs to develop an established protocol for instances in which there is conflict in interpretation of EU law between the ECJ and the member states. Currently, the ECJ believes that a member state cannot restrict its abilities to interpret its own constitutive treaties. Similarly, the Member State courts believe no external body has the right to deny it the competence to interpret its own constitution, not even the ECJ. In cases where the supremacy of EU law is uncertain, who has the competence to interpret the competence of EU law? The author concludes that absolute sovereignty does not belong to either the European community or the Member states, implying that the mutual relationship between the two needs to be more explicitly defined so that the spheres in which each reign sovereign is less questionable. “From Confederacy to Federation: Thoughts on the Finality of European Integration” Speech by Joschka Fisher - Fisher offers his opinion for what should be the ‗finality‘ of European integration - believes that Europe should organize parellel processes of political integration and eastern expansion - opposed to any sort of East/West divide in Europe - ―a divided system of states in Europe would...make Europe a continent of uncertainty...and these traditional lines of conflict would shift from E. Europe into the EU again‖ -He describes EU process of reform -currency, internal security and external security transferred to European institution - unified currency was a political move, but the EU still lacks the structures to complete integration process -European Council marked beginning of far-reaching integration project -common area of justice and internal security -common law - Europe is moving towards development of Common Security and Defence policy - Europe faces the difficult task of organising two major projects in parellel: - Enlargement as quickly as possible, which triggers fear and anxiety among citizens (i.e. are jobs at risk? Will enlargement make EU law less transparent and less comprehensible?) -Europe‘s capacity to act - will the EU institutions be effective with 27 member states? - suggests that the EU adopt more decisive, appropriate and institutional reform in order to maintain capacity to act in face of enlargement - Enlargement requires a fundamental reform of EU institutions -Europe needs to undergo a transition from a union of States to a Federation with a Parliament and government which actually exercise legislative and executive power - Europe needs a constitution -Nation-states should not be sacrificed for the sake of Enlargement - there should be a division of sovereignty between EU and nation-states– ―subsidiarity‖ -He proposes that the European Parliament has two chambers -First chamber will consist of elected officials who are also members of their national parliaments - Second chamber will have directly-elected senators from Member states -Presents two options for European executive - form EU government from national governments - Direct election of president with far-reaching powers - Believes a constitution is necessary for making this structure comprehensible and transparent -would provide equal divison of powers b/w EU and nation-states -a constitution would explicitly delineate the competences of the EU vs. those of the nation-state - would be centered around basic human and civil rights - Proposes that this structure be preliminarily practiced by Euro-11, or other political-economic union committed to further political integration -this group of states would conclude a new European framework treaty, the nucleus of the new constitution -would develop new institutions - such project would not be exclusive, but allow any EU member state to participate if desired What does the European Union do? Alesina 1. Looks at the policy-making role of the EU, which areas are decided at EU, national level 2. Summary This articles focuses on the policy-making role of the EU. This role has increased but the extent depends on the policy domains. Recent times, especially during the 1990s, have seen increases in areas other than those forming the original mission of the European project, namely free market zone and external trade policy. Alesani notes that ―Large portions of European citizens seem reluctant to accept further centralization in the European governance, or at least demand that the rationale for centralization be made more explicit and understandable.‖ He asks the question, ―what does the EU actually do?‖ and (tentatively) addresses the question, what the institutions of the EU should do? In other words, when comes to the allocation of responsibilities between EU and national governments, is there an official outcome? EU treaties do not provide an exhaustive guide on which policies should be allocated where. So Alesina carries out quantitative analysis (legal, judiciary and other non-binding acts emanating from the EU). Examples: - Social policy (perhaps too much for some such Brits who do not want to adopt ‗continental‘ system) - Defense and Foreign policy (perhaps underdeveloped) ―Unions are collections of countries that decide together on provision of certain public ‗goods,‘ that affect them all‖ Therefore Alesina argues that the key historical functions of the EU, International trade and Common market, seem to be properly allocated. The EU role is large on both and rightly so. EU involvement in education is rightly limited. 3-5 This is an empirical based article; it is not in the vein of the course with regards to Morgan‘s largely theoretical approach. It is linked to following issues: - feasibility of supranational project - enlargement (widening v. deepening) - applicable to most policy debates, such as a common foreign and security policy - Unit D: Justifying European Political Integration Unit D: Justifying Political Integration Unit Summary: This unit discusses the need for an EU Constitution. This, of course, brings up the question ―should there be a European superstate?‖ The unit looks into traditional justifications for expansion (keeping the peace and economic gain) and the newer ones (to provide for the welfare state and to maintain security). Prof. Morgan, of course, argues for a superstate maintaining that it is the best way to ensure security. This unit‘s reading include the majority of Prof. Morgan‘s book (which gives summaries of most important scholars on this subject), a rather famous article by Habermas, as well as two smaller articles by Tully and Rawls. Main Themes: , Requirements for justification: publicity, accessibility, sufficiency , Welfare and security arguments for further integration , Introduction to Euroscepticism , Introduction to nationalism , Market liberals vs. social democrats , Discussion of Hayek and Habermas , Explanations and definition of sovereignty , Need for Constitution , Different Approaches to integration Lecture Notes Why does Europe need a Constitutional Treaty? , Current Institutions will no longer work in an enlarged EU of 25+. Euro skepticism is spreading and the EU Commission is viewed as distant and bureaucratic and undemocratic. The treaty is aimed to bring Europe closer to its citizens and make it more democratic , Familiar Cleavages: o Federalists v. Nationalists o Supranationalists v. Intergovernmentalists , New Cleavages: o Larger vs. Smaller States o Market-conforming vs. Market-restricting states o Liberal vs. Social Europe o Pro-US v. Anti-US states o Military vs. Civilian Europe Justification for European Polity The 2 traditional justifications (Internal peace in Europe and Economic Competitiveness) formulated during the Treaty of Rome is obsolete. , The EU has arguably lost its salience in maintaining internal peace in Europe due to the existence of NATO, nuclear weapons, and the prevalence of democracy , The effectiveness of the EU in generating economic competitiveness is also questionable due to the increasing number of regulatory obstacles and the fact that non-euro countries like Britain, Sweden, Denmark has experienced economic gains. What are the requirements of justification? a. Publicity b. Accessibility c. Sufficiency The 2 new justifications for a European polity are: 1. Welfare based Argument 2. Security based Argument The Welfare based argument is based on the premise that European integration provides greater support than the nation-state for welfare due to its commitment to social justice, particularly as globalization has rendered obsolete the ability of nation states to provide welfare to its citizens. However, this is an insufficient justification because Europeans among themselves disagree about the relative merits of social democracy versus market liberalism. The Security based argument does meet the 3 requirement of justification. Europe needs a centralized foreign military policy to formulate its own foreign policy and capacity for independent military action Glyn Morgan, The Idea of a European Superstate, Chapters 1–5 Summary: These chapters of Morgan‘s book lay the groundwork for his argument in favor of a European superstate. He discusses the theoretical aspects of what constitutes an adequate justification, critiques the arguments of euroskeptics, and rejects a welfare-based justification, before suggesting that a security-based justification has promise. Chapter 1 – Justification , Suggests a standard of justification that must be satisfied by the project of European integration , Case for federal Europe must satisfy democratic standard of justification: o Requirement of publicity – arguments must appeal to reasons all Europeans can accept , Public values include ―moral equality of all individuals, personal security, personal and political liberty, and material prosperity‖ (34) , A public justification could be accepted by a bare citizen (i.e. a citizen who embraces public values) , Bare citizen is either logically or reasonably required to accept certain arguments (e.g. a democratic government, a market he cannot deny previous beliefs/actions economy, etc.) – , This requirement rests on identifying public values for Europe o Requirement of accessibility – arguments must not be too complicated , Citizens must be able to participate equally in debate , Important for a democratic society , No firm boundary between accessible and inaccessible o Requirement of sufficiency – arguments must show that a federal European polity can achieve what it intends to achieve , Filters out false or weak arguments , Justification is weak when it simply appeals to values or benefits that are consistent with the new polity being advanced , A strong justification must show that these values or benefits require the new polity , A specific justification must show that the new polity effectively and efficiently protects values and benefits , Justification must also be transformative – both Europhiles and euroskeptics are advancing far-reaching agendas o Therefore, both groups must meet same standards of justification Chapter 3 – Euroscepticism , Hostile to European political integration o Target product – criticize EU o Target process – democratic deficit o Target project – fear (esp. in UK) of superstate or postsovereign polity – perhaps most fundamental problem for Europhiles, addressed in this chapter , Euroskeptic arguments must meet democratic standard of justification , Supported by nationalism o Implies that a European state is impossible o Conservative nationalism: , Reject project because it threatens national identity , Generally opposed to change , Want to preserve distinctive cultures , Europe lacks political homogeneity – Powell says that this will always be true, that sovereignty will always rest with current nation-states , BUT: conservative conception of nationality is not a public value – fails requirement of publicity , Racial minorities have no reason to accept this conception o Social democratic nationalism: , United Europe will not support a welfare state , Do not necessarily value national cultures – conceive of nation as a body to protect social justice , Argument: a modern polity worthy of vertical loyalty (loyalty of member states to institutions of polity) must be a social state; vertical loyalty needs a certain level of horizontal solidarity (between member states); and horizontal solidarity requires a common language, culture, etc., which is not present in Europe , So, without a common identity, a social state would be impossible , BUT: requirement of sufficiency means that social democratic nationalists must show that nation-states are necessary to maintain social welfare (Miller makes this argument, arguing that national solidarity provides a route to a social state) , But there may be other routes as well (e.g. self-interest, etc.) , Furthermore, little empirical evidence showing that nation- states create a strong sense of national identity , Therefore, fails requirement of sufficiency Chapter Four , Market Liberals v. Social Democrats o Market Liberals believe in little more than rule of law and contractual law o Social democrats believe in social welfare and equitable policies o Opposing views of integration on what policies should be pursued , Those desiring welfare o Some view nation-state as a prerequisite o Others believe that the nation-state has not remaining potential and that an integrated Europe will be best to provide social welfare o Social dems assume that policy is necessary to have adequate human welfare o They find wealth provided by the state better than that of the market , Achieving Well-being o 1) The goods (necessities—shelter, food, etc.) as well as wealth o 2) Principle of Distribution o 3) Institutions to support 2 , Welfare based argument for EU integration must distinguish between necessities and conveniences v. institutions necessary for implementation , Hayek o More classically liberal rationale for economic integration— ―multinational character of an interstate federation will prove conducive to the liberal project‖ o Economic union will allow free for one large market, only costs are found in transport, less leverage with taxes o ―In short will impose severe constraints on the states‘ capacity to enact interventionist and protectionist policies.‖ o Lack of national solidarity in economic policy o Less government in a federation o Social democrats fear that integration will cut ties with policies which have tempered the ―markets destructive tendencies‖—Cost will be social justice o Hayek does recognize that nationalism may still harbor protectionist policies—however, does not believe that this exist in Europe—rather view by groups, i.e. farmers o Still Hayek believed that interest groups were more likely to succeed in a nation state o Hayek believes that political actors will constrain the market for their view of social justice o Counter: An argument that defends federation so that it may inhibit national solidarity,protectionist policies is full—what about other factors which allow protectionist policies to manifest , Morgan claims that Hayek fails sufficiency , Believes that he has not proven that integration is more than just consistent with a liberal capitalist order , Most proponents of integration are social democrats—Habermas o Favor to support welfare o Necessary to conserve the achievements made by the nation-state , Wants to maintain democratic norms and welfare state while ridding conceptions of nationality o Believes that integration can be based on democratic norms—not a perceived national identity o Globalization,Nation-state obsolete o Europe has a distinct identity in its commitment to social justice— morally attractive o His critics state that Europe lacks demos—Politically self-conscious and bounded citizenry , Habermas v. Hayek o 2 Problems in Habermas , 1)Social justice is a perversion of justice , Redistribution diminishes personal liberty—Hayek , Commands people through mechanisms of coercion—Hayek , Morgan: Fails because there must be reason that social democratic welfare state is only sustainable at supranational level—fails sufficiency , 2) Problem with unemployment argument , How would integration provide a solution? , Cannot defend protecting welfare of European producers at expense of third-world producers on social democratic grounds o Summary: , ―Neither Habermas nor Hayek can show that a politically integrated Europe is necessary to achieve their preferred economic regimes…[Both fail sufficiency][even if they could] there remains a further problem with the attempt to justify European political integration on the basis of a welfare state…fails the requirement of publicity. , People of Europe disagree on the balance between the state and the market , ―A public argument purports to identify a standpoint for identifying the to exist‖—appeals through generally political institutions that ought accepted values, ―bare citizen‖ , Arguments that use social welfare argument support one type of social welfare—there is no reasons why Europeans should accept a particular system, thus fails requirement of publicity Chapter Two , Post-war period, overcoming nationalism was viewed as a positive; now far more respectable , Moderate forms, i.e. state promoting common national identity, are widely defended , Gellner argued that overlap between state and nation was unavoidable— integration would be ―nonstarter‖ , Seven forms of nationalism—See page 46 o Two of focus are 1) As nation-state formation and 2) As principle of political legitimacy , Gellner claims that nationalism—as form 2—is an unavoidable result of industrialization o For a state to stay on par with others they must build a common national culture , Combat by: 1) Claim has no normative significance or 2) The nation-state itself is unnecessary—post-nationalist world 3) Argue that Europe can be a nation-state , Hobbes devised a theory that reconciled popular sovereignty and effective, impersonal rule—representation and indirect sovereignty o Emphasis on role of representation for unity—no geographic or population boundaries in terms of size , Morgan questions why people care about their common culture o Gellner emphasizes that it is constructed—mastery of culture through education will be necessary for future success though o People are attached to nationalism because it is a familiar creature—memories from childhood, familiar way of life , Some do leave and go to cities though learn new languages , Some voluntary assimilation o Some emphasize chosen nature, but there is the ethnic nature , This could be a problem for a larger united Europe , Still, relies on ―myths of descent and shared memories‖ o We are attached to the nation-state itself as we are to national identity Chapter Five , Proponents of integration say that integration has been key to peace— But… , 1) Europe is already peaceful o Nato is a positive means of dealing with Russia , 2) Why should security weigh heavily? o Euroskeptics may claim that national sovereignty is more important than any gains from political integration‘s security , 3) Only gained at expense of well-entrenched perspectives o Realists and liberals views on IR , Politicians have only supported integration to serve their own nation‘s interests , Waltz (structural realism)argues that the structure of the IR system has greater impact on state than does domestic policy , States seek to maintain their independence by balancing against dominant states , Dismisses IR institutions (NATO, EU) as ―little more than epiphenomena of underlying national power ? , Predicts that other leaders will balance against the US as ―unbalanced power is a danger to all‖ , Moravcsik (liberal theory) , Seeks to formulate generalizations about state behavior , Configuration of states constrains state behavior—everyone is out to get what they want all at the same time , Do believe that in many policy areas states will align , Morgan focuses on ―individual security‖—would integration contribute to individual security? , Power determines preferences that are selected , Notes power imbalance between US and European countries , Believes EU is weak o Notes how Europeans believed in strength when they were strong, how US used to practice indirection—flip-flop , Note IR theorists extended definition of security on include economic, even cultural factors , Security has functioned in three ways: 1) Pre-supposition of individual well-being 2) Element of individual well-being 3) state of collectivity , Insists that theorists idea of security as a precursor for good life must stand separate from idea that security is the largest component of a good life o Other values such as liberty and democracy might then be sacrificed for security o Difference between ―security as a concept and a liberal conception of security‖ , Importance of democratic self-government o Limits adequacy of safe-guards that rely on things that cannot be democratically controlled , Uses this to expose problems with arguments that suggest Europeans can count on US or other foreign powers , Assumption behind security arguments is that integration can be justified in terms of contributions to security , Interested in integration relative to order-enhancing project , Conceptualized as peace there is little argument either way enhanced by peace , Hard to distinguish different views of society given relative terms of harms and basic societal values o Terms must be understood relative to the bare citizen Glyn Morgan Chapters 6 – Conclusion I. Chapter 6 A. Superstate = ‗federal Europe,‘ which requires dissolution of sovereign nation states B. Postsovereign = similar to the European Union 1. Dialogue and contestation C. Difference between project and product of Europe D. MacCormick: (1) law can be present without sovereignty, (2) ‗external sovereignty‘ [independence from outside] can be present without ‗internal‘ sovereignty [centralized decision-making] 1. HE WANTS POSTSOVEREIGN STATE THROUGH INSTITUTING INSTITUTIONAL REFORM (Welsh and Scots get representative weight in EU , this causes a confederation with Europe’s nation-states, and confederation of nation- states 2. Sovereignty = bad E. Weiler: ‗supra-national community ideal‘ contrasted with ‗supra-statal unity ideal‘ , Europe, through EU, already has this , sovereignty = bad 1. Model is nationality-based F. Radical Postsovereignist: nation-state should altogether be abolished 1. The condominio – more radical form (Schmitter) 2. Combines (1) asymmetrical incorporation [different incorporation of judicial units], (2) and open method of coordination [coordination not based on centralized law— catering to locales], and (3) a dialogic order rather than constitutional fixity [preserve openness and flexibility of membership] i) Pros: improve governance and quality of democracy ii) Cons: appeal to values and values aren‘t publicly shared 3. Security: Safeguards should be conceptualized as a belief in efficacy of the measures of the measures that have been taken in protection against harm and probability and the compatibility of these measures with basic societal values G. Postsovereign thought is very much like republicanism H. Must look at following developments: (1) Europe as civilian power (2) membership in the UN and NATO (3) emergence of cosmopolitan legal order II. Chapter 7 A. Malcolm 1. For the source of an authoritative command to be effective, the source must be able to call on an underlying sense of popular legitimacy, which in turn requires (or grows out of) common customs, traditions and languages. Malcolm develops his argument in such a way that it leave open the possibility that any source of authority would be acceptable if it could call on an underlying sense of popular legitimacy 2. Political authority legitimizes sovereign authority B. Four dimensions of sovereignty—sovereignty is: 1. An ordering principle of international affairs 2. A status that attaches to some territorially limited, self- governing polities 3. A set of rights, powers and privileges 4. Internal sovereignty [domestic, defined, centralized, undivided authority structure] , not as relevant as other 3 C. Europe as a sovereignist project involves the transfer of the status of sovereignty from Europe‘s member states to a unitary federal Europe 1. This would help individual security D. Unipolarity is dangerous because it can cause a change in balance of power E. Case against European Sovereignty 1. Individual security requires the unraveling of military alliances F. Problems with the prevailing status quo (NATO, UN) 1. US and Europe have the same interests 2. Assume US is interested in acting multilaterally 3. Asymmetrical dependence G. Eurosceptics rally around the idea of sovereignty H. Eurosceptics worry that legislation from federal Europe wouldn‘t be as advantageous compared to that of the nation-states III. Conclusion A. Europe wants to become a ―superpower‖ without becoming a ―superstate‖ B. Principle problem of Europe is apparent democratic deficit C. European transformation must satisfy the requirements of publicity, accessibility, and sufficiency D. For many Europhiles, the welfare-based argument for European political integration is good , Sozialstaat not viable at the national level E. Security based argument provides best reasons 1. Rests on: (1) security is jeopardized not merely by physical threats but also dependence on arbitrary power of other individuals or organizations (2) Europe cannot afford to adopt the radically decentered polity advocated by postsovereignists F. Europe cannot be crisis driven G. Europe should do more in some policy areas and much less in others H. RECOGNIZE THE SOVEREIGNTY OF STATES AND PRESERVATION OF A EUROPE OF NATION-STATES…THEN THE BASIS FOR A SECURITY-BASED JUSTIFICATION FOR THE EUROPEAN PROJECT WILL EXIST “Why Europe Needs a Constitution” by Jürgen Habermas in 2001 Summary: Habermas argues that the best cure for the problems in Europe is to create a European civil sphere through the use of an EU Constitution. Overview of Article: , If the European Union is to maintain its current position or grow, the people need to be united by something more than a common currency , Should Europe pursue a closer union? o Europe is starting to create its own foreign policy rational that is distinct from the US‘s power politics, and therefore needs one voice o A closer union could also help economically and allow the EU to compete even more heavily with the US and Japan , In the past, constitutions were created to solve a crisis, now it is used to legitimate shared values , Constitution will only work if people want it for cultural reasons, not just economics , Due to globalization, governments are increasingly involved in transnational networks and therefore are involved in asymmetrical negotiated outcomes which create problems that could be alleviated with an EU Constitution , Enlargement makes a Constitution necessary , Deepening of the Union must come before widening , Constitution would a.) allow the nation states to regain some power; b.) get rid of the democratic deficit; c.) improve legitimacy , Cannot create a ―European people‖ at the moment, need emergence of a European civil sphere, a European-wide public sphere, and a shared political culture which Habermas feels is on its way to being created , Sets out specific features that the Constitution would need: (Parliament would have more power; a legislative chamber and the Commission would split the US Presidents power; EJC would be as powerful as US Supreme Court) , Issues to be addressed: which countries will eventually be allowed to join, what policies are in the EU sphere vs. national, etc. Relevance to Course: The relevance is pretty obvious, it discusses the need a.) for an EU Constitution but more broadly b.) for a deepening of the EU. Discussion from Class: Morgan used a comparison between Hayek and Habermas. Habermas argues that you need the EU to preserve the Welfare State; Hayek argued that you need to get rid of the EU to preserve the Welfare State. Then Professor Morgan suggested his reason for a closer European union, security. Three letters on The Law of Peoples and the European Union John Rawls and Philippe Van Parijs Published in Autour de Rawls, special issue of Revue de philosophie économique 7, 2003, pp. 7-20. This article is actually an exchange of three letters written between Philippe Van Parijs an John Rawls. Van Parijs writes to Rawls disagreeing with his take on European integration in his book, ―The Law of the Peoples.‖ He claims that the language issues of the book were greatly simplified, coming as they were from a North American (Rawls). In most of the world language typically does not match up exactly with territory, and it‘s much more complicated. He also states that the book does not effectively address the issue of whether or not Europe can form a cohesive demos. Rawls replies that it is left to the voters to decide is a demos is formed or if it should be a conglomerate of various demoi. He claims that Van Parijs is trying to over-extend his arguments: The duty of one people to assist another is not assumed in his framework. He does, however, assume in his arguments that a nation-state has a common language and history. It is a simple model in this way. He then asks how much of a union there should be in Europe. He is not happy himself about the open-market consumerism and globalization that he sees as it exists in the US. Van Parijs replies point by point to Rawls answer. He claims that though there is not strong need for most societies to help one another, that there is an existing dependency that is usually just not triggered. Society 1 would have to help 2, if they were in trouble. Also, if this is true, then liberal societies would have to become more domestically ―stingy‖ to compensate. He then argues that the complications within and between countries and peoples change the simple model enough that they need to be addressed. Finally, he addresses the economic market question. He asks if a free market economy is really that bed, provided it has mechanisms to benefit the poorest of the society. Additionally, the EU is already a mostly open market, so a stronger ―federal‖ presence is needed to control the consumerism that would destroy the valuable cultural difference between the peoples of the EU and make sure that the economic growth benefits everyone. A New Kind of Europe? Democratic Integration in the European Union James Tully Abstract: The most urgent problem facing the European Union is to develop the best approach to conflicts over integration in the fields of culture, economics and foreign policy. The paper argues that a particular form of democratic integration is better than the two predominant approaches. This approach draws on the actual practices of the democratic negotiation of integration that citizens engage in on a daily basis but which tend to be overlooked and overridden in the dominant approaches. Tully argues that there are three approaches to ―democratic‖ integration. The first is actually very undemocratic. This approach relies on the experts of a bureaucracy to forcibly dictate the terms of integration for immigrants and citizens. Immigrants, being ―subjects but not citizens‖ are still forced to comply. This method creates integration and assumes that a stable demos will follow. Though most people would agree that this is neither desirable nor effective, this is what he says happens most often now, with citizenship tests and regulations in most countries. The second is a system that deals with negotiations in a certain bureaucratic way, reviews proposed changes according to a set of rigid rules, and seeks to settle these rules into a permanent code. The ―non-restricted orientation to democratic integration‖ that Tully is recommending encourages accountability and negotiation in all spheres of public activity and concerning all ―norms of integration.‖ The norms of the negotiation itself cannot be set or strictly adhered to by the ruling society. The dialogue is the end, not the means to create a permanent set of rules on integration. Part of this open-endedness is accepting different cultural and practical interpretations of certain rules. He claims that his view is superior in the three other important areas of integration in the EU: cultural, economic, and foreign policy. His essential argument is that people will naturally fit into their own democratic solutions, and that governments should pay attention to this and work with it. It is a ―live and let live,‖ laissez-faire philosophy. Unit E: European Enlargement and Its Backlash Missing: summary “Twarted by a Surge of Democracy” by Serge Halimi Summary: In France, the vote for/against the Constitutional Treaty was divided largely according to social class. The affluent French population voted for the treaty, while the poorer French population voted against the treaty. The poor chose the more democratic vote, recognizing the links between the social devastation at home (ex. high unemployment) and the neoliberal policies that spread under the cover of European unification. , All leading commentators in the media endorsed the constitutional project, however these figures represent the wealthy portion of the French people o Journalists seem to speak and write for the affluent French people , Huge gap between rich (who support the constitutional treaty) and poor (who are against the treaty): o More than 90% of French deputies had backed the constitution in February 2005, yet it garnered the support of solely 45% of voters o Lopsided differential in the treaty vote in wealthy suburbs of Paris (who strongly voted yes) and mining cities of Northern France and poorest districts of Marseille (who overwhelmingly voted no) o 74% of voters earning more than 4,500 euros a month backed the constitutional project, while 66% of voters earning less than 1,500 euros a month voted against , Chirac was first elected president because he had denounced a ―social divide‖. Today it is greater than ever o A series of free-market reforms has hit pensions, education and industry o Unemployment has kept on rising and poverty has spread , Chirac and the left wing party made the wrong decision to back a constitution protecting free market liberalism, and lost. , The ‗No‖ vote was the truly European vote because the constitutional treaty was not the tool that could end Europe‘s free-market drift. , ―France‘s landslide rejection of the treaty is likely to embolden many of the progressive forces of the EU, bringing about the rethinking of a once-worthy ideal that gradually became distorted into a single market and a military junior partner for the US.‖ , A large turnout (70%) in France challenged the constitutional project, shows a surge of democracy o French people now understand the links between the social devastation at home and the neoliberal policies that spread under the cover of European unification “Europe Without Illusions” by Andrew Moravcsik Summary: Moravcik believes that the way Europe is currently functioning is a success and that the failure of the treaty was a protest against unpopular governments and a reaction to feelings of insecurity felt by poorer Europeans. Moravcik proposes that the EU should continue its successful tradition of quiet and pragmatic reform, rather than try to do too much too fast. , Rather than demonstrating that the EU is in decline or disarray, the rejection of the Constitution demonstrates its essential stability and legitimacy , Central error of the European constitutional framers was one of style and symbolism rather than substance , The union remains the most successful experiment in political institution-building since WWII , Three related motivations that have dominated every EU election in history: o Ideological extremism (centre supported Europe but the extreme left and right voted ―no‖) o Protest voting against unpopular governments o Reaction against the insecurity felt by poorer Europeans , Constitutional treaty became controversial not because its content was objectionable, but because its content was so harmless that citizens saw a chance to cast an inexpensive protest vote. , The proposed constitution sought to marginally improve the EU‘s efficiency and transparency, while retaining its basic structure. o Result: Multinational constitutional compromise that attended to the interests of large and small countries, left and right parties, and Europhile and Eurosceptic tendencies. o Biggest change in the constitution was the creation of a European foreign minister empowered to recommend a more coordinated foreign policy o All reforms (before the vote) were widely supported , It wasn‘t the substance of Constitutional Treaty that triggered opposition. Rather, the objectionable aspect was its form: an idealistic constitution. , Those with intense preferences about the EU tend to be its opponents , The European power remains weak, while the policies that citizens care the most about remain almost exclusively at the national level. , The failure of European elections to generate high turnouts or focus on EU issues over the years suggests that citizens fail to participate in EU politics not because they are blocked from doing so, but because there is no incentive (the policies they care about are dealt with at the national level) , Solution: The constitutional treaty must be renounced and the EU should return to its successful tradition of quiet and pragmatic reform. European politicians need to acknowledge explicitly the existence of a stable European constitutional settlement. , The current EU locks in policy coordination while respecting the powers of the state. European Value Differences Timothy Ash Basic Idea: The European Union will never be fully integrated, however, member states are so interdependent and the economic and social gains of being in the EU make it so that the system will not likely collapse. Today, the EU's main mission is to bring postcommunist countries into it's membership. Further European enlargment has sparked debate among its citizens who fear that there will be an influx of cheap Eastern Europe labor. "In a recent Eurobarometer survey, 50% of those in France and Austria" voted against enlargment because of this fear. The inclusion of largely Islamic nations is proabaly the next big move as far as European enlargment is concerned. Turkey will be the 28th candidate for EU membership if it adheres to the conditions for its membership (includint meeting European standards of human and minority rights). EU membership is especially beneficial for Eastern countries, most of which have lower GDPs. They could be entitled to direct government subsidies from the EU budget. Most of this money will come from larger member states, so they try to limit EU enlargement. The continued EU enlargement has raised questions of legitimacy of the EU as a governing body. Public opinion polls show that EU citizens are not completely supportive of further EU enlargement. The article then goes on to state what is likely to happen in the future of the EU. "The EU will not achieve a Constitution like the US." The ongoing tensions between the supranational and intergovernmental levels of the EU prevent complete cooperation between member states. Howeever, Ash asserts that there will be areas of "enhanced cooperation" centered around the established aim of attaining a single market. "Different circles of 'enhanced cooperation' will overlap that central one." Lastly, he concludes with a brief description of what Europe may become. Some people claim that it will be a supower to rival the United States while others like Britain believe that it will be a partner with the US. However, he points out that member states will have difficulty reaching their target amount of troops in the EUropean Rapid Reaction Force. This leads to the conclusion that the EU might not have the military strength to support it as a military power. The future of Europe is unfolding over time. This article is important because it highlights the unique tension of EU enlargement between its goals of expansion and efficiency. The EU has as one its main goals the establishment of a community that encompasses as many countries as possible. This becomes even more difficult as diverse countries vie for admittance. Religious and economic differences have forced member states to address the real purpose of their institutions, whether that be to promote certain ideals or merely exist for economic reasons. This, as we have seen, becomes more and more diffcult as policy spillover occurs (neo-functional argument) that leads to integration of other areas. The readings on Islamic integration could be looked to in relation to this one. *So, this is how I take notes. I read the articles and take excerpts from important sections. The messages in the Carens and the Sinn are pretty clear. Carens thinks migrants into EU countries from other EU countries need to be treated more fairly. His argument is philosophical. Sinn’s argument is more practical, and he actually suggests changes in the present system to help the integration of foreign workers so that the welfare states of Western Europe don’t collapse. He suggests that it is ok to discriminate based on nationality, but that workers from other countries should get wage subsidies instead of wage replacement so that the burden on the welfare state is less, but the immigrants are still able to find work instead of ―immigration into unemployment‖. I threw in some of the Glyn Morgan too because I had it in my original notes, but feel free to disregard it in favor of other (probably better) notes on that. It’s basically just the type of good that European Enlargement can be.—Jason Kirschner , Immigration, Democracy, and Citizenship Joseph H. Carens In broad terms, I will defend the following two claims: First, although democracy presupposes a demos, membership in the demos is not something that the demos itself is morally free to grant or withhold as it chooses on the basis of its own inclinations or even of its own interests. Second, regardless of how much a polity seeks to promote a particular vision of citizenship (e.g., a republican conception or a deliberative one), a modern democracy is severely constrained (from a moral perspective) in distinguishing between citizens and non-citizens in the allocation of legal rights Some people see citizenship and legal rights as inextricably intertwined. This is simply wrong conceptually, normatively, and empirically. The argument that I have been advancing should not be confused with the view that membership no longer matters because international human rights laws are more important in determining legal rights and duties than national legislation or because the process of globalization is rendering borders irrelevant. On the contrary, I think that membership does matter both empirically and morally. My claim is that residents are members. That is why they deserve basically the same package of rights. In Europe, the opening up of public sector jobs within the EU to citizens of other EU countries has undermined many of the traditional justifications for restrictions (loyalty, acting as an agent of the state, etc.). The ongoing refusal of some EU states to open public employment to their own permanent residents is a form of blatant discrimination. It is morally without justification even if it does not violate any EU laws. *Basically, Carens is whining about how EU countries are not being fair to immigrants from other EU countries. I think the most important thing to gather from his article is the idea that European Enlargement is a donor-transforming good, and EU countries need to accept that fact and give immigrants from other EU countries the same rights as citizens. EU ENLARGEMENT, MIGRATION AND THE NEW CONSTITUTION HANS-WERNER SINN, DECEMBER 2004 Abstract The paper deals with the effects of migration resulting from EU Eastern enlargement on the welfare states of Western Europe. Although migration is good in principle, as it yields gains from trade and specialization for all countries involved, it does so only if it meets with flexible labour markets and if it is not artificially induced by gifts from the welfare state. This is not the present state of affairs in Western Europe. In addition to measures that make labour markets more flexible, the introduction of delayed integration of working migrants and the home country principle for non-working migrants is a rational reaction of the state. The proposed new EU constitution which contains far-reaching rules for a European social union should be amended accordingly. May 2004 was the day on which the division of Europe into West and East was finally overcome. On this day, eight Eastern European countries joined the European Union, as well as Malta and Cyprus. Bulgaria and Romania are waiting in line, hoping to join in 2007 at the latest. The Eastern European countries will enter into especially close economic relations with Western Europe and here especially with Germany and Austria. This will yield gains from trade and specialization for all and it will bring internal peace and general prosperity to Europe. But there will also be problems because of the migration processes to be expected. Although migration is good in principle, this is only true if it meets with flexible labour markets and if it is not artificially induced by gifts of the welfare state. Wages of the accession countries will still amount to only 25% of West German wages in 2010 and 38% in 2020. In sum, the Western Europeans will gain from immigration, but only because the winners win more than the losers lose. Bounded from below by replacement incomes, West European wages of low-skilled workers follow a relatively rigid trend that obeys the wishes of the unions and the welfare politicians‘ ideas of equity instead of the dictates of the market. That is why the additional supply pressure of the immigrants does not lead to wage moderation. And because wages do not fall against the trend, no additional jobs are created. There is immigration into unemployment. The welfare state works like a two-pole magnet for the people who are willing to migrate. With one side it repels the rich net payers and with the other it pulls in the poor who rely on the state. To be sure, the decision to emigrate is a serious personal decision with many non-economic elements, but the choice of where to go, once the decision to leave one‘s home country has been made, will depend in large measure on the economic conditions in the potential countries of destination. The states‘ reactions frequently take many years. But they are led by powerful forces that could, in the long term, significantly change the face of the welfare state of Western European character. In this situation, each potential country of destination is well advised to think about the welfare benefits it wants to offer. If it is too generous it will attract the ―boarders‖ of the state and may have to expect substantial expenditures. Therefore each country may tend to try being stingier than its neighbours. If, however, all Western European countries try to be stingier than their neighbours, this competition for deterrence will lead to a gradual erosion of the welfare state. (see page 21 of paper for specific EU Constitution articles of importance). The solution: Delayed integration into the welfare system and home country principle *In order to prevent the described risks two measures are conceivable. First, the system of wage replacement incomes could largely be abolished, and a system of wage supplements or wage subsidies along the lines of the American ―earned income tax credit‖ could be introduced instead. Wage subsidies are no lower bounds on wages, but nevertheless help to maintain the incomes of the poor. They make wages flexible and prevent immigration into unemployment. European Enlargement and the Boundaries of Membership What “Europe” Owes the Turks Glyn Morgan The Case for Turkish Accession At the beginning of this paper, I argued that EU membership was a distinctive type of good. The distribution of this good—and indeed any good—calls into question the nature of the obligations that individuals, peoples, and organized political communities have towards each other. I further distinguished three schools of thought concerning such obligations: liberal moralism; communitarian culturalism; and realism. While realism in its amoral form—amoral realism--is the least satisfactory of these approaches—it has, for instance, nothing helpful to contribute to the issues raised by European integration—ethical realism is altogether more promising. Ethical realism, as I understand it here, makes no prior assumptions concerning the inevitability or desirability of any particular type of organized political community (whether the state or any of its alternatives). Ethical realists simply demand that any organized political community be able to provide its members with security. In the preceding section, I examined a number of arguments in support of European political integration. These arguments are relevant to the topic of European enlargement, because the “whom?”, “why?”, and “how?” of enlargement cannot be addressed without first addressing some more fundamental questions concerning the nature, purpose, and justification of European political integration. While some European philosophers—most notably Habermas—have sought to justify European political integration on the basis of its capacity to protect a distinctive form of European solidarity. In contrast to this communitarian culturalist argument, I proposed a security-based justification for European political integration. Europe, so I argued, needed to become a unitary sovereign state—a “United States of Europe,” as it were—in order to provide its members with security. The task remains to apply this argument to the topic of European enlargement. Neither liberal moralism nor communitarian culturalism find it easy, as I have noted, to explain or justify European enlargement. Liberal moralists must logically favor the expenditure of costly resources on the altogether more needy people of Africa and elsewhere, rather than the relatively (at least by African standards) affluent members of Eastern Europe. Communitarian culturalists also have great difficulties in explaining why Europe (EU-15) ought to incorporate its poorer neighbors. Given the communitarian culturalist emphasis upon shared understandings and historical identities, it is difficult to see how they could object to those Eurosceptics who think that European countries have greater ties to their former colonies than to their Eastern neighbors. Ethical realism faces none of the same problems with European enlargement. For the ethical realist, European political integration is justified only in so far as it meets the need of Europeans for security. The same holds true for European enlargement. The conclusions to be drawn from this premise will depend, in large measure, on our interpretation of the nature of the current threats to security. In the preceding section, I argued that Europeans today face two principal threats: terrorism; and dependence upon US military forces. On the basis of these two threats to security, it is possible to make a strong case for European enlargement. More to the point, it is possible to draw on these threats to make a case not just for the so-called “Laeken 10” but also for the accession of Turkey. [What follows is a rather sketchy summary of a somewhat longer argument] One of the principal causes of terrorism today lies in the existence, both within and outside of EU-15 boundaries, of young, disaffected Muslims. The social and political causes of this disaffection have many components. One of the principal causes is the failure of almost all states containing a majority of Muslims to develop stable liberal, democratic institutions. The successful incorporation of Turkey into the European Union will potentially have a powerful demonstration effect on other societies in the region. A second security-based reason for favoring the admission of Turkey has to do with the size of its population and the fecundity of its people. In contrast to the United States, the EU-15 is experiencing a very rapid demographic transition. Simply stated, Europeans are rapidly aging and are not having children. Moreover, in contrast to the United States, Europe (at least until quite recently) has not had a large number of immigrants. The incorporation of Turkey into the EU will go some way to alleviating these problems. A Europe with Turkey will be altogether more powerful than a Europe without. Europe will thus be in a better position to balance against other powerful states (Russia, China, and the United States). While it is possible to construct a security-based justification for Turkey’s admittance into the EU, it must be recognized that Turkey’s admittance still poses a number of problems—problems both for the EU and for Turkey itself. It is possible to conceptualize these issues in terms of the account given above of the nature of EU membership. In section one of this paper, I argued that EU membership had the following characteristics: (i) it is a benefit-conferring good; (ii) it is a responsibility- requiring good; (iii) it is a recipient-transforming good; (iv) it is a donor- transforming good; (v) it is a contested good; and (vi) it is a modifiable good. I know want to consider how Turkey’s accession bears on each of these characteristics. (i) EU membership as a benefit-conferring good EU membership is much sought after, because of the many benefits it brings. In the case of a very poor country like Turkey, the Turkish people can expect to receive a sizable injection of funds from other, wealthier European countries. This aspect of EU membership raises the question of why Europeans ought to be willing to make the sacrifices necessary to bring Turkey on board. My answer: Turkey’s accession will, if it is handled properly, bolster European security. (ii) EU membership is a responsibility requiring good. In order for Turkey to gain admittance to the EU, Turkey will have to meet the requirements of the Copenhagen criteria. Given the security-based justification developed here, these Copenhagen criteria may need to be strengthened. Since the purpose of admitting Turkey is to bolster the security of Europe and Europeans, it is necessary to ensure that Turkey’s institutions are consistent with this goal. Here the EU faces a difficult decision: to what extent must Turkey demonstrate successful democratization and liberalization of its institutions and policies before being admitted? And to what extent can the EU rely upon the transformative impact of EU membership itself? (iii) EU membership is a recipient-transforming good; The principal problem that Turkey faces in adapting to the EU is that it will have to fundamentally transform all three of its founding principles: (i) secularization; (ii) unitary republicanism; and (iii) a privileged position for the military as guarantor of (i) and (ii). The EU is constitutionally committed to religious freedom and the protection of minority rights. As a member of the EU, Turkey must be prepared to see its own Kurdish minority acquire similar rights of cultural expression to those possessed by other European national minorities like the Basques, Catalans, the Welsh, and the Flems. No less importantly, EU democratic norms are wholly inconsistent with the special powers occupied by the army in Turkey. Given these problems, it may be necessary for the EU to demand, as a first step, that Turkey brings its laws and constitution into line with the EU constitution. In other words, Turkey will have to show clear signs that it is willing to undergo the transformation necessary to become a full and equal member of the EU. Currently, opinion polls in Turkey suggest that while the Turks are overwhelmingly eager to enter the EU, they do not fully grasp the extent of the political, social, and cultural changes that EU membership will bring. (iv) EU membership is a donor-transforming good Giscard was correct to mention the population size of Turkey, because under existing EU norms Turkey will exercise considerable power within EU political institutions. Given the security-based justification for Turkey’s admission adopted here, the current EU countries have a legitimate interest in ensuring that the changes that will come about when Turkey joins do not jeopardize the EU’s role in providing Europeans with security. (v) EU membership is a contested good Once people in Turkey fully appreciate the extent to which EU membership is recipient-transforming, EU membership will likely become a much more contested issue than it now is. There is nothing wrong with this contestation. It is important, however, that Turkey go through the process of debating EU membership and endorsing their decision in a referendum. (vi) EU membership is a modifiable good The EU is modifiable in the sense that EU members can enact treaties that change the nature of EU membership itself. Giscard raised this issue, when he warned that some governments sought to widen Europe to include Turkey as a prophylactic against the deepening of Europe into some form of federal polity. My security-based justification for Turkey‘s admission supports the idea of both a deep and wide Europe. Here it is important to recall that Turkey has been a member of NATO and the Council of Europe for many decades. These memberships have done nothing, however, to bring about the democratization and liberalization that the EU requires. Only as a relatively ―deep‖ Europe will the EU have the power to assimilate Turkey. Furthermore, only a relatively unitary and centralized Europe will have the power to act quickly and effectively in the world at large. Timothy Garton Ash, The European Orchestra Europe does not know what it wants to be. The result is that countries can‘t agree on what the function should be, who should be admitted, or how to add legitimacy to the EU. Different opinions on the function of Europe range from those who want it to be a superpower to compete against the United States (France) politically, economically, and military. On the opposite end are those who envision a core ring of states that are involved in an economic community and then there would be a different circle of ―enhanced cooperation‖ where countries could be involved to the extent that they choose. Europe is hard to understand. The aquis communautaire is 80,00 pages and most other documents are hard to understand. The result is a lack of support from citizens. Can Albania, MilosevicSerbia, Kosovo, Monetengro, and Moldova be admitted? Garton does not provide many answers to these questions, his article serves mostly to propose a lot of the questions that we talked about in class. Morgan is more focused in is view that Europe should be a United States of Europe (Re: his book) while Garton settles for admitting that Europe has no real direction and does not attempt a solution. The first quote is significant in that it reveals the meaning of the title and also that it most clearly expresses Garton‘s view that Europe should be thought of as a process instead of a structure. Garton seems satisfied with this. Morgan is far more determined that Europe decide on a destination (and that the destination be full unity) and that they move towards achieving that goal. The second quote below is significant in that it highlights Garton‘s overall assessment: that Europe is becoming something that it has never before been. It is impossible to say what that is though because no one knows. ―This is no longer the Concert of Europe, meeting occasionally at a Congress of Vienna or Berlin. It is a permanent Orchestra of Europe, meeting and playing together all the time.‖ ―Europe will, indeed, never be Europe, because it is becoming Europe. But this does not mean that it must return to being Europe again.‖ Glynn Morgan “What Europe Owes the Turks” ―Turkey should be admitted to the EU because they can provide additional security (ethical realist argument).‖ Summary: The question of admitting Turkey to the EU is hotly contested. On the one hand they have a large, youthful population, which could contribute a large standing army and a large market for European goods. They are also a secular democratic government with a majority Muslim population and as such could serve as a model to other Middle-Eastern countries. On the other hand, Turkey‘s large population is also very poor. Their government, though secular, is only maintained by the involvement of the military should an Islamic political party be elected. There are also many questions as to whether or not Turkey really embraces the European ideals of minority rights, freedom of speech, etc. Morgan analyses the perceived ―benefits‖ of joining the EU, which include, access to a common market with a common external trade policy; a common currency agricultural subsidies; and political influence. 4 Theories of Integration: 1) Liberal Moralism: we are all part of common ―human‖ family; state borders should not limit aid. But, liberal moralism cannot support Turkish integration because Turkish citizens are much more well off than the poorest members of the ―human family‖ so by such extension, the money that would be allocated to them as new members of the EU should instead be directed to the poorest regions of the world. 2) Communitarian Culturalism: boundaries and partialistic communities are part of our world; without them political and cultural communities could not exist. Communities should therefore be able to choose their members – if not, they wouldn‘t have distinctive character. This theory is hard to apply to Europe because there is no distinctive ―European‖ culture as of yet. 3) Amoral Realism: states should pursue their own national interests above all else and should only admit members that help them to do so. Not applicable to the EU because it is itself a body of shared sovereignty – no one is acting completely in their self-interest. 4) Ethical realism: recognizes the distinct political character of a state and that the first obligation of that state is to provide it‘s members with security. Morgan uses the theory of ethical realism to support Turkey‘s admission to the EU. As he states, the EU owes it‘s members an obligation of security. Right now that security is threatened by an unequal partnership with the US. The admission of Turkey would increase the EU‘s standing armed forces and its potential for independent action. Turkey‘s young demographic also adds to its military potential. In conclusion, inclusion of Turkey would help equalize the power imbalance between the EU and US and in doing so increase the security of the EU. Unit F: Euroskepticism Unit Summary , Euroscepticism is any form of disagreement with increasing or maintaining the competencies of the European Union. , It can be broadly divided into two categories: based on nationalism and realism , Nationalistic eurosceptics believe that sovereignty of states is more important than unification and homogenization of Europe. They can be further divided into sociological (natural diversity, e.g. language) and ideological nationalists, the latter consisting of conservatives (preservation of national particularity) and social democrats (preservation of welfare state for which a shared conception of national identity is necessary). , Realists on the other hand criticize the EU from the point of power, again from two standpoints: traditional realism (personalizes the state as the point of departure) and security-based realism (the individual as the point of departure - need for personal security achieved by absolutist state). , Alesina addresses two main aspects of euro-sceptic criticism – 1. Institutional balance – including problems with overlapping competencies between EU institutions together and EU institutions with national states. There also is lack of accountability and clarity in their behavior. 2. Dirigisme – ideological persuasion of some states influences the behavior of whole EU, negatively affecting other countries. , Majone argues for negative integration, as opposed to positive integration (regulations, laws etc), decreasing the competencies of the EU and rather pursuing a free common market. , Thatcher is eurosceptic as well, calling for a decentralized power in Europe, supporting the idea of nation state empowerment and intergovernmentalistic approach, instead of technocratic decisions. , Booker and North argue that the project of European integration was unclear to the leaders in the UK, but focus less on showing what is the basis for their euroscepticism. , Smith argues that national and European identity are not mutually exclusive, but there are limited means of building a strong European identity. , Malcolm says that a state needs to be internally and externally sovereign. Sovereignty consists of having legal and political authority. A sovereign state needs an independent constitution. , Powell is eurosceptic, arguing among others that direct elections will only lead to a false sense of legitimacy of EU institutions. , Morgan is generally euro-optimistic, arguing against nationalistic eurosceptics, stating that sociological nationalism fails the requirement of publicity and ideological nationalism fails the requirement of sufficiency. , Among other common criticisms are the problems of democratic deficit and top- down imposition of rules by elites. Alberto Alesina. The European Union: A Politically Incorrect View European Integration 2 Key Issues: (1) ―institutional balance‖ – complex web of institutions with overlapping jurisdiction - leads to lack of clarity in allocation of powers b/w European institutions - confusion of powers between member countries - legislative, executive and regulatory powers are shared by many institutions so distinction is difficult (2) conflict between a dirigiste vs. a more laissez faire approach to government ~ a tension exists between those who want the EU to evolve into a super national entity (federalists/super nationalists) and those who want it to stay a union of independent governments (intergovernmentalists) European Council: heads of state of the EU and the President of Commission meet to discuss general issues - most influential body b/c all major policy guidelines are set, decisions made - meets every 6 months, presidency rotates each meeting Council of the EU: has executive and legislative authority - all regulations and directive must be approved by the Council - meets 80-90 times per year - votes by QMV European Commission: - right to initiate legislation, executive power, regulatory power - each country has 1 commissioner - designed initially as a European think-tank – to propose legislation to bodies with true legislative power European Parliament: - directly elected in all EU member countries for 5 years - shares legislative and budgetary authority with the Council - not currently regarded as a particularly important body as it prevails on uncertain issues (not matters of compulsory spending) European Court of Justice: interprets EU laws and seek its application Treaties: primary source of legislation Regulations, directives and decisions: secondary legislation - Commission has right of initiative in all cases EU is a delicate balance b/w 2 types of institutions and decision making methods ~ intergovernmental institutions (European Council, Council of Ministers) and super national institutions (Commission, EP and Court of Justice) - small countries see the Council and European Council as dominated by the large countries Problem 1: Overlapping Jurisdictions - lack of clarity in the allocation of powers specifically between Commission and the Council and about role of the European Council – could be resolves with system of checks and balances but has not been - allocation of prerogatives between national governments and EU institutions EU institutions have encroached into national competencies - lack of transparency and accountability EU needs to get closer to the European citizens, inform them more about the EU Problem 2: Dirigisme and Rhetoric ~ clash of cultures between dirigisme and laissez faire Examples of policy areas that illustrate these problems: 1. Employment policies - insistence on setting numerical targets - the prescription of highly controversial policies as self-evident ‗goods‘ - the rhetoric ~ no gov‘t today takes the guidelines on employment policies as an even remotely binding constraint 2. Cultural policy - directives to European researchers are cast in loose and meaningless terms that note a vision of ‗research policy‘ at odd with the model prevalent in most Anglo-de Saxon countries CSFP will be impossible in Europe for many years to come 1) divergence of preferences on goals and means of foreign policy a. 70% believe feel EU should be more involved with foreign policy – driven by cultural anti-Americanism in continental Europe – US as enemy of world peace 2) Principle of Institutional Balance – more institutions have a say 3) Unwillingness to spend on defense: EU spends 2% of GDP in defense; US spends 3.5% and growing a. Because of US‘ investment – they control the sea, air and space 4) Aversion of EU members to engage in military action and put men/women on the ground Problems of recent developments in foreign policy 1) War between European institutions 2) Unclear allocation of powers between national governments and European institutions 3) General disagreement between members The Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact - In effect since 1993 - Established that EU members wishing to qualify for EMU (European monetary union) had to show sufficient budget discipline by 1998 Stability and Growth Pact of 1997: designed to give concrete content to several aspects of the Maastricht Treaty regarding economic policies in the EMU - The treaty and the Pact provide a system of multilateral surveillance similar - The motivation for both the Treaty and Pact was largely political - The Pact is criticized for two reasons: one – it prevents countries from using fiscal policy; two – forced cuts on growth enhancing public investment - The Treaty and the Pact have allowed expansion of powers of the Commision Two problems of current institutions of EU 1) the effect of overlapping jurisdictions 2) tendency of excessive faith in gov‘t intervention and policy coordination a. has to do with culture and visions about the role of gov‘t Noel Malcolm. Sense of Sovereignty. Sovereignty is defined as a state exercising authority, internally and externally and having an independent constitution. , Malcolm begins by speaking of the lack of discussion of sovereignty during the Maastricht Treaty negotiations. Delusions of Power , Malcolm quotes Edward Heath‘s definition of sovereignty. Sovereignty is an ideal of invulnerability and omnipotence. A country should have the ability to remain untouched by external influences or to overcome them. This worked back in the nineteenth century with colonialism. , Heath says that in the modern world, no country is sovereign since there is interdependence between countries. Sovereignty is obsolete. , Malcolm refutes this extreme definition since it suggests that true sovereignty can only happen when global omnipotence occurs. The truth is that sovereignty is always changing in differing degrees and percentages. , Nowadays, sovereignty equated with power. The myth of ―Economic Sovereignty‖ , Economic sovereignty is a flawed concept. It is the same as saying total economic power. , There is a significant distinction between power and authority. When the West German Bundesbank raised its interest rates in October 1989, the Chancellor of the Exchequer raised British interest rates less than a half hour later. This shows that even though one might not have total power, one has the authority to change interest relates to keep up with the economy. The Heart of Matter , Malcolm focuses on differentiating the concepts of power and authority. One example is comparing an armed burglar breaking into a home and an armed policeman breaking into the home of a drug dealer. The burglar has power, but the policeman has both. Sovereignty at Large , In international law, a sovereign state must be fully independent in the sense that it has authority, not necessarily power. This still places obligations on the sovereign states. Sovereignty at Home and Away , External sovereignty is independence from another state. , Internal sovereignty is having competences within the nation. Internal sovereignty must occur before external sovereignty can happen. Other nations have to recognize the sovereignty of a nation before it can exercise external sovereignty. The Constitutional Crux , A state can only be sovereign once its constitution is independent from other states. This leads to a state exercising legal and political authority. Can Sovereignty be Limited? , A constitution does not limit sovereign authority; instead, it determines how the authority is exercised. The talk of sovereignty directly relates to the debates of how sovereign the member states of the EU are. Since under an EU constitution, the member states would not have an independent constitution, they would not be considered sovereign. Their internal affairs are not independent, so their external affairs are also not independent. This limits their authority. This can also be applied to the EU itself. It will have to have functional internal affairs before becoming externally sovereign. Depeding on how one what view one takes; one can say that Malcolm is a eurosceptic. He values the sovereignty and independence of nations. Giandomenico Majone. The Common Sense of European Integration. Majone basically talks about the recent rejection of the Constitutional Treaty. He observes that the integration process has been praised for its unsuccessful attempts to imitate the nation-state and criticized for its attempt to provide a true supranational government, as seen in the democratic deficit debate. Majone suggests limiting rather than expanding the competencies of the EU as a solution to the legitimacy problem of the EU. Majone begins by saying that the goal of having an ―ever closer union‖ has caused a lot of confusion when it comes to European integration. He speaks about the alleged democratic deficit in the EU. No solution has been suggested this far. The democratic deficit may be the price people are willing to pay in order to preserve the sovereignty of the nation states. This price is accepted only if the EU competencies continue to be limited. He then begins to speak about what he calls common sense of European integration-simple truths that have been obscured. 1. The Revolt of the Masses and the Desertion of the Elites The surprising thing about the French and Dutch rejection of the Constitutional Treaty was the large gap between the political, economic, intellectual elites and the common citizens. Analysts agree that the rejection by the people was due to social rather than political reasons. There was fear of unemployment due to the masses that would enter the work force especially with the possibility of Turkey entering the EU. Also, the failure of the common currency provided to the rejection. Many attribute the price instability to the euro. The issue of re-distributive policies also placed a burden on these countries. 2. Cryptofederalism Cryptofederalism refers to the ―behind the scenes method‖ of European integration used by people like Jean Monnet. This method entails a triumph of process over product. People no longer agree with this since the product, like the euro, has not been up to par, so people are dissatisfied with the method rather than the actual system of the EU. 3 The Rise and Decline of the classic Community Method The community method defines the roles of the European institutions and the modes of their interaction. The community method places a lot of power on the Commission and the ECJ, which are non-elected figures and have little accountability. The community method has somewhat of a disregard for parliamentary government and separation of powers. This has given the Commission near monopoly in agenda-setting. There is clear evidence that the Commission and the ECJ have used the Community method way beyond the limits set by the drafters of the Treaty of Rome, and the members states have reacted by limiting delegation to these institutions. Majone explains that the Treaty placed more importance on negative rather than positive integration (explained below). There is a preference for an institutional balance rather than policy activism. Majone agrees with the Community method only if it‘s used for negative integration. 4. Democracy and Integration: The Big Trade-Off Here, Majone speaks about the democratic deficit. For those who support cryptofederalism, which is general economic integration, could not be pursued using democratic means. He states that people who complain about the democratic deficit should support a drastic reduction of delegated tasks under the Community methods instead on grating more power to the European Parliament. 5. Different Standards of Legitimacy Majone then turns to discussing the legitimacy of integration. He states that people make a ―category mistake‖ when they use the democratic deficit argument against the EU. The EU is not in the same category as the Member States. He refers to the EU not as a state, but more of an organization of corporate bodies. Legitimacy depends on how well-suited a European institution is for solving the range of problems it faces. Accountability and legitimacy are only possible when objective are clear and limited. 6. Europa: Couldn‟t It Be One Size Smaller? Majone argues that has too many competencies. When it comes to normative, administrative and financial resource limitations, one can see that in many areas, the EU is doing too much at the same time, which produces a sub par outcome. This introduces the idea of accountability deficit rather than a democratic one. Majone suggests bridging the gap between what can be done at the national and the European level. This reduction can later bring support for a federal government since it will be able to be held accountable. 7. Positive and Negative Integration Positive integration involves increasing the competencies of the EU institutions. Majone favors negative integration, which removes national restrictions for example in trade and factors of production. Negative integration would also limit monopoly power and market dominance. He concludes by saying negative integration caters better to the economic constitution of Europe, while attempt to pursue positive integration with inadequate material undermines the legitimacy of the constitutional order. This reading deals with both eurosceptiscim and the democratic deficit. Majone agrees with having a federal entity but with not that many regulations. He also disagrees with the idea of democratic deficit. In lecture, we discussed the different types of Eurosceptics. Majone seems to be the pro-market person who sees the EU as a distracter, but he does support the EU. Margaret Thatcher. The Bruges Speech. Thatcher basically expresses her pro-market and eurosceptic beliefs and advocates a decentralized union of Europe that would preserve a strong national power and encourages defense by relying on NATO. , The Bruges Speech was given on September 20, 1988 in the College of Europe in Burges, Belgium. , Thatcher begins to speak about Britain‘s common history with the rest of Europe and says that Europe was not a product of the Treaty of Rome and it is not the property of a group of institutions. , She states that Britain defended Europe in both World Wars. , Then she says that the European Community belongs to all its members, so it should reflect the traditions and aspirations of all its members. , Thatcher encourages Europe to contribute in full to its own security and to compete commercially and industrially. Success goes to the countries that encourage individual initiative and enterprise. , She sets up guiding principles for the success of Europe in the future. , The first is that the best way to build a successful European Community is with a willing and active cooperation between independent sovereign states. 1. She suggests that the best way to achieve the goals of Europe is by empowering the nation-states and not concentrating power in a center. 2. She encourages the nations to work together, but an appointed bureaucracy should not make the decisions. , The second guiding principle states the Community policies must tackle problems in a practical way. , The third guiding principle is that Community policies should encourage enterprise. That means that means action to free markets, action to widen choice, action to reduce government intervention. , The fourth guiding principle discourages European protectionism and removes trade barriers to contribute to the world economy. , The last guiding principle deals with Europe‘s role in defense. She encourages the continuance of relying on NATO. , She concludes by visualizing Europe as a family of nations, understanding each other better, appreciating each other more, doing more together but relishing national identity no less than their common European endeavor. This speech reveals Thatcher as a strong eurosceptic. Like Malcolm, she values sovereignty. In Thatcher‘s case, one knows that the sovereignty she asks for is nation- state sovereignty and not EU sovereignty. Glyn Morgan describes Thatcher as a strong supporter of a market economy. She is one of the pro-market eurosceptics that sees the EU as a distracter for free trade. Glyn Morgan. Idea of a European Superstate. Chapters 2&3 Chapter 2: Nationalism There are 7 major uses of the term ―nationalism‖, with 1 and 2 being the most important today: 1. a social, economic or political process that forms and sustains the nation 2. a principle of political legitimacy 1. Others: sociological/ethnosymbolic proponents of nationalism - national cultures have an ―ethnic‖ character - modern nation-states derive legitimacy from pre-existing ethnic communities embodied in cultural customs and values - cultural symbols limit extent to which nationalists can construct a modern national identity Glyn Morgan: - These claims are impossible to evaluate and rely heavily on the claim that individuals care about ―myths of descent and shared memories‖ - Nation building has succeeded in the past, and thus it is possible on a grander European scale - National culture creates a familiar way of life and protects it. But when enough people choose to embrace a new culture, those left behind must voluntarily assimilate. 2. Ernest Geller: nationalism as a principle of political legitimacy - nationalism not an ideological concept but as an inevitable consequence of industrialization - a modern polity requires a common public culture in order to be successful; therefore it must transform local subcultures into ―national‖ culture in order to prevail against neighboring states Hobbes: a non-nationalist conception of political legitimacy - indirect popular sovereignty: the people are represented by the sovereign - people defined exclusively by their equal relationship to political power (―a civic nation‖) Glyn Morgan: - the centrality of nationalism to nation states today not in industrialism, but in the shift in the conception of political legitimacy, the bearing of popular sovereignty on nationalism Democratization (1) the idea of popular sovereignty (2) the universal franchise (3) an egalitarian society the modern state needs to engender a deeper sense of loyalty and attachment. The modern nation-state serves as the representative and guardian of a unique set of practices, customs, and traditions. Chapter 3: Euroscepticism A hostility towards the project of European integration based on sociological and ideological nationalism. Conservative nationalism - the European project threatens national identity (in terms of traditions etc.) - nationalism a feature of the modern world; no polity can replace the nation-state - Enoch Powell o a self-governing nation must be political homogenous. Europe lacks political homogeneity because people identify first and foremost with their nation. o Sovereignty is symbol of national identity, transfer of sovereignty results in death of national identity - Glyn Morgan: o Powell‘s argument fails publicity requirement because his arguments contradict the public values of a ―bare citizen‖. Powell offers a narrow and partisan definition of national identity. Social democratic nationalism: - a European polity will not be able to maintain the level of social welfare protection current European nation-states have (will not maintain socialized market, redistributive welfare state and progressive taxation policies) - David Miller and Claus Offe: o In order for a Sozialstaat to be possible, citizens must have vertical loyalty to polity and basic institutions and horizontal solidarity (a common public culture, shared language, or distinct traditions) o In the absence of common nationality, European Sozialstaat is not possible - Glyn Morgan: o Miller and Offe‘s argument fails the requirement of sufficiency. In order for their argument to be sufficient, it must show that the Sozialstaat requires (not that it is merely compatible with) an independent nation-state. Morgan thinks that the Eurosceptic objection to the project of European integration is unjustified because sociological nationalism fails the requirement of publicity and ideological nationalism fails the requirement of sufficiency. In the absence of an adequate justification against European integration, Morgan proceeds to list arguments why instead, a European polity is both justified and necessary. Enoch Powell. The Common Market: The Case Against. - direct elections to the European Assembly would give elective authority to ―irresponsible‖ people of the community - Election Address of 1970: people of the community don‘t really have power over national decisions , they can choose between parties, but many want the people to be able to directly vote on referendum , the author says people shouldn‘t be given this power because if the government wanted to do one thing but the people wanted to do the other, the government wouldn‘t take responsibility for what happened , a lot of debate about whether Britain should enter the Common Market , entering the Common Market would mean Britain taking the currency of the market, which means Britain would then be governed by the market government rather than a British government and Britain wouldn‘t have much economic say , arguments for entering the Common Market: it would give the countries of Western Europe a defensive capability that mere allegiance doesn‘t - Young Conservatives Annual Conference (1973) , a representative assembly can‘t exercise executive power because there would be nothing to prevent it from taking self-contradictory decisions two methods of preventing this: make the executive dependent on the , representative and give it executive power of the assembly (this is what France and the U.S. do), or make the executive belong to and command a working majority in the assembly (this is what Britain does) , it is party that enables parliaments to exercise sovereign power and renders government responsible to Parliament and Parliament responsible to the people Sovereignty , Independence does not equal omnipotence , Examples: Russia and the U.S. are undeniably independent, self-governing states, but they cannot do whatever they choose to do o Policies of both countries blocked in certain regions of the world , Nations depend on each other for livelihood and defense no matter what\ , Independence, sovereignty, does not detach a nation from a certain amount of dependence on trade, investment and defense o These constraints on a nation‘s complete freedom of action have nothing to do with political independence and self-government according to Powell , Definition of independent nation: a nation whose laws are made by no one but itself, whose citizens are governed by no government but their own. Self-government does not depend on the form of government (does not have to be a democracy) , Dismisses the idea that treaties cause a nation to lose its sovereignty o Loss of independence = binding oneself in advance to do whatever others may decide o This loss is present in the Treaty of Rome because it demands compliance ‗for an indefinite period‘ , Powell says that the self-government of the Community is non-existent, largely because thee is no sense of a new ―we‖ just because a certain number of nations agree to join under a common authority o The idea of a parliament that is directly elected to restore the sovereignty that is lost at a higher level will not work o The ―we‖ is the essential starting point for Powell, not an end that can be achieved o If nation states keep their identity but still relinquish governmental sovereignty to a higher level, they forfeit both self-government and independence because the higher government has no way of being democratic , Also there is no reason to think that because United Kingdom and U.S. merged states together that Western Europe can do the same , The idea that a trend toward creating large states is wrong. Powell sees a trend toward maintaining and asserting national self-government Public Meeting at the Dome o Battle to prevent direct election of representatives to the Assembly of the EEC important because if it is not prevented, Western European state is basically guaranteed o Powell says that deception is the most powerful force in leading a nation to give up its sovereignty and that the idea of direct election is very favorable to the British o But it is a trick that the public must be warned about because ―direct elections to the European Assembly are not representation of the people; they are a denial of representation‖ (482) o Representatives of UK would be a minority and direct election would leave no legitimate argument against majority decisions o Thinks the British need to look after their own future and democracy o Also says that elections are useless without parties, because a lack of party affiliation leaves voters choosing without any useful information o Those voted directly to the assembly would try to disassociate themselves from party affiliation within the UK o If the assembly enacts unfavorable laws, the representatives elected can deny responsibility, cannot say that their party will fix it in the future or that the majority was behind it if the majority of their own country was not o In the end, direct elections will only increase bureaucratic nature of the Community and give a sense of false validation to irresponsible institutions of the community. Anthony D. Smith. National identity and the idea of European unity. Conflicts between national identity and European identity are more situational than conceptual due to the possibility of multiplicity of identity and thus a European identity can be forged, probably by confrontation with some external actor. There can be multiple identities. These identities can often overlap and clash, but there is certain fluidity that allows people to evade these clashes. Identity is of two types – individual, which is largely situational and depends on circumstances in which one is defined, and collective, which is more pervasive and persistent. National identity persists. An example of collective identity is national identity, which was formed by factors including territorial boundedness, shared myths and historical memories, standardized culture etc. There are two main models of forming national states – Western (territorial) and Eastern (ethnic), however the ethnic and territorial principles often mix and support each other. The resulting reference to common public culture thus supports the idea of national identity being superior to European one, because it is already established and closer to people. Another possible reason for strengthening of national identity over time is the theory of third sector development, where despite the globalization on all levels people demand more services and more products that are culturally close to them, and thus support their own small cultural entities. Recent strengthening of state, spread of mass media, mass education all suggest that there is little hope for diminishing of ethnic nationalism. uropean project has to be a European identity still needs to be built. E compromise between national and globalizing aspirations. There is no single factor that would determine European identity (among single criteria that fail are linguistics, geography, religion, all because of the national differences), it is rather a family of cultural influences that were spread unevenly and were modified in different countries (―cross fertilization of ideas‖). However, this family of ideas is not yet institutionalized. Synchronized education and mass media might be the ways to achieve it, but none of them seem to be working on it right now. There is also absence of myths and historical memory that are present in national identities, so Europe faces a dilemma whether to artificially support its own myths or be a coldly rational region without loyalty of its inhabitants. Myth building may require negative identification. Defining against outside factors (ethnic conflicts, environmental crisis, terrorism, immigration) might be helpful in creating common historical memories. Opponents may include Third World countries opposing the affluent, conservative Europe. Relevance to the course: This article argues that hopes for supra-governmentalism are somewhere between the euro-sceptic (nationality will prevail) and euro-optimist (national and European identities are not exclusive) view. It shows to what extent may integration continue and what can it be based on. Christopher Booker & Richard North. The Great Deception. Chapter 20 EU is wretched and full of deception. 1. The Monnet method. It was intended to deceive European countries into accepting step-by-step measures that would lead to mostly unforeseen amount of power in hands of EU institutions. Monnet and Salter were unique not as much for their vision but rather for this crab-like method (―engrenage‖) of building a supra-national structure. EU has succeeded in creating its own ―myth‖ of the project, contradictory to historical evidence. 2. The beginnings. In the fifties, Monnet‘s plan was presented as Schuman‘s plan, Schuman being deceitfully used as a ―ventriloquist‘s dummy‖. Monnet was originally pondering more aggressive action; it was Spaak who persuaded him to adopt the incremental, stepwise method. Britain‘s clever refusal to join the community was presented by journalists as missing of a ―historic opportunity‖. Monnet used all his influence to sabotage the inter-governmentalist efforts of the UK. Only after De Gaulle started to imitate UK, Monnet started to want UK in. 3. Britain joins. UK‘s loss of national confidence after Suez and lackluster economic performance caused the sentiment towards the EU to change. However, Macmillan and Heath took a conscious decision not to explain properly to the public what would EU membership entail, and even they themselves appeared to be inadequately informed. Heath‘s application to the EU lacked proper electoral mandate and the 1975 membership referendum was intentionally veered away from discussing real issues, providing one-sided campaign and trivialization of problems. French were motivated to support UK‘s entry only after the CAP policy was established, making UK subsidize French farmers. 4. Thatcher‟s deception. Thatcher was unaware of how fast the EU was evolving behind the scenes, mostly because her closest advisers failed to brief her on important things (e.g. Foreign Secretary Howe). Howe failed to explain that Single European Act was only the first of two treaties which extended the competencies of supranational EU, even though Thatcher was primarily concerned with setting up a ―single market‖. After she found the truth about the EU (and gave her Bruges speech), she got gradually isolated from her old supporters both in EU and in UK. 5. Pro-European orthodoxy. Whole pro-European sentiment in the UK was based on rhetoric and imagery, euro-sceptics being considered negative, narrowly nationalistic, xenophobically hostile and against progress. Despite not knowing much about the object of their admiration, UK people favored euro-optimism, this sentiment being established by the 1975 ―Yes‖ campaign. 6. The nineties. The debate of benefits from the EU has always been unreal and abstract, so importance of launching single market was overrated. Any benefits were offset by the swamp of regulations from the EU. A study has shown that many businesses were in fact discontent with the new flood of imports and regulations. Politicians‘ response to the disillusionment was more deceit and propaganda, including concealment of the fact that the new laws came from Brussels. EC spent money propagating itself by giving grants, but UK‘s contributions to the budget were much higher than what they got back. 7. Democratic deficit. The project did not go as well as Giscard and others pretended – the Eurozone went into recession in 2003, the dream of European army remains unfulfilled and ―Single European Sky‖ has been around for decades. Nothing in the EU is working, from agriculture to overseas aid, from regional policy to Euro, from regulations to bureaucratic methods. The system is manipulated by powerful lobby groups that are unaccountable and that influence different parts of EU legislature. The strongest lobby group is France, which is responsible for most of the EU vices, including CAP, Strasbourg-Brussels dichotomy, unsanctioned subsidies to Air France etc. The whole system is not supposed to be democratic, but rather to serve the interests of individual countries. Monet and Salter never considered that wishes of the people should be considered. The aim of the EU was to replace democracy with technocracy, but to do this, it had to surround itself with a democratic veil, which is blindly accepted by the UK. 8. Euro-schizophrenia. The British have always been the ―awkward partner‖ of Europe, so now they are compensating for it by orthodox, overzealous acceptance of the EU. Enthusiastic acceptance of EU regulations has lead to many bad deals, including areas of waste policy and energy policy. The process of integration has gone so far that seceding would entail significant costs. The most probable outcome of the current decline of the EU is a two-speed Europe, the original six fully integrating and leaving others behind. Relevance to the course: Almost none. It shows how euro-scepticism works in semi-academic environment. Morgan‘s opinion: Disparaging. Probably because they don‘t even have an appealing argument (proving (?) that the incremental move towards supra-governmentalism was unexpected by UK leaders does not prove that it itself is a bad thing). Unit G: Europe‘s Alleged Democratic Deficit Democratic deficit – criticism of the European integration project, process, or product as being not ‘democratic’ [most use citizen’s participation/influence on EU as standard] enough , Concerns relationship of: citizens and the institutions, member-states and the institutions; Parliament and the institutions o Dependent on who is making the critique, the articles reflect different takes on this question , Criticism from proponents AND opponents of EU integration o Eurosceptics: more democracy , state o MORGAN: not necessary b/c will be even more unpopular; BUT integration should be transparent and accessible to the citizens , Increasing debate b/c of Maastricht, which attempts to inject more democracy into the integration process 1. Does democracy presuppose nationality? [see Mill] , Morgan in lecture quotes Mill: successful democracies presuppose shared nationality otherwise the minority would have little stake in a democratic government o Modern example from decolonizing: South Africa – no bloodshed or split o Need to generate national identity before you can have democracy 2. What is democracy? [see Federalist #10] , Simply: rule by the people , MORGAN: most liberal democracies now are not like the pure democracy of Greece but rather limited; modern democracies are just too large for direct input o They all believe that a certain set of rights will trump majoritarian will o Federalist #10: fear of mob rule 3. Democracy and Political Legitimacy Essentially, the problem at hand is whether or not the European Union should derive its political legitimacy directly from the people in the traditional democracy-based manner, or whether it can derive enough political legitimacy more indirectly through the democratically-elected nations of Europe. If the first is the case, then the problem of the alleged democratic deficit becomes crucial, for if such a deficit exists then the European Union lacks political legitimacy. Those like Weiler who argue that the demos is the basis for a democratic polity see a democratic deficit in the relations between the EU people and its institutions, the member states and the EU institutions, and between the European parliament and other EU institutions. Majone and Moravcsik don't contest the democracy based view of political legitimacy, however, they do argue that the democratic deficit has been exaggerated/doesn't exist (Moravcsik's view is that because Europe is a regulatory institution it doesn't need the same legitimacy). Follesdal and Hix follow this up by arguing that while they agree with Majone and Moravcsik these failed to address the lack of democratic contestation in the EU, which weakens its legitimacy. Essentially the only other option for deriving legitimacy is legitimacy by consent (ie the governments' agreeing to the EU suffices to make it legitimate). 4. Democracy, Representation, and European Political Integration The recent expansion of the European Union has posed problems in terms of democracy. If we agree that there is in fact a democratic deficit, and that something should be done about it, the increased size of the European Union makes it harder to decide what. The main argument with regards to representation is that the current structure of the EU does not allow for enough direct representation, and members of the Parliament are not elected based on European political questions, but rather local issues. Thus there is a lack of transnational parties and politics in Europe. Moravzcik Article on Democratic Deficit Moravzcik argues that the there is no Democratic deficit in the European Union. Moravzcik asserts that no Democratic deficit exists because the power of the European Union is highly limited. The EU‘s power according to Moravzcik pertains to technical areas that would be insulated from the Democratic process in most democracies. As examples he cites monetary policy, which in the U.S. is run by the non-elected and independent Federal Reserve Chairman and in Europe is run by the European Central Bank. In contrast National governments specialize in areas which are less technical and regulatory and are thus democratic. In addition the EU does not have a significant discretionary budget, or mechanism of compulsion, as police and military are controlled by the member states. In areas such as immigration, or foreign policy, which are non-regulatory issues that the populace is interested in, the EU operates in an intergovernmental fashion. According to Moravzcik, when the EU operates in an intergovernmental fashion the Democratic Mechanisms of the member states are sufficient to prevent a democratic deficit. Folesdale and Hix Article on Democratic Deficit Folesdale and Hix state that they are explicitly responding to Moravzcik and Majone. They argue that in many forms of regulation there are not absolute efficiency achieving objectives and that value judgments have to be made, and thus there is a need for greater democracy. They also assert that creating a greater Democratic component within the EU, one based on a Westminster style of government, will enable voters to direct their emotion towards elected governments, rather then agitating against the existence of the EU. They further assert that any type of Democracy is better than none. They particularly single out the secrecy of meetings of the Council of Ministers as anti-Democratic, since voters do not know who did and said what and thus can not hold them accountable. They conclude with sentiment that the EU constitution will address issues pertaining to the Democratic deficit. However, as we know the constitution was rejected by voters. Majone – Europe’s ‘Democratic Deficit’[DD]: The Question of Standards – 1998 Thesis: DD debates irrelevant; real question is the legitimate delegation of narrowly defined functions Standard-setting and standard-using: definition of DD not clear; arguments about DD are about nature/functions/goals of EC [institutions]; four basic arguments , Analogies to national institutions – EC institutions should be the same as nationals ones , Majoritarian standards – abstract model, rule by majority = democracy , Standards derived from democratic legitimacy of member-states [MS] -- , Social standards – failure re social justice Inadequacy with current standards , Analogy to national institutions: legislative power with Commission AND Commission too strong compared to Council, which is still answerable to national parliaments; too bureaucratic o HOWEVER: design of Commission-Council-EP ratified by national parliaments o Legislative process involves different parts of the system; not just one o Commission links council and parliament , Limited competences: Single European Act , fear that the EC will gain a lot of competences o HOWEVER: series of articles narrowly defining which competences are relevant to EC function; Maastricht as a inhibitor on expansion; no taxing and small budget so policy areas limited , Majoritarian standards and non-major. practices: majorities should control all of govt; o HOWEVER: majoritarian rule exception in govt practices; rare in federal structures; non-majoritarian rule needed to manage cleavages within polity , Derived legitimacy: democratic MS validate intergovt component but not supranational o HOWEVER: EC protects individuals when govt do not; protection of interests that are lacking at national level , Social policy: lack of EU welfare state , regime shopping, social dumping; create EU welfare state to legitimate integration (as had happened at national level before) o HOWEVER: national govt do not want to cede this control; lack support of citizens; welfare state = defining character of nation; normative judgment of efficiency v. equity confined to within homogenous polities; ERGO, EU- level welfare state would aggravate legitimacy problems all relate to the statutorily independent institutions Resetting the standard – , Two DD problems: problem of supranational econ integration & intergovt pol integration AND legitimacy of non-major. institutions (such as ECB) , Delegation solves commitment problem: in democracies elections mean that current policies may be dismantled by next govt; EU has the problem of national govt as well; compound commitment problem , statutorily independent and supranational agencies more credible , Answer to majoritarian argument: executive bodies checked by elected bodies; procedural limits; stricter judicial review; not necessarily worse accountable than congressional pork , Procedural legitimacy: derive from accountability/transparency; give reason to regulations; open to debate and review; ECJ impose national instit. to be more transparent , Substantive legitimacy: capacity for decision-making; Commission justified b/c best placed to assess general interest of EC (will not muck up b/c reputation seeking AND role explicit in Treaties); furthermore, objectives well defined AND are objectively measurable , Accountability: allow for independent agencies using ex post monitoring and self- policing mechanism; delegating body (Commission) does not have to micromanage Conclusion 1. Federalism only a possibility; real question: can you evaluate EU’s institutional legitimacy with old models? 2. Regulatory role of EC shifts the DD debate to question of delegation with sufficient credibility o Delegation is used by all; key is legitimately delegating to independent agencies MORGAN (no direct response to Majone): DD not solved by more input by people; also question standard [agree with Majone]; delegation is a question of sovereignty btw the EU and MS, tradeoff of sovereignty if EC more democratic JS MILL Essentially, Mill argues in these chapters that ideally the best form of government is representative one (rather than the ideal despot); however, for a variety of reasons, this may not function well in all societies. He then goes on at the end about the idea of nationalities. I suppose that the first part could be related to our discussion of the democratic deficit in that it goes through how representative governments should be. The last chapter relates to what we‘ve been doing in class in that Mill essentially argues that smaller nations will become subsumed in a larger one or amalgated into them if governed tolerantly. Chapter 3 – THAT THE IDEALLY BEST FORM OF GOVERNMENT IS REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT Section 1 Many argue that despotic monarchy would be the best form of government, if only a perfect despot could be found. While Mill is willing to concede that, could such a person be found, the country might be administrated in the purest and most intelligent manner. However, he follows this by arguing that, firstly, such a man could not be found, for he would have to be all-knowing and all-seeing, of superhuman mental ability. Secondly, he continues by arguing that even is such a man could be found, it might not be completely advantageous to have him rule: although the country might be better administrated, this system of government would lead to a mentally passive, morally stunted (for they would have to make no difficult decisions) people. In addition, a despotic state is one that lacks a reliable future, as no despot lives forever and there are no guarantees about his successors. A despot might prevent the creation of a mentally passive people and all that accompanies that by not exercising all his power, and allowing the government to be more similar to a constitutional government (with freedom of the press etc.). However this would lead to new problems: while this would improve despotism to no end, it would also allow for the creation of a public opinion. This public opinion, independent of the despot, could be for or against him. If it were against him the despot could either follow its wishes – making himself more of a constitutional monarch – or try to go against it – which would lead to antagonism and his eventual submission or removal from power. Thus nominal despotism would not really function well. To those who argue that despotism is the only way to combat the ignorance of the people, Mill says that one must educate them, and as all education ―which aims at making human beings other than machines, in the long run makes them claim to have control of their own actions‖ despotism would not work well. Then he goes on to say that in some cases despotism proves better than the alternative, but that shouldn‘t justify it as a permanent mode of government. Section 2 Essentially, Mill argues in this section that it isn‘t hard to prove that the best form of government is that in which sovereignty is vested in the aggregate of the community. He does this by pointing out that the goodness of a government is identifiable by ―how far it promotes the good management of the affairs of society by means of the existing faculties, moral, intellectual, and active, of its various members, and what is its effect in improving or deteriorating those faculties.‖ He then argues that the best way to do this is when humans are self-protecting and self-dependent, not necessarily just because people are selfish and will always consider themselves first but also because, for example, employers of laborers might view things differently from the laborers themesleves when makin laws concerning them. Section 3 Mill moves on to consider the influence of the form of government on character, and finds that here popular government is even more obviously the best choice. This question depends on whether passive or active characters are more desirable for humanity. While the ―general sympathies of mankind‖ are for passive characters – the passivity of others increases our sense of security – when one considers the kinds of mental excellence (intellectual, practical and moral) it becomes clear that active characters have the upper hand. For the first two categories there isn‘t even a question of which is more useful. For the last, a passive character may at first appear better be cause it plays more easily into the submissive values of Christianity and is also inoffensive. However, Mill argues that an active character is better because it is active characters that allow for the possibility of goodwill towards others. Mill then goes few a couple of nations, saying that the great mass of passive contentment is actually discontent. Also, he points out that when we see contented people with no ambition to make others happier, they don‘t get our approval – we admire those actively trying to help themselves and others. Apparently the US and England have more people with the latter character. Inactivity and absence of desire are a far greater hindrance to improvement than misdirection of energy. There is no doubt that the active self-helping character is favored by popular government. Mill goes on for a while about why, seem rather repetitive. Thus, the only government that can ―fully satisfy all the exigencies of the social state‖ is one in which the people participate. However, because we cant, in a large community,, all participate personally, it becomes apparent that the ideal perfect government is representative. Chapter IV UNDER WHAT SOCIAL CONDITIONS REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IS INAPPLICABLE. Although representative government is the best kind, there are cases in which it is inapplicable, that is, when it does not fulfill three fundamental conditions 1. that the people are willing to receive it 2. that they are willing and able to do what is necessary to preserve it 3. that they should be willing and able to fulfill the duties and discharge the functions that come about as a result of it. The most interesting point is the last one. Essentially Mill argues that people need to have some sort of general interest, or few will avail themselves of their right to suffrage and those who do will do so solely for their own interest. There are also some cases where representative government might at some point exist but society is not yet ready for it. 1. when people have not yet learned obedience and thus are not ready to submit themselves to the rule of government. 2. people who are too passive and ready to submit to tyranny (they would probably choose tyrants as their rulers) 3. people still subject to ―the inveterate spirit of locality‖ (ie who are unable to conceive of a nation or even a community larger than their own) For these reasons society in those cases is better served by kingly government. There are lots of other reasons that might prevent representative government from being ideal – Mill doesn‘t go into detail but he does cite overly prejudiced societies and ignorance as some. He then goes on a lot about other potential conditions preventing representative government from being ideal, none of which seem very important but that include overwhelming desire to exercise power over others and disinclination to have power exercised over oneself. Chapter XVI OF NATIONALITY, AS CONNECTED WITH REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT Mill‘s definition of Nationality: ―A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a Nationality if they are united among themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them and any others---which make them co-operate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire to be under the same government, and desire that it should be government by themselves or a portion of themselves exclusively.‖ Nationality can be created by race, religion, language, or even geography. The strongest factors however are political and historical identity. When the feeling of nationality exists to any strong degree, there is a case for uniting all members of it in a government. Creating a free government where there are people of different nationalities, however, is nearly impossible. Non-free governments can play on nationalist antipathies to keep nations enslaved. However, there are some places where nationalities are too intermingled to be ruled separately, and others where one nationality can be subsumed by another. Eureopean Democracy and Its Critique: Five Uneasy Pieces J.H.H. Weiler, U. Haltern and F. Mayer article Summary: Though he has no constant thesis, Weiler uses a ―standard version‖ of attack at the democracy of Europe and whether or not it is sufficient. He discusses every major country, court hearings and each level of government. Long Summary: This essay was confusing and disjointed. I recommend you avoid it for the final as there are many more clear and interesting views on Democratic Deficit. Weiler presents a "Standard Version" of the critique of democracy in the EU: an aggregate of public opinion data, politicians' statements, media commentary, and considerable learned analysis. Weiler hopes to present a balanced view on whether or not Democratic Deficit does in fact exist or not. Without getting into geographic details (what the German court said or the Dutch court), the important points in this disconnected paper is that Democracy, in a loose sense, is about the many permutations of exercise of power by and for that demos. But what is the European people? Europe has three principal facets: International, Supranational and Infranational. According to Weiler, each with their own challenges. In this sense there are three polities, or three regimes, or three modes of governance. This trichotomy creates fundamentally different permutations of power distribution in the overall European polity. The inter-supra-infra trichotomy enables us to build a better picture of the disbursement of power and accountability in the EU. Weiler uses Comitology to answer many of these questions. Weiler discusses how Democratic theory is based on a nation-state context and thus he births a new idea of democratic theory. He explores possible "fits" between various democratic models and EU modes of governance with a view to a better understanding of the problems of democratic governance in the EU. He proposes three different models: International Governance and the Consociational Model: Crucial to Consociational theory is the existence of sharply segmented societal sectors. The essential characteristic of consociational democracy is not so much any particular institutional arrangement as the deliberate joint effort by the elites to render the system functional and stable. However, Democratic problems abound as Weiler believes focus is shifted away from constituents and member-states. Supranationalism, Pluralism and Competitive Elitism: The Supranational mode of governance is the closest to a State model. AND Infranationalism and the Neo-Corporatist Model of Governance and Democracy: an essential technocratic rule of the corporations (why is this good?) So, with this open ended discussion, Weiler hopes to present a new understanding of Democracy based on the different levels of government and peculiar questions of continental citizenship and we are left wondering what this article gave us. Relevance to European Integration: The one thing this article does provide us is the theoretical basis of democratic theory and its insufficiency in the debate over democratization in the entire EU. Weiler does highlight the bias towards nation-states in most elaborated democratic theories and provides some scattered alternative theories which don‘t make much sense. HOBBES: LEVIATHAN Chapters 13-18 Summary: In this theoretical piece, Hobbes discusses power and rights and the contracts we make to balance those in order to keep power checked in its place. He also discusses the delicate balance of fear and love. Long Summary: Hobbes leaves no doubt as to the absolute centrality of power relations in his scheme of human affairs. This emphasis is underscored by his defining many adjectives used to describe the worth of humans in terms of power. Indeed, Hobbes defines human ―worth‖ as the measure of power possessed by an individual, in terms of how much would be exchanged to attain his power. All the relative qualities that may affect human esteem and conduct toward other people, for Hobbes, are based on the relative presence or absence of different sorts of power, and the recognition—or misrecognition—of the amount of power possessed by another person. Power‘s reciprocal companion, fear, dominates Hobbes‘s discussion of the state of nature. Fear both defines the state of nature and is the primary cause of its end: civil society. Most precisely, as Hobbes proclaims in De Cive, it is not mutual love between men that informs their decision to enter into society, it is their mutual fear. The mediation between power and fear, as manifested in human affairs, is called manners. The great variety of manners stem from confusions about the best way to mediate between power and fear, and ignorance of a ―proper philosophy‖ that would grant such knowledge. Fear, Hobbes argues, stems from ignorance of causes, an ignorance for which people have tried to compensate by many artificial crutches, including custom, authority, and religion—all designed to dispel fear. Only proper philosophy can successfully dispel fear by granting scientific truth to the philosophy of causes and by enacting a peaceful society. However, Hobbes starts in the state of nature where peace cannot abound. In the state of nature, security is impossible for anyone, and the fear of death dominates every aspect of life. Being rational, humans will naturally seek to be rid of fear. Reason teaches us that there are certain natural laws that dictate how a society may guarantee peace. One of these laws is the Right of Nature,‖ every man‘s inborn right to use whatever means available to preserve his own life. Natural law includes our right to self-preservation and forbids humans from taking actions destructive to their own lives. Although war may be necessary for self-preservation—and often is, in the state of nature—reason dictates that the first of all natural laws must be that humans seek peace to fulfill their right and obligation to preserve their own lives. Hobbes believes the only answer is a social contract. The contract required by the most fundamental law of nature is forged and entered into by all persons. These persons can be divided into two categories: ―natural persons‖ and ―artificial persons.‖ Natural persons are those whose words are their own, whereas artificial persons are those whose words are those of another. The contract, as the means by which the individual wills of all natural people are joined into one unified will, then becomes a kind of artificial person, whose words are those of many others not itself. Thus, the contract, and the commonwealth it forms, is an artificial person. This great iconographic person is the Leviathan. Relevance to European Integration: This is in the democratic deficit section, so there is a lot of questions on the natural rights that people have to hold the power of their institutions accountable. It provides a theoretical defense for those who feel their rights are being challenged, through both veiled and opaque ways (as Hobbes seems to show). It also discusses the social contract, which is the basic idea of submission towards your government based on an agreement to be lifted out of the state of nature, provides great back drop for the debate over the institution‘s power over the individuals. Unit H: The Challenege of Globalization and Energy Dependency In this unit we considered how Europe participates in the process of globalization. On one hand, globalization pushes Europe to deal with internal issues (social and economic model). On the other, Europe needs to establish a relationship with external entities, which will prevent it from becoming vulnerable (especially crucial in the case of Russia and the energy dispute, as well as in the case of environmental issues). The European economic system appears to many as uncompetitive, because it does not put enough stress on innovation. Europe, unlike the US, has failed to become a post-industrial power, and still relays on mass production and large firms, instead of investing in research and information technologies. Agriculture remains competitive mostly because of subsidies given to European farmers. Textile industry is only competitive because of European protectionist measure (see the issue of dispute with China over anti-dumping and agreement reached on China‘s exports of textiles to Europe). Also the European social model is difficult to defend, considering the global forces at play. Europe‘s job market is not flexible enough, as workers unions prevent any much needed restructuring of key sectors of the industry. Many European companies cannot sustain the high labor costs and move their activities to places, where labor is cheaper (India, Eastern Europe). Finally, in the light of this economic situation, the European social model seems unsustainable – especially the issues concerning long-term employment, which make any adjustments of companies in troubled industries difficult. Another issue is Europe‘s growing dependency on energy. Europe‘s relationship with Russia is becoming more and more important as most of European energy resources (especially gas, but also oil) are imported from Russia. It is feared that unless Europe stands united at the negotiations table with Russia, individual countries risk becoming politically vulnerable to Russia, which controls the crucial energy resources. Finally, Europe needs to take action in solving problems that are affecting the whole globe, such as the issue of climate change. International environmental policy has become the most important aspect of European activity, because it is seen as an issue that all Europeans can agree on, and because it is high on European citizen‘s list of concerns. Finally, it defines Europe‘s role as a soft-power in the scene of debate about international relations. Possible essay themes: Is European economy competitive? What can be done to make it more competitive? Social protectionism – something that needs to be changed in the light of globalization or a defining aspect of European identity? How to negotiate with Russia? How can Europe decrease its energy dependency from Russia? Which ones of these solutions do you consider most feasible? Is Europe‘s policy against climate change efficient? Why/why not? Europe as a soft-power. Social and economic protectionism as a political necessity. April 3, 2007 Varieties of capitalism debate Liberal Anglo-American capitalism was promoted by the European Treaty Seen as a businessman‘s charter that would destroy the European social model Going back to the Treaty of Rome, there has been a dual component of the economic theory embedded in the Treaty of Rome and onwards Seeks to make the market more efficient through the 4 fundamental freedoms Also pays lip service to the idea of a social market – the aim of European treaties is to protect workers and make sure that economic values don‘t triumph blindly over broader social values Over the history of the EU, from an economic point of view, can distinguish 3 periods 1. Customs Union Period (signing of Treaty of Rome in 1957 through mid 1970s) Principle aim of Europe was to remove tariffs on internal trade 2. Common Market (mid to late 70s through the late 1990s) European Court of Justice decisions like Kassis – stipulated that a product that is approved for sale in one country is automatically approved for sale in another country Entails a weakening of national sovereignty Bolstered by the Single European Act of 1986 Achieves what might be termed ―full product market integration‖ Last through the late 1990s 3. European Union (late 90‘s) Controversial and just getting going – met with a lot of hostility If the first period removed tariff barriers and the second removes a lot of non-tariff barriers, the third seeks to remove a whole range of domestic institutional constraints on a free market A market economy functions differently in different European countries German model of capitalism (the Rhenish model) works very differently than classic, liberal, free-market model because of the way that the state and the market mutually interact 1. Co-determination practice – required equal representation of workers and management on the board of directors Workers given representation in the running of the company that was at odds with what went on in Britain or elsewhere 2. Banks and the government (national or local) tended to hold lots of shares in German companies (not allowed in the US) Has the effect of removing companies from a reliance on capital markets (raising money through offering shares) If the bank was a sizeable owner, the company can go to the bank and borrow lots of money on a long term basis 3. Allowed a long term apprenticeship system No American worker would put up with a 4 or 5 year low paid apprenticeship because they would be worried that they would be fired down the road – German critique of Anglo-American model More short termism in workers The Anglo-American model requires companies to be short sighted Have to go to capital markets to raise money and demonstrate on a quarterly basis that they are profitable Thought that German was a better model – patient model – more long term perspective that protects workers Defenders of the Anglo-American model – Germans make it harder to adopt rapid change and enact reforms Side that wins this debate or is winning the debate, is the one that is doing the best at that time Much of the 80s to mid 90s – Germans seen as quite strong This change after 1996 – German and Japanese models have problems and the US model becomes successful – still happening today US becoming increasingly strong in the wake of globalization Rise of India and China make it better to be able to adapt to quick change rdThe Economic Union model (3) – gets going when the Europeans realize that if they are going to have a more vibrant and integrated European economy, they need to get rid of national, institutional constraints on competition Some of these constraints are the features that are outlined with respect to the German model Constraints in regards to takeovers, etc. In this period, the European Commission has said that they will go after those national constraints – will treat Europe like the national government treats America – will not allow protectionism in this institutional way There has been a push back against this by local, national governments 1. The ―Take over Directive‖ EC decision to prohibit national governments from banning other governments from taking over domestic companies Asserted in the face of nations saying that some of their industries were core national industries and were not to be given up to other European companies (ex. Germans trying to take over a Spanish electrical company) National governments push back against this Big issue in the current French election 2. The ―Services Directive‖ By the end of the second period, didn‘t have a free market in services, but only goods Manufacturing becomes less important as time goes on a services become more important Services were never liberalized in the same way as manufactured goods – because of the role of national, institutional regulations Would regulate services through a variety of mechanisms Would give licenses to various services providers that met certain requirements Ex. Regulated services in US like doctors, taxis, etc. EC realized that this is a big barrier to a common market of services Decided to shake it up like the Kassis decision – if you are passed as a janitorial service in Latvia, you should be able to offer your services in France Previously, you would have to meet French requirements on pay, vacation, etc. As long as they satisfy Latvian laws, can offer their services elsewhere This requires a major transformation of French practices Might promote a race to the bottom Less restricted regimes will trump more restricted regimes Services directive was shot down There are different models of capitalism (Ex. Sapir) Four Models 1. Nordic Model (Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and Netherlands) – ideal model 2. Anglo-Saxon Model (Ireland and UK) 3. Continental Model (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg) 4. Mediterranean Model (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain) These models have not yet included Eastern European models Have emerged out of a purely academic debate – has filtered down to the people of Europe – debates over which model of capitalism or social policy model works best Government is asked questions like ―why is our record on education better or worse than Germany?‖ European citizens are comparing and contrasting different models The US doesn‘t do this – much more insular UNICEF rankings – best to be a kid in Netherlands, kids are meanest in England Led to a huge debate in Britain How do we go about evaluating these different models? One way, rank them solely in terms of economic growth Or in terms of economic growth controlled for some measure of equity Position of the median person, through children, through happiness (worldvaluessurvey.org) Why do Europeans and Americans have different views on inequality and unhappiness? Easier to make Europe converge around the Anglo-Saxon model But continental models are right when they say that it isn‘t consistent with happiness and other models Stern Review of the Economics of Climate Change Climate change affects not only access to water, food production, health, and the environment, but also will affect the economic health of the world at a loss of 5% of global GDP each year; international environmental protocol should be adapted to this growing danger. If no action is taken to reduce emissions, the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere could reach double its pre-industrial level as early as 2035, with a global average temperature rise of over 2?C. It is nearly equivalent to the change in average temperatures from the last ice age to today. The poorest countries and populations will suffer earliest and most from extreme weather, including floods, droughts and storms. We can combat this by providing better information, improved planning and more climate-resilient crops and infrastructure. Adaptation will cost tens of billions of dollars a year in developing countries alone, but stabilization is necessary. Stabilization would require emissions to be at least 25% below current levels by 2050, and that annual emissions are brought down to more than 80% below current levels. Costs will be higher if innovation in low-carbon technologies is slower than expected, or if policy-makers fail don‘t allow emissions to be reduced whenever, wherever and however it is cheapest to do so. Carbon markets in rich countries are giving support to low-carbon development like the Clean Development Mechanism. Three elements of policy are required for an effective global response: 1) regulating the price carbon, 2) innovation in low-carbon technologies, and 3) educating citizens and bureaucrats of the dangers of climate change. Countries are taking action already: the EU, US (California) and China. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol provide a basis for international co-operation. Future international frameworks should include: 1) emissions trading, 2) technology cooperation in support for energy R&D, 3) reduction of deforestation, 4) adaptation which includes the integration of climate change policy into development policy. Condoleezza Rice, “The Promise of Democratic Peace” Freedom is the only realistic path to security and international policy should reflect this. The terrain of international politics is shifting so much so that the traditional diplomacy of crisis management is insufficient. Now, major states are increasingly competing in peace, not preparing for war and the US is transforming its relationship with nations like Japan, Russia, the EU, and especially China and India to reach global stability through a balance of power that favors freedom. The greatest threats to security come from weak/failing states rather than the borders between the strong. Weak and failing states serve as global pathways that facilitate the spread of pandemics, the movement of criminals and terrorists, and the proliferation of the world‘s most dangerous weapons. So the fundamental character of regimes matters more today than the international distribution of power and supporting the growth of democratic institutions in all nations is the only realistic response to this changing world. The ―freedom deficit‖ in the broader Middle East creates an environment where citizens cannot redress their grievances through an open political process, making them vulnerable to malignant forces. Here economic reform is not enough for the freedom deficit to be fixed and democracy should be pursued here and it will succeed just as it has in other regions (despite protest to their Asian values, Latin culture, Slavic despotism, and African tribalism). Democracy is the only assurance of peace and security between states because it is the only guarantee of freedom and justice within states. Had America allowed the Middle East to stay with its ―stable‖ status quo then we would not have seen: 1) a Lebanon free of foreign occupation and advancing democratic reform, 2) a Palestinian Authority run by an elected leader who openly calls for peace with Israel, 3) an Egypt that has amended its constitution to hold multiparty elections, 4) a Kuwait where women are now full citizens, and 5) an Iraq that held historic elections, drafted and ratified a new national charter, and will soon elect a new constitutional government. The promise of democratic peace is now a reality in all of Europe and in much of Asia because previous American leaders like Acheson pushed for a statecraft based on American principles when precedents for action were lacking. Andre Safir ‗Globalization and the Reform of European Social Models‘ 1) Europe needs to reform its current labor and market policies and structures in order to kickstart its economy (again) so it can compete with industrialized (e.g. USA) and newly industrializing nations (e.g. China and India) 2) Summary , Europe needs to transform itself from ‗mass production‘, outdated technology and LT employment to keep up with a rapidly changing world economy, emphasizing technological change and competition. Lack to do so will affect the sustainability of integration. Refusal of the referendum by Denmark and France has been attributed to the poor condition of the economy. , ―Europe‖ needs to become flexible to change. It needs to reform its social models especially as the GDP of countries with inefficient ones is 2/3 of Europe and 90% of the ‗Single Market‘. It also needs to co-ordinate national reform of labor market and social policy with necessary reforms at EU level, although the failure of the Lisbon Agenda (which advocated this) may hint otherwise. Political equilibrium has changed: emphasis on ‗medium voters‘ no longer present due to ageing population and globalization i.e. their social benefits are not secure. , Emergence of market capitalism in Asia + former Soviet Bloc areas led to increased competition. Now developing countries‘ exports are 45% in developed countries compared to 10% in 1970. These countries also import many goods. , Europe maintains the status quo rather than moving on. It spends too much on agriculture rather than development. The single market‘s completion is too slow. Changes at EU level not followed by similar changes at national level => failure , Much of Europe considers the single market a threat to employment, economies etc. Fear of delocalization. , Four principal European social models: i)Nordic [Denmark, Finland, Sweden + NLands] high social protection + universal welfare (equity + efficiency) ii)Anglo-Saxon [Ireland & UK] last resort social assistance, weak unions, wage dispersion ( N equity Y efficiency) iii)Continental [Austria, Belgium, France, Germany & Luxembourg] insurance based non-employment benefits, pensions (Y equity N efficiency) iv)Mediterranean [Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain] employment protection, early retirement provisions (N equity, N efficiency) , Poverty: tax redistribution highest in Nordic system, lowest in Med , Protection in labor: Employment protection > Unemployment benefits. Anglo model = not much protection. Nordic best UB but lowest EP. Relative to US, Europe in general better. , Lowest unemployment in Nordic, then AS. Highest in Med. , Equity = lowering of poverty; efficiency =incentive to work, low unemployment , Microeconomic sphere: EU responsible for product and capital regulation and nation for labor market. Macroeconomic: EU responsible for monetary policy (via. European Central Bank) and nation for fiscal issues. , As stated above, one can co-ordinate national and EU policies, or just concentrate on national because that is at present holding the EU advancement back. 3) This article is relevant to: -Unit E European Enlargement (in that the addition of the new countries has posed problems for the ‗Single Market‘ - Unit F Euroscepticism (the apparent deterioration in the European economy has fuelled their arguments - Unit I Great Power Rivalry (USA and Europe) - Units J & K Civic Integration (Globalization will affect the labor market & production due to immigration. The social issues are also tied in with the economic ones re: acceptance: like the view that immigrants are ‗stealing‘ jobs) - Robert Kagan ‗Power and Weakness‘: deals with Europe & USA 4) Morgan commented on the disparity between European countries‘ labor policies and structure e.g. Germany developed a long term apprenticeship program, which would not be possible in the USA => emphasis on efficiency. On the other hand countries such as France have created contracts such as the ‗CDD‘ (Contrat Duree Determine) which shortens the time that people can have at work, in order to combat its unemployment problem and raise youth employment levels => emphasis on equity. 5) NB: Single market refers to countries in EU BEFORE enlargement Robert Kagan ‗Power and Weakness‘ 1) Europe and the USA have diverged in terms of economy, foreign policy and virtually every field because the USA sees issues in black and white (‗good and evil‘), and fighting for ‗good‘ and Europe recognizes more complex issues: moving away from power and towards ‗co-operation‘. Europe is more conducive to negotiation while the USA favours coercion. 2) , USA and Europe have completely different views on foreign policy: USA are more ‗Hobbesian‘ and jump to conflict more quickly while Europeans are more patient and prefer diplomacy. Obv. There are some groups within each that differ e.g. the Dems are less likely to advocate warfare than the Republicans , Why? The European experience with ‗machtpolitik‘ and inter-nation warfare over many centuries has taught them the evils of coercion esp. with 2 WWs in one century. The USA has not experienced this , The USA and Europe have traded places: now Europe is politically weak and the USA is strong, unlike in previous times. Approach has changed to – USA was more idealistic and European was more warfare focused , Europe‘s weakness means that they are reluctant to participate in warfare. The USA now is strong (spends 3% - close to 500 billion - of budget on defense, while in Europe it is <2%). Europe is less likely to annihilate a threat if it can afford to be tolerant, which is not true of a more powerful country; the USA. Also the USA is the primary target while Europe is not. Europe prefers to deal with issues e.g. Civic Integration which cost comparatively little and deal with ethical issues: ‗challenges‘ rather than ‗threats‘. , Europeans do not approve of the USA‘s ‗hyperpuissance‘ and appeal to the American ‗conscience‘ to stop acting like a world policeman: , But: paradoxically, Europe needs the USA to be forceful because it protects European Integration, peace and ‗postmodern Kantian paradise‘. Europe does not need military power because it is shielded by the USA. It was the USA that was crucial to integration: it solved the Franco-German problem with its military presence, economic aid to war-ravaged Europe (esp. Germany) by stopping the conflict between these two countries, forming the basis for integration. , NB: ironically, integration led to peace and the retreat of Europe from the world stage rather than the recreation of it as a superpower. , The USA cannot leave its ‗unilateral‘ mode because it needs to act as a sheriff to protect Europe and itself, given its position of power. Yet it must maintain its idealistic origins. Double standard – as Richard Cooper said, ‗if we are operating in the jungle, we must use the laws of the jungle‘ , BUT this mode is threatening to the European view of diplomacy, tolerance and discussion over war: a threat to its ‗no war‘ mission. , 2 attitudes towards European Integration and reasons for USA aiding Europe: a) in Cold War to create a powerful ally nr. The USSR b) to stop its getting dragged into European conflict on the continent and lessen its power so the USA could grow c) keep peace in the country – commitment , Will the USA maintain its military realist viewpoint and allow Europe to keep its postmodern peace? Materially the USA can finance armies. Unlikely to change. 3) This article is Relevant to: -Unit E European Enlargement (this may possibly affect the relationship of the USA and Europe => more countries => more people => changes economy and policy) - Unit F Euroscepticism (Integration has caused Europe to recede on the world‘s political and economic stage) - Unit I Great Power Rivalry (USA and Europe) - Andre Safir ‗Globalization and the Reform of European Social Models‘: deals with Europe‘s demise as an economic entity and the potential pitfalls of reformation, which is necessary for it to compete on a global level, even if the article thinks that Europe‘s current position is comfortable) 4) The Article is pretty self-explanatory and easy to understand. 5) None Fritz Scharpf, “The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity” Summary: European integration has created a constitutional asymmetry between policies promoting market efficiencies and policies promoting social protection and equality National welfare states are legally and economically constrained by European rules of economic integration, liberalization, and competition law, whereas efforts to adopt European social policies are politically impeded by the diversity of national welfare states, differing not only in levels of economic development and hence in their ability to pay for social transfers and services but, even more significantly, in their normative aspirations and institutional structures Response: Open Method of Coordination (OMC) used in the social-policy field Need solutions with the character of European law to establish constitutional parity with the rules of European economic integration, but which also must be sufficiently differentiated to accommodate the existing diversity of national welfare regimes Two options: ―Closer cooperation‖ and combining differentiated ―framework directives‖ with the OMC The Original Six were welfare states shaped by the Bismarck model of work-based social insurance – wouldn‘t harmonization have been easy? But would make enlargement difficult European Constraints on Welfare States Advance of economic integration has reduced the capacity of member states to influence the course of their own economies and to realize self-defined sociopolitical goals Monetary union deprives states of the ability to adjust exchange rates in response to economic problems, and has replaced national monetary policy by ECB interest rates, which will be too high for economies with below-average rates of economic growth and inflation and too low for countries above the average Impedes the recovery of sluggish economies, adds to inflationary pressures in countries with high growth rates Euro legal constraints have greatly reduced the capacity of nat. govs. to influence growth and employment in the economies for whose performance they are accountable But, govs face strong economic incentives to resort to just such strategies of competitive deregulation and tax cuts to attract or retain mobile firms and investments that might otherwise seek locations with lower production costs and higher post-tax incomes Welfare states might lower generosity + tighten eligibility law to discourage immigration The Dilemma of Social Europe No surprise that countries that rely on social regulations of the economy and welfare-states expect the EU to protect the ―European Social Model‖ Can we combine market, services and capital policies with market-correcting social regulations and taxes? - CAP shows it is possible Ruled out bc of diversity of European welfare states, not economic constraints What is possible in Scandinavia is unaffordable in Greece, Spain, etc. Notes THREE groups, not 4 like Sapir – Scandinavian, Anglo-Saxon, and Continental Represent fundamental social philosophies Voters in Britain could not accept high levels of taxation that sustain generous Swedish welfare state; Swedish families could not live with low level of social and educational services in Germany; and German doctors and patients would unite in protest against any moves toward a British- style National Health System Can the Open Method of Coordination Overcome the Dilemma? Policy choices are at the national level, but are defined as matters of common concern OMC most fully specified for the EES or ―Luxembourg Process‖ What OMC Can Do There will be national diversity because it is voluntary – no formal sanctions Potential for policy learning through information exchange, benchmarking, peer review, deliberation and blaming and shaming But benefits depend on the willingness of states to coordinate What OMC Cannot Do Policies promoted by the MC must avoid challenges to the acquis Member states operate under the same legal and economic constraints of economic integration which limit their policy choices when acting individually Policy through the IMC depends on the authors‘ estimates of the range of options that are still available at the national level under the constraints of an internationalized economy Successful countries usually had favorable economic and/or institutional preconditions Can Social Europe be Europeanized? Can this be done while respecting the diversity of politically salient national solutions? Can they use the ―closer cooperation‖ option? But suspicion prevent its use, though they would not apply to social and economic policy because it is issue-specific May lead to Protectionist vs. non-welfare states Combining Framework Directive with OMC? At the present state of economic integration, the aspirations of "Social Europe" can no longer be realized through purely national solutions Instead of striving for uniformity, European social law should allow different types of welfare states to maintain and develop their specific institutions in response to different understandings of social solidarity Conclusion The course of European integration from the 1950s onward has created asymmetry between policies promoting market efficiencies and promoting social protection/equality The relationship became asymmetric as economic policies were Europeanized while social-protection policies were at the national level. As a consequence, national welfare states are constitutionally constrained by the "supremacy" of all European rules of economic integration, liberalization, and competition law, and they must operate under the fiscal rules of the Monetary Union while their revenue base is eroding as a consequence of tax competition and the need to reduce non-wage labor costs Therefore, demands to ―level the playing field‖ and Europeanize social polices, but this is constrained by the diversity of national welfare state – economic development, normative aspirations, institutional structures, etc. European social policy is not politically feasible or desirable – so a solution needs to be reached that has the character of European law to establish constitutional parity, but must be differentiated enough to accommodate existing diversity Closer Cooperation is currently too inflexible, so maybe can use ―framework directives‖ and the Open Method of Coordination within groups of countries facing similar economic and institutional challenges of welfare-state reform Missing: mark baran Unit I: Great Power Rivalry In The National Interest: A Grand New Strategy for American Foreign Policy Stepehen M. Walt Stephen Walt believes that America needs to reevaluate the way it conducts foreign policy, taking the interests of others into account and practicing offshore balancing in order to preserve its primacy in the world -America‘s economic, military and ideological power is the source of its ability to influence world policy and ensure its security -America‘s primacy also leads to fear, resistance, and manipulation from other states -America needs to maximize the benefits of its power while minimizing the drawbacks -America should attempt to preserve its position of dominance -It should avoid squandering its power needlessly and discourage other states from building up their own capabilities, instead encouraging them to be dependent on America -One possible course of action is ―global hegemony,‖ in which the US attempts to run the world by itself and promote its objectives -This strategy may seem appealing but it is infeasible as the Bush administration‘s failed attempt to implement it shows -A more moderate plan is ―selective engagement,‖ in which the US keeps military forces deployed around the world to ensure security but avoids idealistic crusades -This corresponds to the policies of Bill Clinton and George H.W. Bush -The problem was that it was not selective enough and committed troops unecissarily -Final possibility is ―offshore balancing,‖ traditional US strategy, in which US only uses force abroad when there are direct threats to vital interests and depends primarily on local actors to maintain the balance of power -This is not an isolationist philosophy, the US could still be part of international organizations and keep close ties with foreign nations -Offshore balancing is the ideal strategy for the US; it allows other to do work for us and minimizes resentment provoked by American primacy while not being passive -America should be more selective in using its military force and abandon the doctrine of preemptive war, which has more costs than benefits as Iraq debacle shows -It should demonstrate restraint and wisdom to the world and work within international institutions like NATO and the UN to reassure other nations -America needs to make a continuous effort to convince other nations of its good will -Had America followed this strategy in Iraq, it would have avoided the entire mess -The US should discourage other nations from allying against it, and therefore should avoid using ―clash of civilizations‖ rhetoric like the Bush administration -It‘s better to focus on concrete issues than abstract, overarching enemies like ―terrorism‖ -Use of American force is most effective when perceived as legitimate, and therefore US should defend the legitimacy of its policies to the world -America has ignored this approach and needs to change, particularly with regard to the Islamic world -Luckily, America already has the tools to mount a public information campaign since English is the lingua franca of the world and many foreign students study in America -This obviously won‘t work if American policy ignores the interests of others -If recent American policy had taken the interests of other nations into account more often, it would be more difficult to portray America as a ―rogue superpower‖ -America is hated in the Islamic world, and should commit resources to repairing its relationship with Muslim countries -In order to accomplish this, US will have to follow three steps -America must use its leverage to bring an end to Israel-Palestine conflict -If Israel is unwilling to grant a Palestinian state, then the US should end its support for Israel rather than continue to act against its interest in the name of ideology -Also, US must abandon the quasi-imperialism in the Middle East supported by the neoconservatives of the Bush administration -This will help develop peace and democracy in the region in the long term -Terrorist use of WMD‘s is the greatest threat facing America -US should increase its efforts to secure fissionable materials and prevent terrorists from accessing them and provide strong incentives to stop nations like Iran and DPRK from developing nuclear arsenals -To do this, America must change its own policy and reduce its nuclear arsenal -America should offer a bargain to the world, promising to stop developing weapons and to refrain from aggression against rogue states in return for compliance -America should reduce its military presence in Europe, which is superfluous, and increase its presence in Asia -Bush administration has begun to change this antiquated pattern of deployment -US should ―play hard-to-get,‖ and make other states work to keep its alliance, not the other way around -America is an immature empire that is ignorant of the world its attempts to run -It needs to take foreign policy more seriously and develop a coherent strategy -America should rebuild confidence in its institutions and gain an understanding for what its power can and can‘t accomplish -―In most circumstances, the key is not power but persuasion‖ -America needs to show the world that its continued primacy is desirable -Current policy is not accomplishing these goals, and will ultimately lead to America‘s demise if it is not remedied Relevance: This is clearly relevant to the discussion of Euro-American relations and the connection between international security and European integration. Walt‘s arguments imply that the US should oppose the practice of European integration, which could pose a threat to American primacy. However, the article also suggests that Glyn Morgan is correct in asserting that America is primarily concerned with pursuing its own interests, and that Europe therefore needs to ensure its own security rather than depending on the United States. Stephen M. Walt Responds Stephen M. Walt Walt stands by the contentions he made in his article, and claims that his critics are incorrect. -Critics have claimed that Walt‘s realist perspective is no longer viable in modern world -Realism focuses on actions of states, but transnational problems are now prominent -Walt disagrees, and claims that the international system is not that much different than before, states are still the primary actors in international politics -Realism remains the best paradigm form which to approach the world -Contrary to critics‘ suggestions, Walt‘s view is nothing like the Bush administration‘s grandiose idealism -Other critics argue that Walt endorses American primacy too much -Walt counters that primacy does not imply control over all areas of world policy, but instead means being the most powerful and influential nation -Every modern President has attempted to pursue this goal -It‘s clearly easier to accomplish US objectives with primacy than without -Just because the uses to which American primacy has been put are less than ideal, this does not mean that primacy itself is a bad thing -The US and the world will be more stable with continued American dominance -Walt ignored use of soft power because that hasn‘t been problematic; use of hard power is what needs to be altered -Finally, some claim that Walt‘s policy recommendations are incorrect -Walt defends his contention that the US could cease to support Israel, claiming that the situation is not improving and the American public could be in favor of such a change -Also, he claims his proposal for a ―grand bargain‖ concerning WMD‘s might not work, but is better than any other solution -While Walt concedes that he may have omitted some issues, he maintains that almost everything is influenced by the fundamental foreign policy goals of America Relevance: See summary of ―In the National Interest,‖ by Stephen M. Walt “Of Paradise and Power”- Robert Kagan Kagan's argument is the following: The current transatlantic strife is only the latest symptom of a split that began after World War II, as the United States assumed the role of global police officer and Europe was allowed to rebuild itself economically and socially, guided by a Kantian vision of a unified continent in which commerce and the rule of law would prevent violence from breaking out. According to Kagan, the Europeans have taken up residence in what he calls "a post-historical paradise" where international relations can be governed by the rule of law and by multilateral cooperation. The Americans, meanwhile, continue to believe that the exercise of military force is necessary to deal with threats to international order or to U.S. national security. Kagan generally argues that Europe and America's differences over Iraq are merely one expression of a fundamental divergence of views about the most basic elements of international order. Kagan writes that "on major strategic and international questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus: They agree on little and understand one another less and less." After the appalling trauma of World War II, the nations of Europe turned away from foreign policies based on the pursuit of national interest and the balance of power. In the European Union, they constructed a new legal order based on shared sovereignty and transparency. Kagan sees the EU as "a miracle of world-historical importance." However, he also notes that the success of this model within Europe has led Europeans to place undue faith in the idea that it can be applied universally: that international order can be secured within the existing framework of international law. Kagan observes that Europeans attach much more importance to multilateral or diplomatic processes in dealing with global problems, while the United States now tends to think that resorting to force is the best way to go. The diplomatic back-and-forth that preceded the Iraq war is only one of many examples that support the point. He also attributes European wariness about the use of force to the continent's painful history in the first half of the twentieth century. Moreover, he argues that the absence of a common threat - in the form of the Soviet Union - has reduced the need for the Western powers to pull together, so that their different visions of international order can cause a lot more friction. America and Europe are no longer, in many respects, forced into the same boat. Kagan wants to make a further point: that the European outlook is a reflection not only of its history but also of its weakness. He contends that Europeans shun military solutions because they don't have the power to enforce them, while the United States, which can look after itself very well, doesn't need to be afraid of getting into a fight. International law, Kagan seems to imply, is for sissies. To illustrate his point, Kagan gives the example of a man in a forest carrying a knife who sees a bear prowling around on the loose. He is likely to decide that the bear is a tolerable danger, "inasmuch as the alternative - hunting the bear armed only with a knife - is actually riskier than lying low and hoping the bear never attacks." But, Kagan continues, the same man armed with a rifle "will likely make a different calculation of what constitutes a tolerable risk. Why should he risk being mauled to death if he doesn't have to?" Plainly, the lowly knife-carrier represents Europe; the studly rifle-bearer is the United States. Kagan says this "may be the most important reason for the divergence in views between Europe and the United States. America's power and its willingness to exercise that power - unilaterally if necessary - constitute a threat to Europe's new sense of mission." By Europe's sense of mission, he means its desire to export its "post-historical paradise" of a law-based order to the rest of the world. ―REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON GRAND STRATEGIC CHOICES”- Fukuyama and Ikenberry The report gives an assessment of the place of the US in the world and outlines a grand strategy of actionable terms. The main conclusions are: • East Asia is likely to pose the greatest challenges to the United States over the coming three decades. Thus, the US needs to move toward an Asia centric grand strategy that can consolidate the American position and head off trouble before it occurs. A central part of this strategy is an effort to compete with a rising China for regional influence. • The main stumbling block in the way of such a necessary strategic shift is the ongoing war in Iraq. Failure in Iraq would be catastrophic for the United States so the US should avoid any temptation to cut and run. The US needs to work its way through available strategies to create a stable functioning government and be careful not to allow the best to be the enemy of the tolerable. • What goes on inside states matters profoundly for the United States. However, the US is poorly equipped to influence these developments on its own. The US needs to create a new set of institutions to penetrate failing and rogue states to guard against terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and regional instability. • The war on terrorism is a global counterinsurgency campaign, not a clash of civilizations. The center of gravity of this war is now Iraq, but Western Europe is also a battleground, where the primary challenge is to integrate disaffected Muslims. • The preemptive and preventive use of force is acceptable but fraught with danger. The US ought to be very careful about when it is employed and ensure that it does not rule out more effective options. It is likely to have greater utility against terrorists than states. • Institutions are tools of American power and facilitate national security. The US must relearn the benefits of multilateralism. • Rebuilding the Western order is critical to the security of the United States. Refusing to even try will cause a collapse in its power over outcomes, providing the US with great autonomy but little influence. The key to this process of rebuilding is a series of new grand bargains between the United States and other democracies. Week I Condoleezza Rice Article: “The Promise of Democratic Peace: Why Promoting Freedom Is the Only Realistic Path to Security” Rice begins by comparing the current international political situation with that of Dean Acheson‘s after WWII: she believes that solutions to current international problems require a fundamental new vision and ―imagination.‖ ―In times of unprecedented change, the traditional diplomacy of crisis management is insufficient.‖ The solution, she believes, lies in a ―realistic statecraft.‖ She supports President Bush‘s policy of supporting democratic movements in all areas of the world and ―ending tyranny‖ (Bush‘s words). Rice believes that, besides being the right thing to do, this is also the only policy that will ensure security amidst the new realities of world politics. Although the concept of failing states is nothing new, ―the danger they now pose is unparalleled.‖ Due to globalization, with the rapid movement of ―people, goods, and information,‖ the threats posed by terrorists are ever greater according to Rice. Failing states allow for such terrorists to breed unchecked and increase the danger for the US. Due to this threat, Rice claims it is essential to promote stable, democratic governments. A stable state can ―meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system,‖ thus providing greater stability for their own citizens and lessen the chance of disillusioned citizens becoming terrorists, threatening the US. ―Supporting the growth of democratic institutions in all nations is not some moralistic flight of fancy; it is the only realistic response to our present challenges,‖ according to Rice. The Middle East, according to Rice, is such ―fertile ground‖ for terrorism due to its ―freedom deficit.‖ Democracy, she believes, can and will succeed in the Middle East. Rice concludes that such statecraft is a bold plan, but she reiterates it is the only possibility for setting the foundation for ―a fully free, democratic, and peaceful world.‖ Kenneth Waltz Article: The Emerging Structures of International Politics Waltz begins that in the modern era the international structure has been based on the rise and decline of great powers. This continued to be true in the bipolar world of the Cold War (US and USSR). This era of stability was based on a ―symmetry‖ where states still competed economically and militarily, but nuclear weapons and changes in the international political structure allowed for a ―troubled peace.‖ This era has ended, however, and Waltz poses the questions of what structural changes are ahead and what are the implications. Waltz discusses the inevitable rise and fall of great powers. He believes in the near future Germany (or another western European state), China, and Japan may rise to great power status. The Soviet Union fell from great power status equally abruptly as the rise of China. Waltz notes, however, that to be a great power, there must be a ―certain economic capability‖ which was lacking in Russia. Nuclear weapons, according to Waltz, favors countries who already have them because then they can focus on their economies as opposed to military. Nuclear capability, alone, however, does not make a country a great power (e.g., France and England). Although Russia still has a very capable military, due to its relative decline, it can no longer hold the US in check. Thus, a bipolarity still exists because no other country has yet risen, but it remains in a weakened form where no country is strong enough to challenge the US. The rise of nuclear weapons would suggest that it is now economic power that determines status, as war is not possible due to mutually assured destruction between two nuclear powers. They still, however, secure a ―country‘s vital interests.‖ ―Nuclear weapons have at once secured the vital interests of states possessing them and upheld the international order.‖ Waltz next discusses economic policies in the new international world by focusing on Japan‘s rise and protectionist, neo-mercantilist policies. Waltz notes that the EC (European Community) was in part “out of fear that a disunited Europe could not stand up to Japanese and American competition.” Waltz is then suggesting that in the current international system, economic power has become vital and is also important for security. Waltz makes 4 points about the current international economic system: 1) ―The basic structure of international relations continues to be anarchic. Each state fends for itself with or without the cooperation of others.‖ 2) Relative gains are more important to countries than absolute ones, i.e. growing faster than other countries is more important than absolute growth is more important for security reasons. Economic power is linked with security. 3) The more productive and technologically advanced countries are, the bigger advantage they have in military power and force should it be necessary. Also, ―the reduction of military worries will focus [countries] on their technological and economic successes and failures.‖ 4) Uncertainty is still a fact of international relations. ―Anarchy places a premium ion foresight.‖ States will continue to place strong emphasis on growth for the future, to maintain future security. In respect to Europe, Waltz notes that in a multipolar world, American policy will continue ―bank on NATO‘s continued cohesion and influence.‖ In the long run, however, Waltz believes NATO does not make sense. It will annoy European countries, who will no longer want large amounts of American military power on their soil, and it will also become burdensome in costs to Americans. With the demise of the Soviet Union, NATO becomes obsolete. The cohesion of NATO will fall apart as Western Europe and the US have differing interests. Waltz concludes with an emphasis that states will continue to compete with each other, and powers will rise and fall. He also offers the suggestion that conflict between democracies is indeed possible. The new world is no more stable or necessarily more peaceful. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America September 2002 thAbstract: A look at the United State‘s post September 11 foreign policy. The policy has many implications for world powers such as Europe and centers on the United States‘ desire to spread democracy and also touches on the USA‘s use of preemptive tactics to spread democracy and fight global problems. Introduction from George Bush: The struggles of the twentieth century against totalitarianism have been won over by liberty. This liberty takes the form of freedom, democracy and free enterprise. stIn the 21 century only the nations that defend these freedoms will be able to unleash the power of their people assure their future prosperity. Values that nations need to defend are freedoms and truths for all people of all societies. The United States today is the foremost economic and military power in the world. With this power comes the responsibility to push for human rights for everyone, not just Americans. USA must extend peace and prosperity by encouraging free and open societies on every continent. America must defend itself from outside powers i.e. terrorism but in this struggle there is the opportunity to extend and foster peace. America will help and push for the extension of democracy in all nations. America will extend the benefits of freedom across the globe. United States will stand protect and help any nation that is trying to instill democracy and peace. The United States is committed to working with such organizations such as the UN, NATO, and the WTO. Freedom is a non-negotiable demand of human dignity. The United States welcomes the opportunity to lead the world into an era of peace and prosperity for human rights and the economy for the world. Overview of America‟s International Strategy The United States holds unparallel and unprecedented power and influence on the world stage. The USA‘s version of internationalism reflects the values and national interests. Aim not just to impose will or interest of America, but to make the world a safer and better place. To achieve these goals the United States must: 1)champion aspirations for human dignity 2)strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism 3)work with others to diffuse regional conflicts 4)prevent enemies from threatening USA and friends 5)ignite a new era of economic growth through free markets and free trade on the global level 6)expand circle of development by opening societies and building infrastructures of democracy 7)develop agendas for cooperation with other main centers of global power Unilaterialism This aspect of the Bush Doctrine reflects the understanding that grave threats require decisive action regardless of opposition opinion. To make every attempt to include other nations in military and diplomatic actions and to take necessary action against grave threats even if no other nation is willing to assist. Extens ion of Democracy This aspect of the Bush Doctrine is least expected from a powerful hegemon, since such countries traditionally seek to maintain stability and the status quo instead of pursuing regime change, by force if needed. It does, however, fit into a long history of democracy promotion in US foreign policy, and dovetails with the belief that because democracies don't fight each other, democratic promotion can thus increase security. At the same time, Administration actions since 2001 have shown that the US is sometimes willing to trade democracy for stability and support, as in the cases of Saudi Arabia or Pakistan. However, it is often pointed out that "actively promoting American versions of democracy and freedom in all regions of the world" is imperialism in itself, as America follows the historic pattern of an empire extending its own systems as far as its armies can reach. Notable examples include South Korea and Japan. Missing: Sean Hughes Unit J: The Challenge of Civic Integration – The US and Britain BobWit: He discusses a draft Bill that looked to install additional measures on how to deal with Antillean and Aruban ‗at risk youths‘ and integrate them into the Netherlands. The Bill covers three main areas: 1. Introduction of a power for the Minister to order the expulsion of certain Antillean and Aruban ‗at risk youths‘ between the ages of 14-26 from the Netherlands to one of the other countries un the Kingdom and a corresponding power to refuse them reentry. 2. Introduction of a provision which allows the Dutch Courts, when sentencing Antilleans and Arubans, to direct that such sentence not be served if the convicted person left The Netherlands within a prescribed time and did not return until a stipulated period of two or three years had expired. 3. Introduction of integration programmes for Antillean and Aruban Dutch nationals Wit criticizes the Bill and its three areas: 1. Admission and Expulsion a. Upon entering the Netherlands, Antilleans and Arubans of the age group will be requires to present proof of such matters as their level of formal education, their being registered at a recognized institute of education, their being employed, or their intention to return to their own country within three months b. Proposed law is said to intend to discourage the youngsters from emigrating to The Netherlands without proper education. c. Wit argues that the proposed law will create substantial differential treatment between Dutch nationals in the age group of 16-24 years as only those with an Antillean or Aruban background will have to comply with certain conditions. d. Wit disagrees that there is a considerable threat from these Dutch national of Aruban or Antillean descent that merits the passing of the Bill. He argues that the societal situation in the Netherlands has hardened remarkably with traces of xenophobia, racism, and growing intolerance after 9/11 and this has ignited a need for the government to respond to societal wishes. e. Wit presents numbers and stats that prove that imposing this Bill cannot be supported by the fact that these Antilleans are actually a substantial part of crimes in the Netherlands; most of them have come for study or work f. He says that the Bill on the long run could be disastrous for the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba as the effect of the measures could be a thorough separation of skilled youngsters from those who are behind. The Netherlands and Aruba could with some right be designated as a human ‗dumping paces; as they will slowly be degraded from ‗equal countries‘. g. Wit provides evidence to establish the draft Bill as discriminatory – inequality of treatment without an objective justification between Dutch nationals of diverse backgrounds; restricting their right to enter and reside in the territory of the Netherlands comes down to treating these citizens not only differently from other Dutch nationals but also from European citizens from other Member States who do not have Dutch nationality. h. Antilleans and Arubans will have to be accepted by all European States save their own; Wit says Bill is unnecessary because the group in question is decreasing in numbers and is presently a very small quantity. Bill of this magnitude not necessary. 2. Exile as new mode of silencing a. Wit argues that it is incomprehensible for the Dutch Government not to consider the law proposed as a violation of the principle of equality. Any difference in sentencing on the sole ground of descent would constitute clear discrimination 3. Compulsory integration a. Doesn‘t say much about this, only says he finds it discriminatory as well Conclusion: He argues that the mere fact that one of the countries, being the former or present colonial power, clearly calls the shots, does not mean that the other countries should allow that country to flout the fundamental rights of their people; Wit says that the draft Bill will die a dishonorable death at the stage of the Council of State. Another reason he thinks the proposal will not be enacted is because it would put Netherlands‘ Queen in an extremely awkward position because it would violate the Constitution by being detrimental to her subjects in the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba; she owes allegiance to all her subjects irrespective of race, ethnic background, descent or place of residence. Comparing the UK and Germany: Introduction: , One of the key problems in immigration policy is that politicians of all persuasions have frequently failed to make adequate different groups of migrants and the very different policy responses they require. Simultaneously, the term ‗immigration‘ is often taken to refer to all stages of the migratory process. What rapidly emerges, therefore, is a different group, policies and academic disciplines which are subsumed within the term ‗immigration‘. , Both the UK and Germany have large and stable minority populations and in recent years have emerged as the main destinations for new immigration within the EU; the two countries have had the highest number of applications for asylum in the EU for a number of years. , Challenge of integrating generations of immigrants is faced by both countries, regardless of the definitions used in official discourse. In both countries, the non- white population tends to have higher unemployment rates and lower incomes than the indigenous population. , Structural difference between the two countries: o Most of ethnic minorities in the UK have British citizenship; even if they formally remain aliens, they are included in the political process via the right to vote. o Not the case in Germany, where most immigrants and their offspring have been excluded from the political process by a historically restrictive nationality law. By being denied suffrage, politicians have little incentive to take account of their concerns Macro-theories of immigration: , Globalization, combined with continuing poverty in many areas of the developing world, creates pressures which individual countries can only partially resist. , Theories for explaining immigration o ‗neoclassical theory‘- views migrations is an expression of mankind‘s desire to better itself; as developing countries industrialize, wage differentials encourage people to seek work in urban areas o ‗new economics of labor migration‘ – views international migration as an opportunity for migrants to manage risk and overcome market failures in the home economy. By working abroad temporarily, migrants build up earnings and return money home through remittances or lump sum transfer o ‗world systems theory‘ – sees international migration as a result of the displacement caused by economic globalization, as the capitalist system has penetrated more and more into developing economies. Globalization at the same time has created a more mobile population of workers who seek new ways of earning incomes. Migration thus serves to reinforce international inequalities rather than to alleviate them, since migration is sponsored by multinational corporations who are looking for lower wages. o ‗dual labor market theory‘ – focuses on ‗pull factors‘ from the point of view of the recipient country, by pointing to the internalization of demand for labor; theory says that many jobs in global cities are rejected by natives and employers turn to immigrants to fill these posts o ‗migration networks theory‘ – further immigrants are attracted from the same country of origin because of the existence of friends, family, and fellow nationals. Migration networks are therefore ‗sets of interpersonal relations that link migrants with relatives, friends and fellow countrymen at home‘. This is seen a lot more in Germany than in the UK o ‗cumulative causation theory‘ – views migration as a self-sustaining and self-perpetuating phenomenon Labor Migration , Official policy has consistently maintained that further labor migration, especially by semi- and low-skilled labor, should be prevented to safeguard jobs and to avoid social unrest. , However, the simultaneous decline in birth rates and increase in life expectancy poses considerable challenges not only for pension provision, but also for the financing of other public services such as healthcare. In 2050, the UK and Germany will require net migration of around 1 million and 3.4 million people respectively annually. , Both countries are thinking of including a points-based system in their immigration bills. , Immigration of high-skilled labor is relatively uncontroversial, but the possibility of low-skilled workers could create competition for jobs with the indigenous population. , Migration is economically beneficial in a well functioning labor market and will not harm local labor, as long as migrant skills complement rather than substitute those of the existing workforce. , Key to the economic viability of migration lies in the skills levels of migrants – while an influx or unskilled workers from the accession would create more unemployment in Germany and the EU, qualified migrants would have a positive effect. Towards a manageable asylum system? , Too many applicants for asylum in UK and Germany , Removing failed applicants in countries is very difficult; once entry has been achieved, an asylum seeker probably has a reasonable chance of obtaining permanent residence irrespective of the outcome of his or her asylum application. Inability to remove failed asylum seekers is arguably the Achilles heel of the entire system, as it undermines the credibility of a state‘s attempt to secure its borders , Levels of financial support for asylum seekers have also been kept deliberately low in both countries, partly to keep costs in check, and partly to act as a deterrent Naturalization and Integration , Different starting points for UK and Germany on integration o UK – expansive definition of citizenship; naturalization of immigrants has always been a low-key affair, with few formal requirements and a liberal tolerance of dual citizenship. o Germany – highly exclusive tradition of integration; built around an ethnocultural definition of membership , Both countries are grappling with problems of integration; a vibrant minority subculture has developed in many cities. Unemployment among ethnic minorities is high, language skills are often patchy, and educational achievements are correspondingly low for immigrants. Reading Summaries for Week J (Modood, Goodhart, and Huntington Article) Huntington, “The Hispanic Challenge,” Foreign Policy This article is highly interesting, kinda racist, and completely about the US. Nevertheless: Originally, America‘s WASP settlers here homogenous and defined America in those terms. When Revolution gave them ideological cause, a certain creed developed (embodied in the Declaration of Independence) that is now central to US identity. Immigration has made the US diverse and civil rights have expanded, and now a multi-ethnic and –racial America defines itself based on ―culture and creed.‖ The ‗culture‘ aspect includes English (language), Christianity (along with Protestant sense of mission, work ethic, and individualism), English law, and rights limiting government. ‗Culture‘ has also recently come ―under assault‖ by the rising academic popularity of ―multiculturalism and diversity‖ and the fact that many Americans now have ―dual identities.‖ Specifically, Latin American immigration (and subsequent high fertility) is responsible for this challenge, because the culture they bring is less similar to the American one than immigration has seen, historically—but America is ignoring this. Take Mexican immigration. If it ceased, lower income Americans‘ wages would go up, all this debate would subside, and immigrants would not feel like they could get away without learning English. Current Mexican immigration is unlike anything in the past in 6 ways: (1) contiguity – Mexicans didn‘t brave the ocean and leave families behind and enter via Ellis Island, but just cross a border across from the third world to the first (no other land border has as large of an income gap). (2) scale – They are a higher % of US‘s total immigration than any other group ever, and they‘re reproducing quickly, so they will soon constitute 25% of all American population, and there won‘t be as much pressure for them to learn English. (3) illegality – previous efforts to curb illegality have not worked, and illegal immigration is growing. (4) regional concentration – Hispanics concentrate: Mexicans in S.Calif, Cubans in Miami, Puerto Ricans and Dominicans in NY. Other cities, too, are quickly becoming Hispanic, and this poses great strain on their school systems. (5) persistence – as opposed to other Immigrant waves, current trends show no sign of stopping in the near future. (6) historical presence – the US took these lands from wars with Mexico, and Mexican immigrants have a sense of entitlement that other immigrants don‘t. The result is: assimilation is harder, as shown by their inability to match US norms in education, income, and intermarriage rates. Stats show that they speak Spanish at home overwhelmingly, and that this is a new development; will the third generation make gains in fluency that the second generation hasn‘t? Hispanics encourage native language retention more so than any other immigrant group. The argument that ‗in this modern world people should be bilingual‘ unfairly assumes that second languages have to be Spanish AND sends the wrong message to immigrant kids about the importance of knowing English. The (economic) market has encouraged bilinguals over native speakers, decreasing the latter‘s salaries. It has made people ask, ‗so what do you have against English??‘ and feel inadequate themselves, unfairly. And it may have a huge effect on civil society: required bilingual government documents, programs, education, even public office. Such tension can reproduce the racial tension of the 60s. LA has already seen frighteningly large anti-US demonstrations and in polls 36% of immigrant children identify selves as ―Mexican.‖ They‘re forming an enclave rather than assimilating. Take Miami: there has been a ―Cuban takeover‖ that made Miami an ―enclave city‖ with its own non-American culture. More commerce is conducted in Spanish than English. Anglos are now the minority and many have fled. In LA, it will be worse, because immigrants are less skilled and illegal and not political refugees. They‘ll feel more entitled to solidify their own culture at Americans‘ expense. That reverence of democracy is NOT a Mexican value the way it is an American one; the result will be a political and cultural ―clash‖ that spells ―the end of America as we have known‖ it. Tariq Modood, “Remaking Democracy after 7/7,” openDemocracy One-Sentence Reading Summary: While many Britons might think that multiculturalism is an ineffective position toward immigrants (particularly Arab/Muslim immigrant) following the London Tube bombings, multiculturalism—combined with a bit of pressure toward integration into British culture—remains the ideal stance toward immigrants in Britain. Detailed Summary: , After the London Tube bombings, many criticized Britain‘s multicultural stance towards immigrants (which advocates multicultural equality and acceptance and embraces plural ways of belonging to Britain). o They feared that multiculturalism destroyed the unified ―community‖ of Britons and had increased the feelings of difference and inequality among minority groups (multiculturalism ―fostered fragmentation rather than integration.‖). Instead, they advocate a stronger integration/assimilation of minorities. , Modood‘s response: still supports multiculturalism, but understands need for more integration. But, “integration should take a multicultural rather than an assimilative form.” , Definitions of these 3 key terms: o Assimilation is where the processes affecting the relationship between social groups are seen as one-way: minorities must adopt to the ways of the state/majority, and the state/majority will remain the same. The preferred result is one where the newcomers do little to disturb the society they are settling in and become as much like their new compatriots as possible. o Integration is where processes of social interaction are seen as two-way, and where members of the state/majority as well as immigrants and ethnic minorities are required to do something; so the latter cannot alone be blamed for ―failing to or not trying to integrate.‖ The established society is the site of institutions – including employers, civil society and the government – in which integration has to take place, and they accordingly must take the lead. o Multiculturalism is where processes of integration are seen both as two- way and as working differently for different groups. In this understanding, each group is distinctive, and thus integration cannot consist of a single template. Also, immigrants and minorities are not recognized simply as individuals but rather as parts of groups that possess unique identities (a view called ―multiplicity‖). These groups demand full equality—of dignity and of respect—with the majority. Individuals should feel free to embrace their identities, regardless of whether the identity is ascribed to them (race/gender) or ―chosen‖ (religion) – this distinction is immaterial for Modood‘s purposes. , Modood‘s vision for integration in a multicultural form: o Multiculturalism. To give minority groups political representation (in a multicultural sense, with an appreciation for multiplicity), some form of freely-structured institution (following a ―Board of Deputies‖ model) in which an independent body (formed by the minority groups, not the state) would work with the state to further the interests of their group. Leadership would typically be done by lay representatives (as opposed to rabbis or imams). However, the state should not enforce a secular system upon these groups, whose identity may include religious components. o Yet with multiculturalism, integration. While Britain‘s multicultural policies are not to blame for the London Tube bombings, more integration nevertheless would help augment the effectiveness of multiculturalism. ―We cannot have strong multicultural or minority identities and weak common or national identities.‖ We must strengthen a British national identity that encourages inclusion. The majority and the minority both can embrace their Britishness. Summary: ―Thus, the lesson from the current, post-7 July crisis of how to respond to the appeals and threats from jihadism is that we need to go further with multiculturalism: but it has to be a multiculturalism that is allied to, indeed is the other side of the coin of, a renewed and reinvigorated Britishness.‖ David Goodhart, “Too Diverse?” Prospect. One-Sentence Reading Summary: As Britain becomes more diverse, a conflict arises between the appreciation of this diversity and the survival of a unified welfare state (the ―progressive dilemma‖). While diversity and solidarity are both important, the state must focus on the promotion of solidarity in order to preserve a balance between these conflicting social forces. Detailed Summary: , Britain is becoming more diverse. Diversity is good, but it conflicts with solidarity and sharing. For example, diversity complicates the survival of the welfare state (because people only like to share with those whom they identify with) – this is the “progressive dilemma” (supporting both increased diversity and large welfare state can conflict with each other). , In-group/out-group characterizations are an innate tendency of humans, any anyone who would argue that we should abolish in-group favoritism would have to accept some extreme policies (such as spending the vast proportion of our budget on foreign aid or allowing all immigration). , Citizenship helps to remedy the conflict between diversity and solidarity (by uniting people behind un-ethnic ―national pride‖). But, there‘s a problem: citizenship is tied up in shared history of people and shared values; too much rapid immigration erodes this connection to its values/its past. People fear increasing diversity, particularly ethnic diversity (b/c it‘s more visible). , Political arena must address progressive dilemma b/c it seems to be true (more heterogeneous nations have smaller welfare states, areas with more minorities have lower social trust). , Some—particularly multiculturalists—deny the existence of the ―dilemma‖ (tradeoff btw diversity and solidarity). They argue that all humans share similar needs, and the resistance to responding to these needs equally among all groups is simply a ―false consciousness.‖ Multicultural politics, they feel, can overcome this tradeoff by celebrating diversity while enforcing the acceptance of universal values (i.e., rule of law, right and wrong, marriage and family, etc.). Also, they suggest that ―citizenship‖ is not as rooted in a ―shared history‖ as others argue, and that immigrants can join the ―us‖ of a nation without the complications of an overbearing historical identity. , But, hard to deny that immigration doesn‘t pose serious threat to solidarity. o Economically: while immigration could help fill undesirable jobs, it would increase inequality between whites and minorities while not providing an effective support for the aging baby boomers. o Culturally: conflicts of interest in distributions of benefits (i.e. when immigrants start eating up benefits that could be going to native populations). Also, immigrant groups frequently share a strong sense of community that many whites (who lack such community) look upon with envy. [But paradoxically, because whites share such little community/solidarity between themselves, it makes it easier for whites to accept minorities who wish to integrate!] , When solidarity and diversity come into conflict, public policy should support solidarity. Diversity will support itself, because the natural progress of societies is pushing toward increasing diversity. However, states need to actively reinforce the cultural ties that make up solidarity in order to ensure their survival. , States must support solidarity in four areas: o Immigration and asylum: long-term immigrants should be encouraged to integrate into mainstream culture, and clustering/insularity of immigrant communities should be discouraged. o Welfare policy: Europe is a close and condensed place, so people begin to feel uncomfortable when their tax money is helping undesirable neighbors. Thus, welfare state should be restricted—not by race or ethnicity, but by behavior. I.e., those who make an effort to integrate and become citizens should get more benefits than those who don‘t integrate/become citizens and remain on work permits (a two-tiered welfare system). o Culture: more emphasis should be placed on maintaining a ―single national conversation.‖ The BBC, for example, can serve as ―social glue,‖ and all schools should teach British history. o Politics and language: centralize politics under a nation-state, and encourage the use of a language that embraces minorities but fosters a common culture. THIS IS A BASIC SUMMARY OF MODOODS ARGUMENTS FROM HIS BOOK: Multicultural Politics: Racism, Ethnicity and Muslims in Britain Modood takes the debate into the realm of religious minority groups, and specifically Muslims. Modood differentiates his position from Parekh specifically on religious groups. He argues that instead of religious groups being a similar case to cultural or ethnic groups, they are better represented through a comprehensive timeline of group-differentiated rights. In regards to minority-majority relations, Modood states that, ―claims based on race and ethnicity that established the initial and greater legitimacy, 1with religious claims following on the coattails of the former.‖ Thus, they cannot be bracketed as one in the same as cultural and ethnic claims for legitimacy. Religious group claims are entirely different Modood argues. The primary difference is that religious groups push the issue of multiculturalism to new boundaries that ethnic and cultural groups have not required thus far. For Modood racism has long been gauged by the differences in individual‘s skin color. This ―Atlantocentric‖ pattern is largely due to the American experiences of African Americans, along with the major presence of black-racial politics in the civil rights movement. This conception of racism does not represent the experience of religious, and especially Muslim, individuals which is often supported by things like language, dress, religion, and family structure. Unlike Parekh, who argues 1 Modood, Tariq, Multicultural Politics: Race, Ethnicity, and Muslims in Britain, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2005, p. 178 that national identity is exclusively located in a society‘s political culture, Modood believes that religious, and specifically Muslim identity, is directly related not only to political culture but also their society‘s, ―habits, temperament, attitude to life, sexual 2practices, customs, family structure, body language, hobbies, an so on.‖ Modood takes his definition of Muslim identity and demonstrates how radical secularism, similar to Parekh‘s strong secularism, is incompatible with both mainstream 3Islam and with contemporary society. He argues that the fact that society has a lot of religious values already evident in its political structure is acceptable. He believes that, like Parekh, religion is an integral part of an individual‘s conception of the good and that any argument that a ―strict divide between the public and private spheres suggested by 4some theorists of multiculturalism is overplayed.‖ Given this reality he believes that Islam, and especially mainstream Islam has an important part to play in shaping society. He points to the reality that mainstream Islam, much inline with the historical existence 5of a relationship with the church and the state, advocates a form of moderate secularism. The divide does exist, he argues, between private and public spheres in Islamic faith to ―facilitate dialogue with other (contending) religious and nonreligious communities and 6beliefs.‖ As a result of his views on the integration of Islam into the political sphere, Modood argues that is acceptable and even obligatory to give ―a minority group legal 7protection that the majority does not want for itself.‖ He reinforces this argument for a new order of minority group rights by stating, ―racial equality cannot always mean that our public institutions and the law itself must treat everybody as if they were the same— for that will usually mean treating everybody by the norms and convenience of the 8majority.‖ He mentions religious holidays, language protection, and religious festivals as a few popular examples. He labels this process of increasing the scope of minority rights ―equality through pluralism.‖ Modood then takes an interesting spin on restriction of freedom of speech in the name of minority groups. He states that many states have existing laws that outlaw Holocaust denial because it does not add any legitimate intellectual value and only causes individuals to feel hurt. New laws in Germany and France that imprison those who participate in holocaust denial are evidence of this trend. From this framework, Modood returns to the heavily publicized Rushdie affair concerning The Satanic Verses as an example of how important the Prophet is to the central Muslim psyche. Modood states, ―A piece of history, that piece of oppression, can become so central to the psyche, to the life and continuing vulnerability of that group, that it can become part of its mode of 9being.‖ Thus Modood extends the concept of group defamation regulation to include religious groups. No longer, he argues, should just racial and ethnic groups enjoy protection under group defamation laws. Muslims should ―demand for a full membership 2 Modood, 231-32 3 Modood uses the term ―mainstream‖ Islam to distinguish moderate Islam from more fundamentalist variants. 4 Modood, 149 5 Modood is speaking specifically about Britain but notes that the phenomenon is widely evident. 6 Modood, 142 7 Modood, 111 8 Modood, 108 9 Modood, 121 in which society makes clear through law and other institutional means that gross defamation will not be tolerated.‖ To critics who might argue that self-regulation by society should be enough to control group defamation, Modood counters that this only truly works when the majority group or politically powerful group is the group in question. Minority groups are instead faced with the prospect of regulating material that is often unheard. Instead, he recommends, ―a minimalist legal framework and a voluntary code of practice regulated by a semiofficial body,‖ as a compromise between the two groups. The end goal of these laws, for Modood, is to encourage a dialogue. This dialogue must be ―an argument with, 10not about, the minority group in question and reasoned refutation must be possible.‖ Summary of Mill’s Liberalism, Security, and Group Defamation by Glyn Morgan 1. This article uses three court cases to analyze the intricacies of hate speech laws in diverse western liberal democracies and how objections to hate speech legislation often cite the work of Mill, whose security based liberalism theory Morgan believes is convincing. 2. Morgan‟s article begins with a discussion of three European court cases that involved speech against homosexuals, two spoken by religious leaders and one by a homes man in England. Although the three individuals were prosecuted differently, the cases highlight the fact that laws dealing with hate speech are complex and often incite ire in people of different faiths and political groups. One of the main questions posed is whether hate speech laws should be expanded to include religious groups and people of different sexual orientation. Morgan spends quite some time discussing the writing of Tariq Mododd, who supports legislation restricting expressions of religious and racial hatred and believes such speech amounts to group defamation. Group defamation is extremely difficult to categorize and limit, and thus the argument of who should be included in this term continues to develop. Yet it is the work of Mill that is most frequently referred to, and his discussion of free speech focuses on consequentialist and security based arguments. Morgan finds Mill‟s consequentialist argument troublesome, most importantly because it rests on the assertion that a specific “truth” exists in moral affairs and therefore people will willingly view their position/religion from the point of view of others. This is obviously not the way society has evolved to function, and the growing diversity of the population further discredits Mill‟s theory in this respect because people of radically different faiths and cultures are living together in greater frequency today. Yet Mill‟s discussion of security as a justification for legislation on hate speech is much more convincing because he takes into account 10 Modood, 130 the good of the polity and how hate speech affects the individual, minority groups, and the overall dynamic of society. Although Morgan does not present his own opinion on whether hate speech laws should be expanded, he does reassess the rulings of the court cases in light of the discussion of Modood and Mill. 3. This reading is connected to the time we spent on civic integration and how the growing diversity of Europe has been accompanied by discord and at times violence against groups of different faiths, sexual orientation, or race. A discussion of Mill and Modood elucidates the philosophical foundation for protecting and restricting speech and how these opinions can be seen in the legal codes of present day societies. 4. The time Morgan spent discussing civic integration largely focused on the different ways nations can approach contemporary multiculturalism in society: assimilation, integration, and segmentation. He outlined the specific case in Britain and mainly focused on how the Muslim population has impacted overall societal relations. Olssen, From the Crick Report to the Parkeh Report: Multiculturalism, Cultural Difference, and democracy- the re-visioning of citizenship education This article compares the Crick Report which seeks to ―place citizenship education within the context of a pluralistic society which requires basic but robust civic and political foundations.‖ Basically what this article talks about is how the concept of citizenship should be used as an effective way to integrate new minorities into a society. Citizenship, in this report, is deemed to be the equalizer of all. It is seen as the best way to not only define, but increase the rights that could be enjoyed by all- in the civil, political and also social realm. This article aims to point out the weaknesses of the Crick Report, and show how the Parekh report produced better results in the experiment of integrating new ethnicities to become citizens. One of the main problems the Crick Report encounters by using citizenship as an equalizing factor is that injustice arises as much from treating different people as the same as it does from treating the same people as different. By using citizenship to basically say ―Look, we‘re all the same,‖ all people, regardless of ethnicity, gender, sexuality, race, class or culture all have to accept a set of norms or standards which go along with being a citizen. This means they have to sacrifice their own individual identities and beliefs to be a citizen. This is Olssen‘s primary critique of the Crick Report. He argues the Crick Report fails to respect the ―politics of difference.‖ The Crick Report relies on the fact that there is a national identity to which all new members into society should integrate. Uniform conceptions of moral values and social development constitute a precondition for citizenship, so therefore people have to give up their old notions and adhere to new ones to become citizens. Therefore, by using citizenship to effectively integrate minorities, ethnic minorities must change in order to participate in a common culture. Olssen calls this a ―liberal model of assimilation and integration… which has a very limited approach to cultural diversity.‖ The Parekh Report, in contrast, conducted by an independent think-tank devoted to the cause of promoting racial justice in Britain (2000). The Parekh Report questioned the concept of the ―British identity‖ and advocated the use of ―British‖ in a more-multi- ethnic way, referring to different sub groups that made up the society such as black-British, Asian-British, etc. The main argument of the Parekh Report is as follows: ―Since citizens have different needs, equal treatment requires full account to be taken of their differences. When equality ignores relevant differences and insists on uniformity of treatment, it leads to injustice and inequality; when differences ignore the demands of equality, they result in discrimination. Equality must be defined in a culturally sensitive way and applied in a discriminating but not discriminatory manner.‖ The Parekh report, though, does admit there needs to be some cohesion in society- there DOES need to be some sort of assimilation on a basic level. Everyone has to adhere to some common bounds- a minimal universalism. They warn against those who are extreme multiculturalists who argue for the group rights without considering the need for common democratic norms. Basically, the Parekh Report does a better job in analyzing how to integrate ethnic minorities than the Crick Report for the following reasons: 1. The Crick Report uses citizenship to put everyone on a equal level, but doesn‘t realize that citizenship mandates a very large amount of assimilation and that a lot of minorities have to essentially change their beliefs, norms, and ideals to become citizens. 2. The Parekh Report, on the other hand, realizes that by treating different people the same, you are not really respecting those differences. It does however acknowledge that there should be a general, minimal universal set of democratic values that all ethnicities must adhere to. 3. The Parekh Report, however, does distinguish itself from radical multiculturalists who fight for groups rights, regardless of the common consensus of accepted democratic norms. *This is relevant to this course in the following ways: 1. Muslim integration in Britain – Is the ―British‖ identity fluid enough to include Muslims? 2. France makes everyone assimilate to being ―French.‖ Does this undermine ethnic minorities‘ identities? 3. If Europe is to continue to enlarge and invite immigration, what is the best way of maintaining a unified society while still allowing people to remain different and hold on to their original beliefs? Unit K: The Challenge of Integration – France and the Netherlands ―Islam in Europe‖ by Timothy Garton Ash Part 1 Europe‘s difficulties with Muslim integration could destroy the ―civic fabric‖ of some of the most established democracies in ―Eurabia‖, epecially the Netherlands which is known for its tolerance; this has implications for the Balkans, EU Enlargement, terrorism, and women in Islam. Part 2 Timothy Garton Ash starts off the article with some observations, and then moves on to review two books: Muder in Amsterdam: The Death of Theo Van Gogh and the Limits of Tolerance and The Caged Virfin: An Emancipation Proclamation for Women and Islam. He started off the article by introducing a second-generation Moroccan who blended in perfectly with the French Republican model (spoke perfect French), but was Muslim and had darker skin. Ash points out that most French Muslims are relatively well integrated in to French society. IN addition, he points out something that people often forget about. There are centuries old communities of European Muslims (over 7 million) in the Balkans, and these people are old Europeans. Within the next decade, through EU Enlargement, most of these Muslims will be EU citizens. In fact, when NATO intervened in Kosovo, it was to save the Muslim Albanians from genocide by the Christian Serbs, a point that is often forgotten. Thus ―Europe‘s Muslim problem‖ actually focuses on the over 15 million immigrant Muslims in the EU. Due to further immigration, high birth rates, and the prospect of EU Enlargement (Balkans and Turkey), an increasing number of EU citizens will be Muslim. Ash then reviews Ian Buruma‘s book which focuses a lot of the status of Muslims and integration in the Netherlands. Buruma brings out the existence of a ―myth‖ of Dutch tolerance as evidenced through wartime and postwartime policies toward the Jews. Likewise, a leading Dutch politician and former European commissioner said: ―One must never underestimate the degree of hatred that Dutch people feel for Moroccan and Turkish immigrants.‖ No ―Muslims‖ but people from other places in general. The murders of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh bring Ash to the following idea: ―What we really need to understand is the other part: the experience of the Muslim immigrants and their descendants. Was the killer Mohammed Bouyeri a lone madman or the symptom of a larger malaise‖ Then he then mentions ―dish cities‖ where technology connects these Muslim immigrants back to their homelands. Next, Garton Ash moves on to Ayaan Hirsi Ali‘s book, THE Caged Virgin. Ash points out that Ali is glamorous and had she been ―short, squat, and squinting‖, we may not have listened to her ideas. Ali talks about the scandal that erupted around Ali‘s bogus asylum seeker status. Garton Ash thinks that it is a shame that they could not Ayaan Hirsi Ali among the Europeans since ―her intention was to fight for a better a Holland and a better Europe‖ Part 3 This reading is a way of dealing with the issue of Muslim civic integration in Europe again. Garton Ash provided some background on the current political and social situation in the Netherlands today, especially the murders of Can Gogh and Fortuym which are very visible in the minds of Europeans. It creates a standard of comparison for the Laurence and Vaisse book which talks about integration in France. It also connects to the four integration models. Part 4 This was discussed in lecture in connection with the 4 policies of integration. The Netherlands/Holland follows the policy of segmentation. A whole lecture was dedicated to the problem of Dutch integration on April 25. Morgan discussed Pim Fortuyn, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, and the reaction of Dutch people to the deaths of their politicians and Ali‘s video and book. ―The Bikini and the Burqa‖ by Glyn Morgan Part 1 Morgan‘s paper plans to examine liberal objection to mandatory civic integration policies and Morgan prefers non-interference to civic integration and defends John Stuart Mill‘s liberalism which is a ―more aggressive form of toleration‖ Part 2 The intro to the paper is the idea of the civic integration test and Morgan then mentions the 4 models of integration that he mentioned in lecture. The Dutch government is thinking about proposing a ban on the burqa. There are many objections to this. Some conservatives see civic integration as an alien republican idea (this is a generally British idea). Muliticulturalists think this imposes unfair burdens on immigrant groups. Liberals think that these mandatory integration policies could be incompatible with individual liberty. The point of departure is the liberal conception of ―negative freedom‖ which is that ―all individuals have a robust presumptive right of non-interference‖. There are 2 strands of liberalism-intrinsic and instrumental, neo-Kantian and neo-Millian. Both defend non-interference, appeal to a principle of legal or state restraint and have a problem when confronting the task of prioritizing different liberties. Basic liberties of course do exist: freedom of thought, conscience, association, and freedoms specified by the integrity of the person. The second part of Morgan‘s paper covers Neo-Kantian liberals and civic integration. He calls attention to the French republican tradition. Glyn Morgan took the Neo-Kantian approach which has the following ideas: ―idea of the person‖ with ―higher- order interests‖ which include autonomy, a conception of political justice that is independent and self-standing from comprehensive ways of life, and a commitment to securing civic unity. Morgan then criticizes John Rawls‘ argument which he thinks is consistent with the Dutch-style civic integration test. Also, Rawls‘ liberalism would permit a public school system with a robust civic educational mission (like the French one) The third part of Morgan‘s paper covers Neo-Millian liberals and Civic Integration. Neo-Millian liberalism has three key ideas: objective or universal conception of individual well-being, assumption that individuals will gauge happiness partly from capacity to lead a life that displays individuality, and individuals develop to their maximum only when they have the greatest reign and space to make life-defining choices. Next, Morgan applies neo-Millian liberalism to some of the hard cases of the paper. There is no liberal justification for the Dutch mandatory civic integration test, a ban on the burqa in all places, or a ban on the importation of spouses from abroad There is liberal justification for a ban on the removal of schoolchildren for lengthy periods. Neo-Millians are skeptical of banning Islamic faith-based schools, but they have no conclusive decision. Part 3 This article covers many of the integration problems encountered in the course. Like the Timothy Garton Ash reading, it covers Dutch integration except instead of looking at the social, political, and practical considerations, it takes a philosophical approach. Many of Glyn Morgan‘s other articles take philosophical approaches to various issues. Part 4 Morgan did not discuss his article a lot in lecture, but once again, like the Garton Ash article, it connected to the whole topic of Civic integration in the Netherlands. As a result, the same views that Morgan had in his article, ―The Bikini and the Burqa‖, he also presented in Lecture the Week of April 25, and a little the week before in connection with integration in Britain. Summary, Laurence & Vaisse, Integrating Islam, Parts I & II Part I, “Being Muslim in France”: , From the 1960s to the 1990s, there was a large influx of immigrants into France from North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, and Turkey which substantially altered the ethnic and cultural make up of France , The French Muslim community is diverse within itself; it is divided along lines of national origin, ethnicity, and degree of religious piety. , This influx caused two major demographic changes in France from 1960 to 2000: o Growth of French population from 50 million to 60 million o Tenfold increase in the number of Muslims in France at a time when Catholicism was on the decline , The influx of immigrants caused many social ills in France (unemployment, discrimination, etc.) which culminated in the eruption of urban riots in the Muslim community in 2005 o There are some indications that integration is happening: rates of intermarriage and use of French in immigrant homes have risen o At the same time, however, educational attainment and unemployment rates are still problematic , Further problems have been caused by the ―re-Islamization‖ in civil society – because Muslims feel targeted and suffer from discrimination, Islamophobia, and racism, they are even more inclined to identify with their ethnic group and be hostile towards majority France Summary, Part II: “From Muslims into French Citizens: Muslims and Public Policy” , The French state has been unfairly attacked both for being phobic towards religion and for being overly accommodating – the assumption that the French government is prone either to ―eradication‖ or ―surrender‖ is unfair , The French government created an organization called The French Council of the Muslim Religion. It was heavily criticized for doing so and was accused, at least, of institutionalizing Islam in state- Church relations and at most of creating a ―Muslim church‖ o This pessimistic outlook is premature – the Council has very limited ambitions: it is intended only to ―represent‖ religious Muslims, through the associations that run their prayer spaces, in the domain of state-church relations, and not in social or political affairs. In other words, the Council is supposed to represent the interests of the Muslim community to the government as an advisor, not to actually be a part of the political arena o Hopefully, this council will be able to alleviate the inadequate prayer spaces and lack of trained imams in France – these issues were causing as ―underground Islam‖ to develop that was clearly unfavorable to integration o By establishing the Council, the French government has taken responsibility for ensuring that Muslims have official representatives who can negotiate to ensure that Muslims have respectable conditions for the practice of Islam o With the help of these leaders, the French government is attempting to shape an Islam ―of‖ France instead of simply ―in‖ France , Chapter 6 discusses the headscarf issue (the French government banned headscarves in all French public schools) which represents the French government‘s wider effort to combat extremism and proselytism while reasserting the traditional sanctity and secularity of the French schoolroom , Unfortunately, the slowness of electoral institutions to reflect emerging social realities has forced the French government to pursue sociopolitical integration by other means, some of which have been successful and some of which have not o Some officials have tried to create success stories and positive role models by routing some of the best and brightest students onto the fast track to educational and socioeconomic advancement – they have created some fantastic superstars, particularly in the sports and entertainment arenas (i.e. Zidane and Yannick Noah) o There have been efforts made to employ minority candidates in government positions and to make university admissions favorable to minority applicants , However, despite the French government‘s efforts, there is a persistent problem of poverty and lack of upward mobility in the neighborhoods where many French of Muslim background feel stranded and marginalized Justin Vaisse and Jonathan Laurence: Integrating Islam, Part 2 (Chapter 7 and Conclusion) -Main Idea: France’s assimilation model has two facets: It makes it hard to monitor the social and professional progress of the descendants of immigrants but it also is beneficial in that French citizenship provides a universal identity that immigrants can readily adopt. -Chapter 7: French Policy Responses to the Problem of Integration Frustration with the slowness of electoral institutions to reflect new social realities has led various French governments to pursue sociopolitical integration by other means. Officials have appeared keen to create success stories and positive role models for second and third generation immigrants by routing some of the best and brightest students onto the fast track to educational and socioeconomic advancement. Efforts have recently been made to try and employ more minority candidates in government positions and to make universities admission policies more favorable to minority applicants. Still, the riots of 2005 show that there is a long way to go and that many French of Muslim background feel stranded and marginalized. France rejects the approach of the USA or the UK when it comes to integration of minorities within the society. They desire to adopt an assimilating rather than associative approach to integration. For this specific reason, France refuses to categorize its citizens by ethnicity, race, or religion. Tracking citizens by ethnicity or race evokes too strongly the Vichy Crimes against French jews which left a traumatic legacy and excessive attention to religion threatens the notion of laicité, core to French values. Therefore, It is hard to monitor or obtain an accurate statement of the current status of minorities’ social progress in France. Jacques Chirac, president until May 2007, was a strong opponent of Anglophone style affirmative action and defining of identity ethnically. He once declared: “The Republic does not recognize people on the basis of their origin. You are French and there are French people off all ethnic origins. The idea of checking a box for ethnic identity is scandalous and contrary to the principles of the Republic. It is not only illegal but also immoral”. It may seem an extreme approach and it certainly complicates the assessment or measurement of Immigrants progress. However, it also strengthens the French national Ideal of a universal identity that immigrants can easily adhere to. French Policy makers have generally been hesitant to adopt policies which attempt to “level the playing field” too explicitly as they feel it would undermine France’s sense of national community. Recently, the focus has shifted to the promotion of social and political integration, but it usually takes place under the cover of socioeconomic policies or policies targeting specific geographic locations, not ethnicities... Examples of such policies and actions: , Appointment of minority candidates to office , Creation of HALDE (High Authority for Combating Discrimination and Promoting Equality), formally instituted by National Assembly in 2005. , Enactment of a set of “Equal Opportunity” measures after unrest of 2005. , Public funds allocated to encourage the employment of young people in “sensitive urban areas”. Fifteen new “tax free zones” have been created to encourage business investments in these same areas. New French President Nicolas Sarkozy is a vocal proponent of positive discrimination, in a form closer to that of the USA. He, himself is the son of an Hungarian immigrant. The idea of Affirmative Action is now gaining support among the French public: 40% in favor. The newly formed French Government now faces the challenge to design integration policies that work. -Conclusion This book aims to portray the complex reality of integration’s successes and failures in French politics and society. The International scene looks at French integration with a very pessimistic lens, as they ignore readily available information about the everyday life of Muslims in France. This book attempts to offer this info to the reader. Islam in France is a question of international French politics, not relations with the Arab world.. Most of the work that has to be done to better integrate Islam, France has to do alone and it will be a long process. French government’s Interventionism in its relations with Muslim organizations is beneficial and certainly not a threat to the secular order. It is in the best interest of both Muslims and the state that the Government acknowledge and welcome the cultural and religious diversity of its society. - Relevance to other readings: Very insightful to compare the French Integration Model to the British one, as presented in Modood’s book on Multiculturalism. -In lecture, Morgan presented the French model as one with many flaws. He seemed fairly pessimistic about he potential progress of minorities under the current system but recognized the many progresses made and also the strength of Sarkozy’s policies, who has just been elected French President. Concerning the most controversial French policy, “the educational religious ban”, Morgan appeared to be relatively in favor, though he admitted that France’s take was rather extreme. Jacob Wit - Letter to Emily de Jongh-Elhage Main idea: The Dutch government‘s response to civic integration problems regarding Antillean and Aruban immigrants includes highly discriminatory elements that cannot be justified. Summary: - Written in April 2006 in response to Dutch draft bill - Dutch draft bill - 3 main components o Introduction of a discretionary power for the Minister of Alien Affairs and Integration to order the expulsion of certain Antillean and Aruban ―at risk youths‖ between the ages of 16 and 24 from the Netherlands and a corresponding power to refuse them entry into the Netherlands o Introduction of a provision which allows the Dutch courts, when sentencing Dutch nationals of Antillean and Aruban descent in criminal cases that carry a sentence of imprisonment, to direct that such sentence will not be served if the convicted person left the Netherlands within a prescribed time and did not return until a period of 2-3 years had expired o Introduction of compulsory integration programs for Antillean and Aruban Dutch nationals - Wit‘s opinion regarding admission and expulsion provision o The power to refuse entry is placed in the hands of law enforcement officers. The measure does not require any decision of the Minister and is not subject to any judicial review o This proposed law will create differential treatment between Dutch nationals in this age group; only those of Antillean or Aruban background will have to comply with certain conditions o The research used by the government to justify this law does not reveal a distinct inclination towards a life of crime within the Antillean and Aruban group. In fact, higher crime rates within ethnic minority groups are linked to factors like poverty, under- or unemployment, poor education, etc. o The Netherlands has an obligation to promote the well-being of the inhabitants of its former colonies and to ensure their just treatment and protection against abuse. , This law will produce very little relief for the Netherlands, but may prove to be disastrous for the Antilles and Aruba in the long run - the capable young people will move to the Netherlands while the less capable will stay or be sent back to these countries o This law is problematic because it entitles people who are ―less Dutch‖ than these Antillean and Aruban youths to free entry into the Netherlands , The Netherlands must allow European citizens entry; nationals of other countries let in while Dutch nationals (Arubans and Antilleans) shut out , Freedom of movement bestowed upon European citizens should also be enjoyed by Antilleans and Arubans, who are Dutch nationals and thus European citizens as well. - Wit‘s opinion regarding exile as a new mode of sentencing o This provision constitutes an infringement on the political rights and liberties of the convicted person o This provision constitutes a violation of the principle of equality under the law - the difference in sentencing is based solely on descent o Since it only applies if the sentence is not greater than 3 years imprisonment, this provision ironically allows petty criminals to be exiled while major criminals remain in the Netherlands - Wit‘s opinion regarding compulsory integration o This provision is obviously discriminatory. The arguments regarding the admission and expulsion provision and the exile provision apply to this provision as well. Relevance: In lecture, Prof. Morgan discussed the Netherlands‘s relations with its former colonies and the historical use of a strategy of pillarization. This reading provides an example of the Netherlands‘s difficulties in dealing with a part of its colonial legacy, namely Antillean and Aruban youths who are viewed as causing serious problems in Dutch society. The proposed legislation examined by Wit reveals a significant change in the Dutch approach to civic integration - a shift away from enthusiastic support for pillarization to increasing concern about integrating immigrants, as evidenced by the provision for compulsory integration programs. Prof. Morgan emphasized this shift when he discussed the Dutch reaction to Mohammed Bouyeri‘s murder of a Dutch politician and the establishment of the Dutch citizenship test. This reading ultimately highlights the shortcomings of the current Dutch approach, namely the tendency to discriminate against certain ethnic groups with weak justification. Margriet de Moor, “Alarm bells in Muslim hearts” Main idea: The Dutch experience with Islam can only be understood by viewing Islam through the eyes of Europe and Europe through the eyes of Islam. Summary: - The Netherlands has all the makings of considerable social, political, and religious trouble but has managed to stay calm - nothing has happened that is remotely reminiscent of the state of war in the French banlieues - The Dutch version of tolerance is not based on respect o The Dutch historically held a deep hatred of other people‘s religion (Catholicism vs. Calvinism) o However, the Netherlands has always lived from trade and shipping - espoused tolerance because it was better for business - European history reveals both the beauty and the danger of religion - many terrible acts committed on behalf of religious conviction - The modern phenomenon of Islamic suicide bombers allows us to watch the dangerous poetry of religion on an almost daily basis - Some Europeans look at the current violence between Shiites and Sunnis in Iraq and draw parallels to Europe‘s own history. However, in reality, there are few parallels with the Christian Reformation - the two main currents of Islam do not seek theological renewal, but power. - If Islam is ever to experience a Reform, it will happen in the affluent West - 2 reasons o The flourishing of Islamic studies o Social conditions - free, liberal, prosperous societies foster an easy-going attitude towards religion - The Dutch politician Ayaan Hirsi Ali did much to assist this movement of reform - drew a clear connection between domestic violence against Muslim women, avenging honor, and female circumcision and the machismo of Islam - Muslims newly arrived in the Netherlands are shocked by Dutch society‘s trivial attitude towards sex, viewing it as a kind of obsession which is forced on people in the service of commercial interests. o However, Muslim culture itself is sex-obsessed - teaches women that they are basically ―a walking, sitting, or reclining set of genitals,‖ men are expected to have no qualms about throwing themselves on women unless a divinely ordained dress code forbids them to do so o The West‘s obsession and Muslim culture‘s obsession are just two sides of the same coin - There is hope that all inhabitants of the Netherlands can live together Relevance: This reading is basically de Moor‘s attempt to understand recent events in the Netherlands; it is rather disjointed in its content. It emphasizes the Reform of Islam will have to occur in the West and draws interesting connections between Muslim and Western culture, especially regarding attitudes towards sex. De Moor expresses optimism that Islam and contemporary Dutch society can peacefully coexist, but does not present any specific proposals for facilitating this coexistence. Although Prof. Morgan did not discuss this reading in lecture, he did talk a great deal about the various events in the Netherlands that fueled the debate addressed by de Moor, including the political assassinations in 2002 and 2004, the establishment of a citizenship test, and the role of politician Ayaan Hirsi Ali in challenging Islam. This reading is ultimately an analysis of the perceived failure of segmentation, which has become increasingly prominent in Dutch society.
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