政治关联企业的会计信息质量【外文翻译】

政治关联企业的会计信息质量【外文翻译】 本科 毕业论文 毕业论文答辩ppt模板下载毕业论文ppt模板下载毕业论文ppt下载关于药学专业毕业论文临床本科毕业论文下载 ( 设计 领导形象设计圆作业设计ao工艺污水处理厂设计附属工程施工组织设计清扫机器人结构设计 ) 外 文 翻 译 外文题目 The Quality of Accounting Information In Politically Connected Firms 外文出处 Journal of Accounting and Economics 外文作者 Paul K. Chaney，Mara Faccio，David Parsley 原文: The Quality of Accounting Information in Politically Connected Firms We document that the quality of earnings reported by politically connected firms is significantly poorer than that of similar non-connected companies. Our results are not due to firms with ex-ante poor earnings quality establishing connections more often. Instead, our results suggest that, because of a lesser need to respond to market pressures to increase the quality of information, connected companies can afford disclosing lower quality accounting information. In particular, lower quality reported earnings is associated with a higher cost of debt only for the non-politically connected firms in the sample. In this paper we investigate whether earnings quality varies systematically with political connections in a wide sample of countries and politically connected firms. Overall, our results reveal that the presence of political connections is associated with a lower quality of accounting earnings. We document that political connections have incremental explanatory power beyond country, regulatory, and firm specific ownership characteristics. Ex-ante, one could have argued that because connected firms are subject to extensive controls and monitoring (including scrutiny by the media), political connections would, in fact, be associated with better earnings quality. This, however, is not the case. Based on the results in prior research, three explanations are consistent with our finding that the quality of earnings of politically connected firms is poorer than the quality of earnings of similar non-connected peers. First, as politically connected firms typically derive gains from their connections over and above the payments they make, insiders may hide, obscure, or at least attempt to delay reporting the benefits received with the purpose of intentionally misleading investors to gain at their expense (e.g., Schipper, 1989, or Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki, 2003). In a closely related paper, Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) argue that the higher transparency associated with foreign financing makes it harder for connected companies to extract political favors, especially those of dubious legality. As a consequence, connected firms that enjoy substantial political benefits are likely to choose to remain less transparent by raising capital domestically – a prediction that is strongly supported by Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee’s (2006) results. According to this first hypothesis, connected firms would be more opaque than similar non-connected firms. We employ accruals quality as one specific measureable proxy of this opacity. Second, to the extent that politicians provide protection to their related companies so that low quality accounting information is not penalized, connected firms might simply care less about the quality of the information they disclose, and invest less time to accurately portray their accruals. In this case, the quality of information would be low due to inattention on the part of the firm’s managers. This represents a more benevolent interpretation of poor accruals quality. Third, it might simply be the case that firms with poor earnings quality are more likely to establish political connections. In all cases, political connections would be associated with poor information quality, as we find. We run two sets of tests to attempt to distinguish among these possible explanations. First, for a sub-sample of firms for which the date of establishment of a connection could be determined, we investigate whether poor accruals quality has an impact on the likelihood that a company establishes a connection in a given year. We find no significant association between the quality of earnings and the likelihood that a connection is established. This allows us to rule out that, on average, our results are simply due to firms with ex-ante poor earnings quality establishing connections more often. Second, we assess the need for connected companies to make the investment needed to provide good quality accounting information. This second test exploits earlier evidence in Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper (2005) who find that, for U.S. firms, poor earnings quality is associated with a higher cost of debt (as well as a higher cost of equity). We argue that this result may not hold for politically connected firms. For example political pressure and intervention on behalf of connected companies may substitute for better quality disclosures, and thus mitigate the consequences (i.e., costs) of poor information quality that their non-connected peers face. To implement this test, we examine two measures of the cost of debt: the average realized cost of (total) debt; and the yield to maturity spread on publically issued debt. This latter measure better captures the cost imposed by market participants on firms with poor quality reported earnings but misses firms not accessing public debt markets. Our regression analyses support the conclusion that the cost of (total) debt is inversely related to the quality of reported earnings only for the non-politically connected firms in the sample. That is, companies with political connections are apparently insulated from the negative consequences of their lower quality disclosures. This provides at least partial support to our second hypothesis, i.e., that managers of connected firms pay less attention in developing the quality of their earnings. Unfortunately, we cannot directly test the first hypothesis because it would require being able to identify events around which connected firms would be expected to manage their earnings in a particular direction and in excess of the level of earnings management adopted by similar non-connected peers. A prime candidate as an event for such a test would be the provision of government benefits to connected firms – which insiders would then attempt to steal. Such events however, are generally not observable on a wide scale. This paper relates to a growing literature examining earnings quality internationally. Economic explanations for poor earnings quality typically focus on agency and governance issues. Leuz (2006) documents a positive association between ownership concentration and earnings management, even among the subset of foreign firms that cross -list internationally. Combined with evidence that firms with concentrated ownership structures are more likely to form political ties (Morck et al (2000), Morck and Yeung (2004)), this suggests that politically connected firms may also have lower quality reported earnings. Fan and Wong (2002) find that the reported earnings of Asian family firms have limited information content. They argue that this result is driven by an entrenchment effect, where family firms have more incentive and capability to manipulate earnings in order to hide expropriation from minority shareholders. Wang (2006) however, finds that founding family ownership is associated with higher earnings quality for a sample of S & P 500 firms. While confirming these earlier results, we show that political connections are important over and beyond ownership characteristics. At a more institutional level, the international evidence presented in Leuz et al. (2003) demonstrates that country-level factors, such as equity market development, investor rights, and legal enforcement are systematically related to a country’s median level of earnings management. They see these country-level institutional factors as limiting the ability of insiders to use earnings management to conceal their private control benefits. Haw, Hu, Hwang, and Wu (2004) echo these results by arguing that country-level features interact with differences in control, and cash flow rights, to produce lower quality accounting information in countries with weaker statutory protection of minority rights. Additionally, Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) show that Indonesian firms with political connections to Suharto were less likely to access international capital markets. This latter paper provides some results suggesting that the benefits of political connections outweigh the costs of increased disclosure associated with foreign financing. These papers leave open the question whether political connections improve or lower the quality of reported earnings. The next section briefly describes how the political connections database was compiled. We then describe how we construct our proxy for accounting earnings quality. Sections III and IV present our results and robustness tests. Besides checking whether our results are sensitive to several alternative measures of earnings quality, we check that our results are not driven by a single country by repeating the analysis by successively dropping one country at a time. In section V we provide some justification for the reporting behavior of connected firms, and we offer our conclusions in section VI. Political ties The empirical evidence we provide in this study is derived from two primary data bases. First, we employ a large firm-level data set on corporate political connections developed by Faccio (2006). Second, using underlying accounting data available in Worldscope, we construct several measures of accounting earnings quality based on the variability of discretionary accruals. As discussed above, we also check whether the effects of political connections on accounting information quality depend on characteristics of a firm’s ownership structure (e.g., the existence of large shareholders or family control). A company is classified as politically connected if, at some point between 1997 and 2001, at least one of its large shareholders (anybody directly or indirectly controlling at least 10% of votes) or top directors (CEO, chairman of the board, president, vice-president, or secretary) is a member of parliament, a minister or a head of state, or is tightly related to a politician or party. These close relationships include cases of friendship, past top political (e.g., a head of state or minister) or corporate positions, foreign politicians, and well-known cases of relationships with political parties, as further discussed below. Connections with government ministers include cases in which the politician himself is a large shareholder or a top director, as well as cases where a politician’s close relative (e.g., the son or daughter) holds such positions. For example, Arnoldo Mondadori Editore is included among our connected firms since it is controlled by Silvio Berlusconi, the Italian Prime Minister. Konsortium Logistik Berhad is included in the sample since its chairman, Mirzan bin Mahathir, is the son of the Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad. Connections with a member of parliament, however, are recorded only when members of parliament themselves are shareholders or top directors, but do not include cases when such positions are held by relatives. Examples of connections with members of the parliament include firms such as Fiat (Italy), Taittinger (France), Rolls-Royce (U.K.), and Enron (U.S.). However, H. J. Heinz Company (U.S.) is not included in our sample of connected firms since it is not owned by Senator John Kerry but, rather, by his wife Teresa. Close relationships consist of cases of well-known friendship, as identified from The Economist, Forbes, or Fortune; share ownership or directorships held by former heads of state or prime ministers as well as former directorships held by current politicians, foreign politicians, and well documented relationships with political parties (as identified in Gomez and Jomo, 1997; and Johnson and Mitton, 2003) and other well known connections, as indentified in Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) for the U.S.; Backman (1999) for Asia; Fisman (2001) for Indonesia; and the Stationery Office (2001) for the United Kingdom. To establish the presence of connections, for every publicly traded company included in Wordscope, the names of top company directors were taken from Worldscope, Extel, company websites, and Lexis-Nexis, and block-holders were identified from Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000), Faccio and Lang (2002), the web sites of the stock exchanges or their supervisory authorities, Worldscope, and Extel. The Chiefs of State directory (CIA, 2001) and the official website of the country’s government and parliament were used to gather the names of members of parliament or government. Countries that did not make such information available online were excluded from the sample, resulting in an initial sample of 47 countries. Typically, only a director’s family name and initials were reported in Wordscope. Thus, their names were manually cross checked with those of members of governments and parliaments using Extel, company websites, and extensive searches on Lexis-Nexis. To minimize data errors, if there was not enough information available to ensure that the person in question was the same, the company was not included in the sample of connections. It may be worth pointing out that Government controlled firms are not included in the definition of connections, unless a government minister or a member of the parliament sit on their boards or own large stakes in the company. For this study, we start by focusing on countries with at least 5 politically connected companies in the Faccio (2006) database, which results in an initial sample of 20 countries and 17,435 companies. Matching this sample to those firms with the necessary accounting data ultimately reduces our sample as described below. The final sample of companies, including the number of connected companies, by country, is presented in Table 1, and is discussed in Section III below. We first describe our measure of earnings quality using data on accruals. Source: Paul K. Chaney, Mara Faccio and David Parsley.The Quality of Accounting Information in Politically Connected Firms[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics, July 6, 2010:1-47. 译文: 政治关联企业的会计信息质量 我们阐述了这样一个观点:由政治关联公司报告的盈余质量明显比同类非关联公司差。我们的结果不是因为事先盈余质量较差的企业建立连接更频繁。相反，我们的结果表明，由于较少需要应对提高信息质量的市场压力，关联公司的会计信息披露质量更低。在样品中，特别是低质量的报告收益只与非关联公司的政治成本造成的高负债有关。 在本文中，我们在与国家和政治关联的广泛的企业样本中系统地调查，盈利质量是否不一样。总的来说，我们的结果显示，有政治关系的存在会导致会计盈余质量下降。我们阐述了政治关系已超越国家、管理、所有权和公司的具体特点的增量解释能力。 事前，人们可以争辩说，因为关联公司都受到广泛的控制和监测(包括媒体监督)，政治关联其实与更好的收益质量有关。然而并非如此。在以前研究结果的基础上，给出了三种解释与我们的发现(即政治关联公司的盈余质量比同类非关联同行收益质量差)相一致。首先，政治关联的企业为了有政治上的连接，通常付出的超过自身的负担，内部可能隐藏，遮掩，或至少企图拖延报告，目的是故意误导投资者，取得他们的费用(例如，施舟，1989年，或鲁兹，南大和威索基，2003)。在一个紧密相关的论文中，鲁兹和奥博郝泽 -吉(2006)认为，外国融资较高的透明度，使相关联的公司更难提取政治主张，尤其是那些可疑的合法性。因此，连接企业为了享有政治利益很可能通过增加透明度较低的企业资本，选择留在国内- 这是鲁兹和奥博郝泽 -吉(2006)的结果支持的预测。根据这一假说，连接企业将比同类非关联公司更加不透明。我们聘请一个具体的可测量的这种不透明代理来计算质量。 第二，在政治家为其关联企业提供保护的范围内，低质量的会计信息没有受 关联公司可能很少关心他们披露的信息质量，花较少的时间来准确地描到惩罚， 绘他们的权责发生制。在这种情况下，由于对公司经理的部分疏忽，信息质量将会降低。这是一种对低质量的更善良的解释。第三，它可能只是盈余质量差的公司更容易建立政治关联的情况。在所有情况下，就如我们觉得，政治关联与信息质量低有关。 我们运行两个测试组，试图区分这些可能的解释。首先，对于一个成立之日起就可确定政治关联的子样本公司，我们调查质量差对公司建立一个关联有影响的可能性。我们没有发现收益质量和所建立连接的可能性之间的显著相关性。这使我们能够排除，平均而言，我们的结果仅仅是因为事先盈余质量差的公司建立关联更频繁。 第二，我们评估关联公司投资是否需要提供良好的会计信息质量。这第二次试验利用较早的证据，弗朗西斯，拉方德，奥尔森和席佩尔(2005)发现，对于美国公司，差的盈余质量与较高的债务成本(以及股本成本较高)相关联。我们认为，这一结果可能无法适于政治有关的公司。例如政治压力，对关联公司的可替代高质量的披露，从而减轻其非关联同行面对代表干预的不良信息质量的影响(即成本)。 为实施这项测试，我们研究了两个关于债务成本的措施:平均实现成本(总)的债务，以及对公开发行的债券到期收益率。这后一项措施更好地捕捉市场参与者对公布业绩质量较差但忽略不使用公共债务市场的企业所施加的成本。我们的回归分析支持这样一个结论，在样品中(总)债务成本与非政治关联公司的报告盈余质量呈负相关。也就是说，政治关联的公司显然是与他们的低质量信息披露的消极后果绝缘。这至少提供部分支持我们的第二个假设，即，关联公司的经理对发展其盈余质量不重视。不幸的是，我们不能直接测试第一个假说，因为这需要能够识别周围的关联公司预计将在一个特定的方向管理他们的收入并超出类似的非连接同行的盈余管理水平。作为一个这样的测试活动的首要候选人将是政府提供福利予关联公司——知情者然后试图窃取。然而这样的事件，一般都不会在广泛的规模可观的。 这个文件涉及到越来越多探讨国际盈余质量的文献。对差盈余质量的经济解释通常集中在机构和管理问题。 鲁兹(2006)阐述了股权集中度与盈余管理正相关，甚至在跨国际的外国公司的子集中也一样。与集中所有权结构公司更可能形成政治关系这一证据相结合(默克等人(2000)，默克和也昂(2004))，这表明，与政治有关联的公司也可能有盈余质量较低的报告。范和黄(2002)发现，亚洲家族企业的报告收益限制了信息内容。他们认为，这一结果是家族企业内更多的激励和能力，操纵盈余，以掩盖少数股东的侵占效果。王(2006)，然 而，认定创始家族所有权是与 标准 excel标准偏差excel标准偏差函数exl标准差函数国标检验抽样标准表免费下载红头文件格式标准下载 普尔500家公司样本具有较高盈利质量有关。这些早期结果的证实，我们表明政治关系比所有权更重要。 在更多体制方面，鲁兹等提出的国际证据表明，国家级的因素如股市发展，投资者权益和法律的执行与一个国家的平均水平的盈余管理系统相关。他们认为，这些国家级的 制度 关于办公室下班关闭电源制度矿山事故隐患举报和奖励制度制度下载人事管理制度doc盘点制度下载 性因素限制了内部盈余管理来掩盖其私人控制权收益。哈乌，胡，黄，吴(2004)通过辩称国家一级功能与现金流量权、控制差异的对照，回应了这些说法，用较弱的少数人权利的法定维护，从而在国家产生低质量的会计信息。此外，鲁兹和奥博郝泽 -吉(2006年)表明，与苏哈托有政治关联的印度尼西亚公司不太可能进入国际资本市场。这后一份文件提供的一些结果表明，政治关联的好处比增加披露与国外融资相关的成本要大。这些文件解开了政治关系是否改善或降低报告收益的质量这一问题。 下一节将简要介绍如何编译政治关联的数据库。然后，我们描述如何构建我国的会计盈余质量的代理。第三节和第四节介绍的是目前我们的结果和鲁棒性测试。除了检查我们的结果对收益质量的几种替代措施是否敏感，我们还要通过先后放弃一次一个国家的重复分析，检查我们的结果不是由单一国家主导。在第五节中，我们提供一些关联的企业申报行为的理由，第六节我们提供我们的结论。 政治关系 我们在这项研究中提供的实证证据是来自两个基地的主要数据。首先，我们采用了法乔(2006)的大企业的政治联系的企业数据集。其次，使用基本的会计数据情况下，我们构建了几点以可操纵利润的多变性为基础的会计盈余质量措施。如上所述，我们还检查了政治关系对会计信息质量的影响是否取决于一个企业的所有制结构(例如，大股东或家族控制的存在)的特点。 如果甲公司被列为政治关联，在1997年和2001年之间的一些观点来说，至少其大股东(任何人直接或间接控制至少10,的投票权)或顶级董事(首席执行官，董事会主席，顶级大股东，副总裁，或秘书)是议会的成员，部长或国家元首，或者是紧密相关的政客或政党。在包含了这些密切的友好关系的情况下，过去高级政治(例如，一个国家元首或部长)，或企业职位的外国政要，以及众所周知的与政党的关系，作为一个话题在下文进一步讨论。 与政府部长关联包括政治家本人是大股东或顶级董事的情况，以及政治家的 近亲(例如，儿子或女儿)站在这样的立场的情况。例如，阿诺尔蒙达多利爱迪特包含在我们关联公司，因为它是由西尔维奥贝卢斯科尼，意大利总理控制。卡塞蒂姆罗吉斯迪克贝尔海德被包含在样本是因为其主席穆赞宾马哈蒂尔，是马来西亚总理马哈蒂尔的儿子。 与国会议员关联，然而，被 记录 混凝土 养护记录下载土方回填监理旁站记录免费下载集备记录下载集备记录下载集备记录下载 的只有议会成员本身是股东或顶级董事的情况，但不包括亲属担任这些职位的情况。与议会的成员关联的例子包括诸如菲亚特(意大利)，泰汀戈(法国)，罗尔斯罗伊斯公司(英国)和安然(美国)公司。不过，亨氏公司(美国)不包括在我们关联公司的抽样调查，因为属于联邦参议员的不是约翰克里，而是他的妻子蒂如纱。 经济学家福布斯或福特定义密切的关系包括众所周知的友谊的情况;股份所有权或由国家元首或总理以及由目前的政治家，外国政要，前任主管，以及良好记录与政党的关系的董事(如确定在戈麦斯和乔莫，1997年，约翰逊和米顿，2003)和其他一些著名的关联，正如美国的阿格拉沃尔和克内贝尔(2001); 亚洲的贝克曼(1999); 印度尼西亚的菲斯曼( 2001年)，以及英国的斯达西纳瑞(2001年)。 要建立关联的存在，对每个上市公司来说，顶级董事的名字取自交换电讯社网站，和奈克斯数据库的词汇，持有人来自克莱森斯，蒂简卡乌，郎(2000年)，法乔，朗(2002年)交易所或他们的监督机构，交换电讯社的网站。国家目录(中央情报局，2001年)和该国政府和议会的官方网站被用来收集议会或政府成员的姓名。在网上没有提供这些资料的国家被排除在样本外，最后的结果在最初的47个国家的样本中产生。 通常，只有董事的姓氏和缩写被报告。因此，他们的名字是手工核对与各国政府和议会成员通过交换电讯社，公司网站，并在奈克斯数据库词汇中广泛搜索。为了尽量减少数据错误，如果没有足够的资料以确保有关的人是一样的，公司就不会包含在关联样本内。 可能值得指出的是，政府控制的企业不包括在关联的定义，除非政府部长或议会的成员在其董事会或公司拥有大量股权。 在这项研究中，我们首先关注的是在法乔(2006)数据库中至少有5个政治关联公司的国家，该数据库是20个国家和17435公司初步抽样调查的结果。 企业样本要符合必要的会计数据，因此最终减少了我们作为下面描述的样本。最后的公司样本，包括按国家关联公司的数量，载于表1，并在第三节讨论。我们首先通过计量的数据来描述我们的盈余质量措施。 来源:保罗克查理，玛丽法乔，大卫帕斯理. 政治关联企业的会计信息质量[J].会计与经济学，2010年7月6日:1-47. 节选范围:第一页第一节至第六页第二节