国际法上的国际组织——联合国安理会改革

国际法上的国际组织——联合国安理会改革 第四章 国际法上的国际组织 联合国安理会改革问 题 快递公司问题件快递公司问题件货款处理关于圆的周长面积重点题型关于解方程组的题及答案关于南海问题 探讨 序言:时代的发展变化需要对联合国，尤其是对安理会进行改革 Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice It is no secret to anyone that the United Nations cannot survive as a vital force in international politics if it does not reform, if it doesn't reform its organizations, if it doesn't reform its Secretariat, if it doesn't reform its management practices. We have had problems with peacekeepers, we've had problems with the Oil-for-Food situation .... [I]t's an important time for UN reform. In September 2003, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan launched a major initiative toward reforming the United Nations. [FN1] A central focus of the initiative was Security Council reform, encompassing both the Council's structure and the principles under which it operates. The United Nations Security Council was created during World War II. Since its creation, both the political and economic climate has changed significantly. The Security Council must reflect on the political realities of the twenty-first century, not that of post-World War II. "The Council's ineffectiveness [is] attributable to the fact that the present structure [does not] reflect the current composition of the international community, nor the present distribution of power between nations . . . . There must be limits on the right to veto." - Bernd Niehaus [FN1] 近年来，联合国的改革问题受到世界各国的普遍关注，围绕此问题的争论也愈演愈烈。发展问题、安 全问题和人权问题现已成为联合国工作的三大支柱。对国际和平与安全负有首要责任的安理会的改革是联 合国改革中一个异常棘手的问题，而安理会改革的难点在于其成员的扩大。 2005年3月31日，日本、巴西、印度和德国的常驻联合国代表在纽约举行集会，并发表四国联合声明， 正式就安理会成员的扩大问题提出了初步草案，并呼吁联合国大会通过表决解决安理会扩大问题。但是“四 国联盟”2005年的“争常”努力最终由于遭到多数国家，特别是“咖啡俱乐部”国家的强烈反对而失败。 可以说，安理会改革的前景并不明朗。 一、安理会在联合国体系中的地位 背景资料——《联合国宪章》中有关安理会的条款 第五章 安全理事会 组织 第二十三条??,,,？年,,月,,日经大会通过修正～,,,,年,月？,日生效。二十三条的 修正案将安全理事会理事国自十一国增至十五国。 一、安全理事会以联合国十五会员国组织之。中华民国、法兰西、苏维埃社会主义共和国联邦、大不 列颠及北爱尔兰联合王国及美利坚合众国应为安全理事会常任理事国。大会应选举联合国其他十会员国为 安全理事会非常任理事国，选举时首宜充分斟酌联合国各会员国于维持国际和平与安全及本组织其余各宗 旨上之贡献，并宜充分斟酌地域上之公匀分配。 二、安全理事会非常任理事国任期定为二年。安全理事会理事国自十一国增至十五国后第一次选举非 常任理事国时，所增四国中两国之任期应为一年。任满之理事国不得即行连选。 三、安全理事会每一理事国应有代表一人。 职权 第二十四条 一、为保证联合国行动迅速有效起见，各会员国将维持国际和平及安全之主要责任，授予安全理事会， 并同意安全理事会于履行此项责任下之职务时，即系代表各会员国。 二、安全理事会于履行此项职务时，应遵照联合国之宗旨及原则。为履行此项职务而授予安全理事会 之特定权力，于本宪章第六章、第七章、第八章、及第十二章内规定之。 三、安全理事会应将常年报告、并于必要时将特别报告、提送大会审查。 第二十五条 联合国会员国同意依宪章之规定接受并履行安全理事会之决议。 第二十六条 为促进国际和平及安全之建立及维持，以尽量减少世界人力及经济资源之消耗于军备起见，安全理事会借第四十七条所指之军事参谋团之协助，应负责拟具 方案 气瓶 现场处置方案 .pdf气瓶 现场处置方案 .doc见习基地管理方案.doc关于群访事件的化解方案建筑工地扬尘治理专项方案下载 ，提交联合国会员国，以建立军备管制 制度 关于办公室下班关闭电源制度矿山事故隐患举报和奖励制度制度下载人事管理制度doc盘点制度下载 。 投票 第二十七条??,,,？年,,月,,日经大会修正～,,,,年,月？,日生效。修正后的第二十七条规定安全理事会关于程序事项之决议～应以九理事国,前为七理事国,之可决票表决之～对于其他一切事项之决议～应以九理事国,前为七理事国,之可决票包括安全理事会五常任理事国之同意票表决之。 一、安全理事会每一理事国应有一个投票权。 二、安全理事会关于程序事项之决议，应以九理事国之可决票表决之。 三、安全理事会对于其他一切事项之决议，应以九理事国之可决票包括全体常任理事国之同意票表决之;但对于第六章及第五十二条第三项内各事项之决议，争端当事国不得投票。 程序 第二十八条 一、安全理事会之组织，应以使其能继续不断行使职务为要件。为此目的，安全理事会之各理事国应有常驻本组织会所之代表。 二、安全理事会应举行定期会议，每一理事国认为合宜时得派政府大员或其他特别指定之代表出席。 三、在本组织会所以外，安全理事会得在认为最能便利其工作之其他地点举行会议。 第二十九条 安全理事会得设立其认为于行使职务所必需之辅助机关。 第三十条 安全理事会应自行制定其议事规则，包括其推选主席之方法。 第三十一条 在安全理事会提出之任何问题，经其认为对于非安全理事会理事国之联合国任何会员国之利益有特别关系时，该会员国得参加讨论，但无投票权。 第三十二条 联合国会员国而非为安全理事会之理事国，或非联合国会员国之国家，如于安全理事会考虑中之争端为当事国者，应被邀参加关于该项争端之讨论，但无投票权。安全理事会应规定其所认为公平之条件，以便非联合国会员国之国家参加。 第六章 争端之和平解决 第三十三条 一、任何争端之当事国，于争端之继续存在足以危及国际和平与安全之维持时，应尽先以谈判、调查、调停、和解、公断、司法解决、区域机关或区域办法之利用、或各该国自行选择之其他和平方法，求得解决。 二、安全理事会认为必要时，应促请各当事国以此项方法，解决其争端。 第三十四条 安全理事会得调查任何争端或可能引起国际磨擦或惹起争端之任何情势，以断定该项争端或情势之继续存在是否足以危及国际和平与安全之维持。 第三十五条 一、联合国任何会员国得将属于第三十四条所指之性质之任何争端或情势，提请安全理事会或大会注意。 二、非联合国会员国之国家如为任何争端之当事国时，经预先声明就该争端而言接受本宪章所规定和平解决之义务后，得将该项争端，提请大会或安全理事会注意。 三、大会关于按照本条所提请注意事项之进行步骤，应遵守第十一条及第十二条之规定。 第三十六条 一、属于第三十三条所指之性质之争端或相似之情势，安全理事会在任何阶段，得建议适当程序或调整方法。 二、安全理事会对于当事国为解决争端业经采取之任何程序，理应予以考虑。 三、安全理事会按照本条作成建议时，同时理应注意凡具有法律性质之争端，在原则上，理应由当事国依国际法院规约之规定提交国际法院。 第三十七条 一、属于第三十三条所指之性质之争端，当事国如未能依该条所示方法解决时，应将该项争端提交安全理事会。 二、安全理事会如认为该项争端之继续存在，在事实上足以危及国际和平与安全之维持时，应决定是否当依第三十六条采取行动或建议其所认为适当之解决条件。 第三十八条 安全理事会如经所有争端当事国之请求，得向各当事国作成建议，以求争端之和平解决，但以不妨碍第三十三条至第三十七条之规定为限。 第七章 对于和平之威胁和平之破坏及侵略行为之应付办法 第三十九条 安全理事会应断定任何和平之威胁、和平之破坏、或侵略行为之是否存在，并应作成建议或抉择依第四十一条及第四十二条规定之办法，以维持或恢复国际和平及安全。 第四十条 为防止情势之恶化，安全理事会在依第三十九条规定作成建议或决定办法以前，得促请关系当事国遵行安全理事会所认为必要或合宜之临时办法，此项临时办法并不妨碍关系当事国之权利、要求、或立场。安全理事会对于不遵行此项临时办法之情形，应予适当注意。 第四十一条 安全理事会得决定所应采武力以外之办法，以实施其决议，并得促请联合国会员国执行此项办法。此项办法得包括经济关系、铁路、海运、航空、邮、电、无线电、及其他交通工具、之局部或全部停止，以及外交关系之断绝。 第四十二条 安全理事会如认第四十一条所规定之办法为不足或已经证明为不足时，得采取必要之空海陆军行动，以维持或恢复国际和平及安全。此项行动得包括联合国会员国之空海陆军示威、封锁、及其他军事举 动。 第四十三条 一、联合国各会员国为求对于维持国际和平及安全有所贡献起见，担任于安全理事会发令时，并依特别协定，供给为维持国际和平及安全所必需之军队、协助、及便利，包括过境权。 二、此项特别协定应规定军队之数目及种类，其准备程度及一般驻扎地点，以及所供便利及协助之性质。 三、此项特别协定应以安全理事会之主动，尽速议订。此项协定应由安全理事会与会员国或由安全理事会与若干会员国之集团缔结之，并由签字国各依其宪法程序批准之。 第四十四条 安全理事会决定使用武力时，于要求非安全理事会会员国依第四十三条供给军队以履行其义务之前，如经该会员国请求，应请其派遣代表，参加安全理事会关于使用其军事部队之决议。 第四十五条 为使联合国能采取紧急军事办法起见，会员国应将其本国空军部队为国际共同执行行动随时供给调遣。此项部队之实力与准备之程度，及其共同行动之计划，应由安全理事会以军事参谋团之协助，在第四十三条所指之特别协定范围内决定之。 第四十六条 武力使用之计划应由安全理事会以军事参谋团之协助决定之。 第四十七条 一、兹设立军事参谋团，以便对于安全理事会维持国际和平及安全之军事需要问题，对于受该会所支配军队之使用及统率问题，对于军备之管制及可能之军缩问题，向该会贡献意见并予以协助。 二、军事参谋团应由安全理事会各常任理事国之参谋总长或其代表组织之。联合国任何会员国在该团未有常任代表者，如于该团责任之履行在效率上必需该国参加其工作时，应由该团邀请参加。 三、军事参谋团在安全理事会权力之下，对于受该会所支配之任何军队，负战略上之指挥责任;关于该项军队之统率问题，应待以后处理。 四、军事参谋团，经安全理事会之授权，并与区域内有关机关商议后，得设立区域分团。 第四十八条 一、执行安全理事会为维持国际和平及安全之决议所必要之行动，应由联合国全体会员国或由若干会员国担任之，一依安全理事会之决定。 二、此项决议应由联合国会员国以其直接行动、及经其加入为会员之有关国际机关之行动履行之。 第四十九条 联合国会员国应通力合作，彼此协助，以执行安全理事会所决定之办法。 第五十条 安全理事会对于任何国家采取防止或执行办法时，其他国家，不论其是否为联合国会员国，遇有因此项办法之执行而引起之特殊经济问题者，应有权与安全理事会会商解决此项问题。 第五十一条 联合国任何会员国受武力攻击时，在安全理事会采取必要办法，以维持国际和平及安全以前，本宪章不得认为禁止行使单独或集体自卫之自然权利。会员国因行使此项自卫权而采取之办法，应立即向安全理事会报告，此项办法于任何方面不得影响该会按照本宪章随时采取其所认为必要行动之权责，以维持或恢复国际和平及安全。 二、梁西教授论安理会及否决权 (梁西:国际困境:联合国安理会的改革问题——从日、德、印、巴争当常任理事国说起，《法学评论》2005年第1期。) 对安理会的任何实质性的(甚至非实质性的)变动不仅需要启动修改《联合国宪章》的复杂程序，而且实际上还会涉及到世界权力重新分配的问题。尤其是对于拥有否决权的常任理事国席位的调整在国际政治中更为敏感，将牵动会员国(特别是大国)的每一根神经。 举一个极端的例子:即使在联合国的191个会员国中有190个各依其宪法程序批准了增加常任理事国席位的《宪章》修正案，如果那个未批准该修正案的国家是五常任理事国之一，那么这一修正案就不能生效。可见，从纯理论上说，常任理事国对修正案的不批准权乃安理会改革中真正的最后的“杀手锏”。 ——安理会改革之困境:有必要进行改革，但此种改革将会非常艰难。 有条件或条件接近的联合国会员国之所以不惮其“难”地争取进入安理会，整个国际社会之所以如此关安理会的改革，主要原因就在于，安理会是联合国这个“当今世界最大最权威的国际组织”的决策机构。这机构的决策威力来自何方?它主要是经否决权制度从正反两个角度(即行使或不行使)来实现的。以下进步就相关问题具体解剖安理会及其否决权制度。 如前所述，联合国已经“大腹便便”，是一个国际巨人，是一架巨大的机器。这架巨大机器到底是如何操作的呢?从其内部机构设置来看，主要是采用“六大机关分权”的制度:联合国大会，是其最高议事机关，是全世界舆论的集中场所;秘书处，是其日常办事行政机关，秘书长是联合国的行政首长;经社理事会，是其管理经济及社会发展事务的机关，管辖范围非常广泛;国际法院，是其主要司法机关，按《国际法院规约》分别执行诉讼管辖与咨询管辖;托管理事会，是其负责监督托管领土行政管理的机关，旧殖民体系基本瓦解后，它已完成历史任务。 在联合国这个庞大国际组织的操作过程中，影响最大的是安理会。如前所述，它是联合国的权力和决策核心，是联合国的心脏。《宪章》第24条规定“各会员国将维持国际和平与安全之主要责任授予安全理事会”。安理会由十五个理事国组成:中、法、俄、英、美五国为常任理事国;由联合国大会另选十国为非常任理事国，每届任期为两年。 安理会的巨大权力主要表现为如下三点:第一，安理会作出的决定对全体会员国具有法律约束力;第二，在联合国所有机关中，安理会是唯一有权采取强制 措施 《全国民用建筑工程设计技术措施》规划•建筑•景观全国民用建筑工程设计技术措施》规划•建筑•景观软件质量保证措施下载工地伤害及预防措施下载关于贯彻落实的具体措施 的机关;第三，为了维持国际和平与安全，安理会可以采取包括武力在内的军事行动。这几点不仅在联合国的六大机关中，而且在全世界成千上万的国际组织中都是独一无二的。 由十五个理事国组成的安理会有如此巨大的权力，这些权力到底是由什么来控制的呢?为了说形象一些，可以做一个比喻:这些巨大权力最终是由《西游记》中齐天大圣的那根“金箍棒”来控制的。不过，掌握这根金箍棒的不是一个孙悟空，而是五个孙悟空。这根看不见的金箍棒在法律上叫做“否决权”，叫做‘veto power’或‘veto right’。 从国际组织法角度考察，安理会的veto是一项很有特色的制度。《宪章》第27条规定:“一、安全理事会每一理事国应有一个投票权。二、安全理事会关于程序事项之决议，应以九理事国之可决票表决之。三、安全理事会对于其他一切事项之决议，应以九理事国之可决票包括全体常任理事国之同意票表决之„„” 第27条第1项是关于投票权的分配规则:安理会所有十五个理事国，不论常任或非常任，一律平等，都享有而且只享有一个投票权。第2项是关于“程序性事项”的表决规则:有关此类事项的决议，在十五个理事国中，只要有任何九个以上的理事国投赞成票即可通过。第3项是关于“实质性事项”的表决规则。此项规则包括两个条件:第一，在十五个理事国中，要有九个以上的多数票赞成;第二，在五个常任理事国中，没有任何一个投反对票。只有当这两个条件同时具备时，有关实质性事项的决议才能通过。如果有一个常任理事国投反对票，怎么办?即使其他十四票都是赞成票，该决议也无法通过。这里可以举出一个安理会投票史上有关Veto的空前的 案例 全员育人导师制案例信息技术应用案例心得信息技术教学案例综合实践活动案例我余额宝案例 。按规定，联合国秘书长须五年改选一次，首先经安理会提名推荐，然后由联合国大会任命。在1981年第36届联大期间，最初参加竞选第五任秘书长的有两位:一位是任期将近届满的秘书长瓦尔德海姆(奥地利人)，另一位是非洲的坦桑尼亚外长萨利姆。安理会从1981年10月27日开始举行会议，对两位候选人进行讨论并投票。但是，安理会经过一个多月的磋商，先后进行了16次投票，始终未能通过关于推荐秘书长的决议。原因何在?美国先后对萨利姆投了16次反对票，因为美国觉得萨利姆在非洲问题和巴以问题上同美国政策有距离;而中国则先后对瓦尔德海姆投了16次反对票，因为中国觉得过去四任秘书长有三位来自欧洲，但联合国会员国却有四分之三是亚非拉国家，故主张第五任秘书长最好由发展中国家来接任。结果，两位候选人虽然都曾多次获得九个以上的多数赞成票，但最终均未能获得推荐。之后,另行报名竞选，又有九位候选人参加。再经过十多天的磋商投票，安理会才在没有出现常任理事国反对票的情况下对秘鲁的德奎利亚尔作出了正式推荐的决议。接着，第36届联大顺利通过了这一推荐。 在上述基本认识的基础上，我们还可以从理论与实践相结合的高度，再深入一步对否决权制度作出如下七点综合性的分析: 第一点，从性质分析，安理会的否决权制度是一种少数可以抵制或阻止多数的权力(the power or right to forbid or prevent)。它的实际价值就在于能够“以少胜多”。因为这一制度要求有五个常任理事国的一致赞成票才能通过有关实质性事项的决议，所以它又被称为“大国一致原则”。因为它对一切实质性事项的决议，既要求九票以上的多数，又要求这个多数中必须包括五个常任理事国的赞成票在内才能通过，所以，旧金山会议的《四国声明》又把这一制度称为“受限制的多数表决制”(a system of qualified majority voting)" 从这个意义来说，实际上有两种情况可以使有关决议不能通过:一种是有一个常任理事国投反对票;另一种是某项得到五个常任理事国一致同意的决议，如果有七个非常任理事国的反对或弃权，因而使赞成票无法获得九票的多数时，该项决议同样不能通过。所以，从理论上分析，这一制度也可以称为“受限制的大国一致原则”。不过，《四国声明》为了减轻这一制度的大国色彩将后一种情况巧妙地称为非常任理事国的“集体否决权”(a group veto)，认为这也是一种少数可以抵制多数的情况。此外，根据上述《四国声明》的解释，如果将来有必要决定“某一事项是否属于程序性这一先决问题(preliminary question)”时，也“必须由安理会九个理事国的表决包括各常任理事国的同意票在内”才能做出决定。这意味着,常任理事国在此情况下享有所谓“双重否决权”(double veto):既对实质性事项有否决权，也对是否为程序性事项有否决权。行使双重否决权的效果为:常任理事国有可能先用否决权使某一事项成为非程序性事项，然后再用否决权使有关该事项的决议不能通过。 第二点，联合国安理会“大国一致”的表决原则是吸取国联教训的结果，比国联行政院“全体一致”的表决原则有了很大发展。从理论上讲，安理会的表决制度是一种“复轨表决制”。对程序性事项来说，只要求多数，而不要求一致;但对实质性事项来说，则不仅要求理事国的多数，而且要求常任理事国的一致。它的多数不是简单的过半数，它的一致也不是全体理事国清一色的同意。它赋予大国的特权远远超过了《国联盟约》的规定。 第三点，从否决权的特点来看，它只能起到消极抵制的作用，却没有积极进攻的能力。这可以用矛和盾来作比喻:常任理事国行使否决权，能产生“盾牌”的作用，因为它能阻止决议的通过;但是否决权不可能当作“长矛”来使用，因为它无法使一个自己满意的决议案获得通过。因此，这根所谓的“如意”金箍棒也并非真正是“万事如意”的。 第四点，在安理会的实践过程中，已形成一项习惯性规则:常任理事国的弃权票不产生否决效果。如果某常任理事国不想支持某项决议，但又无意阻止该决议的通过，在此情况下就可以投弃权票。这给了常任理事国在国际关系方面很大的灵活空间，更便于贯彻己国政府的外交政策与策略。历史上有一个著名案例: 安理会于1973年12月15日表决第344号关于中东问题的决议时，虽然有四个常任理事国弃权，我国也未参加投票，但因为其他十个理事国都投了赞成票，决议获得通过。又如，1990年11月29日安理会表决有关海湾危机的第678号决议时，我国基于反对伊拉克侵占科威特并主张和平解决海湾危机的一贯立场，投了弃权票。这一票也未影响该决议案的通过。 第五点，从国际实践来分析，否决权行使的频率与国际社会格局的发展变化是息息相关的。联合国成立后的第一个十年(1946,1955)，安理会一共行使过82次否决权，其中竟有79次是当时的苏联行使的。为什么?因为苏联在当时的联合国处于少数派地位，它即用否决权这块盾牌来抵制西方的多数。仅在1955年12月13日这一天，苏联就接连投过15次否决票。人们因此讥称当时苏联驻联合国的代表葛罗米柯为Mr. No”。但是，到了第三个十年(1966-1975)，情况发生了戏剧性的变化。在此期间，安理会一共行使过31次否决权，而美国却占了其中的12次，居五常任理事国之首。这又是为什么?因为60年代之后新独立的发展中国家大量增加，美国在联合国已经失去了对多数的控制。从1990年8月2日伊拉克侵占科威特后的约四个月时间里，安理会针对海湾危机陆续通过了12项决议，五常任理事国没有行使过一次否决权。这种情况在安理会的表决史上是少有的。这无疑反映了国际社会在经历了长期的冷战折磨后，苏联在衰退，世界的两极格局正在发生巨大变化。 第六点，否决权制度虽然具体规定于《宪章》第27条，但这并非此项制度的全部内容。对安理会决策机制的研究应该扩及如下三组条文。 (1)第23条:规定中、法、俄、英、美为安理会常任理事国，,享有独特地位。五国是否决权的主体。 (2)第27条:授予常任理事国在表决中以超越一般计量的权力，使一票具有压倒多数票的表决效果。此条是否决权制度的主干条款。 (3)第108,110条:规定常任理事国对于《宪章》的生效以及《宪章》生效后的修正案的生效，均享有否决权。其法律效果是:如果某常任理事国有意坚持和维护否决权制度，则在《宪章》草案未规定否决权时，或者在《宪章》生效后否决权条款遭到该国不愿接受的修正案时，该国都可以用否决权来抵制或阻止这种可能得到多数赞成的方案成为现实。从这一角度来看，这组条文是上述两条的永恒性保障条款。 这三组条文相互为用，很像一台“钢筋三脚架”支撑着联合国的整个体制，并且也使否决权自身在联合国体制中根深蒂固，不易动摇。 第七点也是最后一点:分析至此，似乎应该对安理会否决权制度的讨论作一个简短的结束语了。在国际舆论中，有两种主要见解。一方面，有很多国家(主要是发展中国家)和学者认为，安理会的否决权就像一把大铁锤，使众多符合国际利益或中小国家要求的决议被无情地打掉了，有损“会员国主权平等”原则，因此主张修改或限制否决权，有的甚至要求取消否决权。但是另一方面，也有不少国家和学者从另一角度分析，十分强调“大国一致”原则的积极作用，认为这一制度是联合国不可动摇的基石。其基本论点为:如果在大国不一致的情况下，安理会可以按多数票做出重大决定，并据此采取重大行动(甚至军事行动)，那即有可能激化国际社会的分裂，诱发危机，动摇国际法律秩序，甚至引起联合国的瘫痪和解体。依此论点，可以把否决权比作电路中的保险丝，即使发生短路事故，产生了强大电流，但是由于保险丝在起作用，定能阻止这股危险电流的通过。如果没有这一保险装置，联合国这座大厦就会顷刻被一场熊熊烈火所焚毁。 上述两种见解从不同角度出发，各有其合理内核，但是，又都在不同程度上有不够全面之处。我们在原则上必须首先明确两点:第一，在主要由国家组成的国际社会中，任何一个现实的国际法律制度既须顾及国际社会各实体的“社会性”，也须考虑到这些实体的“非社会性”;第二，在人类发展的现阶段，我们还没有社会基础建立一个能够完全摆脱“国家利益”的联合国，因为联合国毕竟还是由众多独立的国家组成的。所以，在此原则性认识的基础上，应该从整个国际社会和联合国的现实出发，从多个角度来考察否决权的作用及其利弊。既要预测到一个没有否决权制度的联合国将出现什么状况，也要看到一个已有否决权制度的联合国产生了何种弊端。问题的要害是:要使国际利益与国家利益平衡;要使各国(大小强弱)之间的利益平衡;要使否决权制度本身利大于弊。只有这样，才有望建立一个和平、公正和有效的国际法律秩序。社会现象如同自然现象,均受“平衡规律”的支配。小到个人与个人之间的各种关系，大到国家，甚至我们的地球、日月星辰、整个宇宙，都只有在反复保持平衡的条件下才能正常有序地运行。 根据这些原则性的构想和思路，我在2003年11月所作的《国际法的危机》讲座中，曾就联合国的改革问题提出过八点建议，现将其中有关扩大安理会和改进否决权制度的两项建议摘述如下: (1)安理会是联合国的权力核心和执行机关，欲使其发挥更大作用，其组成就应根据国际社会五十多年来的发展予以适当扩大。一个由包括7,9名常任理事国在内的21,27名理事国组成的安理会，估计是有可能为国际社会所接受的。常任理事国及理事国的名额，应适当注意地域分配上的公允。如常任理事国超 过7名，除7名有否决权的常任理事国外，其余则可为无否决权但可较长期连任的(半)常任理事国。 (2)为了扩大国际民主并缓和对安理会否决权制度的抵制，可考虑将常任理事国的“一票否决制”改 进为“2,3票(缀连)否决制”。 以上两项建议，纯系“书生之见”，谨供各位在继续研究这一问题时作参考。 三、安理会改革之方向——一位外国学者的看法 Amber Fitzgerald, Security Council Reform: Creating a More Representative Body of the Entire U.N. Membership, 12 Pace Int'l L. Rev. 319 (Fall 2000). I. Introduction ........................................................ 321 II. Overview of the Security Council .................................... 324 A. Background of the Security Council ............................. 324 B. The Security Council's Functions, Powers and Procedures ........ 325 III. Reforming the Security Council ...................................... 328 A. Renewed Calls to Reform the Security Council ................... 328 B. Main Problems Causing the Need to Reform ....................... 329 1. Domination by the Security Council Over the United Nations ... 329 a. Security Council's Exclusive Power ......................... 329 b. Self-Interest of Council Members ........................... 330 c. Lack of "Checks and Balances" .............................. 332 2. Veto Power ................................................... 333 3. Non-Participation of U.N. Members in Security Council Decisions .. 335 4. Lack of Transparency of Security Council Meetings ............ 336 C. Obstacles to Reforming the Council ............................. 338 1. Procedures to Amend the Charter .............................. 338 2. Financial and Political Realities ............................ 339 IV. Proposals Presented to Reform the Security Council .................. 340 A. Additional Permanent Members ................................... 341 1. Proposals by Member States and Regional Groups ............... 342 2. Working Group's Proposals .................................... 344 3. Author's Proposals ........................................... 344 B. Increasing Overall Security Council Membership ................. 346 1. Proposals by Member States and Regional Groups ............... 347 2. Working Group's Proposals .................................... 348 3. Author's Proposals ........................................... 349 C. Veto Proposals ................................................. 350 1. Proposals by Member States and Regional Groups ............... 350 2. Working Group's Proposals .................................... 352 3. Author's Proposals ........................................... 352 D. Increasing Participation in the Decision Making Process ........ 353 1. Proposals by Member States and Regional Groups ............... 353 2. Working Group's Proposals .................................... 354 3. Author's Proposals ........................................... 354 E. Increasing Transparency ........................................ 356 1. Proposals by Member States and Regional Groups ............... 356 2. Working Group's Proposals .................................... 356 3. Author's Proposals ........................................... 357 F. Other Proposals to Increase Equality and Representation ........ 358 1. Shifting Power to the General Assembly ....................... 358 2. Finalizing Provisional Rules ................................. 362 3. Time Frame ................................................... 363 V. Conclusion .......................................................... 364 *321 [T]his 15 member Council acts on behalf of a total of [188] Member States of the United Nations. This means that [173] States have placed their security, and possibly their very survival, in the hands of fifteen. This is a solemn and heavy responsibility that each and every member of the Council carries. It is therefore of crucial importance that every decision taken by the Security Council be able to withstand the careful scrutiny of the [173] Member States on whose behalf the Council is expected to act. [FN1] I. Introduction According to the United Nations Charter ("Charter"), the Security Council of the United Nations ("Security Council") is designed to act on behalf of the entire U.N. membership. Article 24 of the Charter provides, "In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf." [FN2] Despite this mandate, at the turn of the century, the Security Council remains unrepresentative of the U.N. membership. The Charter also provides that "[t]he Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Member States and equal rights should be afforded to nations large and small." [FN3] This fundamental principle of equality for all Member States has never been adopted in practice. The reality is that due to the disparity in power created by the Security Council, Member States are far from being equal. Several factors contribute to this inequality. Numerically speaking, the current U.N. membership includes 188 Member States from every region of the world, while there are only fifteen Member States on the Security Council. [FN4] At the time of the signing of the Charter, only eleven of the fifty-one original Member States were on the Security Council. At its formation, therefore, the proportion of Security Council Members to the total*322 Member States was greater than twenty percent. [FN5] Today, it is less than eight percent. [FN6] A second factor causing a lack of representation is the continuing domination of the Security Council by its Permanent Members, a domination collectively aided by the shared power of veto. In addition, all Security Council Members generally act in their own self-interest. Finally, the overall working methods of the Security Council do not allow the participation of pertinent non-Security Council members and their methods lack transparency. All U.N. Member States and the international community agree on the need to reform the Security Council in order to reflect the modern world structure and to represent all Member States. [FN7] The difficulty lies in deciding what exact measures need to be implemented to assure the equality, representation, transparency, and effectiveness of the Security Council. The main issues surrounding reform of the Security Council include the following: whether its membership should be expanded and, if so, whether the number of both the non-permanent members and the Permanent Members should be expanded; whether the veto power should be abolished, limited, expanded, or modified; whether the non-members of the Security Council should be afforded greater participation in Security Council decisions; and whether Security Council proceedings should be more transparent. The Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable *323 Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council ("Working Group") was created in 1993 to address these specific issues and to propose reform measures for the Security Council in general. Yet, in the seven years since its establishment, the Working Group has failed to pass any substantive resolutions. [FN8] This article will discuss the problems of the Security Council that have resulted in a lack of representation and equality for U.N. Member States including the domination of the Security Council, with particular attention to domination by the Security Council's Permanent Members. This article will also present possible solutions to these problems. Although many argue that the Security Council is finally doing what it was originally intended to do, the purpose of this paper is not to argue that the Security Council should decrease its activities. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that if and when the Security Council decides to act, it must do so according to principles of equality and representation, fundamental ideals of the United Nations. Part II contains a brief overview of the Security Council's background, functions, powers, and procedures. Part III discusses both the existing problems of the Security Council which led to calls for reform, and the obstacles that may block such measures. Part IV provides various suggestions proposed by Member States, regional groups, the Working Group and the author's own proposals. Part V contains a conclusion with a summary of the proposals. *324 II. Overview of The Security Council An overview of the Security Council is necessary to demonstrate how the Security Council's functions, powers and procedures inherently result in inequality and under-representation of U.N. Member States. The background also illustrates that the manner in which the Security Council was formed created the same problems that have lingered until the present day. A. Background of the Security Council In the wake of World War II, the victorious nations, China, France, Great Britain, Russia and the United States ("Five Powers") agreed to form the United Nations to replace the defunct League of Nations. [FN9] During initial negotiations, one of the main debates centered on how to design a Security Council that would ensure member representation and equality through its composition and voting procedures. [FN10] Numerous concerns were raised about what appeared to be an overabundance of power given to the Security Council, particularly to its Permanent Members. Smaller States feared that the greater powers would unite and impose their will upon them. [FN11] The Five Powers counter-argued that they could not act alone because a certain number of the non-Permanent Members would be required to agree to any resolutions. [FN12] Realizing that the United Nations would not come into existence without meeting the demands of the Five Powers, debates subsided and all other States succumbed to the terms of the Five Powers without having their concerns seriously addressed. With the signing of the U.N. Charter in 1945, the Five Powers became the five Permanent Members of the Security Council, and were bestowed with enormous power. *325 In the four decades following the signing of the Charter, the East-West political divide had a crucial impact on the functioning of the Security Council. It was often frustrated by its inability to act quickly and effectively against perceived threats to peace. The collapse of the "Iron Curtain" marked a decline in this East-West tension and resulted in an incredible transformation of the Security Council, thus ending its previous stalemate. No longer paralyzed by superpower vetoes, the Security Council displayed an unprecedented activism in the 1990's, including the assumption of a key role in the Gulf War. Of the fifty-three operations that the Security Council has undertaken since 1948, forty have been initiated between the years of 1988 and 2000. [FN13] As of February 1, 2000, seventeen operations were under way. [FN14] B. The Security Council's Functions, Powers and Procedures The Security Council is responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. [FN15] The Security Council can make recommendations either to individual parties in a dispute or to the General Assembly as a whole. It can also render binding resolutions on any or all U.N. Member States. Member States are obligated to follow these binding resolutions in accordance with the Charter which states that Member States must "accept and carry out" its decisions. [FN16] No other organ of the United Nations has such binding, mandatory authority. [FN17] *326 The Security Council also has the power to investigate any situation that could lead to international friction or dispute. [FN18] After investigating, the Security Council may determine the existence of any threat to peace and may take measures to resolve the problem. Such measures include provisional measures, non-military orders such as the regulation of armaments, and economic sanctions. [FN19] If these are insufficient, the Security Council may then order peacekeeping missions or enforcement actions against a State that is threatening the maintenance of peace. [FN20] These two methods should not be confused. [FN21] Peacekeeping missions are traditionally carried out with the consent of the disputing parties and peacekeepers are deployed to implement an agreement approved by the parties. [FN22] With enforcement actions, the Security Council gives Member States the authority to take all necessary means to achieve an objective, and consent of the parties is not required. [FN23] The Security Council authorized such enforcement actions in the Gulf War, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Albania. [FN24] While the Security Council approved these enforcement operations, a single country or group of countries undertook the actual actions. When these authorizations are rendered, the Security Council normally does not have control over the actions. [FN25] *327 Beyond these powers and functions, the general procedures of the Security Council have often been called into controversy. The Charter provides that the Security Council can establish its own rule of procedures. [FN26] Procedures for voting are one of its most controversial aspects. Any Security Council Member may submit a proposal to be voted upon. [FN27] U.N. Member States can also submit proposals, but before any vote on such a proposal is considered, a member of the Security Council must request it be considered. [FN28] All members of the Security Council receive one vote. [FN29] Passing a resolution requires an affirmative vote of nine Members, including the concurring votes of all Permanent Members. The requirement that all Permanent Members must concur is the source of their veto power. [FN30] Abstentions, the "hidden veto," and absences also effect the voting of the Security Council. Voluntary abstentions are permitted, [FN31] and Members who are parties to disputes are required to abstain from voting. [FN32] The "hidden vote" exists in a situation where an insufficient number of Members vote, and the proposal is automatically rejected. [FN33] When Members can be persuaded to refrain from voting, proposals may be defeated. [FN34] Absences, either voluntary or involuntary, have also been used to affect outcomes. [FN35] *328 Although this overview has attempted to present the Security Council's functions, powers and procedures in a neutral way, it is evident from its formation and founding principles that the Security Council does not provide equality or representation to U.N. Member States. Considering these problems and concerns, the need to reform has been pushed to the forefront of the United Nations' agenda. III. Reforming the Security Council A. Renewed Calls to Reform the Security Council Dissatisfaction with the Security Council surfaced during its own formation negotiations. [FN36] The discontent failed to subside and the issue of reformation of the Security Council was finally put on the General Assembly's agenda in 1979. It was not until 1991, however, that the topic was formally discussed. [FN37] The focus during the 1990's on reforms of the Security Council was partly a result of the significant increases in interventions and authorizations of the use of force. [FN38] The diminishing *329 of political divisions within the Security Council and increased Security Council activism once again raised great concerns about the possible abuse of power. [FN39] Many U.N. Member States began to worry that future interventions would affect their own countries. Member States also became increasingly worried about the declining ability of non-members to influence the Security Council. B. Main Problems Causing the Need to Reform 1. Domination by the Security Council Over the United Nations Contrary to the principles of equality and representation, the Security Council and its Permanent Members dominate the U.N., rather than act on its behalf. This domination is a product of the Security Council's exclusive powers, the self-interest of Council Members and the absence of "Check and Balances" to limit the Security Council's power. a. Security Council's Exclusive Power Preliminarily, the Charter provides that if the Security Council is exercising any of its powers, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendations with regard to the matter "unless the Security Council so requests." [FN40] Therefore, if the Security Council wants to take over an issue, all substantive powers are taken from the Assembly. The Security Council has *330 exclusive power to decide the dispute; and the General Assembly cannot interfere with this decision. [FN41] A de facto amendment was made to the Charter permitting the General Assembly to make recommendations even where the Security Council seized the problem, but these recommendations are in no way binding on the Security Council. b. Self-Interest of Council Members In some parts of the world, especially in Africa, the Council was seen as a disinterested and immovable body that was only roused to action when conflicts around the world became so brutal and bloody that they could not escape the attention of the selective world media. [FN42] Security Council Members normally act, or fail to act, only in accordance with their own self-interest. The Security Council may act, therefore, to the detriment of what may be more beneficial to the international community as a whole. The authorization of the use of force, which is normally made at the request of a particular member, frequently reflects an individual member's own agenda. For example, the United States pushed for a resolution in Haiti mainly because of the large number of Haitians fleeing to its borders seeking asylum, not because there was a threat to international peace or security. Further, it is probably no coincidence that an unparalleled number of discussions within the Security Council on one single country, Rwanda, occurred at a time when Rwanda was a member of the Security Council, between 1994 and 1995. It adopted more than thirty resolutions and presidential statements concerning Rwanda during this time. [FN43] In December 1994, Rwanda actually presided over the Security Council. This poses the question of what would have been the Security Council's actions had Rwanda not been a member at that time. France was also accused of acting in its self-interest regarding Rwanda. France gave arms to one side of the conflict throughout the massacres, *331 and it voted on the Security Council in a manner consistent with its support of one faction. [FN44] The Security Council Members also continually try to fulfill their own agendas by influencing the decisions of other Security Council Members' decisions with political or economic pressure. [FN45] For example, the self-interest of the United States was suspicious to many during the Gulf War. [FN46] Shortly after a vote concerning Iraq, reportedly in retaliation for its negative vote, the United States cut economic aid to Yemen. [FN47] The problem of self-interest is also evident when Permanent Members are not willing to abstain from voting when they *332 are parties to a dispute. While the U.N. Charter states that, "a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting" in decisions under Chapter VI, [FN48] mandatory abstention does not apply to a "situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute," rather than an actual dispute. [FN49] Because "dispute" was never defined during the San Francisco conference, Security Council Members have argued that the event was a "situation" and not a "dispute"; or if a dispute did exist, that the member was not a party to it. [FN50] When this issue was brought before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), it concluded that abstention from voting requires "the prior determination by the Security Council that a dispute exists and that certain members of the Security Council are involved as parties to such a dispute." [FN51] By exercising its veto power, a Permanent Member exercises control over the determination of whether it is or is not involved in the dispute. The obvious result is that if a Permanent Member wants to veto a Security Council action, it will deem itself not to be party to a "dispute." c. Lack of "Checks and Balances" Finally, because its decisions are not revisable by any other organ of the U.N., the Security Council can be said to dominate the entire U.N. [FN52] The ICJ can issue advisory opinions, and the General Assembly can render simultaneous opinions, but these opinions are neither binding nor retroactive. The only "check" on the Security Council's power may occur when it asks for sanctions or troops, and no States respond. This check is highly insufficient because the Security Council Members, in particular the Permanent Members, have sufficient military power to *333 implement a plan. Greater checks are necessary to prevent infringements on state sovereignty and to balance the power of the Security Council. 2. Veto Power The most criticized aspect of the Security Council is the Permanent Members' veto power. [FN53] The actual use of the veto, however, has declined since the end of the Cold War. The veto was used 194 times between 1946 and 1990, but it was only used nine times in the past decade. [FN54] Russia has used its veto power 120 times, but only twice in the past decade. [FN55] The United States has vetoed seventy-two proposals over the years. [FN56] Britain has used its veto power thirty-two times, France eighteen times, and China only five times. [FN57] Despite the decline, most Member States continue to oppose the veto power. [FN58] *334 Essentially, if any Permanent Member vetoes a proposal, the Security Council is completely frozen. [FN59] Further, the Five Powers can free themselves from the governance of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the United Nations as a whole by merely vetoing any proposal made against their interests. As stated above, if the Security Council is considering a problem, aside from issuing non-binding resolutions, the General Assembly may not interfere. Thus, if the General Assembly attempts to address a problem caused by a Permanent Member, the Permanent Member simply has to put the problem on the Security Council's agenda, and the General Assembly is no longer permitted to take further firm action. Permanent Members can also shield allied Member States by using this same technique. Although much attention is given to the veto, the problem of the reverse veto may prove to be more detrimental. The reverse veto does not block Security Council action, but rather blocks the termination or altering of a resolution that has already been passed. [FN60] This has more relevance today considering the relative increase in the Security Council's activities in the past decade. For example, after days of bombarding Iraq, several countries sought to establish peace initiatives and bring an end to the attack. Both the United States and the United Kingdom, however, argued that they were authorized to continue using force until a further resolution passed and ended *335 their authority. Furthermore, each stated they would veto any such provision. [FN61] 3. Non-Participation of U.N. Members in Security Council Decisions Three provisions in the U.N. Charter and the provisions in the Security Council's own Provisional Rules of Procedure provide for participation by the U.N. Members in the Security Council's decision-making process when they are affected or when they have an interest in the Security Council's actions. Article 31 provides: "Any member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council whenever the latter considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected." [FN62] Article 32 provides that any Member State or non-U.N. Member State that is a party to the dispute "shall be invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute." [FN63] Article 50 provides that those third party States affected by Security Council actions shall have the right to consult the Security Council. [FN64] The Security Council's Provisional Rules of Procedure also contain similar provisions giving Member States the right to be heard. Rule 37 provides: Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may be invited, as a result of a decision of the Security Council, to participate without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council when the Security *336 Council considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected, or when a Member brings a matter to the attention of the Security Council in accordance with Article 35(1) of the Charter. [FN65] The inherent problem with both Article 31 of the Charter and the Security Council's Provisional Rule 37 is that the discretion to allow participation by a Member State lies in the hands of the Security Council itself. Both Article 32 and Article 50, however, seem to create the right of participation when a Member State's interests are affected. Contrary to these mandates, decisions are frequently made without any input from the countries involved. [FN66] Resolutions are often taken without involving non-Security Council Members and without hearing outside points of view. [FN67] Such resolutions include decisions affecting only the domestic affairs of a country. Even when the Security Council hears an argument by a Member State, it typically will have no bearing or impact on the resolution under discussion "which will have been prepared, every 'i' dotted and every 't' crossed, during previous informal consultations." [FN68] 4. Lack of Transparency of Security Council Meetings Directly linked to the problem of non-participation of U.N. Member States in Security Council decisions is the absence of transparency in the Security Council's meetings. The Council's Provisional Rules provide, "unless it decides otherwise, the Security Council shall meet in public." [FN69] Apparently, the Security *337 Council has chosen "otherwise" in the majority of its decision-making proceedings. In the early years, most of the Security Council's meetings were held in public, and verbatim records were maintained, including records on procedural debates and votes. [FN70] Today the records are scant and offer little indication of the proceedings actually held before a resolution is adopted. [FN71] Private informal consultations are now the norm. [FN72] In fact, nearly all the Security Council's work occurs in informal consultations from which Member States are excluded and which only Security Council Members or the Secretariat may attend. [FN73] It is usually agreed in these consultations that no debate will take place in the official meeting and that no non-Security Council Members will speak. [FN74] In other words, the official public meetings of the Security Council have generally become "very much a prearranged, set-piece affair." [FN75] Closed consultations are also held by sub-groups of the Security Council, such as the five Permanent Members alone. [FN76] The following description provides additional details on the Security Council proceedings in informal consultations: Probably in order to avoid the recurrence of the difficult public meetings punctuated by procedural disputes which had marked the cold war era, special attention has for several years been *338 given to delivering only a finished product at official meetings of the Council. In other words, it is still customary nowadays to wait until all the differences of opinion within the Council have been settled, and a text has been negotiated down to the last comma, before holding an official meeting. The script for such a meeting has always been worked out beforehand in its tiniest details so as to leave no room for surprises. The consequence of this is, inevitably, the declaratory, rigid style of such meetings, at which delegations not members of the Council may be heard reading out their prepared statements before a decision is taken, with members presenting before and after the vote explanations which, of course, do not take into account the arguments put forth during the debate leading up to the vote. [FN77] C. Obstacles to Reforming the Council While the above section provides an overview for a multitude of problems existing in the Security Council as well as a demonstration of the need to reform the Security Council, several obstacles continue to block Security Council reform. These obstacles include procedures to amend the Charter, a majority vote requirement to pass reform measures, and general financial and political realities. 1. Procedures to Amend the Charter Although the drafters of the Charter foresaw that amendments would most likely be necessary in the future and, therefore, included amendment procedures, the actual ability to amend the Charter depends on the Permanent Members of the Security Council. [FN78] The Charter can only be amended by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly in addition to ratification by two-thirds of the Security Council (including the Permanent *339 Members). [FN79] Any restructuring through means of amending the Charter, therefore, will ultimately depend on the Security Council and the Permanent Members themselves. [FN80] 2. Financial and Political Realities Simply stated, a few countries in the world have extreme economic and political control over the majority of the smaller nations. While most countries are in favor of reform, it will most likely be an extremely long process, if it occurs at all. It is possible reform measures will never be obtained since the smaller nations will most likely submit to the pressures of the larger powers in the world. Stronger Member States will continue to put political pressure on other Member States in an attempt to halt reforms or to press only for the reforms that they want. Member States may also boycott or withhold funds from the United Nations if they do not agree with reform measures. Despite all of these obstacles, U.N. Member States are continuing to press for reform. It is certain that reforming the Security Council will remain a high priority on the United Nation's agenda until a solution is found. With that in mind, it is important to set forth those measures that are being considered. *340 IV. Proposals Presented to Reform the Security Council The proposals being discussed are remarkably similar to those rejected over fifty years ago during the formation of the Security Council. [FN81] This reflects the continued disenchantment with the Security Council and the desire to implement change. This Section provides proposals from Member States, regional groups, the U.N. Working Group, and the author's own proposals. These proposals attempt to increase equality and representation for all U.N. Member States. Member States have individually made proposals; in addition, various States have joined regional groups to present their ideas uniformly. [FN82] These groups include the Non-Aligned Movement ("NAM") and the Groups of African, Arab, Asian and Latin States. [FN83] Due to the overwhelming number of proposals submitted by over 100 Member States either individually or collectively, this Section only provides some examples and is, therefore, not exhaustive of the topic. The Working Group is also currently formulating proposals. The Working Group, formed in 1993, [FN84] met for the first time in January 1994 [FN85] and had its mandate extended by the General Assembly at its forty-eighth through fifty-second sessions. Reports on its progress were submitted at each of these sessions. The Working Group appears to be independent and *341 has conducted bilateral consultations with over 165 countries. [FN86] Its substantive meetings are open to all U.N. delegations to submit any oral or written proposals. [FN87] The latest report of the Working Group, released on August 5, 1999, failed to make any firm recommendations. [FN88] Its only so-called "recommendation" reads as follows: At its 53rd meeting, on 30 July 1999, the Open-ended Working Group concluded its work for the current session of the General Assembly and decided to recommend that consideration of this item be continued at the fifty-fourth session of the Assembly, building upon the work done during the previous sessions. To that end, the Working Group recommends to the General Assembly" that the Working Group should continue its work. [FN89] In other words, the Working Group did not make any recommendations. [FN90] In fact, after seven years the Working Group has only made "general observations" that certain "elements [have] emerged that may prove useful when the Working Group resumes its work." [FN91] The following are the five main areas of reform currently being discussed regarding increased representation and equality of Member States in the Security Council: 1) adding additional Permanent Members; 2) increasing the overall Security Council membership; 3) changing the veto power; 4) increasing participation in the decision making process; and 5) increasing transparency. A. Additional Permanent Members Adding Permanent Members has been proposed several times since the Security Council's formation. Less than twenty *342 years after its creation, and again in 1979 suggestions were made to expand the Permanent Membership, but were never implemented. [FN92] In 1991, the interest resurfaced again with the fall of the Soviet Union and the hopes that its seat would become vacant, but Russia eventually replaced the Soviet Union in that position. 1. Proposals by Member States and Regional Groups The majority of States presumably agree on the need to enlarge the Security Council's permanent membership. [FN93] Previously, the Five Powers strongly resisted any attempt to enlarge this membership, but more recently they have supported the idea. [FN94] The most widely accepted proposal is to add Japan and/or Germany, which are the second and third largest contributors to the U.N. regular budget. [FN95] The other potential candidates for permanent seats include Nigeria and Brazil. [FN96] A wide variety of other proposals have been made. [FN97] These include the following: 1) Tenured membership: members could occupy seats for longer than two years; 2) Extended membership: these seats would not be subject to the prohibition against *343 re-election of consecutive two-year terms; 3) Two stage approach: enlarge the permanent seats by a certain amount at the first stage and at the second stage the specific countries to receive the seats would be announced; [FN98] 4) Redistribution of the permanent seats: the two obvious choices are to replace France and Great Britain which are no longer economic nor military powers; [FN99] 5) Replacing seats: creating one single European Union permanent seat to replace Great Britain and France. [FN100] Other Member States suggest adding permanent seats on the basis of geographical representation. [FN101] The Group of Arab States want a "full-fledged rotating permanent seat" which would entail that one permanent seat would go to the Arab States on a rotating basis amongst this region. [FN102] The African States want to be allocated no less than two permanent seats. [FN103] The African States and Arab States also want new Permanent Members to possess the same prerogatives and powers as the current members. [FN104] It is clear that most Member States and regional groups favor expanding the permanent membership. The uncertainty of exactly which or how many States will be added remains to be the difficulty. *344 2. Working Group's Proposals The Working Group has failed to reach a decisive consensus on the expansion of the permanent membership category of the Security Council. While concluding that the majority of Member States expressed a preference for an increase in permanent seats, the Working Group, rather than making any proposals, has only thus far listed issues in its ongoing conference room paper. Such issues include: "Can we agree whether it is desirable to have an expansion that includes both additional permanent and additional non-Permanent Members?; Can we agree on how any additional permanent seats should be allocated?" [FN105] 3. Author's Proposals There are a few countries that appear to believe that the only yardstick by which progress on this issue can be measured is the achievement of their ambition to become a permanent member of the Council. Their desire to seek a permanent status on the Security Council is not motivated by altruistic or noble sentiments. It is an undisguised grab for power and privilege. [FN106] New permanent seats should not be granted to any individual U.N. Member State. In the new millennium, special privileges should not be bestowed on some and denied to others. The addition of any individual Member States as a Permanent Member would only make the Security Council more unrepresentative, unequal, and unresponsive to the concerns of the other countries. The status of Permanent Members should never have been created when the Security Council was formed, and it is inconceivable at this point that the current Permanent Members will ever relinquish their power. Although this author does not support the continued permanent membership of the majority of its current State Members, at this stage, it seems impossible to attempt to revoke any Permanent Member's status. Besides the countries fighting for a permanent seat, it is unclear why numerous other Member States also accept the *345 idea of additional individual States' seats. Permanent Member status was strongly opposed at the San Francisco Conference. It was not seriously challenged, however, because it became clear that the Five Powers would reject the Charter completely unless this status was conferred upon them. [FN107] No doubt exists today, however, that if the Charter were drafted de novo, the same Permanent Members would not be chosen. If new Permanent Members are chosen from a particular country, the same issues will arise in the future as to whether these countries deserve permanent status. For example, when the United Nations was formed, both Germany and Japan were prohibited from joining and were officially deemed to be "enemy states" in the original Charter. [FN108] Now, they are the prime candidates to receive permanent seats. Future historical and political trends are uncertain. It does not seem prudent to designate permanent seats when it is uncertain whether these countries will later deserve to remain in such a position. This problem would only be exacerbated if the potential new members were given the right to veto. While many countries support Japan and Germany becoming Permanent Members, this proposal should be rejected. If Germany were selected this would lead to three seats being maintained by Western European countries. If Japan were chosen this would cause more domination by the industrialized nations. France, Great Britain, and the United States want Japan to become a permanent member because they all have strong political ties with Japan, and Japan would most likely vote similarly to them. This is not a solution to provide more equality and representation. *346 As already suggested by some regional groups, the ideal approach is to create permanent seats based on regional representation. It is the small and medium sized countries that constitute the overwhelming majority of the United Nations, and it is they who must be given greater representation in the decision-making process of the Security Council. These groups have already been self-proclaimed as the following: African Group, Arab Group, Asian Group and Latin Group. Each of these groups should be afforded one permanent seat. The representative from each group should be selected by an agreement of each region itself and not by the General Assembly. This will provide more equitable representation and equality of U.N. Member States. B. Increasing Overall Security Council Membership The second most debated reform measure involves increasing the overall membership of the Security Council. This has also been a recurrent theme throughout the years. In 1963, forty-four African and Asian States argued that since the U.N. membership had increased to 112 members from the original fifty-one, the membership of the Security Council should also be increased. [FN109] Despite initial opposition, an amendment to enlarge the Security Council was ratified in 1965, increasing the number of non-Permanent Members from six to ten. [FN110] Subsequent to this amendment, several other proposals for expansion were advanced. In 1979, a proposal was made to increase the number of non-Permanent Members to fourteen. [FN111] In 1980, a group of African, Asian and Latin States proposed the addition of six non-Permanent Members with a majority of fourteen members required to pass a resolution. [FN112] In 1981, the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization submitted a report recommending an increase in the membership of the Security Council "taking into account the principle of equitable geographical *347 distribution." [FN113] All of these proposals were opposed by the Permanent Members and were never implemented. [FN114] 1. Proposals by Member States and Regional Groups Currently, most Member States agree that the Security Council should be expanded, but there is widespread disagreement on how many additional members should be added. Indecisiveness about the exact number is demonstrated in a paper submitted by Colombia on behalf of numerous other delegations. It states, "[T]he Security Council should be expanded to: a) No more than 20 to 21 members; b) 24 members; c) 23 to 25 members; d) Not less than 26 members; e) Any other option." [FN115] Permanent Members such as the United Kingdom, China, and France now accept the general idea of enlarging the Security Council as long as it does not hinder its efficiency. [FN116] France has stated that it agrees with the need to expand the non-Permanent Members to between twenty-one and twenty-five seats. [FN117] The United States supports expansion but has stated that expansion beyond twenty-one Members will be challenged. [FN118] Russia agrees that the increase should not exceed *348 twenty or twenty-one and has stated that going beyond these numbers would affect the efficiency of the Security Council. [FN119] NAM and all of the regional groups have produced their own solutions. NAM supports the increase in membership by no less than eleven new members "based on the principles of equitable geographical distribution and sovereign equality of States." [FN120] The Asian Group has argued that it deserves special consideration in the composition of an expanded Security Council due to its vast geographical coverage and population. [FN121] The African Group wants the "composition of the Security Council [to] be democratized to reflect the increase in the number of Member States of the United Nations" and to consist of twenty-six States, allocating five non-permanent seats to African countries "for the benefit of developing countries, and African countries in particular." [FN122] The Arab Group supports expansion to at least twenty-six Members to ensure the Security Council is "democratized to reflect the increase in the number of States members of the United Nations" [FN123] 2. Working Group's Proposals The Working Group has only made "general observations" regarding expanding the Security Council and has reported that "the number of members of an enlarged Security Council should be from 20 to 26 as a minimum . . . and [t]he scope and modalities of the periodic review of an enlarged Security Council*349 should be further considered." [FN124] Beyond this "general observation" and concluding that the majority of Member States support an increase in non-permanent seats, the Working Group once again has only thus far listed issues. [FN125] 3. Author's Proposal The U.N. Member States are, numerically speaking, grossly under-represented in the Security Council. A more equitable representation in the Security Council may be obtained by increasing the number of its Members, taking into account the substantial increase in the membership of the United Nations, especially of developing countries, as well as the changes in international relations. This will not only enhance the credibility of the Security Council and reflect the universal character of the world body, but would modify existing imbalances in the composition of the Security Council. Apparently, the only obstacle to expanding the Security Council membership is an agreement upon a number. An agreement must take into consideration adequate representation of the Member States and continued effectiveness to act. The Security Council must be sufficiently large to represent the Member States, while remaining small enough to operate with "prompt and effective action" in the maintenance of international peace and security on behalf of the entire U.N. membership. [FN126] Similar to the amendment in 1963 to increase membership, the General Assembly should pass an amendment to increase the entire Security Council membership to twenty-five seats. Encompassing the proposal stated above, which would add four new permanent seats on a regional basis to the African, Arab, Asian and Latin Groups, this amendment would increase the overall membership by only ten members. The result would be *350 the continued representation as Permanent Members by China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States; new representation by the regional African, Arab, Asian, and Latin Groups; and the remainder of sixteen seats to be divided on the grounds of equitable representation of the different regions of the world. This proposal will obviously be challenged by the United States and Russia and possibly the United Kingdom. France, however, has stated that it will support an increase of ten members, and China which is normally the silent, passive permanent member will also most likely support this increase. Similar to the situation leading up to the previous amendment on expansion, the U.N. Member States will have to continually pressure the opposing Member States and the Permanent Members into an agreement. Eventually the opposition will probably be subordinated to the majority of Member States' demands. Changing the time period during which a non-permanent member serves on the Security Council can also provide greater equitable representation of the entire U.N. membership. Instead of serving two-year terms, each non-permanent member should serve a one-year term. C. Veto Proposals Proposals regarding the veto can be grouped into three categories: modify the current veto power; narrow the veto to certain categories; or completely abolish the veto. The problem of reforming the veto is intertwined with the issue of increasing the permanent membership of the Security Council. Thus, reforming the veto involves two considerations: the veto power of the existing Permanent Members and the veto power of possible future Permanent Members. 1. Proposals by Member States and Regional Groups While most U.N. Member States agree that the veto power must be reformed in some manner, Permanent Members such as the United States and the Russian Federation adamantly object to any reform of the veto. [FN127] Russia's representative rejected the claim that the veto almost led to a paralysis of the *351 Security Council and stated that the veto is an indispensable tool. [FN128] The United Kingdom claimed that the voting rights of the existing Permanent Members are fundamental to both the authority of the Security Council and its ability to function effectively, and it would firmly oppose any restrictions on these rights. [FN129] The other Permanent Members have made similar statements and arguments. Several groups and States have made proposals and statements contrary to the Permanent Members' opinions. [FN130] NAM has suggested a two-step restriction process: at present, the use of the veto would be restricted to Chapter VII issues, and, eventually, the veto would be completely abolished. [FN131] The African Group also wants the exercise of the right of veto to be progressively curtailed until complete abrogation. [FN132] This Group has also stated that if the veto is not eliminated, then additional Permanent Members should be granted the same privilege. [FN133] Other proposals submitted on behalf of various countries include limiting the veto power by prohibiting its use in the following instances: gathering information and ascertaining facts; calling on parties to settle disputes by peaceful means; calling *352 on the parties to a conflict to respect human rights and international humanitarian law; mediating and preventing conflicts; and dispatching U.N. observers. [FN134] 2. Working Group's Proposals The Working Group not only failed to make any recommendations concerning the veto, but it also omitted any discussion on the veto in its last report. It merely stated that the question of the veto had to be considered, and proposed the issue, "Can we agree to what extent, if any, the veto should be extended to any additional Permanent Members?" [FN135] It is curious to note, however, that the report of 1998 does include the following "suggested improvements": . . . the Charter should be amended to restrict vetoes to only Chapter VII issues; a single veto should be insufficient to nullify a proposal if the required majority had voted affirmatively; the right of the veto should be subject to suspension on specific occasions as defined by a qualified majority of the General Assembly; and the list of decisions deemed procedural should be updated. [FN136] All of these "suggested improvements" were deleted from the subsequent, current report of the Working Group. 3. Author's Proposals Ideally, the veto power should be completely abolished. Empowering only five U.N. Member States with the right to veto contradicts the fundamental principles of equality and representation provided in the Charter and is contrary to the United Nation's ideals. Further, the Permanent Members should no longer be free from the governance of the United Nations. While in recent years the Permanent Members have shown considerable restraint in making recourse to the veto, there are no guarantees that this tendency will continue to the point of being irreversible. Moreover, the simple threat of using *353 the veto can have a strong impact on the Security Council's proceedings and on the final outcome of its debates. The obvious "Catch-22" is that the Permanent Members can, and most likely will, veto any proposal to abolish their veto power. A roundabout approach of first attempting to modify or limit the veto power should therefore be taken. This would allow the Permanent Members to take "baby steps" towards finally accepting and deferring to the request of almost all U.N. Member States that the veto be reformed. Initial limitations could include requiring two votes by the Permanent Members to constitute a veto, or limiting use of the veto to Chapter VII issues only. At a minimum, the General Assembly should adopt a declaration or resolution expressing its attitude towards the veto as a voting instrument in the Security Council, encouraging the curtailment of the veto and requesting, in the event of any veto of a draft resolution that the Permanent Member provide an explanation of its actions. The General Assembly should also suggest that the Permanent Members be allowed to declare that they are casting a negative vote, without having such vote constitute a veto. Finally, the problem of the reverse veto can be easily remedied by placing in the original resolution a time frame or a provision that states that only a majority vote is needed to end an action. D. Increasing Participation Decision Making Process Compared to other areas, agreement on reform measures to allow increased participation in the Security Council's decision-making process is less controversial and agreement has been easier to achieve among U.N. Members. The Working Group has also made relatively important steps in this area. 1. Proposals by Member States and Regional Groups Several proposals have been made by Member States. These proposals include the following: the Security Council should hear the views of pertinent non-members of the Security Council when it is considering substantive matters; a non-member should be able to meet with the President of the Security Council when the non-member's interests are affected; the Security Council should fully implement Articles 31, 32 and 50 of *354 the Charter and Rules 37 and 38 of the Security Council's Provisional Rules of Procedure; the Security Council should consult on a regular and timely basis not only with the countries affected by Security Council decisions, but with concerned regional groups and organizations; the Security Council should invite non-members to its discussions; and the agenda for informal consultations should be circulated. [FN137] 2. Working Group's Proposals The Working Group's proposals are similar to those of the Member States. It has stated that the views of non-members of the Security Council should be heard and consulted more frequently; that the Security Council should not challenge non-members' request to be heard, but should comply with Article 31, 32 and 50 of the Charter and Rules 37 and 38 of the Security Council's Rules; and that the President of the Security Council should promptly meet with the non-members whose interests are urgently affected. [FN138] 3. Author's Proposals No United Nations organ, especially the Council, must become so complex as to preclude a category of State from participation. Wisdom, like democratic rights, should be widely shared. There must be full access to the distilled experiences of the weak, the poor and the small. [FN139] Increasing the participation of Member States in the Security Council's decision-making process is yet another way to provide equality and representation of the entire U.N. Membership. The Security Council must consult with Member States whose interests are directly affected before making decisions or passing resolutions that will affect such countries. Mandating direct consultations will not affect the ability of the *355 Security Council to act promptly. With the telecommunications technology presently available throughout the world, time efficiency is no longer a pertinent issue in this respect. The General Assembly should amend Article 31 of the Charter to provide mandatory, rather than discretionary, participation by affected Member States. This would entail changing the language of the Article from "may participate" to "shall participate." [FN140] Since this is a less controversial area, the Permanent Members most likely will not veto this amendment. The General Assembly could alternatively pass a resolution stating that affected countries should be consulted and have an opportunity to be heard before a Security Council resolution is passed. A related problem that should be addressed is the insufficiency of consulting with the Member States alone. One of the difficulties of only consulting with Member States is that it automatically gives a reigning government an advantage. In civil strife, the opposition would not have the privilege of attending Security Council consultations. The situation surrounding Rwanda can again be used as an example. During 1994 alone, members of two diametrically different governments represented Rwanda at different times: the Hutu and the Tutsi-lead governments. [FN141] The Hutu government had originally placed its representative in the Security Council. [FN142] Later, the Tutsi government replaced that Security Council representative. During the time when resolutions concerning Rwanda were being passed, therefore, the Security Council was consulting with either one side or the other. This probably hindered the process of understanding the complete truth of the then-current events in Rwanda, and affected the path taken by the Security Council. To halt future similar occurrences, the General Assembly should also pass a resolution providing that the Security Council will not only consult with the Member States, but also various representatives within a single State such as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's). *356 E. Increasing Transparency Consensus seemed to have emerged on the need for greater transparency in the Council's work, which would imbue it with greater democracy and accountability . . . It would also encourage the majority of Member States to render their full support and contribute to the work of the Council through more active participation. [FN143] 1. Proposals by Member States and Regional Groups Reform proposals pertaining to transparency have been sparse, and debate has been rare by the Member States regional groups. Yet, there is a general consensus that the secrecy of Security Council meetings should be eradicated, and that they should be held in public. Surprisingly, one permanent member has proposed suggestions for greater transparency. France recommended that the Security Council should open its sessions more frequently to all U.N. Members with only certain limitations for timely concerns. [FN144] The French proposal also included adding two new instances in which the Security Council should meet in public: 1) orientation debates when the Security Council is preparing to begin consideration of an important question; and 2) public exchanges of views between Members of the Security Council. [FN145] 2. Working Group's Proposals The Working Group suggested several practices which can increase transparency of the Security Council. [FN146] Some of these "suggested improvements" include: a) The Security Council should conduct its business in a public format open to all member States of the United Nations; ... c) *357 The Security Council should hold substantive orientation debates open to all Member States at the beginning of its consideration of any substantive matter; d) The Security Council should, more often, conduct open debates and orientation discussions on the important items at the ministerial level"; Immediately following meetings between Security Council members, troop-contributing countries, other contributors and the Secretariat, the President should brief interested non-members of the Security Council on the contents of such meetings. [FN147] The Working Group, however, also stated that "[w]hen it so decides, the Security Council may meet in private and/or conduct its business in consultations as a whole." [FN148] Essentially, this nullifies all of the suggested improvements by permitting the Security Council to hold private meetings at its discretion. 3. Author's Proposals While the great majority of the Security Council's work is accomplished in private, informal consultations, such consultations are not mentioned in either the U.N. Charter or in the Security Council's Provisional Rules of Procedure. Rule 48 states that meetings "shall" be held in public "unless it decides otherwise." [FN149] The Security Council itself should delete the wording "unless it decides otherwise" and create an objective standard pertaining to when private meetings can be held. These meetings should only be held in limited circumstances. Previously, the Security Council did most of its work in public meetings and provided verbatim records of these meetings. The Security Council should return to this system. As mentioned above, the resolutions and subsequent actions surrounding Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina are considered to be the greatest failures of the Security Council. These were formulated almost entirely in private sessions with only a formal show of hands in public sessions. If the Security Council itself will not change this rule of procedures, then the General Assembly should pass a resolution to require public meetings and to clarify the circumstances in which private meetings may be held. *358 F. Other Proposals to Increase Equality and Representation 1. Shifting Power to the General Assembly Beyond the specific proposals discussed above, a means to significantly increase representation and equality of U.N. Member States is to shift power from the Security Council to the General Assembly. The General Assembly is inherently more equitable and representative for several reasons. It is composed of one representative from each Member State, each Member State having one vote. [FN150] A two-thirds majority is required to pass its resolutions of importance, and all other issues require only a simple majority. [FN151] No single State has the power to veto any action. [FN152] The idea of placing more power with the General Assembly was mentioned at the San Francisco Conference. At the time, the smaller powers throughout the world were concerned that the Security Council would possess unyielding power. Suggestions were made in an attempt to curtail the Security Council's authority. These included associating the General Assembly with the Security Council in terms of its enforcement decisions and giving the General Assembly authority to judge the Security Council's actions. [FN153] These ideas were found unacceptable by the Five Powers and were rejected. [FN154] The inherent obstacle of transferring power to the General Assembly is, once again, dependent on the Security Council's acceptance. Several methods can be utilized to achieve a transfer of power from the Security Council to the General Assembly. First, an attempt can be made to pass amendments to the Charter in accordance with the proposals suggested above. Some amendments concerning the less controversial areas will be easier to pass and the Permanent Members will be less likely to reject them. The Charter has only been amended three times in the past. It was amended in 1965 to increase the size of the Security Council from eleven to fifteen. Two subsequent amendments were passed to expand the Economic and Social *359 Council from eighteen to twenty-seven and later to fifty-four. [FN155] These amendments were the result of pressure from U.N. Member States complaining that the composition of these two organs did not reflect the entire United Nations. [FN156] This method of increased pressure can also function today to pass amendments reforming the Security Council. Second, de facto amendments to the Charter can be passed to decrease the Security Council's power and shift it to the Assembly. De facto amendments are accomplished through the resolution process. [FN157] These resolutions are in no way binding under the terms of the Charter. Yet, in the past they have been accepted and adhered to by the Security Council. For example, a de facto amendment was made to the Charter permitting the General Assembly to make recommendations despite the fact that the Security Council had seized the problem. The Security Council did not raise objections to this resolution. The General Assembly has also rendered de facto amendments that directly changed the working methods of the Security Council. For example, the General Assembly was able to remove the so-called "double veto" that the Permanent Members once possessed. [FN158] The double veto occurred when the Security Council was making a preliminary determination as to whether an issue was procedural or substantive. Since the veto cannot be used on purely procedural matters, a permanent member would use its veto declaring the matter to be substantive when, in fact, it was procedural. [FN159] After it was deemed substantive, the same country could later veto any decision. If that same issue had been deemed procedural, the veto could not have been invoked on the decision. [FN160] China, the Soviet Union, *360 the United States and the United Kingdom all favored this double veto. [FN161] But, in 1949, the Assembly adopted a resolution containing an affirmative list of categories deemed procedural and essentially terminated the double veto. [FN162] The Security Council accepted the resolution and never used the double veto again. [FN163] This demonstrates that while the General Assembly's resolutions are not actually binding on the Security Council, the Security Council has accepted and implemented General Assembly resolutions. The Security Council has accepted and most likely will continue to accept other de facto amendments. The General Assembly should, therefore, pass resolutions, as de facto amendments or otherwise, related to the specific proposals and other problems discussed above. For example, to address the problem of lack of "checks and balances" the General Assembly should pass a resolution to the effect that the Security Council must take into consideration past ICJ decisions in its future proceedings. This will be more efficient than involving the ICJ while the Security Council is in the process of deciding an issue. If the Security Council must hold its decision-making process to obtain an interlocutory decision, it will be impossible for the Security Council to fulfill its mandate to act with promptness. Further, applying the ICJ's decisions retroactively would not be timely or relevant. Third, correcting the problem of the Security Council's exclusive power when it has seized a matter can also be accomplished through resolutions. As stated above, the General Assembly can pass resolutions on issues that the Security Council has seized. It should continue to use this method with more frequency to voice the opinion of the entire Assembly, if its opinion does vary from that of the Security Council. Further, the General Assembly should consider passing a resolution to formulate a list of circumstances in which the Security Council is permitted to seize a matter solely, and the situations in which it is prohibited from doing so. In the latter case, the Security Council must act jointly with the General Assembly. *361 Fourth, although this article discusses action rather than inaction of the Security Council, a means of increasing the power of Assembly in the event of inaction should be mentioned. If the Security Council fails to act, power can be shifted to the General Assembly with the "Uniting for Peace Resolution" (the "Resolution"). [FN164] This Resolution was adopted in 1950 by an overwhelming majority vote of fifty-two to five with two abstentions. [FN165] This Resolution provides: If the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately . . . [FN166] This Resolution has seldom been used, but it can be a very effective tool for empowering the Assembly. It effectively transfers Security Council issues to the General Assembly in the event that action is blocked in the Security Council by a veto. The Resolution has been used to address issues surrounding the Suez Crisis, Hungary, Lebanon and Jordan, the Congo, and Israel. [FN167] The Resolution can also be used to invoke an "emergency special session" of the Assembly to be convened within twenty-four hours. Ten of these sessions have been convened. [FN168] The legality of the resolution was contested by the Soviet Union, but in 1962 the ICJ ruled that the Resolution was based on a lawful interpretation of the Charter. [FN169] The potential value of this Resolution has not been recognized. A past example in which the Resolution could have been *362 used was when the Security Council failed to act in response to the Argentinean-British conflict over the Falklands (Malvinas). [FN170] A resolution to force an immediate cease-fire and to seek a diplomatic solution failed as a result of vetoes by Great Britain and the United States. [FN171] According to the Charter, Great Britain, as a party to the dispute, should have been disqualified from voting. The United States representative also stated that if it were possible, it would have changed its veto to an abstention. [FN172] In this situation, the General Assembly could have invoked the Resolution to force a cease-fire more rapidly. More recently, the General Assembly could have used the Resolution in Kosovo. The Resolution should be used in more situations because it allows the General Assembly and all Member States to actively participate. The powers created by the U.N. must be shifted away from the Security Council and placed with the General Assembly. This can be accomplished by passing amendments to the Charter, de facto amendments, resolutions in general, declarations, and by using already available resolutions with more frequency. With continued and increased pressure from the U.N. Member States, these methods can accomplish Security Council reform. 2. Finalizing Provisional Rules The Security Council's lack of adherence to its own Provisional Rules of Procedure must be addressed. Although the Charter was adopted over fifty-five years ago, these rules have never been finalized. The Security Council, therefore, can and does depart from the rules when it deems necessary. [FN173] The Procedures of the Security Council must be finalized immediately. The term "Provisional" must be deleted, and these procedures must be followed. Finally, any General Assembly resolutions pertaining to the Security Council's working methods *363 should be incorporated into the rules of procedure rather than making mere "gentlemen's agreements" as is now the norm. 3. Time Frame Ideally, a specific date, a date of some anniversary, should be set as a deadline for the completion of Security Council reform measures. At one point, the year 2000 had been established as the deadline to accomplish reform. Yet, the year 2000 will come and go before any reforms are invoked. Instead of determining a specific year or date for the completion of Security Council reform, measures should be accomplished in segments. The General Assembly should not wait for all reform issues to be resolved before reforming the Security Council. Rather, it should focus on one issue at a time, resolve it, and take the necessary steps to implement the change. As stated above, increased participation is not as controversial an issue as the others and, therefore, it could be addressed before more controversial issues. Concerning the Working Group, rather than approving its mandate to continue its work, the General Assembly should create a certain time frame mandating its completion of proposals. This time frame could also include the order of issues to be presented. The Working Group has produced modest progress within the past seven years of its existence. After such a time elapse, the Working Group should be beyond simply stating issues such as "Can we agree that every endeavor should be made to explore the possibility of Security Council enlargement?" The General Assembly, therefore, should not approve the Working Groups' own recommendations that it continue its work. Through the use of political pressure, amendments, and resolution procedures, the General Assembly must immediately begin to reform the Security Council step-by-step. The General Assembly should create an agenda during the year 2001 that states which issues of reform will be addressed and in which order. Subsequently, starting in the official new millennium, the General Assembly must tackle these issues. *364 V. Conclusion Security Council reform would be durable and fruitful only if it fully reflected the principles of sovereign equality of Member States, equitable geographical distribution and democratization. Developing countries must have adequate representation, taking into account the fact that most of the issues under the Council's authority took place in, or were of vital interest to, the developing world. [FN174] The United Nations Security Council was created during World War II. Since its creation, both the political and economic climate has changed significantly. The Security Council must reflect on the political realities of the twenty-first century, not that of post-World War II. As the new millennium continues, it is most likely that the activities of the Security Council will continue to increase. Although it has been argued that the Security Council has finally arrived at its intended state, by achieving concerted international action to remedy situations throughout the world, the Security Council has faltered in the manner in which it has approached its activities. The Charter provides that the Security Council's action will be directed for the benefit of the entire membership; not only for a select few, and that equality must be afforded to all Member States. These fundamental principles have been and continue to be ignored, thus resulting in the demands for reform by the vast majority of Member States. To summarize the specific proposals, the permanent membership of the Security Council should be expanded to include seats for the African, Arab, Asian, and Latin Groups, and the overall membership should be increased to twenty-five members. The result would be the continued inclusion of the Permanent Members China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States; new representation by the regional groups; and a remainder of sixteen seats to be divided on the grounds of equitable representation for the different regions of the world. Modifications or limitations should be invoked against the veto power, such as requiring a two votes veto or limiting its use to Chapter VII issues, leading to the eventual abolishment of *365 the veto. Furthermore, the General Assembly should amend Article 31 of the Charter to provide mandatory rather than discretionary participation of interested Member States. Pertaining to its private meetings, the Security Council itself should delete the wording "unless it decides otherwise" and create an objective standard describing when private meetings shall be held. If the Security Council itself does not change this procedural rule, the General Assembly should pass a resolution to mandate public meetings. Beyond these specific proposals, any Security Council reform measures, ultimately, will depend on the General Assembly as a whole and on all the U.N. Member States individually, particularly the Permanent Member's continuous pressure on the Security Council. The majority of the Member States should not act hypocritically by calling for reforms, and at the same time yielding to the desires of the powerful Member States. Unfortunately, the mechanisms installed over fifty years ago bestowed incredible power upon the Security Council, including giving the Permanent Members the right to approve any changes. Thus, the General Assembly must first attempt to pass amendments, and, if unsuccessful, the General Assembly must then pass resolutions, which the Security Council can adopt and in many instances will adopt in practice. The U.N. and the Security Council cannot continue into the new millennium in their present state. Considering the availability of such great force, the decision to use the powers of the U.N. should not be left to the prerogative of the few Permanent Members. The world has seen an incredible increase in Security Council activities in the 1990's, an increase that will most likely continue. The Security Council's activities should not be permitted to continue in the absence of representation and equality for all U.N. Member States.