Cara S 244;nia, - UniFI

Cara S 244;nia, - UniFI 1 iLatin America: a New Social Agenda in the making? iiDr Sônia M. Draibe iiiManuel Riesco Abstract The paper?s purpose is to examine, in comparative terms, the profile, and contents of the new Latin American Social Agenda emerging in the so-called post Neoliberal era in the region. It focuses on three main dimensions now affecting the domestic welfare states: the targeted and “welfarist” (asistentialist) poverty reduction?s strategies, the new wave of social programs? reform and the strategic issue of the regional economic and social integration. Starting from the domestic Welfare States? main changes by the former Neoliberal reforms, the study seeks to identify the challenges faced by those systems in order to implement the new developmental and progressive social agenda. As widely pointed out, different processes and facts seem to indicate the emergency of a new social agenda in Latin America, and more generally a new strategy of economic and social development. Expressions of this tendency can be found both in the growing criticism about the so-called Neoliberal paradigm that have ruled the region for more than twenty-five years. More recently, in the electoral victories of political leaders of the left and centre-left, supposed to be committed with different and socially more progressive alternatives of economic growth and international insertion. Finally, in the new processes of social programs? reforms starting in 2006 in Chile, in the both fields of social security and education. A central question is if and how; the Neoliberal model of growth that oriented the region in the last twenty-five years would be reaching its limit. In this case, what is the nature of the region?s next development stage? What kind of social regulation it will be present, in the new phase? More specifically, what role will social policies play in the new period? 2 Developmentalist Welfare State: Key to Modern LA During recent decades, social policy has been conceived as a “subsidiary” aspect of State policies centred instead in promoting open market economies. Far from this limited view, state welfarism seems to have been key to the momentous socio-economic transformation of LA along a century. It will be argued that a new development strategy seems to be emerging that once more calls it to play centre stage. However, new social actors displayed over a wider and increasingly integrated regional space are rehearsing the novel script. Latin Americans: Astoundingly Diverse! Emerging from a century of tectonic transformation out of its traditional agrarian self, LA still seems to be in full transition, when considered as a whole. According to a CELADE classification, about 10% of the population is still in early or moderate stages, while 75% is in full demographic transition. Only the remaining 15% has already achieved an advanced level in this process. Moreover, when multiple other indicators are displayed alongside population data, they suggest this classification may capture much more than demographic transition. In most cases, it seems quite a precise indicator of the current state of the overarching socio-economic transformation process. Countries in the latter group, for example, show levels of per capita productivity, and public social expenditures, which are five times, and fourteen times higher, respectively, than those observed in the first group. In the case of public expenditure in social security, this relation rises to over thirty times (see tables 1-5 in appendix). The region harbours two of the largest four urban centres in the world, each of them approaching twenty million inhabitants, and several in the ten million range. However, over 42% of the population are still peasants, according to the most recent WB estimates. The same day under the sun may still witness people living and working in styles that resemble almost every social formation recorded in history. They range from high-qualified professionals employed by large LA private multinationals, one of whose owners is the second richest man in the world, to indigenous American peasants caring after their llamas and alpacas in the magnificent Andean highlands, and even aboriginals in the deep of Amazonian rain forests. However, early before sunrise, the vast majority will descend by the tens of millions into packed metros, or ride for hours clamped in noisy buses that inch through the tortured traffic of congested streets, in 3 their way to salaried jobs, somewhere in the huge factories that bustling LA cities have become. They will work long straining hours, even during Saturdays, Sundays and ivfiestas de guardar, mostly in small or medium sized private shops and firms, increasingly in the service sector. Moreover, their jobs are extremely short termed, and they are constantly forced to cross the quite porous boundaries between formal and informal employment – no Chinese wall stands in between both categories -, with periods of unemployment in the meantime. In Chile, for example, excellent statistics constantly track the individual job histories of the entire workforce, being this perhaps the only undisputed good outcome of the renowned AFP pension system. Nearly all of them (96.5%) declare themselves salaried workers and contribute forcefully as such while they are hired. However, only about one tenth contribute regularly, 12 months each year. Meanwhile, half will contribute less than four, one third less than two, and one fifth less than one, months per year, in the average. No high fence, rather a tenuous atmosphere, seems to enclose the workforce as well, especially in the case of women. The number of them who hold AFP accounts – each identified by name and RUT, the Chilean unique ID number, and most have contributed in recent years -, exceeds the official INE estimate of the female workforce by almost one half, suggesting that they are also constantly moving in and out of the workforce. Seen from the outside, or even from the inside of each country, LA seems to present one single, easily identifiably, face. However, a careful listener will distinguish a rich variety of tonalities in the Iberic tongues spoken by all – which popular continent-wide TV soap operas have not been able yet to erase. In the same way, its peoples have traversed along quite diverse historical paths – huellas y chaquiñañes as Andean trails are called - towards their rather astoundingly different modernities. The fertile valleys and highlands of the Andes, from Mexico to Peru and Bolivia, have harboured most of the indigenous American population along the millennia, and they still predominate there, vastly, up to this day. Their hands forged the golden magnificence of ancient American empires, as well as the classical colonial, and latifundia, periods. The architectural remains of all these epochs witness to the greatness of each one. It seems not at all improbable that when these regions finally complete their ongoing, massive, fast, painful, and sometimes chaotic, transition to contemporary times, their deep roots, rich cultures and complex structures, may perhaps also cradle the distinctive richness of 4 authentic American modernity. However, that is yet to come, perhaps some decades into the 21st century, although some of it may be already surfacing in modern Mexico. On the opposite side, the rich shores of Rio de la Plata witnessed the massive immigration that flooded the area by 1900, which created the twin cities of Buenos Aires and Montevideo, one of the very few million-strong metropolises of the world of the time. Railroads and the army expanded into the pampas all the way south to Patagonia, in a pincer movement that virtually exterminated the scarce and nomadic indigenous population – in a way not at all dissimilar to what was taking place in the conquest of the North American West, around the same time. These early developers created then the most advanced LA social formation, which still is, although other zones are catching up quickly. Brazil, of course, is a unique pattern by itself, out of sheer hugeness, which encompasses one fourth of the surface, and about one third of practically everything else that may be found in LA. In addition, slavery played a dominant role in this country, as well as in Cuba. Brazil accounted for about 40% of total slave imports from Africa along four centuries, and both countries held almost all those remaining in the world by the last decades of the 19th century. Finally, countries that lay on the meagre fringes of the ancient American empires, such as Costa Rica and Chile, never in the past were able to sustain anything more than peasants and very modest lordships. The poor Spanish settlers established there since the 16th century, even in the middle of the 20th could well have passed for the butlers of their seigniorial counterparts in the richer regions, as the remaining mansions and churches from the colonial and latifundia periods may still witness. Nevertheless, they conformed tight-knit elites that built relatively strong states, rather early. Still today, after several mutations, these families lie in the core of the aggressive emergent bourgeoisies that have grown up in their respective countries. It is interesting to note that these transition categories, and historical patterns, not only seem to predominate in one country or the other, but also are seemingly present within each. This is quite evident in the larger countries, which harbour all levels and patterns inside. However, even small Ecuador, for example, looks like different countries whether in the Pacific coast or the Andes. Furthermore, in the Amazonia it resembles none of the above-described patterns. 5 States Led the Way by Two Successive Strategies LA States following two successive development strategies along the past century led transition. Both were violently conflicting but seem to conform a unity as well, in the backdrop of a huge socio-economic transformation. Starting around the mid 1920s, but especially after the Great Depression, most States explicitly assumed the twin challenge of bringing both economic and social progress to their, then quite backward agrarian, societies. Developmentalism was forced to replicate what had already been created in advanced countries by the early emergence there of the actors that LA lacked by that time; and nurture those actors in the process. It shows quite impressive achievements in both counts, at least in the main countries. By the end of the period, many had built basic institutions, infrastructure, and industries. Most important, they were remarkably active in changing the region?s social structures, teaching millions of peasants how to read and write, improving their health, accompanying and stimulating their massive migration to the cities. In this sense – and this has frequently been overlooked -, social policies played an essential role in the experience, which seems to justify the usefulness of the concept of developmentalist welfarism in LA. The block in power was led by bureaucracies –the military played a central role in many countries -, and supported by urban middle classes, including nascent bourgeoisies, workers and poor, as well as peasants in the final phase. However, there were many flavours of developmentalism. Many started with progressive military coups, although a couple have epic revolutionary origins. However, some started decades before others. A few reached their climax as well under military rule, this time conservative. In others, democratic governments of all signs pursued the strategy relentlessly, after being vprimed by the military. In certain countries, it climaxed in full-blown revolutions that in a few years quite completely and irreversibly wiped out old agrarian relations. It does not seem at all surprising that these precise countries leaped ahead of the pack, miraculously, during the period that was to follow. By the last two decades of the century, States adopted what would later be accepted as the Washington Consensus. Theoretically, it is little more than a short list of simple rules emphasizing the importance of markets in the framework of openness to 6 globalization. In practice, they were applied quite unilaterally in the liking of emergent local capitalists, especially foreign investors, and surrounding high-income happy few; mostly disregarding the rest. Many times, it resulted in severe dismantling of State institutions, especially in the realm of social policy, as a privatization and tariff reduction frenzy took hold of LA elites. Some, benefited considerably from it – especially foreign multinationals, but local capital as well -, as they kept many privatized state companies for themselves, at a bargain. New, segmented, private services, including social services, were made available to those who could afford to pay. Everybody more or less enjoyed the flood of better quality and lower price imported goods – except those who lost their jobs, and many times their companies, when the opening was made in a rush. In the average, the affluent 10%, secured for themselves over 40% of income, meanwhile the poorest 40% had to get along with no more than 10% of it. The middle half got their corresponding share, but about half of that went to the relatively well-off 10%, within this segment. Some countries are even worse; meanwhile two or three constitute notable positive exceptions in this respect. Furthermore, the dismantling of public social policy affected the middle sectors the most, as they were left largely unprotected. At the same time, their jobs got precarious and their lives more insecure in the face of globalization. Meanwhile, a reduced public social spending was targeted in the extreme poor, alleviating their horrible conditions a trifle, or at least keeping them from deteriorating further. However, the denoted unilateralism varied widely in degree, mainly in dependence to the kind of government that implemented these “reforms,” and the timing of the same. A first wave was pioneered in a few countries, during the late 1970s and 1980s, in the midst of a severe economic crisis, a decade or more before consensus was reached in Washington. Brutal counter revolutionary, or counter-insurgence, US sponsored, military dictatorships, which seemed to plague the region around that time, imposed them. Such Neoliberal “reforms” were supported, with a vengeance, by young elites full of hatred towards successful and profound State-led reforms of the previous period addressed against their parents. In other cases, terrified decadent landed oligarchies resorted to them as their bloody last hurrah. In contrast, the second wave of “structural reforms” was implemented during the generally expansive 1990s, by democratic governments that replaced dictatorships 7 almost everywhere. They were more moderate, quite light in fact in some countries, and took place in the backdrop of an expansion in per capita public social spending that averaged 40% during the decade. Nevertheless, some degree of State dismantling, more or less severe, took place anyway, although now under the influence of “third wave” ideologues, who made damaging efforts to transform public institutions into service providers to citizens they conceptualized as consumers. To be sure, the massive and rapid social transformation that had been taking place in LA under developmentalism, which had then been so effectively stimulated and made more humane through its public social policy, continued in full during the Neoliberal period. It even reached new heights, although this time in a rather brutal manner. Alphabetization and education, nutrition, sanitary, and housing policies, on the one hand, and agrarian reform on the other, had been the main instruments of social change under developmentalism. Under the Neoliberal period, they were replaced by violent culmination of agrarian reform processes that forcefully expelled hundreds of thousands into the roads, but did not reposition latifundia. In other less fortunate countries, the catalysts were cruel, open, or protracted, civil wars, which resulted in massive peasant migration to cities and to the North, especially in Central America. Massive economic displacements induced by economic crisis and globalization played a no smaller part as well. As a result, peasant migration that had doubled in speed towards the mid 20th century, and tripled again during the height of developmentalism in the 1970s, maintained that frantic pace all through the 1980s, only to decline in the 1990s. However, in the zones where this process has taken place later, it is still ongoing in full, and probably even accelerating, in some countries. On the other hand, Neoliberal privatization of State enterprises, social services and pension funds, replaced tariffs and credit policies used by developmentalism, as the main ways to promote local capitalists, which induced the growth of some into huge conglomerates. In some cases, they attained this status without disbursing a penny of their own – which they did not posses in advance, in any case -, as functionaries in vicharge of privatizing public enterprises and utilities kept them for themselves. Why did the Washington Consensus replace developmentalist strategies in LA? A sober, data supported, assessment, will probably contradict the usual slogans about it. It did not seem to happen because of stagnant growth, because the developmentalist period 8 shows still unparalleled record in this aspect, especially as it approached its climax. The 1980s crisis affected extreme Neoliberal Chile the most, and pragmatic or “unorthodox” Costa Rica the least. Reclamations of “big State” seem ridiculous in most cases, because public expenditures has always been very low in LA by international standards, especially concerning social policies, and regulations have always been rather slack, to say the least. It also seems inappropriate to blame “populist monetary irresponsibility,” because although developmentalism was generally expansive, the worst episodes of hyperinflation in fact took place under Neoliberal ministers. Conspiracy theories blaming the BWI seem also difficult to accept as a unique explanation for such a wide and overarching phenomena, although evidently they promoted it in all their might. Perhaps, it was just that the success of developmentalism in modernizing social structures that made it redundant in the end, becoming a hurdle, especially in some of its economic aspects. It created its own gravediggers in some of the new social actors it helped to come of age, which support modern economic development. The latter is everywhere market-based, although certainly not in the unilateral - sometimes fanatically “bourgeois anarchist” – manner that became fashionable among LA elites under the Neoliberal period. Another Turn of the Rudder? An unambiguous shift of direction away from Neoliberalism – as formulated by The Economist assessing Lula?s election -, has been taking place in LA since the 1997 economic crisis. Throughout the region, wide coalitions have sprung, sometimes out of the unexpected, which have accessed political power in many countries, or barely missed doing so in others. Neoliberal thinking is still strong, dominating academia, government cadres, and holding the hitherto impregnable citadels of finance ministries and central banks. However, it seems clearly on the defensive, and even right wing parties no longer campaign under its slogans. A new development strategy seems to be in the making, which repositions the State as the leading actor, although this time it may rely on the modern actors of civil society that have come of age out of the two previous periods. Social policy once again comes centre stage, as the new strategy offers an explicit Rooseveltian New Deal to the massive urban salariat that is emerging in the region?s booming cities, and renews its 9 commitment both with the urban poor, and peasants who continue their migration in huge numbers, especially in some countries. Although subject to serious criticism from the left, and certainly controversial, the case may be argued that President Lula pioneers the new LA development strategy, in the largest and most powerful LA country by far. Based on PT, a highly structured and experienced, mass worker-based, party and movement, which has been characterized as essentially “non co-optable,” Lula has managed to assemble an impressive alliance, viiwhile still maintaining unprecedented popular support. President Kirchner has been able to reshuffle the Peronista party once again in viiiArgentine. It presides over the most explicit, active, coherent, and advanced, ixformulation of the new development strategy in practical terms. Even Neoliberal Chile is overhauling its privatized pension and education systems. Clear evidence was raised that the first was leaving about two third of the workforce without any effective coverage at all. On the other hand, one million secondary students took to the streets in 2006, and held their schools, demanding the derogation of the privatizing laws inherited from Pinochet – which the democratic governments had not dared or wanted to change so far. Polls reveal that a vast majority of active Chilean workers would want to go back to the old pay-as-you-go public pension system if permitted to do so. The latter system still pays pensions to three out of every four elders in Chile, and the amount received by its beneficiaries easily duplicates the corresponding pensions that are recently starting to be paid by the AFP system; this difference is even larger in the case of women. Similar situations prompted the Argentinean and Peruvian parliaments to enact laws during the first months of 2007, which allow active workers to return to the old pay-as-you-go systems, which were also kept in place in those countries; tens of thousands flocked to change in the first day, led by President Kirchner himself in the case of Argentine. In the case of the Chilean education system, the dismantling of the public system and ensuing privatization resulted in the reduction of the former by over 700,000 students since 1974, about a fifth of the total then; tens of thousands continue deserting decaying public schools each year. Meanwhile, publicly financed private schools have received all the students expelled from the public schools. This process has continued even though democratic governments since 1990 have done significant efforts to recover 10 public educational expenditure that was cut in half by the dictatorship. Nine of ten additional students since 1990 have entered private schools that receive state subsidies; meanwhile, the public system continues to loose tens of thousands of pupils each year. Overall, the impact of Neoliberal policies have reduced the total proportion of students in both public and private institutions, in relation to the entire population, from 30% back in 1974, at the end of the developmentalist period, down to 25% in 1990, and up again to 27% today. At the same time, changes in the population age pyramid have made it possible to attain full coverage in basic and secondary levels. However, the country has fallen seriously behind in tertiary level, where coverage is still 32%, half of neighbouring Argentina and Uruguay, and eons away from the 98% coverage attained by South Korea, in this level. The poor quality, social segmentation and inequity, of the privatized Chilean educational system - today half of the students are in private schools and universities, and families disburse half of school fees overall - are so severe that they prompted the current student protests and overhauling of the system. When asked what the solution may be, over 70% of Chileans answer that schools should return to the ministry of education, which by the 1960s had already built a decent national public system in all xlevels of education, where most Chileans sent their sons at no cost for the families. All the above events are taking place in South American countries that, as noted, have attained advanced stages in the transition process, and in giant Brazil. In Mexico - the other LA heavyweight in the north of the continent, which accounts for one fifth of regional purchasing power parity adjusted GDP –, PRD led by Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador was in the brink of winning recent elections. The candidate in fact refused to acknowledge his opponent?s victory and the political situation seems very fluid as well, as in the case of Chile. PRD also explicitly proposes the replacement of the Neoliberal model by a modern State led strategy. In a different scenario, paramount events are taking place in Bolivia, and changes are taking place as well in Nicaragua and other countries that are still in early or moderate stages of socio-economic transition, as well as in Venezuela and Ecuador, which are still in full transition. In all these countries, movements have surged to power, which question the Neoliberal model in a generally radical manner. It must be emphasized that although both coalesce under the same “change the model” slogan, these processes are strikingly different in nature from the ones described above, which take place in the 11 relatively more advanced countries. Perhaps no better way to show this difference than to mention that the main social actor in these countries are peasants, which have been xireduced to a relatively small number in those described earlier. Recovering round rent Theirs have not been empty words, especially in the case of Venezuela and Bolivia, which, for example, have successfully renegotiated with powerful foreign companies over a more fair redistribution of windfall oil and gas revenues. Even the previous government of Ecuador joined them in these measures, which have restored billions of dollars in annual revenues to their rightful owners, the citizens of the countries that host these rich mineral resources and are entitled to the significant ground rent they generate. By contrast, Neoliberal leaning Chilean governments have not been able to deal effectively with a small group of mostly London-listed conglomerates, which presently exploit over 70% of the country?s rich copper mines – the remaining production, as well as over half of reserves, are still in hands of CODELCO, the giant State copper company inherited from the developmentalist period. All mineral resources were nationalized by Allende and are declared “inalienable” even by the 1980 Pinochet constitution, still in effect. However, a legislative twist introduced by Pinochet and sustained by the democratic governments has permitted private companies to take hold of these resources and exploit them under long term leases, without paying any royalties or even regular income taxes, at all, for over a decade. Last year they reaped profits for around 20 billion dollars, roughly the equivalent of the total annual budget of the xiiChilean State, and paid less than 4 billion in taxes. Poverty reduction strategies Even though social policies period have played a residual role in State strategies during the Washington Consensus period, there has also been a certain improvement in some areas. Especially during recent years, as democratization has advanced considerably in the region, in the level of guiding principles there has been a shift towards the enlargement of social rights, under the wider encompassing concepts of solidarity and social cohesion. The social policy institutions on their part, have experienced a two way reform. There was an initial emphasis on decentralization, which in some extreme cases thinly veiled privatization efforts. Nevertheless, in recent years there has been a critical reassessment of these intents, and a rebound in favour of reinforcing central State authority, as well as to enhance participation of citizens control groups. 12 As is well known, “safety net” transfer programs targeted to poor families were implemented more or less widely during the height of the Neoliberal period, especially during periods of severe fiscal adjustment. Their negative implications and poor results have been extensively documented. However, since the mid 1990s, direct monetary transfers to poor families have taken an important inflexion towards a less targeted, rights-based conception. The new tendencies suggest a certain convergence of social protection models based on new social pacts and social rights and fiscal equilibriums; on principles of distributive justice an rules of effectiveness; on universal and means tested programs; between service provision and monetary transfers; between bureaucratic and participative management; etc. The conditional transfer programs (CTP) such as Bolsa Familia in Brazil, Oportunidades in México and Chile Solidario seem to exemplify this, in part. Such programs were central to poverty reduction strategies in these countries. According to comparative studies (Serrano, 2005; Rawlings e Rubio, 2003; Banco Mundial, 2003), they subsidize demand of poor families to provide some immediate poverty alleviation, but at the same time try to build “human capital” though had better access to education and health. The programs declare allegiance to social rights and promote an active participation of the beneficiaries, who are considered co-responsible. However, they are targeted to the poor or even the extreme poor, which are detected through different measurements. Women who led households are generally the recipients. The programs are highly centralized in their general definitions, but decentralized in their application, in both cases through public institutions. Their funding generally comes from the WB and IADB in a significant part. They depend on modern information technology and are constantly monitored. Sometimes especial laws regulate them. Literature distinguishes at least four successive generations of these programs, that increasingly move away from the Neoliberal paradigm and towards an integrated modern conception of a social protection network that includes all aspects of the same, and mainly the universal health, education, unemployment and retirement systems. Puente, in Chile, for example is conceived as the doorstep to the latter (Székely, 2001; Ferranti et al, 2001). Coverage is sometimes quite wide. Bolsa Familia is reaching 12,5 million households and near 40 million people, while Oportunidades reaches 5 and 20 million, respectively. Several studies show that former has contributed reasonably in reducing poverty and 13 inequality, and its legitimacy may be measured in the recent re-election of President Lula (Draibe 2006). However, there is a strong discussion about the virtues and effects of the PTCs and other programs of cash transfers to poor families. Many aspects have been debated, among them the real importance of the conditionality as regards to health and the children's education – a family?s commitment which allow its access to the benefit. More important maybe, is the question of the place of such programs in the system of social protection, if central or complementary to the universal programs. Another important question concerns the effectiveness of such programs in overall policy aiming to reduce poverty, comparing to the knowingly wider and more durable effects of the basic universal programs of health, education, and pensions. A Young Giant in the Making? A new developmentalist welfare State model seems to be in the making in LA. Moreover, there does not seem to be much novelty in its outlined design, nor in the kind of social structure over the background of which it is emerging. Both bear strong resemblances to what Western Europe and the US, and other developed countries, experienced around the time of 20th century Golden Age. The new relevant questions rather seem to be: Will the emerging strategy remain confined within the national borders of the different countries? Alternatively, in the world of the 21st century, will it evolve over the wider space of an increasingly integrated LA? If so, what might be the role of regional social policy in this xiiiconstruction? In modern nation building, there could be an underlying tendency pushing towards something that approximates a minimum, or optimal, dimension of sovereign space. During the 19th century, it may have coincided, approximately, with the order of magnitude of the pioneering Western European countries, and especially the leader of the time, GB. The emergence of the US during the 20th, a new leader with continental dimensions, may have prompted European nations towards forming the European Union in its original form. Very recently, strategic planners, and increasingly, informed public opinion, have been assessing the impact of the emergence of China and India, which potentially may in the future surpass the order of magnitude of the US by three or four times. Perhaps, those who have been struggling to enlarge the EU even more, and 14 elevate its sovereign status as such keep this in mind. It seems reasonable that this idea should be given much thought by strategic planners in LA –, and happily, it seems to have been, by some. The magnitude of the challenges facing rapidly modernizing LA seemingly exceeds, by far, the dimensions of its present republics – no doubt on that, even in the case of the largest maybe. It seems that strategies designed to achieve certain minimal level of autonomy in science and technology, energy provision, fast physical communication networks, complex industries such as aerospace and defence, etc., are not possible within their current dimensions, for most countries at least. Overshadowing all, and with more tangible pecuniary dividends or punishments, the challenge of conforming a modern market in itself, capable of competing with an appropriate degree of sovereignty xivwith the major players of the 21st century. On the other hand, LA appears quite natural a space over where such institutional construction may take place. The total inhabitants of the region are approaching 600 million today, 700 within two decades, and near one billion by mid century, within the same gross order of magnitude as the world leaders. They will no longer be ignorant subservient peasants in their overwhelming majority, as they were at the turn of the 19th century, not even masses in full transition as they are at the turn of the 20th. In one or two decades, at the most, the vast majority of LA population will have achieved the status of citizens, with decent health standards, reasonable quality basic and secondary xveducation, and high numbers having completed tertiary level as well. They seem to constitute a sound base for an economic market in the major leagues if in addition; LA manages to acquire some degree of sovereign power. The new State led development strategy that seems to be in the making probably will only make sense over this increasingly integrated larger space. However, to be sure, there are plenty of obstacles to overcome if that may become possible. Not the least, the wide differences above described in socioeconomic, historical, and institutional, evolution of the different countries and regions. An important hurdle to LA integration is the explicit strategy in the contrary, but mainly, the economic attraction, from its powerful neighbour in the north. The imbalance xvibetween their respective powers is huge. It seems out of the question that the US would even consider surrendering even a minimal degree of sovereignty in the benefit of building an integrated zone in equal terms. 15 As is well known, President George H. Bush launched in 2001 the FTAA, “an economic free zone extending all the way from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego.” However, the evidently imbalanced approach of the US to “free trade,” in favour of its own interests, has all but buried the FTAA for the time being. Mercosur led by Brazil did not accept unilateral opening to trade and investment, government procurements, and TRIPS, meanwhile the US would not even consider lowering its farm subsidies, or non-tariff barriers, among other aspects. This has been accepted, in turn, by those LA countries - led by Mexico and Chile - that have been adhering to individual FTA, the more restricted version of FTAA which the US has been pushing throughout the region as xviitheir second best, after the failure of the larger initiative. However, it does not seem reasonable to assert beforehand that such difficulties are xviiiinsurmountable. The idea of integration is as old as LA independence, which is why it is called Bolivar?s dream. Frustrated, stagnant, or ineffectual initiatives abound. The long and impressive list of successive integration initiatives duly updated by the IADB registers the first one in 1958. Nevertheless, the pioneering and still the most ambitious one was promoted by developmentalism in its climax, the 1960, and was called the Asociación Latinoamericana de Libre Comercio, ALALC, later ALADI, created by the Treaty of Montevideo signed on Februeary 18, 1960. It embraced the main countries of LA, during a decade managed to function, applied several barrier reductions, and built a secretariat, following the EU model. ECLAC, inspired by Prebisch, and Chile, led by Frei Montalva and then by Allende, were active promoters of integration, together with progressive governments throughout the region, certainly including Mexico in the opposite end. When conservative military governments took hold in Brazil an Argentina, Chile together with Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador Colombia, and Venezuela signed the more advanced Acuerdo de Cartagena in May 26, 1969. It created the Comunidad Andina de Naciones (CAN) as a temporary second best – transplanting to it the structures of ALALC, which still operate in this realm, including the Banco Andino de Fomento (1969), large and modern headquarters in Lima, among other institutions, modelled after the EU. Chile withdrew from Mercosur immediately after the Pinochet coup, and Venezuela did the same in 2006, in protest of the signing of FTA with the US by Colombia and Peru, quite rightly denouncing such pacts as contrary to LA integration. In a quite evident countermove, Chile rejoined this pact immediately after Venezuela 16 withdrew. However, at the same time, the newly elected governments of Presidents Morales and Correa in Bolivia and Ecuador, two of the Andean Pact?s long standing members, are signalling their adherence to the integration strategy led by Mercosur. The creation of Mercosur by the treaty of Asunción, signed by Brazil, Argentine, Uruguay, and Paraguay, in May 26, 1991, was a major milestone in this process. Mercosur has been the highest expression of integration efforts up to now. With the inclusion of Venezuela in April 2006, it now encompasses 256 million inhabitants (2005) and a GDP of almost two trillion dollars (ppp, 2002), which represent 46% and 50% of the respective figures of the LA region as a whole. Not only has Mercosur advanced consistently in the economic front, surmounting severe economic and political crisis in its major partners, but also has a complex and growing institutions. The latest addition is the Parlamento del Mercosur, officially inaugurated in May 7, 2007 and initially conformed by 18 members from each member country, selected by the respective parliaments, which in 2010 will hold its first universal election. The countries associated to Mercosur, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, may send non-voting observers. The Mercosur led integration strategy is presently focused in the convergence of all of South America in a common initiative. The Comunidad Sudamericana de Naciones was created in September 9, 2005, signed by all LA countries, and coordinating the existing structures of both Mercosur and CAN, and with the concurrence of what still exists of ALADI, as well as the sub regional initiative that unites Caribbean nations, CARICOM. This process received an important boost during the Presidential Meeting of Cochabamba, in September 12, 2006. The final declaration of this meeting creates a coordinating secretariat for the Comunidad Sudamericana, and advanced in integration projects, mainly in the area of energy. Even more up to date than the above cited IADB chronology, Wikipedia describes it quite correctly in the paragraph that follows. “The Union of South American Nations (Spanish: Unión de Naciones Suramericanas and Portuguese: União das Nações Sul-Americanas, abbreviated as Unasur and Unasul) is a fledgling supranational and intergovernmental union that will unite two existing free-trade organizations – Mercosur and the Andean Community – as part of a continuing process of South American integration. It is loosely modelled on the European Union. According to agreements made thus far, the Union's headquarters will be located in Quito, the capital of Ecuador, while its bank, the South American Bank, will be located 17 in Brasilia, Brazil. The Union's former designation, the South American Community of Nations (Spanish: Comunidad Sudamericana de Naciones and Portuguese: Comunidade Sulk-Americana de Nações, abbreviated as CSN; Dutch: Zuid-Amerikaanse Statengemeenschap) was dropped at the First South American Energy Summit on April 16, 2007. Complete integration of the Andean Community and Mercosur to create Unasur/Unasul is expected by the end of 2007.” Mexico and Panama have signed as observers to UNASUR, which certainly represents a real alternative for the other regional giant, in the case it may opt to look more towards the south, as it did during the height of the developmentalist period. In parallel, Venezuela is leading a sub regional effort that has more a more ambitious timetable, the Acuerdo para la aplicación de la alternativa Bolivariana para los pueblos de nuestra América y el Tratado de Comercio de los Pueblos, ALBA, and the Tratado de Comercio de los Pueblos, which also includes Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua. The first three countries signed this pact in April 29, 2006, and the last adhered in January 2007. As the above shows, the LA integration process has already been going on for almost half a century, showing successive advances and retrenchments. However, its present situation and dynamics are certainly far more advanced than is currently noted even by the LA public – perhaps the “serious press” usually underplays the news about it, as has been noted. This said, the obstacles of the process – which are in turn routinely highlighted as a routine in the front pages of the mentioned press – are huge and real, as has been noted, and even if the probabilities are perhaps tilted towards the advance of the process, nobody can give it for sure. Surmounting all the serious obstacles requires powerful, motivated, and committed actors, operating under a more or less coordinated long-term State strategy. This is consistent with the requirement of a new block in power that was mentioned above in reference to the emerging development strategy. Are these actors in place today? Are they powerful enough? Do they have a strategy? Are they riding favourable winds and currents? In what follows, some is said about them, and the conclusion is that may be a certain base to avoid being overly pessimistic concerning this matter, today. Moreover, regional social policy will be mentioned as a key factor to bring at least one of these main powerful actors consistently into this integrated development strategy. 18 By far the largest, more structured, and stably employed, group in any country since over a century ago, LA bureaucracy has been a primary actor in the region since then, as has been highlighted above. Especially its most powerful, autonomous, and strategically xixaware, segment: the military. xxThe military play an active role in improving the relations of the country with its neighbours, through what is called the 2+2 diplomacy that has been implemented since a few years ago, which officially involves both a diplomat and a military in most key xximeetings among LA countries, especially the neighbouring ones. A similar kind of bureaucratic 2+2 has been a systematically consistent key driving force behind the LA integration process, since at least a couple of decades. Itamaratí – the able and influential Brazilian foreign office - has assumed the leading role during years and throughout governments of otherwise quite diverging political stances. Moreover, xxiiItamaratí has made sure that it is not alone in this quest among its LA counterparts. Very important parts of LA bureaucracy, its intellectuals have always played a hugely progressive role in LA strategic development. However, it must be reckoned that this is not happening this time, at least concerning LA integration. Even the pioneering flagship of LA progressive developmental thinking, Prebisch?s ECLAC, hardly studies integration nowadays, and certainly is not behind it as a driving force, as it was three and even two decades ago. The not much analyzed privatization of LA intellectuals during recent decades, as well as the cooptation of public universities and other institutions by Neoliberal leaning way of thinking, probably have played not a small part in this decline. The BWI institutions certainly take a lot of credit for this shift. However, the less studied role of some donor agencies that assumed a significant role in financing intellectual activity in LA during the 1980s and 1990, and shaping their agenda in the process, may have played a significant role as well. Certainly, however, the main cause of the decline of LA intellectuals as a driving force behind LA integration and other strategic aspects of development should be searched for well within LA societies, in the unilateral and in some cases extreme course followed by the second State strategy adopted during past decades – especially when this took place under right wing dictatorships. As has been suggested above, these are also the main culprits behind the privatization and dispersing of the distinguished traditional intellectual drive behind LA developmentalism. Regrouping intellectuals, mainly within 19 the realm of a reconstructed and reinforced modern LA public university system, seems quite and imperative today. The EU has been deeply involved in support of LA integration efforts since the 1990s, xxiiiand even earlier . Quite probably, the EU has strategic considerations in the back of its mind in promoting LA unity, and these could reflect the aspect of rivalry in its long-term relation with the US. Rather evidently, the influence of the EU vis-a-vis the US in LA only seems to gain out of the integration of the latter, with respect to the alternative, individual country subordination to their northern neighbour or, even worst, their collective subordination in the framework of FTAA. Moreover, there is another sideline to this interest, which reflects the quite extraordinary investment surge of Spanish private and semi private capital in LA – EU countries other than Spain have also increased theirs, but much less significantly. Spanish capital has xxivdisplaced all other direct foreign investors in LA in a few years, mainly since 1990. Evidently, foreign direct investors view the region as a whole, and operate accordingly, usually from headquarters located in one of the main LA capitals, following a comprehensive LA business plan, and using standardized procedures and centralized services for the whole region. On the other hand, in order to be successful, they are obliged to rapidly master the subtleties of each country, experience that they share among the highly qualified professional cadres that manage their operations, jumping from one capital to the other just as any EU or US executive do within their respective territories. Spanish have the great advantage of the common peninsular language and cultural origins, so they move in LA quite like fish in the water. Many of these cadres are in fact native LA. In this way, Spaniard capital is becoming an extraordinarily effective business school for those that, quite probably in the end, will end up jumping ahead of them as the main economic unifying force of regional integration: LA business. “Se pasan de giles (they behave like fools),” declared Horst Paulman, owner of the giant Jumbo retail chain, in reference to Chilean businesspersons who do not invest in Argentine. He knows what he is talking bout, as his company now controls a significant part of the market in both countries. He has profited hugely from investing in one profits reaped in the other, taking advantage of frequently alternating economic and foreign exchange cycles in both countries during recent decades. Mostly since 1990, Chilean big business has started pouring foreign direct investment (FDI) for the first time ever. Large Chilean companies have directly invested around 30 billion US$ dollar 20 abroad, about a third of 2005 Chilean GDP – most of it in energy, forestry, and retail, but in several other industries as well. Over half (52%) of the accumulated total is concentrated in Argentine – indicating they not all of them are “giles” -, and most of the rest distributed among Brazil (16%), Peru (16%) and Bolivia (8%). Practically all the remaining FDI is also in other LA countries. Large local entrepreneurs in the most advanced LA countries may tell a similar story. Perhaps the most notorious example is at the same time the richest person the region and the second richest in the world, according to the 2006 Fortune estimate: Mexican billionaire Carlos Slim. Son of a modest Lebanese immigrant, Slim has built an empire around beer and cement - he owns Corona and CEMEX -, which now includes banks, telecommunications, and media, among many other industry leaders. Even though he does not refrain to enter the US market – he has made notorious acquisitions there -, he is highly critical of NAFTA, and in more practical terms, invests heavily in LA, especially in South America, from Venezuela all the way down to Chile. In 2003, Slim conveyed in his sprawling mansion in Veracruz what was probably the first summit of emergent LA large private conglomerates. All the family heads of LA largest private conglomerates attended the meeting, together with their heirs in waiting. It is not known what they talked about during their unusual, week-long, strait, but it is not probable that joint ventures were to be completely overshadowed by more pleasurable activities, which these guys are not know to shy away from. No integration process whatsoever will be possible if it is not able to seduce the region?s emerging overwhelmingly massive social force: the new urban salaried middle classes. In the present social scenery of LA as a whole, and especially in the countries that are in the more advanced phases of transition, any progressive strategy, and certainly regional integration, must include this emerging force as a basic part of the power block required to promote it to success. In this sense, the situation of LA today is not entirely different to the one confronted during the second part of the 19th century by Western European regions that were relative late comers to the process of national unification. As then, the leading States were already in place and thriving, and in order to catch up, it seemed necessary to build some sovereign spaces of a similar order of magnitude. On the other hand, the underlying socio-economic conditions within the late coming regions had matured up to a point where it seemed possible to be successful in the intent. Especially, a new massive modern salariat had emerged, which then as today is fundamental base of 21 such a possibility. How to seduce it into supporting a political block that may realize this strategy? The Iron Chancellor found then the way to do it. Perhaps the driving agents behind today?s process in LA should give him a second reading. The emerging progressive LA coalitions already have made an explicit revival in their political programs of the other towering figure behind the building of progressive modern coalitions in this continent: he who offered a New Deal to the masses of American salaried workers in the wake of the Great depression, and got advice from Lord Keynes. In this way, it is possible that under the unlikely hanging pair of portraits of Roosevelt and Bismarck in the background, LA integration will move ahead towards integration under the auspices of a New Deal where regional social policy becomes the basic binding material for this building. It has been noted above that both the change in both development and integration strategies presently follows two quite distinctive and complementary paths, both under the same “cambiar el modelo Neoliberal” slogan, but quite different in nature. It has also been noted that the social-economic background of the ones is strikingly different form the other, and that it is basically the presence or relative absence in one or the other of one actor that makes all the difference: peasants. Rather, peasants and, to be more precise. The integration of LA must consider this most important actor, if it is to succeed – it still represents almost half of the overall population when recently immigrant urban poor are taken into account into this category. If it is relatively easy to incite separatist, nationalistic, and xenophobic, self-destructive, sentiments even among urban salaried workers, this is much easier in the case of peasants – the same happens with urban petit bourgeoisie -, as is well known, and tragic historical experiences well prove. Again, it seems, huge and necessary cross border developmentalist projects and the sheer need to build a modern market of 21st century dimensions could perhaps be enough to incite business into allowing frontiers to be opened to regional trade, investment, and labour mobility. Maybe the strategic minded general staffs of LA bureaucracies are already somewhat convinced about the need to partially cede now rather ineffective national level sovereignty in the benefit of sharing a more effective regional stature. Nevertheless, it is difficult that salaried workers may be enthusiastic about such a move if it is not associated with potent signals regarding their rights, and smaller scale but more concrete measures of regional social policy in their direct benefit. 22 Furthermore, in the case of the yet vast masses of LA peasants and urban poor, concrete regional social policy measures seem indispensable to motivate their own integration. Such as regional minimum livelihood guarantees, for example, that is nonetheless feasible from an economic or financial feasibility point of view. Lula?s political success in Brazil seems to prove this overall point. This huge country is like a slightly reduced version of LA, and contains within itself almost everything that is present in the larger region – and in similar proportions. It has been noted that Lula?s direct cash transfers to the poor have been a major element in his political successful first term in office – and that those policies are indeed quite cheap. In the larger region, it seems possible to argue that similar policies associated to a regional integration process may well include peasants and urban poor into the emerging political power blocs that are needed to promote the new LA developmentalist welfare that may be in the making. i This paper is based mainly in the introduction, capter 1, 5 and 9 of the recent book Latin America, a New Developmental Welfare Model in the Making? 2007, Palgrave Macmillan, London. Sonia Draibe and Manuel Riesco are coauthors of the mentioned chapters, and the latter is the editor. The book is part of the series “Social Policies in a Development Context,” UNRISD, Geneva. ii - Associate Professor of the Economics Institute at UNICAMP, Brazil. Former General Secretary of the Brazilian Political Science Association; former Director of NEPP – Núcleo de Políticas Públicas da UNICAMP; international consultant. smdraibe@uol.com.br iii - Manuel Riesco is member of the Board at Centro de Estudios Nacionales de Desarrollo Alternativo (CEA), and editor of Revista Encuentro XXI, in Santiago, Chile. He is external research coordinator at UNRISD, Geneva. mriesco@cendachile.cl iv Fiestas de guardar: Religious holidays v In the remarkable case of Mexico, the civil bureaucracy that consolidated out of revolution and civil war presided throughout this whole period, in a lasting alliance with entrepreneurs, peasants, and workers. Moreover, it also led the phase that would follow. Everywhere, though, this block increasingly confronted traditional LA landed elites, sometimes quite violently, especially as developmentalism reached its climax towards the middle part of the second half of the century. vi In this manner, a sort of “Russian variant” to bourgeoisie creation was not foreign at all in LA. vii Many of his sometimes fierce ex opponents are now members of a government he assembled in no hurry – he took over six months to designate his cabinet, and all serious contenders to succeed him are seeking his blessing. Leaders of large conglomerates have declared that had they been aware in advance, of what his policies would look like, they would have supported him much earlier. On the other hand, even though they get 23 pretty little each, the country?s tens of million urban and rural poor seem contented with the massive cash transfers that the government has issued in their behalf, among other highly effective social policies. The whole world, even the Davos socialites, seems to have been seduced by Lula?s authentic popular roots and compassionate discourse. This seems even more surprising given the case that economic growth has remained sluggish even after a revision of national accounts raised it considerably, urban unemployment, interest rates, and the Real, remain sky high, and income distribution remains scandalous, even though a bit less than beforeEven the case can be made that the strict macroeconomic strategy followed has not been very unintelligent. It may be argued that although it secured a huge primary fiscal surplus, and accumulated enormous foreign currency reserves, it has lowered interest payments considerably, as a previously junk debt is now well rated by financial agencies. viii This early urban worker-based, mass party – which corresponds itself to the early modern social structure born out of the Rio de la Plata late inmigrant-based historical pattern; it may be argued that in many ways the Peronista Party anticipates PT by three or four decades -, pioneered State developmentalist welfarism in LA during the life of general Perón. During the 1990s, under Menem, it presided over a singularly corrupt, although from other points of view certainly not the worst, version of the Washington Consensus. In the wake of the cataclysmic implosion of the Argentinean Neoliberal experience in 2002, Kirchnerism performed a surprising leap from remote southern provincial politics to national dominance. ix With characteristic Argentinean assertiveness, Kirchner confronted the BWI and declared the most massive debt default in record, exception made, perhaps, in real terms, of the ones declared by the US in the 1930s and Russia during the 1990s. Argentine achieved one the most convenient external debt renegotiations in memory; it ended up paying one third of the face value of its bonds. Kirchner has sustained similarly assertive and explicitly unorthodox responses regarding all the main Neoliberal dogmas and policies. He has reasserted an active State role in all aspects – not to speak of his firm attitude regarding human rights issues. As in the case of Lula, his popular support is today overwhelming. What is most significant: this has taken place in the country that beholds Latin America?s third economy, and the earliest and most advanced modern social structure, by far. x Recently, chaos has resulted out of the complete change in the public transportation scheme in Santiago. Large private concessionaires are replacing thousands of privately owned buses that delivered a poor service, congested the streets, and polluted the air. The latter, in turn, had been handed over public transportation after Pinochet privatized early on the State Company in charge of it, built during the developmentalist period. The public outrage over the incompetence of the private concessionaries has prompted even ex President Frei Ruiz-Tagle– renowned for privatizing public utilities himself during the 1990s – to call for the re-statization of public transport. Calls to replace the so called “Neoliberal model” are being from ever wider sectors – increasingly vocal critics may now be found in the Socialists as well as in the moderate Christian Democrats, within the government coalition, and even in the rightist opposition. Political parties to the left of the government coalition are presently getting around 10% of the vote, but are still marginalized from parliament by Pinochet?s laws; which generously subsidize the parliamentary representation of the right instead. However, they lead the social movement demanding to change “the model,” which has a wide audience in the citizenry at large. The government of President Bachelet, and especially the President herself, is less identified with “the model,” than her predecessors. In fact, 24 the political situation in Chile is quite fluid at present – it is not at all improbable that wider protests may erupt, this time involving not only students, or unemployed from poor poblaciones, but millions of salaried urban workers as well. Such an occurrence would certainly change the political balance of forces, and may finally prompt the end of a Neoliberal period that does not seem in good shape to outlive for long its criminal progenitor, Pinochet; recently dead himself. xi The towering and colourful figures of Presidents Chavez and Morales lead these processes, joined by the more recently elected Presidents Correa and Ortega. They all image themselves after the venerable figure of Cuban President Fidel Castro, who despite his advanced age and recent health problems, as well as Cuban revolutionary government?s own tribulations, maintains a huge prestige throughout the LA masses, and the increasing respect of its elites, and certainly that of the most relevant LA political leaders. In Peru, as well, also a country in full transition, important movements are taking place which point in the same direction, as reformist President Alan García was elected thanks to the support of the right, in a “stop Umaña” - a military closely identified with Chavez -, least worse, political choice. Similar movements may easily erupt in many LA countries still in early, moderate, or full transition. Their popular background, radical questioning of Neoliberalism and lively confrontation with the Bush administration, have captured the imagination and sympathies of wide popular sectors throughout LA, as well as internationally. xii A small royalty charge was introduced in Chile in 2004, after wide public dissatisfaction with this situation. However, the new scheme in practice reduced the effective tax rate of the copper companies that had cheated the most with their income returns during the previous decade. xiii Certainly, if the previous section resumes findings that rest over a virtual mountain of data and practical experiences, what follows relies, instead, mostly in knowledgeable prognosis, perhaps moving no small distance into the dubious and uncertain terrain covered by what is now known as “futurism.” In this kind reasoning, necessarily as well, what is called normative thinking acquires a major relevance, as it pursues a goal. None of this is foreign, however, to strategic reasoning in general, which is always displayed over these kinds of dimensions, as any military general staff knows well enough. In addition, of course, their conclusions are sobered by the conviction that the results of their most careful planning will quite probably be completely altered by the unexpected emerging out of the fog of battle – in this case out of history. xiv Neoliberal abstractions notwithstanding, contemporary markets have always been institutional creations, where States play the key role. All the above points towards the necessity and convenience of conforming a larger space that may be capable of exerting at least a certain degree of sovereignty in a world that, more than becoming in the future, seems to be already here. xv The economic projection of the emergence of these huge concentrations of market-oriented workers is paramount. According to the now classic 2001 calculations of investment bank Goldman-Sachs, for example, BRIC countries, which stands for Brazil, Russia, India, and China, now represent 15% of GDP of G6 economies, will represent half of the latter group in 2025, and will surpass them by 2040, in dollar terms. xvi Just considering their economies, LA GDP as a whole, when adjusted by purchasing power parity (ppp), adds up to around 40% of US GDP; Brazil, the largest country, is about a third of that, meaning it is about 15% of the US economy at present . In this way, and without even taking into account other aspects of relative State power, where the difference is today even more overwhelming, 25 xvii The US strategy to block or delay LA integration and subordinate individual countries to their hegemony not only follows grand schemes such as NAFTA, FTAA or FTA. It must be noted that not a minor part of US strategy has been co-opting LA intellectuals, mainly its economists, to an abstract and non-strategic view of this problem, such as promoted by Neoliberalism, for which these considerations simply do not exist, as opening up markets is always beneficial, in the long run. On the other hand, they play a subtle and intelligent game of networking these cadres, and promoting them through a long chain of institutions, in the top of which sits the BWI, but where, as said, “independent” Central Banks and autonomous Finance Ministers play a key role at the country level. Universities also play a key role in this kind of networking, as well as other international organizations. The “serious” LA press plays its part as well, where articles and news that foment scepticism towards integration efforts are of daily occurrence. Constantly, the US LA desk takes initiatives that are more concrete. A notorious example happened when then just elected Chilean President Ricardo Lagos, a socialist and lifelong promoter of LA integration, embraced his close friend, then Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, in PlanAlto palace, and promised formally that Chile would become full member of Mercosur a few months ahead, by the end of 2002. His enthusiasm damped quickly, though, when he received a telephone call from then President Clinton, who offered a FTA for Chile if Lagos withdrew this compromise. Which he did. Moreover, without taking time to call his friend Cardoso before rushing to make the public announcement of FTA with the US, and delayed Mercosur membership. This has not been forgotten in PlanAlto, and especially in Itamarati, the highly professionalized Brazilian Foreign Ministry that has been the most consistent promoter of LA integration. xviii Especially, when they seem to pale when compared to the huge complexity that involved uniting the myriad peoples, languages, cultures, histories, and relative levels of development, during the process of Western European nation building during the 19h century, or those that have been surmounted in the building the EU, in the 20th and today. xix Chilean leaders of the leftist coalition Juntos Podemos Más were surprised in 2005, when General Juan Emilio Cheyre, then Commander in Chief of the Chilean army, publicly accepted their request for an interview, in the midst of the national presidential and parliamentary campaign. It became an historical first official meeting between the military and the sector of the Chilean left that includes the Communist Party, since the 10th of September 1973. In the meantime, the Chilean communists had led the resistance to the Pinochet dictatorship, which at a certain point included a relatively powerful, armed expression: Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodriguez. Among other urban guerrilla actions, they had performed a sophisticated ambush against the dictator himself, from which he miraculously escaped alive, in 1986. Cheyre acknowledged this at the end of the interview, when he warmly shook hands with Guillermo Teiller, president of the party and former head of the military commission of the same, and “you and us, you and us – he emphasized – who have confronted ourselves over the terrain, might perhaps achieve greater purposes than with others...that are rather „tribune horses?.” This despiteful military expression, which refers to horses that are good for nothing except parading in front of official tribunes, was clearly addressed to leaders of the democratic governments. Many of them spent most of the dictatorship in exile, and could not participate actively in the internal resistance movement; nonetheless, they assumed the highest posts in the transition governments. 26 xx However, what really astounded the leftist leaders was to learn that the Chilean military are in fact decisively in favour of LA integration. During the meeting, they had told Cheyre about their vision of a 21st century economic giant being born at the other side of the Andes. They argued in favour of participating together with geopolitical equals in the construction of a wider and increasingly integrated LA space that could to a certain degree of sovereignty to compete in the world that is taking form. In addition, they highlighted the dangers to national security of a continued isolation in the region, by being perceived by its neighbours as instrumental to the counter integrationist strategy followed in the region by the rival, established, power. To all this, Cheyre had nodded approvingly. When it was his turn, he started saying that he never spoke for himself “it is the same as with you – he said – I also need to have a majority of my central committee in agreement.” Then he continued to express that in their view, not only should Chile join Mercosur as a full member, but also this association should advance rapidly from economic to political union. xxi . This was confirmed by a front-page picture that appeared in April 2007 in all the Chilean and Bolivian press, showing the admiral who is Commander in Chief of the Chilean navy together with his Bolivian counterpart, at the helm of Inca piragua in Lake Titicaca! Chile and Bolivia, of course, have had no formal ambassador level diplomatic relations for many years, and tensions have been especially high in recently. xxii Most of the region?s professional diplomats have studied in Brasilia?s highly regarded academies at some point ion their careers and all LA representations around the world officially constitute and operate as GRULAC or Grupo Latinamericano. They become friendly and it is not infrequent to catch them exchanging sardonic glances from opposite sides of negotiating tables, when their usually less knowledgably Foreign Ministers or other politically designated dignitaries say something they considered inappropriate, especially regarding LA integration. xxiii This author recently held a meeting with one of the leading EU foreign assistance State agencies –which assigns some thousands of EU scholarships to LA students each year, just to name one important interchange program. Never had he heard from any State official in LA, such a passionate discourse in favour of LA integration, as the welcome speech from the head of this EU agency. Not only did he argue with knowledge and sincere conviction, but also reflected the frustration of EU officials who have been trying for years to woo LA governments into coalescing. "Germans are now throwing in the towel - he said -, and are starting to return bilateral country deals, meanwhile Spaniards are still trying to hold the line of promoting multilateral agreements; trouble is, we all see little interest in integration coming from LA political leaders themselves." He exemplified this with the long running an still unaccomplished intent to sign a FTA between the EU and Mercosur as a block, which Mexico and Chile managed to sideline signing earlier bilateral FTA themselves. xxiv A virtual armada of modern Spanish conquerors landed in LA in the 1990s. Large private, recently privatized, and even public Spanish conglomerates spearheaded it. Amazingly rapidly, it acquired a dominant role throughout the whole region in banking, energy, and telecommunications, as well as public services under private concession, such as water and infrastructure. It has attained a significant stake in several other relevant industries as well. This was stimulated by the simultaneous and newly occurrence of a general surge in Spanish foreign direct investment, on the one side, and Washington Consensus promoted privatization and market openings in LA, on the other. 27 Both situations seem to be rooted as well in recent fast socio-economic change. This has been argued at length in relation to the latter, but seems to have taken place in Spain as well. In some aspects, quite in plain sight, this country appears to have a lead of perhaps no more than one or two decades or so, in relation to the more advanced regions of LA. It seems only natural that surging Spanish FDI would look towards LA for expansion – history is long, rich, and complex, terribly disruptive in fact -, in similar expansions. The long-term impact of this business invasion regarding LA integration process may have been under estimated, and is certainly quite under researched. Probably, it will be considered in the future as a key detonating in the process, as British capital was, regarding the expansion of the US to the west in the second part of the 19th century. Just as their ancestors did during the conquest of America, the Spaniards view the region as a whole and move across it accordingly. It has always been an amazing story, the way Spaniard descubridores and conquistadores covered the entire span of what today is LA in just a few years – quite on foot. Peoples crossing from Asia across the Bering Strait achieved the same, of course, much earlier, but it took them thousand of years to reach the southern tip of the continent, and then, they remained mostly isolated within smaller or larger communities, as they are still are today. Meanwhile under Spanish dominance, LA retained a certain unity, and even the independence movement, for example, took place quite simultaneously throughout the region. The victorious Bolivar and San Martín finally embraced in Ayacucho, right in the middle of South America, after liberating the whole continent starting from Venezuela and what today is Argentina, respectively. Whereas in the wake of independence, LA republics behaved not in an entirely different way its indigenous inhabitants had, as they returned to almost complete isolation for centuries– that explains the different intonations of the language, for example. The new conquistadores, instead, behaved just like latter day versions of Pizarro and even Cabeza de vaca – the amazing Spaniard who reached from the Rio de la Plata to the Missisippi literally walking. The triumphant LA forays of Banco Santander and BBVA, Endesa and Repsol, and Telefonica, during the 1990s are well known. However, these large Spanish fragatas were followed and sometimes preceded by a swarm of young, enthusiastic, small and medium entrepreneurs, who landed in LA for the first time during the 1990s, sometimes enticed by EU sponsored joint venture programs for PYME. Drawing fewer headlines in the financial press, but exhibiting a sense of adventure and courage not foreign to the heroism of the old descubridores, they criss-crossed the region, in a flash getting to know it much better than almost any native LA, doing business all along. Some were successful, others not so much, meanwhile no few ended up in the same way as old Cabeza de vaca, whose bones lie somewhere in America.