UKCorporateGovernanceCode英国公司管理系统治理准则

UKCorporateGovernanceCodeFromWikipedia,thefreeencyclopediaJumpto:navigationsearchTheUKCorporateGovernanceCode2010(fromhereonreferredtoas"theCode")isasetofprinciplesofgoodcorporategovernanceaimedatcompanieslistedontheLondonStockExchange.ItisoverseenbytheFinancialReportingCouncilanditsimportancederivesfromtheFinancialServicesAuthoritysListingRules.TheListingRulesthemselvesaregivenstatutoryauthorityundertheFinancialServicesandMarketsAct2000U]andrequirethatpubliclistedcompaniesdisclosehowtheyhavecompliedwiththecode,andexplainwheretheyhavenotappliedthecode-inwhatthecodereferstoas'complyorexplain'.白Privatecompaniesarealsoencouragedtoconform;howeverthereisnorequirementfordisclosureofcomplianceinprivatecompanyaccounts.TheCodeadoptsaprinciples-basedapproachinthesensethatitprovidesgeneralguidelinesofbestpractice.Thiscontrastswitharules-basedapproachwhichrigidlydefinesexactprovisionsthatmustbeadheredto.Contents[]1Origins2Contentso2.1Schedules3Codecompliance?4Seealso5Notes6References7Externallinks[edit]OriginsTheCodeisessentiallyaconsolidationandrefinementofanumberofdifferentreportsandcodesconcerningopinionsongoodcorporategovernance.ThefirststepontheroadtotheinitialiterationofthecodewasthepublicationoftheCadburyReportin1992.ProducedbyacommitteechairedbySirAdrianCadbury,theReportwasaresponsetomajorcorporatescandalsassociatedwithgovernancefailuresintheUK.Thecommitteewasformedin1991afterPollyPeck,amajorUKcompany,wentinsolventafteryearsoffalsifyingfinancialreports.Initiallylimitedtopreventingfinancialfraud,whenBCCIandRobertMaxwellscandalstookplace,Cadbury'sremitwasexpandedtocorporategovernancegenerally.Hencethefinalreportcoveredfinancial,auditingandcorporategovernancematters,andmadethefollowingthreebasicrecommendations:theCEOandChairmanofcompaniesshouldbeseparatedboardsshouldhaveatleastthreenon-executivedirectors,twoofwhomshouldhavenofinancialorpersonaltiestoexecutiveseachboardshouldhaveanauditcommitteecomposedofnon-executivedirectorsTheserecommendationswereinitiallyhighlycontroversial,althoughtheydidnomorethanreflectthecontemporary"bestpractice",andurgedthatthesepracticesbespreadacrosslistedcompanies.AtthesametimeitwasemphasisedbyCadburythattherewasnosuchthingas"onesizefitsall".㈤In1994,theprincipleswereappendedtotheListingRulesoftheLondonStockExchange,anditwasstipulatedthatcompaniesneednotcomplywiththeprinciples,buthadtoexplaintothestockmarketwhynotiftheydidnot.Beforelong,afurthercommitteechairedbychairmanofMarks&SpencerSirRichardGreenburywassetupasa'studygroup'onexecutivecompensation.Itrespondedtopublicanger,andsomevaguestatementsbythePrimeMinisterJohnMajorthatregulationmightbenecessary,overspirallingexecutivepay,particularlyinpublicutilitiesthathadbeenp^vatisedIn1996theGreenburyReportwaspublished.ThisrecommendedsomefurtherchangestotheexistingprinciplesintheCadburyCode:eachboardshouldhavearemunerationcommitteecomposedwithoutexecutivedirectors,butpossiblythechairmandirectorsshouldhavelongtermperformancerelatedpay,whichshouldbedisclosedinthecompanyaccountsandcontractsrenewableeachyearGreenburyrecommendedthatprogressbereviewedeverythreeyearsandsoin1998SirRonaldHampel,whowaschairmanandmanagingdirectorofICIpic,chairedathirdcommittee.TheensuingHampelReportsuggestedthatalltheCadburyandGreenburyprinciplesbeconsolidatedintoa"CombinedCode".Itaddedthat,theChairmanoftheboardshouldbeseenasthe"leader"ofthenon-executivedirectorsinstitutionalinvestorsshouldconsidervotingthesharestheyheldatmeetings,thoughrejectedcompulsoryvotingallkindsofremunerationincludingpensionsshouldbedisclosed.ItrejectedtheideathathadbeentoutedthattheUKshouldfollowtheGermantwo-tierboardstructure,orreformsintheEUDraftFifthDirectiveonCompanyLaw.Afurthermini-reportwasproducedthefollowingyearbytheTurnbullCommitteewhichrecommendeddirectorsberesponsibleforinternalfinancialandauditingcontrols.Anumberofotherreportswereissuedthroughthenextdecade,particularlyincludingtheHiggsreview,fromDerekHiggsfocusingonwhatnon-executivedirectorsshoulddo,andrespondingtotheproblemsthrownupbythecollapseofEnronintheUS.PaulMynersalsocompletedtwomajorreviewsoftheroleofinstitutionalinvestorsfortheTreasury,whoseprincipleswerealsofoundintheCombinedCode.ShortlyfollowingthecollapseofNorthernRockandtheFinancialCrisistheWalkerReviewproducedareportfocusedonthebankingindustry,butalsowithrecommendationsforallcompanies国In2010,anewStewardshipCodewasissuedbytheFinancialReportingCouncil,alongwithanewversionoftheUKCorporateGovernanceCode,henceseparatingtheissuesfromoneanother.[edit]ContentsSectionA:LeadershipEverycompanyshouldbeheadedbyaneffectiveboardwhichiscollectivelyresponsibleforthelong-termsuccessofthecompany.Thereshouldbeacleardivisionofresponsibilitiesattheheadofthecompanybetweentherunningoftheboardandtheexecutiveresponsibilityfortherunningofthecompany’sbusiness.Nooneindividualshouldhaveunfetteredpowersofdecision.Thechairmanisresponsibleforleadershipoftheboardandensuringitseffectivenessonallaspectsofitsrole.Aspartoftheirroleasmembersofaunitaryboard,non-executivedirectorsshouldconstructivelychallengeandhelpdevelopproposalsonstrategy.SectionB:EffectivenessTheboardanditscommitteesshouldhavetheappropriatebalanceofskills,experience,independenceandknowledgeofthecompanytoenablethemtodischargetheirrespectivedutiesandresponsibilitieseffectively.Thereshouldbeaformal,rigorousandtransparentprocedurefortheappointmentofnewdirectorstotheboard.Alldirectorsshouldbeabletoallocatesufficienttimetothecompanytodischargetheirresponsibilitieseffectively.Alldirectorsshouldreceiveinductiononjoiningtheboardandshouldregularlyupdateandrefreshtheirskillsandknowledge.Theboardshouldbesuppliedinatimelymannerwithinformationinaformandofaqualityappropriatetoenableittodischargeitsduties.Theboardshouldundertakeaformalandrigorousannualevaluationofitsownperformanceandthatofitscommitteesandindividualdirectors.Alldirectorsshouldbesubmittedforre-electionatregularintervals,subjecttocontinuedsatisfactoryperformance.SectionC:AccountabilityTheboardshouldpresentabalancedandunderstandableassessmentofthecompany’spositionandprospects.Theboardisresponsiblefordeterminingthenatureandextentofthesignificantrisksitiswillingtotakeinachievingitsstrategicobjectives.Theboardshouldmaintainsoundriskmanagementandinternalcontrolsystems.Theboardshouldestablishformalandtransparentarrangementsforconsideringhowtheyshouldapplythecorporatereportingandriskmanagementandinternalcontrolprinciplesandformaintaininganappropriaterelationshipwiththecompany’sauditor.SectionD:RemunerationLevelsofremunerationshouldbesufficienttoattract,retainandmotivatedirectorsofthequalityrequiredtorunthecompanysuccessfully,butacompanyshouldavoidpayingmorethanisnecessaryforthispurpose.Asignificantproportionofexecutivedirectors’remunerationshouldbestructuredsoastolinkrewardstocorporateandindividualperformance.Thereshouldbeaformalandtransparentprocedurefordevelopingpolicyonexecutiveremunerationandforfixingtheremunerationpackagesofindividualdirectors.Nodirectorshouldbeinvolvedindecidinghisorherownremuneration.SectionE:RelationswithShareholdersThereshouldbeadialoguewithshareholdersbasedonthemutualunderstandingofobjectives.Theboardasawholehasresponsibilityforensuringthatasatisfactorydialoguewithshareholderstakesplace.TheboardshouldusetheAGMtocommunicatewithinvestorsandtoencouragetheirparticipation.[edit]SchedulesScheduleAProvisionsonthedesignofperformancerelatedremunerationThisgoesintomoredetailabouttheproblemofdirectorpay.ScheduleBDisclosureofcorporategovernancearrangementsThissetsoutachecklistofwhichdutiesmustbecompliedwith(orexplained)underListingRule9.8.6.Itmakesclearwhatobligationsthereare,andthateverythingshouldbepostedonthecompany'swebsite.[edit]Codecompliance?Inits2007responsetoaFinancialReportingCouncilconsulationpaperinJuly2007Pensions&InvestmentResearchConsultantsLtd(acommercialproxyadvisoryservice)reportedthatonly33%oflistedcompanieswerefullycompliantwithalloftheCodesprovisions.[6]Spreadoveralltherules,thisisnotnecessarilyapoorresponse,andindicationsarethatcompliancehasbeenclimbing.PIRCmaintainsthatpoorcompliancecorrelatestopoorbusinessperformance,andatanyrateakeyprovisionsuchasseparatingtheCEOfromtheChairhadan88.4%compliancerate.ThequestionthrownupbytheCode'sapproachisthetensionbetweenwantingtomaintain"flexibility"andachieveconsistency.Thetensionisbetweenanaversionto"onesizefitsall"solutions,whichmaynotberightforeveryone,andpracticeswhichareingeneralagreementtobetried,testedandsuccessful.叫Ifcompaniesfindthatnon-complianceworksforthem,andshareholdersagree,theywillnotbepunishedbyanexodusofinvestors.Sothechiefmethodforaccountabilityismeanttobethroughthemarket,ratherthanthroughlaw.AnadditionalreasonforaCode,wastheoriginalconcernofthCadburyRepor,thatcompaniesfacedwithminimumstandardsinlawwouldcomplymerelywiththeletterandnotthespiritoftherules阁TheFinancialServicesAuthorityhasrecentlywhen?]proposedtoabandonarequirementtostatecompliancewiththeprinciples(underLR9.8.6(5)),ratherthantherulesindetailthemselves.[edit]SeealsoCorporateGovernanceCorporateSocialResponsibilityStewardshipCodeOECDPrinciplesofCorporateGovernance2004()CompanyreformreportsWrenburyCommittee(1918)(concernedwith"alienshareholders"andkeyindustries)GreeneCommittee(1926)ReportoftheCompanyLawAmendmentCommittee(Cmnd2657,1926)CohenCommittee(1945)JenkinsCommittee(1962)AlanBullock(1977)ReportofthecommitteeofinquiryonindustrialdemocmcyonworkercodeterminationCorkReportInsolvencyLawandPractice,ReportoftheReviewCommittee(1982)(Cmnd8558)CadburyReport(1992),FinancialAspectsofCorporateGovernance,oncorporategovernancegenerally.PdffilehereGreenburyReport(1995)Directors'Remuneration,ReportoftheStudyGroupPdfhereHampelReport(1998),ReviewofcorporategovernancesinceCadbury,hereandonlinewiththeEGCIhereTurnbullReport(1999)oninternalcontrolstoensuregoodfinancialreportingMynersReport(2001),InstitutionalInvestmentintheUnitedKingdom:AReviewoninstitutionalinvestors,PdffilehereandReviewofProgressReporthereHiggsReport(2003)Reviewoftheroleandeffectivenessofnon-executivedirectors.PdfhereSmithReport(2003)onauditors.PdfhereMynersReview(2004)Mynersprinciplesforinstitutionalinvestmentdecision-making:reviewofprogress.pdfhereWalkerReview(2009)inresponsetothefinancialcrisis,andfocusingoninstitutionalinvestors,pdfdocument[edit]Notes△FinancialServicesandMarketsAct2000s2⑷(a)andgenerallyPartVIListingRule9.△Seegenerally,VFinch,'BoardPerformanceandCadburyonCorporateGovernance'[1992]JournalofBusinessLaw581△SeeADignam,'APrincipledApproachtoSelf-regulation?TheReportoftheHampelCommitteeonCorporateGovernance'[1998]CompanyLawyer140DavidWalker,AreviewofcorporategovernanceinUKbanksandotherfinancialindustryentities(2009)2PIRC,ReviewoftheimpactoftheCombinedCode(2007)里e.g.thishumorous£mmblin£fromaFinancialTimescolumnist△para1.10oftheCadburyReport[edit]ReferencesSArcotandVBruno,‘InLetterbutnotinspirit:AnAnalysisofCorporateGovernanceintheUK’(2006)SSRNSArcotandVBruno,'OneSizeDoesNotFitAll,AfterAll:EvidencefromCorporateGovernance'(2007)SSRNADignam,'APrincipledApproachtoSelf-regulation?TheReportoftheHampelCommitteeonCorporateGovernance'[1998]CompanyLawyer140[edit]ExternallinksFulltextUKCorporateGovernanceCode2010FulltextoftheCombinedCode2008Fulltextofthecombinedcode2006Fulltextofthecombinedcode2003TheFinancialServicesAuthorityListingRulesonlineandinpdfformat,underwhichthereisanobligationtocomplywiththeCombinedCode,orexplainwhyitisnotcompliedwith,underLR9.8.6(6).TheFinancialReportingCouncilswebsiteRetrievedfrom"HYPERLINK"http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=UK_Corporate_Governance_Code&oldid"http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=UKCorporateGovernanceCode&oldid=533077697"