Sponsoring Editor: John Greenman
Project Editor: Renee E. Beach
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Compositor: American Book-St&ford Press, Inc.
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THE EXTERNAL CONTROL OF ORGANIZATIONS
A Resource Dependence Perspective
Copyright 0 1978 by Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald R. Salancik
All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this book
may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission
except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews. For
information address Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 10 East 53rd Street, New
York, N.Y. 10022.
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Pfeffer, Jeffrey.
The external control of organizations.
Includes index.
1 . Indus t ry-Soc ia l aspec t s . 2 . In te r -
organizational relations. I. Salancik, Gerald R.,
jo in t au thor . I I . T i t l e .
HD60.P46 658.4’08 77-13907
ISBN O-06-045193-9
The theme of this book, and the underlying premise of the external
perspective on organizations, is that organizational activities and out-
comes are accounted for by the context in which the organization is
embedded. While some empirical attention has been paid to the effects
of environment on organizational structures, and there has been some
theoretical emphasis on the importance of environment, there are
remarkably few studies of interorganizational influence activities. This
is especially remarkable since many organizations have as their
primary function and purpose the control and alteration of the activi-
ties of other organizations. Wiley and Zald (1968) have examined the
operation of two regional college and university accrediting organiza-
tions; Zald and Hair (1972) have written of the various external con-
trols on hospitals. But these two case studies are rare.
The number of organizations attempting to control other organiza-
tions is large. There are, first, all the various accrediting organizations,
such as those operating to accredit educational organizations, hospi-
39
40 The External Control of Organizations
tals, and social service agencies. There are regulatory bodies that func-
tion to control at least some of the activities of the organizations they
regulate. Regulatory bodies include those established by law and those
established by the agreement of the organizations themselves, such as
the NCAA, established by university athletic departments to regulate
the conduct of interscholastic sports. Various advocate and interest
groups, such as the Sierra Club, Common Cause, and others of
narrower interests and shorter duration, operate to attempt to affect
the decisions and activities of business and government organizations.
In addition to organizations that explicitly and openly seek to control
other organizations, interorganizational influence attempts are frequent
among organizations interacting for other purposes. Thus, banks may
attempt to control the dividend policies of firms to which they lend
money.
In this chapter, we will present the basic theory we propose to
explain the operation of interorganizational influence, or social control
processes. Although we will also present some relevant empirical evi-
dence, it should be clear that many aspects of these ideas have yet to
be empirically examined. Thus, the material is presented as a way of
organizing thinking and understanding of the process of interorganiza-
tional influence.
INTERDEPENDENCE
Interdependence is the reason why nothing comes out quite the way
one wants it to. Any event that depends on more than a single causal
agent is an outcome based en interdependent agents. Interpendence is
the reason you cannot find the word in the American Heritage Dic-
tionary-an outcome which depends both on your obtaining the
dictionary and looking up the word and on the publishers’ having in-
cluded the word in the volume. In social systems and social interac-
tions, interdependence exists whenever one actor does not entirely
control all of the conditions necessary for the achievement of an action
or for obtaining the outcome desired from the action.
Virtually all organizational outcomes are based on interdependent
causes or agents. Interdependence characterizes the relationship be-
tween the agents creating an outcome, not the outcome itself. A seller
is interdependent with a buyer because the outcome of concluding a
sale depends on the activities contributed by each. A seller is also
interdependent with another seller if each is negotiating with the same
buyer for a sale.
There are various ways of categorizing interdependence. One way
Social Control of Organizations 41
is to distinguish between outcome interdependence and behavior in-
terdependence. These two forms of interdependence are themselves
independent, meaning that they can occur either alone or together. In
a situation of outcome interdependence, the outcomes achieved by A
are interdependent with, or jointly determined with, the outcome
achieved by B. Consider a market of a given size in which there are
two participants; the quantity sold is determined by the price charged;
and the profits earned by the participants are determined by the
amount sold, the price charged, and the quantity produced. In such a
situation, the two participants, A and B, are in a situation of outcome
interdependence. While each independently may make price and
quantity decisions, the outcome-profit-will be a function of both the
participant’s own decisions and those of his or her competitor. In the
case of behavior interdependence, the activities are themselves depen-
dent on the actions of another social actor, Organizing a poker game is
an example of behavioral interdependence, In order for one person to
play poker, it is necessary that he or she convince others to participate
in the game, which involves having them at a certain place at a certain
specified time. If the others do not cooperate, then the person cannot
engage in the activity of playing poker.
A further distinction can be made between kinds of outcome in-
terdependence by whether the participants are in a competitive or
symbiotic relationship. In a competitive relationship, the outcome
achieved by one can only be higher if the outcome achieved by the
other is lower. In the terminology of game theory, this is a fixed sum,
or zero sum, game. In a situation of symbiotic interdependence, the
output of one is input for the other. It is possible for both to be better
off or worse off simultaneously. Many efforts have been made to define
competitive and symbiotic relationships (e.g., Hawley, 1950). In terms
of human ecology, competitive relationships exist when the actors each
require identical resources for survival. Symbiotic relationships involve
one actor’s using the by-products of the other, or in other words, using
different resources.
Interdependencies are not necessarily symmetric or balanced.
They can be asymmetric. Moreover, interdependence existing between
two social actors need not be either competitive or symbiotic-fre-
quently, relationships contain both forms of interdependence simul-
taneously. For instance, a conglomerate firm may sell the product of
one of its divisions to another firm, thereby existing in a symbiotic
relationship, and at the same time, be in competition with that other
firm in the sale of the product of a different division.
Interdependence is important to an organization because of the
impact it has on the ability of the organization to achieve its desired
outcomes. Consider the following illustration:
42 The External Control of Organizations
In a small town in Maine there is one seller of a perishable product and
one buyer. The buyer requires 100 units of product every two days,
with the probability of his needing the 100 units on any given day
being .5. The supplier has a .9 probability of having 100 units of the
product on hand on any given day. The probability of the buyer,
buyer A, being able to obtain what he wants is .9 and results from his
dependence on the supplier. One day a new buyer, buyer B, comes into
town. Buyer B also needs 100 widgets on average every two days, with
demand varying randomly. Buyer A’s probability of now getting what
he wants is a function of his getting to the supplier either on a different
day or, if on the same day as B, on the probability of getting there
before B. The probability of A now getting what he wants is reduced
to .675. This added uncertainty is troublesome to A, so he decides to
find an alternate source of supply for the product. Meanwhile, the first
supplier notes that his sales have fallen from the time when both A and
B bought from him. When A and B were both in the market, there was
only a .25 chance of not selling the product that day, but with only B
in the market, there was a .5 chance of not selling the product. The
supplier, therefore, decides to cut down on the amount of product he
carries, so if B does not come in, he will not be out so much inventory.
This, in turn, reduces the likelihood of a B getting what he wants.
Eventually, it is likely that the buyer and supplier will work out some
arrangement to coordinate their behaviors so that neither faces as much
uncertainty. In short, to cope with the interdependence of outcomes,
the two will probably decide to make their behaviors more inter-
dependent.
This simple illustration demonstrates a number of important
points about the consequences of interdependence for analyzing orga-
nizational behavior. First, we can see that interdependence varies with
the availability of resources relative to the demands for them. When
there is a large amount of resources relative to the demand, interde-
pendence between actors who need the same resource is reduced.
Second, interdependence characterizes individuals transacting in the
same environment, with the connection being through the flow of
transactions. We can also see that interdependence can create prob-
lems of uncertainty or unpredictability for the organization. This un-
certainty, which is typically troublesome to organizations, derives from
the lack of coordination of activities among social units. Organizations
facing uncertainty attempt to cope with it on occasion by restructuring
their exchange relationships. The solution to one organization’s un-
certainties-for instance, finding a new supplier-can create new un-
certainties for other organizations. Most importantly, the example
illustrates how organizations, to solve their problems of uncertainty
regarding outcomes, are likely to be led to increase their interde-
pendence with respect to behavior, that is, to interstructure their
Social Control of Organizations 43
behaviors in ways predictable for each. The typical solution to prob-
lems of interdependence and uncertainty involves increasing coordina-
tion, which ‘means increasing the mutual control over each others’
activities, or, in other words, increasing the behavioral interdepen-
dence of the social actors.
Interdependence is a consequence of the open-systems nature of
organizations-the fact that organizations must transact with elements
of the environment in order to obtain the resources necessary for sur-
vival. It might be noted that interdependence has been increased with
the increasing specialization and division of labor among organiza-
tional entities. In the days of the pioneers on the American frontier
when a family grew and made most of the things it required, the
interdependence between the family and the various organizations it
dealt with was less than for a family in the present, where there are
specialized organizations providing a variety of goods and services, as
well as organizations that purchase labor. To the extent that social
organizations are self-contained, there is less interdependence between
them. The amount of interdependence existing between organizations
is not a given, but can change over time as organizations become more
or less self-contained.
Organizations engage in exchanges and transactions with other groups
or -‘organizations. The exchanges may involve monetary or physical
resources, information, or social legitimacy. Because organizations are
not self-contained or self-sufficient, the environment must be relied
upon to provide support. For continuing to provide what the organiza-
tion needs, the external groups or organizations may demand certain
actions from the organization in return. It is the fact of the organiza-
tion’s dependence on the environment that makes the external con-
straint and control of organizational behavior both possible and almost
inevitable.
Organizations could not survive if they were not responsive to the
demands from their environments. But, we have noted that demands
often conflict and that response to the demands of one group con-
strains the organization in its future actions, including responding to
the demands of others. This suggests that organizations cannot survive
by responding completely to every environmental demand. The inter-
esting issue then becomes the extent to which organizations can and
should respond to various environmental demands, or the conditions
under which one social unit is able to obtain compliance with its
44 The External Control of Organizations
demands. By understanding the conditions of the social control of
organizations, we believe it is possible to understand how organiza-
tions decide to comply with, or attempt to avoid, influence.
The nature of control and influence in social processes has been
explored in a variety of disciplines, including social psychology, politi-
cal science, sociology, and economics. In the, study of interorganiza-
tional influence, there have been some preliminary attempts to develop
an adequate theory. Most of these theories assume that some form of
interdependence is a necessary condition for exerting influence (e.g.,
Emerson, 1962; Jacobs, 1974; Blau, 1964). As Hawley wrote,
“Dominance attaches to the unit that controls the conditions necessary
to the functioning of the other units” (1950:221). We would concur
that, in general, organizations will tend to be influenced by those who
control the resources they require. But there are a number of other
conditions which increase the likelihood of the influence being success-
ful. Below is a list of the conditions which affect the extent to which an
organization will comply with control attempts:
1. The focal organization is aware of the demands.
2. The focal organization obtains some resources from the social actor mak-
ing the demands.
3. The resource is a critical or important part of the focal organization’s
operation.
4. The social actor controls the allocation, access, or use of the resource;
alternative sources for the resource are not available to the focal orga-
nization.
5. The focal organization does not control the allocation, access, or use of
other resources critical to the social actor’s operation and survival.
6. The actions or outputs of the focal organization are visible and can be
assessed by the social actor to judge whether the actions comply with
its demands.
7. The focal organization’s satisfaction of the social actor’s requests are
not in conflict with the satisfaction of demands from other components
of the environment with which it is interdependent.
8. The focal organization does not control the determination, formulation,
or expression of the social actor’s demands.
9. The focal organization is capable of developing actions or outcomes that
will satisfy the external demands.
10. The organization desires to survive.
It is not necessary that all conditions be present for influence to be
observed. We would argue, however, that as more of the conditions
are met, the probability of external control becomes more and more
likely. These conditions are not themselves unalterable givens in a
situation. Social actors can and do attempt to affect the conditions in
44 The External Control of Organizations
demands. By understanding the conditions of the social control of
organizations, we believe it is possible to understand how organiza-
tions decide to comply with, or attempt to avoid, influence.
The nature of control and influence in social processes has been
explored in a variety of disciplines, including social psychology, politi-
cal science, sociology, and economics. In the study of interorganiza-
tional influence, there have been some preliminary attempts to develop
an adequate theory. Most of these theories assume that some form of
interdependence is a necessary condition for exerting influence (e.g.,
Emerson, 1962; Jacobs, 1974; Blau, 1964). As Hawley wrote,
“Dominance attaches to the unit that controls the conditions necessary
to the functioning of the other units” (1950:221). We would concur
that, in general, organizations will tend to be influenced by those who
control the resources they require. But there are a number of other
conditions which increase the likelihood of the influence being success-
ful. Below is a list of the conditions which affect the extent to which an
organization will comply with control attempts:
1. The focal organization is aware of the demands.
2. The focal organization obtains some resources from the social actor mak-
ing the demands.
3. The resource is a critical or important part of the focal organization’s
operation.
4. The social actor controls the allocation, access, or use of the resource;
alternative sources for the resource are not available to the focal orga-
nization.
5. The focal organization does not control the allocation, access, or use of
other resources critical to the social actor’s operation and survival.
6. The actions or outputs of the focal organization are visible and can be
assessed by the social actor to judge whether the actions comply with
its demands.
7. The focal organization’s satisfaction of the social actor’s requests are
not in conflict with the satisfaction of demands from other components
of the environment with which it is interdependent,
8. The focal organization does not control the determination, formulation,
or expression of the social actor’s demands.
9. The focal organization is capable of developing actions or outcomes that
will satisfy the external demands.
10. The organization desires to survive.
It is not necessary that all conditions be present for influence to be
observed. We would argue, however, that as more of the conditions
are met, the probability of external control becomes more and more
likely. These conditions are not themselves unalterable givens in a
situation. Social actors can and do attempt to affect the conditions in
Social Control of Organizations 45
order to create greater likelihood of being able to exert control success-
fully over other organizations. Attempts are made to obtain more con-
trol over important resources, to obtain better access to information in
order to assess the organization’s actions and outcomes, and to increase
the importance of what the influencing organization supplies. Social
control involves a process in which both the influencer and the fo-
cal organization act to affect the conditions governing the influence
process.
These conditions have parallels in other discussions of interorgani-
zational power. Thompson (1967:31) noted that “an organization is
dependent on some element of its task environment 1) in proportion to
the organization’s need for resources or performances which that ele-
ment can provide, and 2) in inverse proportion to the ability of other
elements to provide the same resources or performance.” Blau
( 1964: 119-125)) in specifying the conditions for independence, the
converse of dependence, states that 1) strategic resources promote
independence; 2) the fact that there are alternative sources from
which a needed servi
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