首页 > > > [价格理论及应用](Price.Theory.and.Applications).赫舒拉发(H…

[价格理论及应用](Price.Theory.and.Applications).赫舒拉发(Hirshleifer).扫描版.pdf

[价格理论及应用](Price.Theory.and.Appl…

上传者: 不胜曦嘘 2012-02-20 评分1 评论0 下载15 收藏10 阅读量141 暂无简介 简介 举报

简介:本文档为《[价格理论及应用](Price.Theory.and.Applications).赫舒拉发(Hirshleifer).扫描版pdf》,可适用于经济金融领域,主题内容包含ThispageintentionallyleftblankP:JZPaggxmlCBHirshleiferJune,:PRICETHEORYAND符等。

This page intentionally left blank P1: JZP 0521818648agg.xml CB902/Hirshleifer 0 521 81864 8 June 30, 2005 10:49 PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS SEVENTH EDITION This new seventh edition of Price Theory and Applications adds extensive discussion of in- formation, uncertainty, and game theory. It contains more than 100 real-world examples illustrating the applicability of economic analysis not only to mainline economic topics but also to issues in politics, history, biology, the family, and many other areas. These discus- sions generally describe recent research published in scholarly books and articles, giving students a good idea of the scientific work done by professional economists. In addition, at appropriate places the text provides “Applications” representing more extended discussions of selected topics including rationing in wartime (Chapter 5), import quotas (Chapter 7), alleged monopolistic suppression of inventions (Chapter 9), minimum wage laws (Chap- ter 12), the effects of Social Security on saving (Chapter 15), fair division of disputed property (Chapter 16), and whether one should pay ransom to a kidnapper (Chapter 17). Jack Hirshleifer is Distinguished Professor of Economics, Emeritus, at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). He is the author or coauthor of the six previous editions of Price Theory and Applications and the author or coauthor of six other books, including The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information (1992, with John G. Riley) and The Dark Side of the Force (2001), both published by Cambridge University Press. Professor Hirshleifer is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Econometric Society, a former president of the Western Economic Association, and a former vice president of the American Economic Association, which named him a Distinguished Fellow in 2000. He has served on the editorial boards of the American Economic Review, the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, and the Journal of Bioeconomics. Amihai Glazer is Professor of Economics at the University of California, Irvine. He has taught at the Hebrew University, Carnegie Mellon University, and the University of Tampere, Finland. The author of more than 80 articles in professional journals, Professor Glazer is coauthor with Jack Hirshleifer of the fifth edition of Price Theory and Applications, coauthor with Laurence Rothenberg of Why Government Succeeds and Why It Fails (2001), and coeditor with Kai Konrad of Conflict and Governance (2003). He is a coeditor of the journal Economics of Governance. David Hirshleifer is the Ralph M. Kurtz Professor of Finance at the Ohio State University. He previously taught at the Anderson School of UCLA and the University of Michigan Business School. The coauthor with Jack Hirshleifer of the sixth edition of Price Theory and Applications, David Hirshleifer has served as a director of the American Finance Association, as editor of the Review of Financial Studies, and as associate editor or coeditor of several other journals in finance, economics, and corporate strategy. His papers have received a number of research awards, including the 1999 Smith–Breeden Award for the outstanding paper in the Journal of Finance. i P1: JZP 0521818648agg.xml CB902/Hirshleifer 0 521 81864 8 June 30, 2005 10:49 ii P1: JZP 0521818648agg.xml CB902/Hirshleifer 0 521 81864 8 June 30, 2005 10:49 PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS Decisions, Markets, and Information SEVENTH EDITION JACK HIRSHLEIFER University of California, Los Angeles AMIHAI GLAZER University of California, Irvine DAVID HIRSHLEIFER Ohio State University iii CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK First published in print format ISBN-13 978-0-521-81864-3 ISBN-13 978-0-521-52342-4 ISBN-13 978-0-511-34451-0 Jack Hirshleifer, Amihai Glazer, and David Hirshleifer 2005 2005 Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521818643 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. ISBN-10 0-511-34451-1 ISBN-10 0-521-81864-8 ISBN-10 0-521-52342-7 Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of urls for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate. Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org hardback paperback paperback eBook (EBL) eBook (EBL) hardback P1: JZP 0521818648agg.xml CB902/Hirshleifer 0 521 81864 8 June 30, 2005 10:49 Contents Preface page xiii part one. introduction 1 The Nature and Scope of Economics 3 1.1 Economics as a Social Science 4 1.2 “Economic Man” 9 Rationality 9 Human Goals – The Self-Interest Assumption 12 Ignorance and Uncertainty 16 1.3 Market and Nonmarket Interactions 16 1.4 Allocation by Prices – The Market System 18 1.5 Behavior within Organizations 20 1.6 Positive and Normative Analysis: “Is” versus “Ought” 20 1.7 Elements of the Economic System 21 Decision-Making Agents in the Economy 21 Scarcity, Objects of Choice, and Economic Activities 22 1.8 Microeconomics and Macroeconomics 23 summary 23 questions 24 2 Working Tools 27 2.1 Equilibrium: Supply-Demand Analysis 28 Balancing Supply and Demand 28 How Changes in Supply and Demand Affect Equilibrium 30 Algebra of Supply-Demand Analysis 36 An Application: Introducing a New Supply Source 38 Taxes on Transactions 39 An Application: Interdicting Supply 43 Price Ceilings and Price Floors 46 2.2 Finding an Optimum 49 The Logic of Total, Average, and Marginal Concepts 50 How Total, Average, and Marginal Magnitudes Are Related 54 An Application: Foraging – When Is It Time to Pack Up and Leave? 59 v P1: JZP 0521818648agg.xml CB902/Hirshleifer 0 521 81864 8 June 30, 2005 10:49 vi CONTENTS summary 61 questions 62 part two. preference, consumption, and demand 3 Utility and Preference 69 3.1 The Laws of Preference 70 3.2 Utility and Preference 72 Cardinal versus Ordinal Utility 73 Utility of Commodity Baskets 77 3.3 Characteristics of Indifference Curves 79 3.4 More on Goods and Bads 83 An Application: Charity 85 3.5 The Sources and Content of Preferences 86 summary 90 questions 90 4 Consumption and Demand 93 4.1 The Optimum of the Consumer 94 The Geometry of Consumer Choice 94 Optimum of the Consumer (Cardinal Utility) 97 Optimum of the Consumer (Ordinal Utility) 100 4.2 Complements and Substitutes 104 4.3 The Consumer’s Response to Changing Opportunities 107 The Income Expansion Path 107 The Engel Curve 110 Price Expansion Path and Demand Curve 112 4.4 Income and Substitution Effects of a Price Change 115 An Application: How Can the Giffen Case Come About? How Likely Is It? 117 4.5 From Individual Demand to Market Demand 118 4.6 An Application: Subsidy versus Voucher 120 summary 122 questions 124 5 Applications and Extensions of Demand Theory 127 5.1 The Engel Curve and the Income Elasticity of Demand 128 5.2 The Demand Curve and the Price Elasticity of Demand 132 5.3 The Cross-Elasticity of Demand 136 5.4 Fitting a Demand Curve 137 Constant Slope versus Constant Elasticity 138 General Demand Functions 139 5.5 Determinants of Responsiveness of Demand to Price 142 5.6 Multiple Constraints – Rationing 144 Coupon Rationing 144 Point Rationing 146 summary 151 questions 152 P1: JZP 0521818648agg.xml CB902/Hirshleifer 0 521 81864 8 June 30, 2005 10:49 CONTENTS vii part three. the firm and the industry 6 The Business Firm 157 6.1 Why Firms? Entrepreneur, Owner, Manager 158 Economic Profit versus Accounting Profit 160 The Separation of Ownership and Control 160 6.2 The Optimum of the Firm in Pure Competition 165 The Shutdown Decision 172 An Application: Division of Output among Plants 174 6.3 Cost Functions 176 Short Run versus Long Run 176 Rising Costs and Diminishing Returns 180 6.4 An Application: Peak versus Off-Peak Operation 182 summary 186 questions 187 7 Equilibrium in the Product Market – Competitive Industry 191 7.1 The Supply Function 192 From Firm Supply to Market Supply: The Short Run 192 Long-Run and Short-Run Supply 195 External Economies and Diseconomies 199 7.2 Firm Survival and the Zero-Profit Theorem 201 7.3 The Benefits of Exchange: Consumer Surplus and Producer Surplus 203 An Application: The Water-Diamond Paradox 205 An Application: Benefits of an Innovation 206 7.4 Transaction Taxes and Other Hindrances to Trade 207 Transaction Taxes 208 Supply Quotas 209 An Application: Import Quotas 210 Price Ceilings and “Shortages” 213 summary 217 questions 218 8 Monopolies, Cartels, and Networks 221 8.1 The Monopolist’s Profit-Maximizing Optimum 222 Price-Quantity Solution 222 Monopoly versus Competitive Solutions 226 An Application: Author versus Publisher 228 An Application: Monopolist with Competitive Fringe 231 8.2 Monopoly and Economic Efficiency 231 8.3 Regulation of Monopoly 234 8.4 Monopolistic Price Discrimination 238 Market Segmentation 238 Block Pricing 241 Perfect Discrimination 243 8.5 Cartels 244 P1: JZP 0521818648agg.xml CB902/Hirshleifer 0 521 81864 8 June 30, 2005 10:49 viii CONTENTS 8.6 Network Externalities 248 Demand for a Network Good 248 Monopoly or Competition? 250 The Lock-in Issue 250 summary 253 questions 254 9 Product Quality and Product Variety 257 9.1 Quality 258 Quality under Competition and Monopoly 259 An Application: Suppression of Inventions 263 Cartels and Quality 265 9.2 Variety 266 Product Variety under Monopoly 268 Blending Monopoly and Competition – Monopolistic Competition 270 summary 275 questions 276 10 Competition Among the Few: Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior 279 10.1 Strategic Behavior: The Theory of Games 280 Patterns of Payoffs 280 An Application: Public Goods – Two-Person versus Multiperson Prisoners’ Dilemma 282 Pure Strategies 283 Mixed Strategies 286 10.2 Duopoly – Identical Products 288 Quantity Competition 289 Price Competition 293 An Application: “Most-Favored-Customer” Clause 295 10.3 Duopoly – Differentiated Products 297 Quantity Competition 297 Price Competition 298 10.4 Oligopoly, Collusion, and Numbers 300 An Application: The “Kinked” Demand Curve 300 Oligopoly and Numbers 302 summary 304 questions 304 11 Dealing with Uncertainty – The Economics of Risk and Information 307 11.1 Decisions under Uncertainty 308 Expected Gain versus Expected Utility 308 Risk Aversion 309 Risk-Bearing and Insurance 312 11.2 The Value of Information 316 11.3 Asymmetric Information 317 Adverse Selection – The Lemons Problem 317 P1: JZP 0521818648agg.xml CB902/Hirshleifer 0 521 81864 8 June 30, 2005 10:49 CONTENTS ix Conveying Quality through Reputation 321 Do Prices Signal Quality? Information as a Public Good 323 Conveying Information – Advertising 325 11.4 Herd Behavior and Informational Cascades 325 11.5 Copyright, Patents, and Intellectual Property Rights 328 summary 332 questions 334 part four. factor markets and income distribution 12 The Demand for Factor Services 339 12.1 Production and Factor Employment with a Single Variable Input 340 The Production Function 340 Diminishing Returns 340 From Production Function to Cost Function 343 The Firm’s Demand for a Single Variable Input 345 12.2 Production and Factor Employment with Several Variable Inputs 349 The Production Function 350 Factor Balance and Factor Employment 355 The Firm’s Demand for Inputs 358 12.3 The Industry’s Demand for Inputs 362 12.4 Monopsony in the Factor Market 364 12.5 An Application: Minimum-Wage Laws 366 summary 371 questions 373 13 Resource Supply and Factor-Market Equilibrium 375 13.1 The Optimum of the Resource-Owner 376 An Application: The Incentive Effects of “Welfare” and Social Security 382 13.2 Personnel Economics: Managerial Applications of Employment Theory 385 The Principal-Agent Problem 385 Paying by the Piece 386 Signalling 389 13.3 Factor-Market Equilibrium 390 From Individual Supply to Market Supply 390 Demand and Supply Together 391 An Application: Sources of Growing Wage Inequality 392 13.4 Monopolies and Cartels in Factor Supply 395 13.5 The “Functional” Distribution of Income 397 The Traditional Classification: Land, Labor, and Capital 397 Capital, Rate of Return, and Interest 398 13.6 Economic Rent 402 summary 403 questions 404 P1: JZP 0521818648agg.xml CB902/Hirshleifer 0 521 81864 8 June 30, 2005 10:49 x CONTENTS part five. exchange 14 Exchange, Transaction Costs, and Money 409 14.1 Pure Exchange: The Edgeworth Box 410 14.2 Supply and Demand in Pure Exchange 416 An Application: Market Experiments in Economics 420 14.3 Exchange and Production 423 14.4 Imperfect Markets: Costs of Exchange 430 How Perfect Are Markets? 430 Proportional Transaction Costs 433 Lump-Sum Transaction Costs 437 14.5 The Role of Money 440 Money as Medium of Exchange 440 Money as Temporary Store of Value 442 14.6 An Application: Auctions 443 The English Auction 445 Sealed-Bid Second-Price Auction 445 Sealed-Bid First-Price Auction 445 The Dutch Auction 446 summary 448 questions 449 part six. economics and time 15 The Economics of Time 455 15.1 Present versus Future 456 15.2 Consumption Choices over Time: Pure Exchange 459 Borrowing-Lending Equilibrium with Zero Net Investment 459 An Application: Double Taxation of Saving? 461 15.3 Production and Consumption over Time: Saving and Investment 464 15.4 Investment Decisions and Project Analysis 468 The Separation Theorem 468 The Present-Value Rule 469 The Rate of Return (ROR) Rule 475 15.5 Real Interest and Monetary Interest: Allowing for Inflation 479 15.6 The Multiplicity of Interest Rates 482 An Application: The Discount Rate for Project Analysis 485 15.7 The Fundamentals of Investment, Saving, and Interest 486 summary 490 questions 491 part seven. political economy 16 Welfare Economics: The Market and the State 497 16.1 Goals of Economic Policy 498 Efficiency versus Equity 498 Utilitarianism 500 P1: JZP 0521818648agg.xml CB902/Hirshleifer 0 521 81864 8 June 30, 2005 10:49 CONTENTS xi Efficiency as the Sum of Consumer Surplus and Producer Surplus 500 Efficient Allocations in the Edgeworth Box 501 “Equity” Reconsidered 502 An Application: How to Divide a Cake 504 16.2 The Theorem of the Invisible Hand: The Role of Prices 506 Efficient Consumption 506 Efficient Production 506 Efficient Balance between Production and Consumption 507 16.3 “Market Failures” 508 Monopoly 508 Externalities 508 The Coase Theorem 513 16.4 The Commons: The Consequences of Unrestricted Access 515 16.5 Public Goods 518 Efficient Production and Consumption of Public Goods 518 Voluntary Provision of Nonexcludable Public Goods – Free-Riding 521 An Extension: Weakest-Link versus Best-Shot Models of Public Goods 525 16.6 Appropriative Activity and Rent-Seeking 529 summary 533 questions 534 17 Government, Politics, and Conflict 537 17.1 The Other Side of the Coin: Government Failures 538 Corruption as Government Failure 538 Political Competition and Its Limits 539 Politics and Special Interests 541 17.2 Voting as an Instrument of Control 543 Majority and Minority – “Log-Rolling” 544 The Cycling Paradox 545 The Median-Voter Theorem 546 17.3 Conflict and Cooperation 550 Sources of Cooperation and Conflict 550 Conflict and Game Theory 557 An Application: Should You Pay Ransom? 561 summary 563 questions 564 Answers to Selected Questions 567 Name Index 597 Subject Index 601 P1: JZP 0521818648agg.xml CB902/Hirshleifer 0 521 81864 8 June 30, 2005 10:49 xii P1: JZP 0521818648agg.xml CB902/Hirshleifer 0 521 81864 8 June 30, 2005 10:49 Preface Theory is useless unless it leads to applications. But real-world problems remain a buzzing, blooming confusion absent a systematic theory to put them in intellectual order. Earlier editions of this book pioneered an approach, not totally new but given unusual emphasis by us, that weaves together economic theory and real-world applica- tions. Most current intermediate microtheory texts have come to follow our lead and also now try to enrich the theoretical exposition with selected applications. Our enthu- siasm for and experience in discovering, describing, and analyzing how microtheory works out in the real world nevertheless lend a special strength to Price Theory and Applications. To this end the many brief “Examples” that direct attention to specific applications remain, as in previous editions, a hallmark of Price Theory and Applications. This edition contains more than a hundred such examples. These discussions generally describe recent research published in scholarly books and articles and so also give students a better idea of the scientific work that professional economists actually do. (The media typically picture economists as a band of squabbling soothsayers – some saying business will be good, others always predicting doom. Students may be surprised to find that there are any scientifically validated results in economics.) In addition, at appropriate places the text provides “Applications” representing a wide range of topics, among them rationing in wartime (Chapter 5), import quotas (Chapter 7), alleged monopolistic suppression of inventions (Chapter 9), minimum wage laws (Chapter 12), the effects of Social Security on saving (Chapter 15), fair division of disputed property (Chap- ter 16), and whether you should pay ransom to a kidnapper (Chapter 17). Two other key themes guide this text. First, that economics is not a body of facts or propositions to be memorized. It is instead a way of thinking about the world. There are diligent students who say, “Prof, just tell me what pages you want me to learn and I guarantee I’ll know every word.” But memorization is not enough. Even the ability to derive and prove logical or mathematical propositions does not suffice. Insight and intuition must also be cultivated. Insight and intuition tell us what theories or propositions apply in any given context. Yet not everything can be left to inspiration. Insight and intuition have to be earned by hard intellectual labor. Second, traditional economic theory has been guilty of tunnel vision in focusing so strictly on rationalistic individual behavior and market interactions. Humans are not always entirely rational, and market interactions are only one of the many domains of social life. Economics as a universal science applies outside these boundaries, whenever humans (or even animals!) have to cope with resource scarcity. Market decisions are of xiii P1: JZP 0521818648agg.xml CB902/Hirshleifer 0 521 81864 8 June 30, 2005 10:49 xiv PREFACE course amenable to economic analysis. But so are personal choices (how many children to have, whether to live in the city or the suburbs, whom to seek as friends) and political ones (balancing between affluence and defense, between regulation of improper behavior and individual freedom, between relief for persons unable or unwilling to work versus providing incentives to those who are productive). Accordingly, the text employs a range of materials from scientific work in anthropology, psychology, political science, social biology, and other fields that all serve to illustrate economic principles. Critics of economics sometimes object that, under the pressures of everyday life, peo- ple have to make decisions without using esoteric economic concepts such as marginal analysis. But biologists have discovered that marginal analysis explains many aspects of the behavior of animals (see the “Smart Ants!” example in Chapter 4), and humans are surely cleverer than ants. Yet people, individually or collectively,

该用户的其他资料

  • 名称/格式
  • 评分
  • 下载次数
  • 资料大小
  • 上传时间

用户评论

0/200
    暂无评论
上传我的资料

相关资料

资料评价:

/ 632
所需积分:1 立即下载
返回
顶部
举报
资料
关闭

温馨提示

感谢您对爱问共享资料的支持,精彩活动将尽快为您呈现,敬请期待!