The Great Crash, 2008
A Geopolitical Setback for the West
Roger C. Altman From Foreign Affairs, January/February 2009
Summary: The financial crisis has called into serious question the credibility of
western governments and may precipitate an eastward shift of power.
ROGER C. ALTMAN is Chair and CEO of Evercore Partners. He was U.S. Deputy
Treasury Secretary in 1993-94.
The financial and economic crash of 2008, the worst in over 75 years, is a major
geopolitical setback for the United States and Europe. Over the medium term,
Washington and European governments will have neither the resources nor the
economic credibility to play the role in global affairs that they otherwise would have
played. These weaknesses will eventually be repaired, but in the interim, they will
accelerate trends that are shifting the world's center of gravity away from the United
States.
A brutal recession is unfolding in the United States, Europe, and probably Japan -- a
recession likely to be more harmful than the slump of 1981-82. The current financial
crisis has deeply frightened consumers and businesses, and in response they have
sharply retrenched. In addition, the usual recovery tools used by governments --
monetary and fiscal stimuli -- will be relatively ineffective under the circumstances.
This damage has put the American model of free-market capitalism under a cloud.
The financial system is seen as having collapsed; and the regulatory framework, as
having spectacularly failed to curb widespread abuses and corruption. Now, searching
for stability, the U.S. government and some European governments have nationalized
their financial sectors to a degree that contradicts the tenets of modern capitalism.
Much of the world is turning a historic corner and heading into a period in which the
role of the state will be larger and that of the private sector will be smaller. As it does,
the United States' global power, as well as the appeal of U.S.-style democracy, is
eroding. Although the United States is fortunate that this crisis coincides with the
promise inherent in the election of Barack Obama as president, historical forces -- and
the crash of 2008 -- will carry the world away from a unipolar system regardless.
Indeed, rising economic powers are gaining new influence. No country will benefit
economically from the financial crisis over the coming year, but a few states -- most
notably China -- will achieve a stronger relative global position. China is experiencing
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its own real estate slowdown, its export markets are weak, and its overall growth rate
is set to slow. But the country is still relatively insulated from the global crisis. Its
foreign exchange reserves are approaching $2 trillion, making it the world's strongest
country in terms of liquidity. China's financial system is not exposed, and the
country's growth, which is now driven by domestic activity, will continue at solid, if
diminished, rates.
This relatively unscathed position gives China the opportunity to solidify its strategic
advantages as the United States and Europe struggle to recover. Beijing will be in a
position to assist other nations financially and make key investments in, for example,
natural resources at a time when the West cannot. At the same time, this crisis may
lead to a closer relationship between the United States and China. Trade-related
flashpoints are diminishing, which may soften protectionist stances in the U.S.
Congress. And it is likely that, with Washington less distracted by the war in Iraq, the
new administration of President Obama will see more clearly than its predecessor that
the U.S.-Chinese relationship is becoming the United States' most important bilateral
relationship. The Obama administration could lead efforts to bring China into the G-8
(the group of highly industrialized states) and expand China's shareholding position in
the International Monetary Fund. China, in turn, could lead an effort to enlarge the
capital base of the IMF.
AT BOTTOM
Conventional wisdom attributes the crisis to the collapse of housing prices and the
subprime mortgage market in the United States. This is not correct; these were
themselves the consequence of another problem. The crisis' underlying cause was the
(invariably lethal) combination of very low interest rates and unprecedented levels of
liquidity. The low interest rates reflected the U.S. government's overly
accommodating monetary policy after 9/11. (The U.S. Federal Reserve lowered the
federal funds rate to nearly one percent in late 2001 and maintained it near that very
low level for three years.) The liquidity reflected, among other factors, what Federal
Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke has called "the global savings glut": the enormous
financial surpluses realized by certain countries, particularly China, Singapore, and
the oil-producing states of the Persian Gulf. Until the mid-1990s, most emerging
economies ran balance-of-payments deficits as they imported capital to finance their
growth. But the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, among other things, changed this in
much of Asia. After that, surpluses grew throughout the region and then were
consistently recycled back to the West in the form of portfolio investments.
Facing low yields, this mountain of liquidity naturally sought higher ones. One basic
law of finance is that yields on loans are inversely proportional to credit quality: the
stronger the borrower, the lower the yield, and vice versa. Huge amounts of capital
thus flowed into the subprime mortgage sector and toward weak borrowers of all
types in the United States, in Europe, and, to a lesser extent, around the world. For
example, the annual volume of U.S. subprime and other securitized mortgages rose
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from a long-term average of approximately $100 billion to over $600 billion in 2005
and 2006. As with all financial bubbles, the lessons of history, including about
long-term default rates on such poor credits, were ignored.
This flood of mortgage money caused residential and commercial real estate prices to
rise at unprecedented rates. Whereas the average U.S. home had appreciated at 1.4
percent annually over the 30 years before 2000, the appreciation rate roared forward
at 7.6 percent annually from 2000 through mid-2006. From mid-2005 to mid-2006,
amid rampant speculation in the housing market, it was 11 percent.
But like most spikes in commodity prices, this one eventually reversed itself -- and
with a vengeance. Housing prices have been falling sharply for over two years, and so
far there is no sign that they will bottom out. Futures markets are signaling that, from
peak to trough, the drop in the value of the nation's housing stock could reach 30-35
percent. This would be an astonishing fall for a pool of assets once valued at $13
trillion.
This collapse in housing prices undermined the value of the multitrillion-dollar pool
of lower-value mortgages that had been created over the 2003-6 period. In addition,
countless subprime mortgages that were structured to be artificially cheap at the outset
began to convert to more expensive terms. Innumerable borrowers could not afford
the adjusted terms, and delinquencies became more frequent. Losses on these loans
began to emerge in mid-2007 and quickly grew to staggering levels. And with prices
in real estate and other asset values still dropping, the value of these loans is
continuing to deteriorate. The larger financial institutions are reporting continuous
losses. They mark down the value of a loan or similar asset in one quarter, only to
mark it down again in the next. This self-reinforcing downward cycle has caused
markets to plunge across the globe.
The damage is most visible at the household level. Americans have lost one-quarter of
their net worth in just a year and a half, since June 30, 2007, and the trend continues.
Americans' largest single asset is the equity in their homes. Total home equity in the
United States, which was valued at $13 trillion at its peak in 2006, had dropped to
$8.8 trillion by mid-2008 and was still falling in late 2008. Total retirement assets,
Americans' second-largest household asset, dropped by 22 percent, from $10.3 trillion
in 2006 to $8 trillion in mid-2008. During the same period, savings and investment
assets (apart from retirement savings) lost $1.2 trillion and pension assets lost $1.3
trillion. Taken together, these losses total a staggering $8.3 trillion.
Such large and sudden hits have shocked U.S. families. And because these have
occurred amid headlines reporting failing financial institutions and huge bailouts,
Americans' fears over the safety and accessibility of their deposits are now more
pervasive than they have been since 1933. This is why Americans withdrew $150
billion from money-market funds over a two-day period in September (average
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weekly outflows are just $5 billion). It is also why the Federal Reserve established a
special $540 billion facility to help these funds meet continuing redemptions.
ROUGH-AND-TUMBLE
It is increasingly evident that the severe recession unfolding in the United States and
Europe will be the deepest slump in the world economy since the 1930s. The United
States' GDP fell in the third quarter of 2008 and was forecast to drop precipitously, by
nearly four percent, in the fourth quarter. Of 52 economists surveyed by The Wall
Street Journal throughout last year, a majority expected the U.S. economy to contract
for at least three consecutive quarters, which it has not done in 50 years. At least for
the medium term, the global roles of the United States and European states will shrink
along with those countries' economies.
Stock markets in the United States and globally are signaling a brutal economic
period ahead. By early November 2008, the broadest of the U.S. market indices, the S
and P 500, was down 45 percent from its 2007 high. That is a considerably steeper fall
than occurred in 1981-82, which, until now, was the worst recession period since the
1930s. The only logical explanation for the plunge is that the market is anticipating an
even worse drop in corporate profits for 2009 than occurred almost three decades ago.
Such a major drop in corporate profits might occur because U.S. consumers are
deeply frightened and have stopped spending on discretionary items. Shocked by the
financial crisis, fearful about the security of their bank and money-market deposits,
and rocked by the sense of doom pervading Washington and the U.S. media, they
have quickly raised their savings by curtailing spending and paying down debt. The
result last September was the biggest monthly drop ever recorded in the widely
followed Conference Board Consumer Confidence Index. That month also saw the
sharpest monthly drop in consumer spending since 1980 -- and the drop in October
was even worse. The chief executive officer of Caterpillar and other business leaders
have described these conditions as the worst they have ever seen and are cutting back
severely on capital spending.
As former Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers has observed, this recession will be
prolonged partly because of the unusual nature of this downward financial spiral. As
the value of financial assets fall, margin calls are triggered, forcing the sale of those
and other assets, which further depresses their value. This means larger losses for
households and financial institutions, and these in turn discourage spending and
lending. The end result is an even weaker economy, characterized by less spending,
lower incomes, and more unemployment.
This recession also will be prolonged because the usual government tools for
stimulating recovery are either unavailable or unlikely to work. The most basic way to
revitalize an ailing economy is to ease monetary policy, as the U.S. Federal Reserve
did in the fall. But interest rates in the United States and Europe are already extremely
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low, and central banks have already injected unprecedented amounts of liquidity into
the credit markets. Thus, the impact of any further easing will probably be small.
Another tool, fiscal stimulus, will also likely be used in the United States, Europe, and
Japan -- but to modest effect. Even the $300 billion package of spending increases
and tax rebates currently under discussion in the U.S. Congress would be small in
relation to the United States' $15 trillion economy. And judging from the past, another
round of stimuli will be only partially effective: the $168 billion package enacted last
February improved the United States' GDP by only half that amount.
The slowdown in Europe is expected to be every bit as severe. European consumers
are spending less for the same reasons American consumers are. The financial sectors
of European countries, relative to those countries' GDPs, have suffered even more
damage than that of the United States. The British government reported a contraction
of its economy last fall, and the eurozone countries are now officially in recession.
The international financial system has also been devastated. The IMF estimates that
loan losses for global financial institutions will eventually reach $1.5 trillion. Some
$750 billion in such losses had been reported as of last November. These losses have
wiped out much of the capital in the banking system and caused flows of credit to shut
down. Starting in late 2007, institutions became so concerned about the
creditworthiness of borrowers, including one another, that they would no longer lend.
This was evidenced by the spread between three-month U.S. Treasury bills and the
three-month LIBOR borrowing rate, the benchmark for interbank lending, which
quadrupled within a month of the collapse of the investment bank Lehman Brothers in
September 2008.
This credit freeze has brought the global financial system to the brink of collapse. The
IMF's managing director, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, spoke of an imminent "systemic
meltdown" in October. As a result, the U.S. Federal Reserve, the European Central
Bank, and other central banks injected a total of $2.5 trillion of liquidity into the
credit markets, by far the biggest monetary intervention in world history. And the U.S.
government and European governments took the previously unthinkable step of
committing another $1.5 trillion to direct equity investments in their local financial
institutions.
THE ROAD TO RECOVERY
As of this writing, there has been a modest thaw in credit-market conditions. But a
return to normalcy is not even on the distant horizon. The West's financial system is
already a shadow of its former self. Given ongoing losses, Western financial
institutions must reduce their leverage much more just to keep balance sheets stable.
In other words, they will have to withdraw credit from the world for at least three or
four years.
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In a classic pattern of overshooting, markets are swinging from euphoria to despair.
Now, the psychology of financial institutions has swung to a conservative extreme.
They are overhauling their credit-approval and risk-management systems, as well as
their leverage and liquidity ratios. Stricter lending standards will prevail for the
foreseeable future.
These new lending patterns will be further constrained by sharply tightened regulation.
It is widely acknowledged that this crisis reflects the greatest regulatory failure in
modern history -- a failure that extended from bank supervision to U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission disclosures to credit-rating oversight. The recriminations, let
alone the criminal prosecutions, are just beginning. There is unanimity that broad
regulatory reform is necessary. Obama and the new U.S. Congress will surely pursue
legislation to implement reform this year. European authorities will undoubtedly take
similar steps. Minimum capital and liquidity standards for regulated institutions will
likely be tightened, among other measures.
If history is any guide, however, financial reform will go too far. The Sarbanes-Oxley
legislation that followed the collapse of Enron and WorldCom is an example of such
an overreaction. Should something like this occur again, tighter restrictions on the U.S.
and European banking systems could delay their return to robust financing activity.
The United States will be further constrained by gigantic budget deficits, the product
of sudden government spending designed to fight the financial crisis and of the sharp
drop in revenues caused by the recession. It now appears that the United States' deficit
for the fiscal year that began in October 2008 will approach $1 trillion, more than
double the $450 billion for the year before. This would be by far the largest nominal
deficit ever incurred by any nation and would represent 7.5 percent of U.S. GDP, a
level previously seen only during the world wars.
THE IMPACT
There could hardly be more constraining conditions for the United States and Europe.
First, the severe recession will prompt governments there to focus inward as their
citizens demand that national resources be concentrated on domestic recovery. The
priorities of Obama, as expressed in his campaign, fit this mold. If the matter has not
already been handled in the lame-duck session of Congress in late 2008, Obama's first
major act as president will be to introduce economic-stimulus legislation. He is also
likely to take steps to further alleviate the financial crisis, address the plight of U.S.
automakers, and begin the complex task of reforming health care and energy policy.
European leaders will also be focusing on the home front. They, too, will be
implementing stimulus programs and trying to manage the financial damage. This
past fall, French President Nicolas Sarkozy and Italian Prime Minister Silvio
Berlusconi were already making fiery speeches about protecting their domestic
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companies from being acquired by foreign interests -- hardly a message consistent
with modern economics.
Second, unprecedented fiscal deficits and difficulties in the financial systems will also
preclude the West from embarking on major international initiatives. If Obama
inherits a $1 trillion deficit, and temporarily enlarges it to $1.3 trillion with a stimulus
program, there will not be much of a constituency calling for increased U.S. spending
on endeavors abroad. Indeed, the country may be entering a period of forced restraint
not seen since the 1930s. Should a crisis like the 1994 collapse of the Mexican
economy present itself again, it is doubtful that the United States would intervene.
And even in the event of economic crises in strategically important areas, such as
Pakistan, major economic assistance from the United States or key European nations
is unlikely. Instead, the IMF will have to be the primary intervenor.
On the private side, Western capital markets will not return to full health for years.
For the indefinite future, large financial institutions will shrink as losses continue and
as they reduce their leverage further. The overshooting pattern that occurs after crises
will also make markets averse to risk and leverage for the foreseeable future.
Historically, U.S. capital markets were far deeper and more liquid than any others in
the world. They were in a league of their own for decades, until European markets
also started developing rapidly over the past 10-15 years. The rest of the world was
dependent on them for capital, and this relationship reinforced the United States'
global influence. They will now be supplying proportionately far less capital for years
to come.
Third, the economic credibility of the West has been undermined by the crisis. This is
important because for decades much of the United States' inf
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