上市公司财务治理结构研究

金融机构在中国上市公司治理中的作用 Rongli Yuan, Jason Zezhong Xiao, Nikolaos Milonas, Joe Hong Zou British Journal of Management, Dec2009,Vol.20: p562-580 最近，一个重大的监管工作在中国被实施，在改善公司治理和稳定股市的过程中，给予金融机构一个重要的角色。例如，在2000年，政府做出了发展中国家（中国证券监督管理委员会，2000年）金融机构的战略决策，大力鼓励金融机构，特别是共同基金和证券公司，投资于上市公司，使他们能够监督公司管理和打击投机行为的个人投资者。在此背景下，共同基金和证券公司都经历了前所未有的增长。截至2003年底开展了这项研究时，有133个证券公司和54只封闭式和41只开放式基金。 不幸的是，迄今为止金融机构的作用在中国很少受到学术界的关注，这部分是因为金融机构在公司治理中没有被察觉到有任何重大作用（Gen，2002年）。然而，没有文献提供经验证据支持这种看法。事实上，最近金融机构试图干预企业管治问题， 表 关于同志近三年现实表现材料材料类招标技术评分表图表与交易pdf视力表打印pdf用图表说话 pdf 明他们中的一些在保护少数股东的权利方面正起着重要的作用。因此，这是一个重要的经验，对于重新评估其目前在公司治理和近期监管工作的有效性中的角色。本研究是朝着填补文学差距的第一次尝试。如果经验证据表明，金融在企业机构发挥了一定的作用治理，那么这将是一个迹象，表明监管工作在方法上取得了一定的成功，并且也许应该延长。如果有证据 证明 住所证明下载场所使用证明下载诊断证明下载住所证明下载爱问住所证明下载爱问 以前的看法，普遍认为金融机构发挥小或在公司治理中没有发挥作用，那么应查明为什么会这样的原因，并且找到克服这些困难的途径。 为了探讨金融机构在上市公司治理中的作用，我们采访了金融机构和上市公司的董事和高级管理人员。通过听取他们的观点，我们能够提供均衡和全面的关于公司治理的参与和金融机构的作用的证据。这次访谈的证据表明，多数证券公司是被动的投资者，而一些积极的尝试获得共同基金介入在其投资组合公司的治理工作。这一发现表明，在促进发展的共同基金监管工作似乎已经对公司治理产生积极的影响，尽管是有限的。文章还指出，这一作用有限，可以归因于几个因素。有些因素是其他经济体系所进行研究提出的一致论点。这些因素包括与投资公司，监督成本高和缺乏专门知识的利益冲突。其他的似乎是具体到中国的背景下，如高浓度的国家所有权，不成熟的监管环境，财务信息披露不充分，和金融机构本身薄弱的公司治理。 由于大多数上市公司已经从中国的原国有企业的改造，有一个国家所有权和法人所有权（由机构发起人和其他法人，其中大部分也是国有或控制，通过高比例持有股份即国有企业或者其他国有机构）和所有权的浓度（Xiao,Dahya和Lin，2004）大的程度。2003年数据（根据Sinofin数据库北京大学中国大学编制）表明，国有股和法人股占上市公司总股本的64%以上。根据法律规定，这些股份不公开交易，但是他们在政府批准的情况下可以交易，因此只留下大约三分之一的股份公开交易。此外，最大的三个股东平均持有约48%股份，其中由第一大股东平均持股约42%。在集中的股权结构下，代理问题成为了业主之间的控制和少数股东（Claessens和Fan，2002）的主要冲突。 在这种集中的股权结构下，金融机构可以发挥有效的作用？现存文献的结论是，中国金融机构是被动的，短暂的投资者。 Tenev，zhang和Brevort（2002）认为，在中国，金融机构有一个小市场的存在并不能起到稳定作用。因此，企业的控制机制和股东行动根据现行的高度集中和分段所有制结构无助于缓解代理问题。Zhang（2002）持有相同的看法,有关金融机构当前的作用有限主要原因有两个 –机构数量少和金融机构的资本，还有不成熟的法律 制度 关于办公室下班关闭电源制度矿山事故隐患举报和奖励制度制度下载人事管理制度doc盘点制度下载 。据根Gen（2002），金融机构在上市公司的公司治理中不会起到任何作用，因为波动的证券市场。具体来说，Tan（2002）指出，管理的基金一直无法发挥提升企业业绩的预期作用，也不能灌输一个稳定因素在经常动荡中的金融机构的作用治理上市公司股票的市场中。但是，没有任何经验的研究提供了证据支持这些说法。 这项研究调查了金融机构在公司治理预期的和实际的作用和影响因素的作用。我们的大多数受访者预期金融机构在公司治理中发挥了积极的监督或干预的作用，少数受访者认为，他们应该保持被动的投资者。 我们的访谈节目分为两个阶段关于影响金融机构是否会影响公司的治理。在此之前做出的投资，金融机构进行质量研究，以找出有效率的企业，以此将有限的资金引导到最有效的利用，从而提高企业效益。事实上，大多数基金经理认为企业绩效，股权交易，财务报表和年度 报告 软件系统测试报告下载sgs报告如何下载关于路面塌陷情况报告535n,sgs报告怎么下载竣工报告下载 ，管理质量，还有机构投资者沟通是影响投资决策的重要因素。 访谈数据还表明，五个共同基金似乎是积极的监测和行使其对企业管理的影响，一些董事确认了对金融机构参与公司治理的积极作用。相比之下，其他共同基金和在我们的样本中各证券公司一样似乎是被动的股东，并没有​​发挥上市公司治理的作用。总体而言，似乎是一个与实际的作用和预期的作用期望的差距。 访谈数据还表明，一些因素可能会被视为金融机构发挥这有限的作用的原因。这是国家所有权，不成熟的监管环境，财务信息披露不充分，金融机构自身薄弱的公司治理，与投资公司的兴趣冲突，监督成本高，缺乏专门知识和利益冲突。最重要的决定因素，也许是国家所有权高度集中。这可能导致严重的内部人控制，这限制了金融机构在公司治理中的作用（Zhou，2004年）。 这项研究提出了一些贡献。这是首次研究提供采访为基础的金融机构在上市公司治理中作用的实证证据。这一证据表明，事先认为他们没有发挥任何作用，应当修改。第二，访问表明，证券公司和共同基金不同的特点可能会影响他们在中国的公司治理的作用。第三，成果突出了中国特有的因素，初步设定可能影响金融机构在公司治理中的作用。 此外，调查结果的政策含义。首先，他们建议，在促进监管工作中，共同基金的发展已经对公司治理产生积极的，尽管是有限的影响。其次，治理，监测和金融机构本身需要的激励机制有待完善。第三，有必要提高中小投资者的法律保护，包括金融机构。此外，有必要在金融机构及其投资组合公司中培养一种信任和道德文化，以防止内幕交易，官商勾结和虚假报道。最后，改善投资者关系可能有助于提高金融机构在公司治理中的作用。 所有权组织和企业绩效 Kang, David L.; Sørensen, B.. Annual Review of Sociology, 1999, Vol.25: p121. 最近，组织社会学的工作，对如何理解现代公共机构中治理系统的某些功能对公司的重要成果的影响取得了相当大的进展。企业人员的功能背景，局外人的董事比例，主席及行政总裁职位分离，和在公司发现的社会网络已被用来预测结果，如企业多样化政策，以及使用多部门组织形式。这项研究已普遍淡化在公司治理中所有权的作用，和假设所有权和控制权得到有效的分离。相比之下，金融经济的研究继续所有权在控制公司中的作用，尽管这种研究的传统已就组织之间的所有权与经营绩效关系产生非常不同的结果。 所有制组织研及其对工作成果影响的研究不能完全交由财政经济研究。关于谁控制了资金的使用和这个控制如何影响社会创造和分配财富的研究，一直是知识探索的重要防线，始发于马克思。运用更广泛和更灵活的方法对个人和企业的财产关系进行研究，也许能对现代资本主义企业的分配效率和结果提供重要的见解。目前，社会学对这一调查线索的实际和潜在的贡献就显得尤为重要，并因此及时地评估什么是已知的什么是未知的，关于所有制组织对公司绩效的影响。我们提出了一种基于所有制类型的方法，在决定公司的所有权成果中作为一个主要的组织变量。 在组织社会学和经济学文献中，现代企业往往被看作是一个具有四个主要演员的大机构：股东，董事，高层管理人员和其他管理人员和职工。股东们认为是业主。他们提供金融资本和接收来自公司的业务 合同 劳动合同范本免费下载装修合同范本免费下载租赁合同免费下载房屋买卖合同下载劳务合同范本下载 的经济回报的承诺。董事作为该公司的受托人，可以批准一定的策略和投资决策，但其主要责任是雇用和解雇高层管理人员的受托人。企业经营管理人员，他们行使大多数商业决策并监督和聘请工人。职工开展活动，创建企业 的产量。 这个现代企业形象准确地反映了许多大型的美国经济中占主导地位的公营机构组织。然而，许多其他公司的方式是进行合并两个或多个组织：业主可同时投资和管理，工人可能是业主，管理人员有可能获得较大份额的所有权等等。在创业型企业，一个人承担所有四项任务：投资，监测，管理和工作。事实上，业主管理公司是资本主义生产的起源和主宰直到二十世纪的美国经济。然而，由于企业在如钢铁，铁路，石油行业扩大了业务，个人和家庭业主发现，他们没有足够的财富来资助大规模的产业化经营（Chandler 1977年）。企业开始用发行股票方法来筹集资本，以满足经济增长和地域扩张对资本的需求。因此，许多企业，尤其是大型企业，已不再是业主管理公司，但有时数以千计的股东只拥有公司的一小部分股份。 我们已审查理论和证据，有关所有权作为一种重要的社会学和组织变量，影响公司业绩。近二十五年已经过去了，达成一个惊人的共识，控制企业的是管理人员，而不是业主，被认为是一种社会科学（Zeitlin 1974）。然而，管理主义的假设再次流行，因为最近组织研究淡化了所有权的重要性，而是对社会结构，社会关系和机构可能会限制经理等为主。业主现在通常描述为互换，那里是假设几乎没有所有者经理关系的社会组成部分。虽然代理理论对企业带来了激励与会者参与公司的重要见解，但它描述的是该公司的委托代理关系构成的注意力都集中在权力关系如何发展国际间组织参加有趣而重要的问题。特别是，某些类型的大股东可能具有足够的正式授权，社会影响力，和专业知识来获得该公司的控制权，给他们不成比例的大量好处，和使用的权利。所有制类型提供了另一种纯粹在所有权集中程度计算中测量单纯的所有制结构，或者简单地归类为所有者或经理控制的控制。所有者和经营者之间的关系具有重要的社会层面，不能在合同条款中简单地表示。 我们的审查显示公司治理的权变理论对企业绩效的影响取决于合适所有者类型和行业背景。某些类型的大股东可能会导致公司业绩增加，这与股权结构并不重要的管理学假设相反。我们不认为在确定公司业绩上经理们的表现并不重要。历史记载表明了,“个人资本主义”是失败的关键，由业主管理人员控制的英国企业没有聘请必要的职业经理人，以管理日益复杂的组织，分销渠道和生产过程而失败为特征的第二次工业革命（Chandler 1990）。企业必须聘用高技能的职业经理人，但某些类型的大股东可能通过塑造战略决策来提高这些管理人员的效率和增加企业业绩。 所有权的重要性的研究很可能会加快美国和世界经济的性质和所有制结构的不断发展。资本市场是有可能变得越来越有效率，随着投资者的企业战略和投资决策信息更容易获得。与此同时，现代企业已减少对实物资产的依赖，并且更多的依赖无形资产，如知识产权和那些被给予股份作为一种补偿形式的高技能员工。最近在所有制形式的变化也可能会增加理解的所有制结构对分配的影响后果的重要性，因为所有权的效率和分配后果是高度交织在一起。最后，虽然在美国所有权和控制权有很大程度上的分离，这当然不是在世界上其他最富裕地方的大部分情况，那里的许多理依赖Berle & Means公司，可能只有有限的相关性（La Porta等人1998）。因此，我们认为，所有权是一个重要但被忽视的社会和组织变量，值得继续学术研究。 The Role of Financial Institutions in the Corporate Governance of Listed Chinese Companies Rongli Yuan, Jason Zezhong Xiao, Nikolaos Milonas, Joe Hong Zou British Journal of Management, Dec2009,Vol.20: p562-580 A substantial regulatory effort has recently been made in China to accord financial institutions an important role in improving corporate governance and stabilizing the stock market. For example, in 2000 the government made a strategic decision to devote major efforts to developing financial institutions (China Securities Regulatory Commission, 2000). It encouraged financial institutions, especially mutual funds and securities companies, to invest in listed companies so that they can monitor corporate management and counter opportunistic behaviours of individual investors. In this context, mutual funds and securities companies have experienced an unprecedented growth. As at the end of 2003 when this study was undertaken, there were 133 securities companies and 54 closed-end and 41 open-end mutual funds. Unfortunately, the role of financial institutions in China so far has attracted little academic attention, partly because financial institutions are not perceived to play any significant role in corporate governance (Gen, 2002). However, the literature offers no empirical evidence to support such a perception. Indeed, financial institutions’ recent attempts to intervene in corporate governance issues suggest that some of them are exercising an important role in protecting the rights of minority shareholders. Thus, it is important to empirically reassess their current role in corporate governance and the effectiveness of the recent regulatory efforts. This study represents a first attempt towards filling a gap in the literature. If empirical evidence suggests that financial institutions play a certain role in corporate governance, then this would be an indication that the regulatory efforts have achieved some measure of success and such efforts should probably be extended. If the evidence confirms prior perceptions that financial institutions play little or no role in corporate governance, then it would be useful to identify the reasons why this is the case and ways to overcome the difficulties. To explore the role of financial institutions in the governance of listed Chinese companies, we interviewed both senior managers of financial institutions and directors of listed companies. From their perspectives, we are able to provide balanced and comprehensive evidence on the participation and role of financial institutions in corporate governance. The interview evidence indicates that most securities companies are passive investors, while some active mutual funds attempt to get involved in the governance of their portfolio firms. This finding suggests that the regulatory efforts in promoting the development of mutual funds seem to have generated positive, albeit limited, impacts on corporate governance. This paper also indicates that this limited role can be attributed to a number of factors. Some of the factors are consistent with the arguments put forward by studies undertaken in other economies. These include conflicts of interest with investee companies, high monitoring costs and lack of expertise. Others appear to be specific to the Chinese context, e.g. high concentration of state ownership, immature regulatory environment, inadequate disclosure of financial information, and weak corporate governance within financial institutions themselves Since most listed Chinese companies have been transformed from former state-owned enterprises, there is a high proportion of state ownership and legal person ownership (i.e. shares held by institutional promoters and other legal persons, most of which are also state-owned or controlled through state-owned enterprises or other state-owned institutions) and a great degree of ownership concentration (Xiao, Dahya and Lin, 2004). Data from 2003 (according to the Sinofin database compiled by Peking University in China) indicate that state shares and legal person shares accounted for over 64% of total share ownership in listed firms. By law, these shares are not publicly tradable although they could be exchanged by agreement approved by the government, thus leaving only about one third of shares publicly tradable. Moreover, the largest three shareholders held, on average, about 48% of total shares, of which the average shareholding by the largest shareholders was about 42%. Under the concentrated ownership structure, the agency problem mainly becomes the conflict between controlling owners and minority shareholders (Claessens and Fan, 2002). Can financial institutions play an effective role given this concentrated ownership structure? The extant literature concludes that Chinese financial institutions are passive and transient investors. Tenev, Zhang and Brevort (2002) argue that financial institutions in China have a small market presence and cannot play a stabilizing role. As a result, corporate control mechanisms and shareholder activism can do little to mitigate agency problems under the existing highly concentrated and segmented ownership structure. Zhang (2002) holds the same opinion about the current role of financial institutions, and attributes their limited role to two main reasons – the small number and market capitalization of Chinese financial institutions, and the immature legal system. According to Gen (2002), financial institutions would not play any role at all in corporate governance in listed companies because of the volatile securities market. Specifically, Tam (2002) points out that managed funds have not been able to play the anticipated role in lifting corporate performance nor instilling an element of stability in the often volatile Chinese Governance Role of Financial Institutions in Listed Chinese Companies stock markets. However, no study has provided any empirical evidence to support these claims. This study has investigated the expected and actual roles of financial institutions in corporate governance and the factors that affect their role. The majority of our interviewees expected financial institutions to play an active monitoring or interventionist role in corporate governance while a minority of our interviewees argued that they should remain passive investors. Our interviews show two phases at which financial institutions could affect corporate governance. Prior to making an investment, financial institutions performed quality research in order to identify efficient firms, thus directing scarce capital to its most efficient use and consequently enhancing corporate efficiency. Indeed, most fund managers considered firm performance, tradable shareholdings, financial statements and annual report, quality of management, and investor communications as important factors that affect institutional investment decisions. The interview data also indicate that five mutual funds seemed to be active monitors and exercised their influence on corporate management and that some directors confirmed the positive effect of financial institutions’ participation in corporate governance. By contrast, the other mutual funds and all securities companies in our sample appeared to be passive shareholders and did not play any role in the governance of listed companies. Overall, there appeared to be an expectations gap between the actual role and the expected role. The interview data also suggest that a number of factors might be seen to account for this limited role played by financial institutions. These were the high concentration of state ownership, the immature regulatory environment, the inadequate disclosure of financial information, the weak corporate governance within financial institutions themselves, conflicts of interest with investee companies, high monitoring costs, and lack of expertise. The most important determinant was perhaps the high degree of state ownership concentration. This could cause severe insider control and pursuance of non-economic objectives in listed companies, which limits the role of financial institutions in corporate governance (Zhou, 2004). This study makes several contributions. It is the first study to provide interview-based empirical evidence on the role of financial institutions in the governance of listed Chinese firms. This evidence suggests that the prior perception that they do not play any role should be modified. Second, the interviews suggest that different characteristics of securities companies and mutual funds could affect their corporate governance roles in China. Third, the results highlight a tentative set of China-specific factors that may affect the role of financial institutions in corporate governance. In addition, the findings have a number of policy implications. First, they suggest that the regulatory efforts in promoting the development of mutual funds seem to have generated positive, albeit limited, impacts on corporate governance. Second, the governance, monitoring and incentive mechanisms for financial institutions themselves need to be perfected. Third, there is a need to improve legal protection of minority investors including financial institutions. Moreover, there is a need to nurture a culture of trust and ethics in both financial institutions and their portfolio firms to prevent insider trading, collusion and false reporting. Finally, improved investor relations may help to enhance the role of financial institutions in corporate governance. OWNERSHIP ORGANIZATION AND FIRM PERFORMANCE Kang, David L.; Sørensen, B.. Annual Review of Sociology, 1999, Vol.25: p121. Recent work in organizational sociology has made considerable progress toward understanding how certain features of the governance systems found in modern public corporations affect a range of important firm outcomes. The functional backgrounds of corporate officers, the proportion of outsider directors, the separation of the Chairman and CEO positions, and the social networks found across firms have been used to predict outcomes such as corporate diversification policies, and the use of the multidivisional organizational form. This research has generally downplayed the role of ownership in corporate governance and assumed that ownership and control are effectively separated. By contrast, financial economic research continues to question the role of ownership in understanding control of the firm, although this research tradition has produced highly mixed results on the relationship between ownership organization and performance. The study of ownership organization and its effect on performance should not be left completely to financial economic research. The study of who controls the use of capital and how this control affects the creation and distribution of wealth in society has long been an important line of intellectual inquiry, originating with Marx. Studying the relationships of individuals and firms to property with a broader and more flexible approach may provide important insights into the efficiency and distributive consequences of modern capitalist firms. The actual and potential contributions of sociology to this line of inquiry seem particularly important at the present time, and it is therefore timely to assess what is known, and not known, about the effects of ownership organization on firm performance. We propose an approach based on ownership type that views ownership as a key organizational variable in determining firm outcomes. In the sociological and economic literature on organizations, the modern firm is usually seen as a large organization with four main groups of actors: shareholders, boards of directors, top executives and other managers, and workers. Shareholders are thought of as .owners. they provide financial capital and in return receive a contractual promise of economic returns from the operations of the firm. Directors act as fiduciaries of the corporation who may approve certain strategy and investment decisions but whose main responsibility is to hire and fire top managers. Managers operate the firms; they make most business decisions and employ and supervise workers. Workers carry out the activities that create the firm’s output. This image of the modern firm accurately reflects the organization of many large public corporations that dominate the US economy. However, many other firms are organized in ways that merge two or more of these tasks: Owners may be both investing and managing, workers may be owners, managers may acquire large shares of ownership, and so forth. In entrepreneurial firms, one person fuses all four tasks: investing, monitoring, managing, and working. In fact, owner-managed firms were the origin of capitalist production and dominated the US economy until the twentieth century. However, as firms in industries such as steel, railroads, and oil expanded their operations, individual and family owners found that they did not have enough wealth to finance large-scale industrial operations (Chandler 1977). Firms began the practice of issuing shares to raise the large amounts of capital necessary for growth and geographic expansion. As a result, many firms, particularly large firms, are no longer owner-managed firms but corporations, sometimes with thousands of shareholders each of whom owns only a small fraction of the shares. We have reviewed theory and evidence about ownership as an important sociological and organizational variable that affects firm performance. Nearly twenty-five years have passed since the “astonishing consensus” that managers, rather than owners, control modern corporations was found to be a social scientific “pseudo fact” (Zeitlin 1974). However, the assumption of “managerialism” is again prevalent, as recent organizational research downplays the importance of ownership and instead focuses on other varieties of social structures, social relationships, and institutions that may constrain managers. Owners are now routinely depicted as fungible, where there is assumed to be virtually no social component in owner-manager relations. Although agency theory has brought important insights on the incentives of participants in corporations, its depiction of the corporation as being composed of principal and agent relationships has focused attention away from the interesting and important question of how power relationships develop among organizational participants. In particular, certain types of large-block shareholders may have sufficient formal authority, social influence, and expertise to capture property rights to gain control of the firm, giving them disproportionately large amounts of benefit and use rights. Ownership types offer an alternative approach to measuring ownership structure purely in terms of ownership concentration, or simply classifying firms as owner-controlled or manager-controlled. The relationships between owners and managers have an important social dimension that cannot be expressed simply in contractual terms. Our review suggests a contingency theory of corporate governance where the effect of ownership on firm performance is contingent on the “fit” between owner types and the industry con