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首页 ACF Lit Jensen and Meckling 1976

ACF Lit Jensen and Meckling 1976.pdf

ACF Lit Jensen and Meckling 1976

中小学精品课件
2019-04-26 0人阅读 举报 0 0 0 暂无简介

简介:本文档为《ACF Lit Jensen and Meckling 1976pdf》,可适用于经济金融领域

JournalofFinancialEconomics()QNorthHollandPublishingCompanyTHEORYOFTHEFIRM:MANAGERIALBEHAVIOR,AGENCYCOSTSANDOWNERSHIPSTRUCTUREMichaelCJENSENandWilliamHMECKLING*UniversityofRochester,Rochester,NY,USAReceivedJanuary,revisedversionreceivedJulyThispaperintegrateselementsfromthetheoryofagencythetheoryofpropertyrightsandthetheoryoffinancetodevelopatheoryoftheownershipstructureofthefirmWedefinetheconceptofagencycosts,showitsrelationshiptothe‘separationandcontrol’issue,investigatethenatureoftheagencycostsgeneratedbytheexistenceofdebtandoutsideequity,demonstratewhobearsthesecostsandwhy,andinvestigatetheParetooptirnalityoftheirexistenceWealsoprovideanewdefinitionofthefirm,andshowhowouranalysisofthefactorsinfluencingthtcreationandissuanceofdebtandequityclaimsisaspecialcaseofthesupplysideofthecompletenessofmarketsproblemThedirectorsofsuchjointstockcompanies,however,beingthemanagersratherofotherpeople’smoneythanoftheirown,itcannotwellbeexpected,thattheyshouldwatchoveritwiththesameanxiousvigilancewrswhichisthereverseofthesituationweexaminedinsectionFurthcrmorc,thisseemstocapturesomeoftheconcernoftencxprcsscdregardingthcfactthatmnnngcrsoflargepubliclyheldcorporationsseemtobchavcinariskaversewaytothedctrimcntoftheequityholdersOnesolutiontothiswouldbctoestablishincentivecompensationsystemsforthemanagerortogivehimstockoptionswhichincfl’cctgivehimaclaimontheuppertailoftheoutcomedistributionThisalsoseemstobcacommonlyobscrvcdphcnomcnonThisanalysisalsosuggestssonicadditionalissuesregardingthecostsandbcncfitsassociatedwiththeuseofmorecomplicatedfinancialclaimssuchaswarrants,convertiblebondsandconvertiblepreferredstockwhichwehavenotformallyanalyzedasyetWarrants,convertiblebondsandconvertibleprcferrcdstockhavesomeofthearacteristicsofnonvotingsharesalthoughtheycanbeconvertedintovotingsharesundersometermsAlchianDcmsetz()provideaninterestinganalysisregardingtheuseofnonvotingsharesTheyarguethatsomeshareholderswithstrongbeliefsinthetalentsandjudgementsofthemanagerwillwanttobcprotectedagainstthepossibilitythatsomeothersharcholderswilltakeoverandlimittheactionsofthemanager(orfirehim)GiventhatthesecuritiesexchangesprohibittheuseofnonvotingsharesbylistedfirmstheuseofoptiontypesecuritiesmightbeasubstitutefortheseclaimsInadditionwarrantsrepresentsaclaimontheuppertailofthedistributionofConsiderfhcsituationinwhichthebondholdershavetherightintheeventofbankruptcylotcrminarchisemploymentandthcrcforetofcrminatethefuturereturnstoanyspecifichumancapitalorrentshemaybercccivingMCJrnsenandWHNechling,AgencyCOSISarrdlhetheoryofrhefirmoutcomes,andconvertiblesecuritiescanbethoughtofassecuritieswithnondetachablewarrantsItseemsthattheincentiveeffectsofwarrantswouldtendtooffsettosomeextenttheincentiveeffectsoftheexistenceofriskydebtbecausetheownermanagerwouldbesharingpartoftheproceedsassociatedwithashiftinthedistributionofreturnswiththewarrantholdersThus,weconjecturethatpotentialbondholderswillfinditattractivetohavewarrantsattachedtotheriskydebtoffirmsinwhichitisrelativelyeasytoshiftthedistributionofoutcomestoexpandtheuppertailofthedistributiontotransferwealthfrombondholdersItwouldalsothenbeattractivetotheownermanagerbecauseofthereductionintheagencycostswhichhewouldbearThisargumentalsoimpliesthatitwouldmakelittledifferenceifthewarrantsweredetachable(andthereforesaleableseparatelyfromthebonds)sincetheirmereexistencewouldreducetheincentivesofthemanager(orstockholders)toincreasetheriskinessofthefirm(andthereforeincreasetheprobabilityofbankruptcy)Furthermore,theadditionofaconversionprivilegetofixedclaimssuchasdebtorpreferredstockwouldalsotendtoreducetheincentiveeffectsoftheexistenceofsuchfixedclaimsandthereforelowertheagencycostsassociatedwiththemThetheorypredictsthatthesephenomenashouldbcmorefrequentlyobservedincaseswheretheincentiveeffectsofsuchfixedclaimsarehighthanwhentheyarelowOneofthearcasinwhich’furthcranalysisislikelytoleadtohighpayoffsisthatofmonitoringWCcurrentlyhavelittlewhichcouldbegloritiedbythetitleofa“TheoryofMonitoring”andyetthisisacrucialbuildingblockoftheanalysisWCwouldcxpcctmonitoringactivitiestobecomespecializedtothoseinstitutionsandindividualswhopossesscomparative~dVilllt~lgCSinthcscactivitiesOneofthegroupswhoseemtoplayalargeroleintheseactivitiesiscomposedofthesecurityanalystsemployedbyinstitutionalinvestors,brokersandinvestmentadvisoryservicesaswellastheanalysispcrformcdbyindividualinvestorsinthenormalcourseofinvestmentdecisionmakingAlargebodyofevidenceexistswhichindicatesthatsecuritypricesincorporateinanunbiasedmannerallpubliclyavailableinformationandmuchofwhatmightbccalled“privateinformation”’Thereisalsoalargebodyofevidencewhichindicatesthatthesecurityanalysisactivitiesofmutualfundsandotherinstitutionalinvestorsarenotreflectedinportfolioreturns,ie,theydonotincreaseriskadjustedportfolioreturnsoveranaiverandomselectionbuyandholdstrategy“’ThereforesomehavebeentemptedtoconcludethatthercsourccsexpendedonsuchresearchactivitiestofindunderorovervaluedsecuritiesisasociallossJensen()arguesthatthisconclusioncannotbexFamn()forasurveyofthis‘efficientmarkets’literawre“SeeJcnscn()forancnampleofthisevidenceandreferencesMCJensenandWHMecklingAgencyCOSISandIWtheoryofIKfirmunambiguouslydrawnbecausethereisalargeconsumptionelementinthedemandfortheseservicesFurthermore,theanalysisofthispaperwouldseemtoindicatethattotheextentthatsecurityanalysisactivitiesreducetheagencycostsassociatedwiththeseparationofownershipandcontroltheyareindeedsociallyproductiveMoreover,ifthisistrueweexpectthemajorbenefitsofthesecurityanalysisactivitytobereflectedinthehighercapitalizedvalueoftheownershipclaimstocorporationsandnorintheperiodtoperiodportfolioreturnsoftheanalystEquilibriuminthesecurityanalysisindustryrequiresthattheprivatereturnstoanalysis(ieportfolioreturns)mustbejustequaltotheprivatecostsofsuchactivity,”andthiswillnotreflectthesocialproductofthisactivitywhichwillconsistoflargeroutputandhigherCWSofthecapitalvalueofownershipclaimsTherefore,theargumentimpliesthatifthereisanonoptimalamountofsecurityanalysisbeingperformeditistoomuch”nottoolittle(sincethesh:lrcholderswouldbewillingtopaydirectlytohavethe“optimal”monitoringperformed),andWCdon’tseemtoobservesuchp:tymcntsOurpreviousanalysisofagencycostssuggestsatlcnstoneothertectnblchypothesis:ic,thatinthoseindustrieswhcrctheinccntivccfYcctsofoutsitlcequityordebtarcwidelydifircnt,vcwouldexpecttoSWspecializationintheuseofthelowagencycostlinuncingnrrnngcnicntInindustrieswhcrcitisrclativclyeasyformanagerstolowerthemeanvnlucoftheoutcomesofthecntcrpriscbyoutrighttheft,specialtrcatmcntoffrlvorcdcustomers,caseofconsumptionofIcisurconthejobetc(forcxamplc,thebarandrcstiurnntindustry)wcwouldcxpccttoseetheownershipstructtrrcoffirmschnractcricdbyrelativelylittlcoutsideequity(ie,percentownershipoftheequitybythemanager)withalmostalloutsidecapitalobtainthroughtheuseofdchtThetheorypredictstheoppositewouldbctruewhcrctheincentiveelrcctsofdebtarelargerclstivctotheinccntivceffectsofequityFirmslikeconglomcrnlcs,inwhichitwouldbecnsytoshiftoutcomedistributionsadvcrsclyforbondholders(bychangingtheacquisitionordivestiturepolicy)shouldbecharactcrizcdbyrclativclylouverutilizationofdebtConverselyinindustriesihcrcthefreedomofmanagementtotakeriskierprojectsisseverelyconstrnincd(forexample,regulatedindustriessuchaspublicutilities)WCshouldt’indmoreintensiveuseofdebtfinancingTheanalysissuggeststhatinadditiontothefairlywelluntlcrstoodroleofuncertaintyinthedeterminationofthequalityofcollateralthcrcisatlcastoneotherclementofgreatimportancetheabilityoftheownerofthecollntcralto“Ignoringanypureconsumptionclcmcnt~inrhcdemandforsecurityanalysis‘*AgainignoringthevaiucofthepureconsumptionclemcntsillthedemandforsccurifyanalysisMCJensenandWHMeckling,AgencycostsandthetheoryofthefirmchangethedistributionofoutcomesbyshiftingeitherthemeanoutcomeorthevarianceoftheoutcomesAstudyofbanklendingpoliciesshouldrevealthesetobeimportantaspectsofthecontractualpracticesobservedthereApplicationofIheanalysistothelargediffuseowtcrskipcorporarionWhilewebelievethestructureoutlinedintheproceedingpagesisapplicabletoawiderangeofcorporationsitisstillinanincompletestateOneofthemostseriouslimitationoftheanalysisisthatasitstandswehavenotworkedoutinthispaperitsapplicationtotheverylargemoderncorporationwhosemanagersownlittleornoequityWebelieveourapproachcanbeappliedtothiscasebutspacelimitationsprecludesdiscussionoftheseissueshereTheyremaintobeworkedoutindetailandwillbeincludedinafuturepaperTlrcnrppl~*siofriteincottlplcfemarketsqlresfionTheanalysisofthispaperisalsorelevanttotheincompletemarketissueconsideredbyArrow(),Diamond(),Hakansson(a,b),Rubinstein()Ross()andothersTheproblemsaddrcsscdinthisliteraturederivefromthefactthatwhenevertheavailablesetoffinancialclaimsonoutcomesinamarketinitstospantheunderlyingstntcspaceseeArrow()andDcbreu())theresultingallocationisParetoincllicicntAdisturbingclementinthislitcraturcsurroundsthefactthattheinefficiencyconclusionisgcncrallydrawnwithoutexplicitattentionintheanalysistothecostsofcreatingnewclaimsorofmaintainingtheexpandedsetofmarketscalledfortobringaboutthewclfarcimprovcmcntThedemonstrationofapossiblewclFarcimprovementfromtheexpansionofthesetofclaimsbytheintroductionofnewbasiccontingentclaimsoroptionscanbcthoughtofasananalysisofthedemandconditionsfornewmarketsViewedfromthisperspective,whatismissingintheliteratureonthisproblemistheformulationofapositiveanalysisofthesupplyofmarkets(orthesupplyofcontingentclaims)Thatis,whatisitinthemaximizingbehaviorofindividualsintheeconomythatcausesthemtocreateandsellcontingentclaimsofvarioussorts’TheanalysisinthispapercanbeviewedasasmallfirststepinthedirectionofformulatingananalysisofthesupplyofmarketsissuewhichisfoundedintheselfinterestedmaximizingbehaviorofindividualsWehaveshownwhyitisintheinterestofawealthmaximizingentrepreneurtocreateandsellclaimssuchasdebtandequityFurthermore,asWChaveindicatedabove,itappearsthatextensionsoftheseargumentswillleadtoatheoryofthesupplyofwarrants,convertiblebondsandconvertiblepreferredstockWCarcnotsuggestingthatthespecificanalysisofferedaboveislikelytobesufficienttoleadtoatheoryofthesupplyofthewiderangeofcontracts(bothexistingandmerelypotential)inMCJensenandWHMeckling,AgencycostsandthetheoryoffhefirmtheworldatlargeHowever,wedobelievethatframingthequestionofthecompletenessofmarketsintermsofthejoiningofboththedemandandsupplyconditionswillbeveryfruitfulinsteadofimplicitlyassumingthatnewclaimsspringforthfromsome(costless)wellheadofcreativityunaidedorunsupportedbyhumaneffortConclusionsThepubliclyheldbusinesscorporationisanavvesomesocialinventionMillionsofindividualsvoluntarilyentrustbillionsofdollars,francs,pesos,etc,ofpersonalwealthtothecareofmanagersonthebasisofacomplexsetofcontractingrelationshipswhichdelineatetherightsofthepartiesinvolvedThegrowthintheuseofthecorporateformaswellasthegrowthinmarketvalueofestablishedcorporationssuggeststhatatleastuptothepresent,creditorsandinvestorshavebyandlargenotbeendisappointedwiththeresults,despitetheagencycostsinherentinthecorporateformAgencycostsarcasrealasanyothercostsTheIcvclofagencycostsdependsamongotherthingsonstatutoryandcommonlawandhumaningenuityindevisingcontractsBoththelawandthesophisticationofcontractsrelevanttothemoderncorporationaretheproductsofahistoricalprocessinwhichtherekvcrcstronginccntivcsforindividualstominimizeagencycostsMorcovcr,thcrcwerealtcrnativcorganizationalformsavailable,andopportunitiestoinventnewonesWhatcvcritsshortcomings,thecorporationhitsthusfarsurvivedthemarkettestagninstpotentialaltcrnativcsRcfcrenccsAlchinnAA,Thebncisofsomercccntndvnnccsinthe~hcoryofmnnagcmcntofthelirmJournrlofIntluslridLGnomicsNovAlchian,AA,Corporamanagcmcntandpropertyrightsin:Economicpolicyandtheregulationofsccuritics(AmericanEntcrpriycInstituteWashington,DC)Alchian,AA,SomeimplicationsofrecognitionofpropertyrighttransactionscosfsunpublishedpaperprcscnlcdattheFirstlnterlakcnConfcrcncconAnalysisandIdeology,JuneAlchianAAandWRAllen,,ExchangeantIproduction:TheoryinUSC(Wadsworth,Belmont,CA)AlchianAAandIIDcmsctz,Productioninformationcosts,andeconomicorganirnionAmericanEconomicRcvicwLXII,no,AlchianAAandRAKcsscl,,Competition,monopolyandthepursuitofpccuni:lrygainin:Aspectsoflaboreconomics(NationalBureauofEconomicRcscarch,I’rincclonNJ)Arrow,KJ!ControlinlargeorganizationsManagcmcntScicnccIOArrow,KJTheroleofsccuriricsintheoptimalallocationofriskbaringRcvicwofEconomicstudiesI,noAtkinsonTR,Trcndrincorporatebondqualityin:Srudie~incorporalcbondfinance(NationalRurcnuofEconomicRcscarchNewYork)DaumolL’JBusinessbehaviorvalueandgrowth(Macmillan,NewYork)BeckerG,Theeconomicsofdiscrimination(UniversityofChicagoPress,Chicago,IL)MCJensenandWHMeckling,AgenbycostsandthetheoryofthejimBecker,GSandGJStiglerLawenforcementcorruptionandcompensationofenforcers,unpublishedpaperpresentedattheConferenceonCapitalismandFreedomOctBenston,G,Theimpactofmaturityregulationonhighinterestratelendersandborrowers,JournalofFinancialEconomics,noBerhold,M,Atheoryoflinearprofitsharingincentives,QuarterlyJournalofEconomicsLXXXVAug,Berle,AAJrandGCMeans,Themoderncorporationandprivateproperty(Macmillan,NewYork)BlackFandMScholcsThepricingofoptionsandcorporateliabilities,JournalofPoliticalEconomy,no,tBlack,F,MHMillerandRAPosner,,Anapproachtotheregulationofbankholdingcompanies,unpublishedmanuscript(UniversityofChicago,Chicago,IL)BranchBCorporateobjectivesandmarketperformance,FinancialManagementSummerCeaseRH,Thenatureofthefirm,EconomicaNewSeries,IV,Reprintedin:Readingsinpricetheory(Irwin,Homewood,IL)CoaxRHTheFederalCommunicationsCommission,JournalofLawandEconomitsII,Oct,IJOCoaqeRHTheproblemofsocialcostJournalofLawandEconomicsIIIOctlConseRHIhlDixussiunAmericanEconomicReviewLIVnoCyert,RMandCLlcdricL,Theoryofthefirm:PactprcscntandfutureAnintorpretationJournalofFconomicLiternturcXJuneRllCyertRMandJGhlarch,Abehavioraltheoryofthefirm(Prenticetlall,EnglcwoodClilhNJ)DCAlcssiLPrivntcpropertyanddispersionofownershipinlargecorporations,JourrxllofFinanceSept,Dchrcu,GTheoryofvnluc(W~lcy,NewYork)Dcmscfr,Il,,TowardatheoryofpropertyrightsAmericanEconomicRcvicwLVIIhiayDcnicllII,IInforrnnlioniindcficicncy:AnotherviewpointJournalofLawandI:conomicXIIAprilI)mondPA,‘~roleofastockmarketinagcncralcquillbriummodelwithtcchnoIogicilunccrI~~~ltyAmcrlclrrlicononiicRcvicwLVIIScplL:vI~JIandSII,rchcrlOOR,l)ivcrilicationandthereductionofdicpcrsion:Anempiricll:InIIyixJc>urn~lofI~~nanccI)ccI:ama:Oal:llicicntcapitilmarkets:Arcvicwoftheoryandempiricalwork,JournalofI~IIIIIlccxxvI,,)KimaII:,ObMultipcriodcon~umpliorlinvc~tllieitcions,AmericanEconomicRcvicwXMarchI:lm~L<I:,Ordin:ilandmcasurablcutility,in:MCJcnscn,cd,Studinthetheoryofcapitalmarkets(I’racgcrNewYork)I‘anxlEI’amIhl~llllcr,Thetheoryoflinnncc(IloltRinchartandWinston,NewYork)lzricdnxm,bl,TheosillrcxponribilityofhusinczsistoincreaseitprofitsNewYorkTimesM:igLincIScpt,tiI:urubotnECantISPclovichPropxtyrightsandeconomictheory:AsurveyofrcccntlitcraturcJournalofEconomiciitcratureXDecllbGalai)andRWMacul~sTheoptionnricinamodelandtheriskfactorofstockJournalofI:lnancillI:conomicsnoiII~ikanssonNHJnThesuperfund:Eficientpathstowardacompletefinancialmarket,unpublilhedmanuscriptIlnkansxm,NH~Orringmarketsandthecapitalstrucfurc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