哲学笔记海德格尔 研究存在与时间的术语表 打印版

Glossary of Terms in Being and Time By Roderick Munday Introductory notes This glossary is taken from my 'Explication and Commentary' of Heidegger's Being and Time. It was first published online in February 2006 and was substantially updated in September 2006. It is, however, a work in progress, so please do not expect a definitive list of terms (yet). The citations contained in this glossary refer to the relevant passages in the aforementioned 'Explication and Commentary' and also to the page references found in the 1962 English translation of Being and Time. The full citation of this work is: Heidegger, Martin (2000), Being and Time, John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (trans), London: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. The glossary is primarily aimed at persons reading Being and Time in English and consequently German terms are, for the most part, omitted. The primary exception to this is the term "Dasein", which is familiar enough to English readers. Needless to say, I apologise to any German readers - as well as to Heidegger purists reading this! For those seeking translations of the many of the Greek words and phrases in Being and Time, there is already and excellent online resource dedicated to this at Pete's Ereignis site: - A - Apophantic A term coined by Aristotle to designate a certain kind of judgement, which, he claimed, could ascertain what is false and what is true about phenomena. However, an apophantic judgement does not arrive at its verdict by comparing true entities with false ones, but by examining and evaluating the entities in themselves. This is why Heidegger was so keen on the method for his phenomenology [ref. ¶ 7, page 56]. Heidegger argues that the comparative methods of judging actually obscures the truth, because it is a placing of something in front of something else. Therefore in order to discover the truth, one must apprehending the being of an entity in and for itself. Apophantic judgements are made either by attributing a predicate to a subject (insofar as it pertains to the subject as a property of it); or conversely denying a predicate to a subject (insofar as it does not pertain to it), However in both cases the subject and predicates belong to the entity itself and not to something else. Thus, from this ontological basis Aristotle claimed that apophantic judgements could establish the "pure forms" of all possible true (and false) predications and Heidegger claimed by using them he could avoid basing his philosophy on the comparative method of judgment (so that his would not be a mere philosophy of appearances) [ref. ¶ 7, Page 52 - 53]. (This explanation of apophantic was adapted from www.marcuse.org). Appearance and Announcing Appearance describes a relationship between phenomena, which is always based on a referral of some kind or other, therefore it is contrary to phenomena that show themselves in their genuine Being. The 'phenomenon' of appearance also shows itself, but its Being is always a reference masking some other kind of Being. [ref. ¶ 7, page 54] Appearance (as the appearance of something) does not mean something that shows itself, but rather something that announces itself. Announcing can be defined as a 'showing itself by not showing itself,' for example an illness announces itself in its symptoms, which are, so to speak, its calling card. So, in a sense, appearance is a not showing itself (Heidegger uses the term "not" here with the caveat that it is not to be understood as meaning a negation, but as indicating the presence of something unseen). Anything that never shows itself is also something that can never seem. This is why appearance is different from showing or seeming. All indications, presentations, symptoms and symbols have this basic formal structure of appearing. Appearance has four distinct meanings. 1. Appearance = something which announces itself without showing itself, i.e. the disease announcing itself through its symptoms. 2. Appearance = something that signifies showing itself, and therefore implies the appearance of phenomena, i.e., a phantom trace on a radar screen that is mistaken for a plane. 3. Appearance = the term used incorrectly to describing the genuine 'showing-itself' of a phenomenon. 4. Appearance = something which is the positive emissary of that which does not appear in any manifest form, i.e., a thing which indicates the existence of that which does not appear and never will appear. For instance, causal changes due to the passage of time announces itself in the greying of someone's hair, or the changes in a landscape, or the decaying of fruit, left in a bowl. All these instances appear to point to the existence of a thing called time, which otherwise does not exist as a phenomenon which can be seen in itself. The point to be made here is that if one defines phenomenon with the aid of a conception of appearance which does not differentiate between these multiple meaning, then confusion is bound to reign! [ref. ¶ 7, Page 52 - 53] Assignment (See equipment) Authenticity and Inauthenticity Authentic Being is its own measure, in other words when it does not have to justify it's existence as compared with anything else. Authenticity and inauthenticity are what gives Dasein its definite character. Dasein is either Authentic, which, in the sense of my Being, means that I can chose and win myself, or conversely lose and never win myself [ref.¶ 9, Page 68], or Dasein is Inauthentic, which means fleeing in the face of my Being and forgetting that I can chose and win myself [ref.¶ 9, Page 69-70]. Authenticity and inauthenticity do not derive their meaning or value by comparison with anything else, in this sense that they simply are what they are. This means that we cannot speak of them as being determined by any prior considerations or influences, but rather we should think of them as determining these things, since authenticity and inauthenticity are the grounds on which a particular Dasein determines its own possibilies. [ref. ¶12, page 78] When a particular Dasein talks about its Being, it is in each case "my Being". And because the essence of Dasein lies in its 'to be' it is also 'my to be'. Thus, we talk about Dasein's Being in terms of possibility rather than actuality. But of course describing something in terms of all of the potential ways that it can be, is far more complex than describing it in terms of what it "is". [ref. ¶ 9, Page 67]. The decision as to which way the Being of Dasein is 'my to be,' is something that a particular Dasein will have decided beforehand, based on the constraints imposed upon it by experience (see historicality). The entity Dasein, who's Being is an issue for it, comports itself towards its Being as its ownmost possibility. In each case Dasein is its possibility and for that reason it can chose itself and win itself, or conversely lose itself and never win itself, or perhaps only seem to do so. But this choosing and loosing is defined only in the sense that it can be essentially viewed by Dasein as Being authentic - that is as something which has a reality value that is not relative to or measured by comparisons with anything else. Authenticity stands alone: it is the way things are. [ref. ¶ 9, Page 68] An authentic Being is its own measure, because it does not have to justify it's existence by comparing it with anything else (indeed, how would it be possible for people step outside of their own lives to do this?) Dasein exists, either in the mode of authenticity, or inauthenticity. In fact, in saying this Heidegger is claiming that Dasein cannot properly be described as existing in any other state, although he does concedes that Dasein can be said to be modally undifferentiated. However in considering this last remark, I want to point out that this 'undifferentiated Dasein' cannot be said to constitute a description of any positive characteristics, since undifferentiated Dasein would not possess any characteristics at all. The key word in Heidegger's above statement is describe. You cannot describe Dasein itself since Dasein is not a thing that can be pointed at or talked about in the way we can talk about entities which are not Dasein [ref. ¶ 9, page 67]. In order to talk about being at all we have to talk about structures of Being. For example you cannot talk about the Being of a particular Dasein because it is the sum total of all its possibilities, but you can say of Dasein, generally speaking, that it is the sum total of its possibilities and potentials (whatever they may be). This statement is structural because it describes the structures in which Dasein inhabits. This then is what we are looking at when we are analysing Being. The structural map to the territory that is Being. By looking at the map, we can point to certain characteristics that stand out, of which authenticity and inauthenticity are the primary ones. Authenticity and inauthenticity of Dasein must be seen and understood in Heidegger's analysis as being a priori (that is as coming before) Dasein's understanding of itself and thus of its understanding of its own existence. However, although not determined by anything prior, authenticity and inauthenticity are themselves grounded upon a state of Heidegger calls Being-in-the-world. [ref. ¶ 12, page 78] (see also inauthenticity) Average Everydayness In this history of philosophy, one gets the strong impression that thoughts about existence have always emerged in the rarefied atmosphere of solitary contemplation. As Heidegger quite rightly points out, this attitude is not typical of the way people live their everyday lives. Much of our existence is not spend in reflexive contemplation of our Being-in-the-world, but rather we are immersed in the task of just getting on with our lives. This then is Dasein's mode of average everydayness. However Heidegger considers this ordinary mode of Being, despite being the most unconsidered, to be also the most important. He argues that Dasein is, of course, close to us, (concern about our Being is effectively the same thing as having an "us" inside out head that speaks to us) in this sense, our Being and ourselves are the same thing. But but this also creates a paradox, since Dasein is simultaneously also the thing which is furthest away from us. The fact that Dasein is onto-ontologically prior (to its own thoughts about itself), means that Dasein's own structure of Being is effectively concealed; hidden from view. But, when we speak of it in terms of a pre-ontological understanding, Dasein is hardly a stranger to us. [ref. ¶ 5, page 36 - 37]. This pre-ontological understanding is Dasein's average everydayness. Thus Heidegger argues that average everydayness should not be neglected in a philosophical analysis and Heidegger tasks himself discovering various methods whereby we can gain access to this kind of understanding. Here's what he has to say about average everydayness. Average everydayness, that undifferentiated character of Dasein, is not nothing, but is actually a positive phenomenological characteristic of this entity, that is its averageness: "Out of this kind of Being--and back into it again--is all existing, such as it is." The averageness of Dasein makes up what is ontically proximal for this entity. No doubt the reason that the averageness of Dasein has been passed over again and again in philosophical explications of the human condition is because it is so unremarkable. But this almost tautologically sounding statement in fact underscores the truth in Heidegger's maxim, "what is closest to us ontologically is at the same time the furthest away" [ref. ¶ 5, page 36]. In order to understand that which, phenomenologically speaking, is the closest thing of all, it has to be articulated in a way that means 'the closest thing' is not overlooked, but seen rather in its positive characterisation. [ref. ¶ 9, Page 69] Dasein's average everydayness is therefore not to be taken as an aspect of it. Dasein comports itself towards its Being in the mode of average everydayness, and the understanding of this is felt by Dasein even before it can even be articulated in thought. Average everydayness' does not carry the usual hazy indefinite connotations that these words have in ordinary speech. In the explication of Dasein anything that is understood ontically can be thought of as existing in an average way and this mode may be grasped in patterns of existence. These are Patterns which Heidegger terms 'pregnant structures', which may be indistinguishable from an authentic Being of Dasein, in other words Dasein choosing and winning itself by comporting itself towards its Being as its ownmost possibility. [ref. ¶ 9, Page 69-70] A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z - B - Being Since the whole of Being and Time is an attempt to answer the question, "What is Being?", it would be a little presumptions of me to attempt a summary here. However, there are three preliminary remarks that can be extracted from the ontological tradition in philosophy, that will help us initially to clarify the question: 1/ "Being is not a genus". It has been maintained that Being is the most universal of concepts, thus an understanding of Being is presupposed in our conceiving of anything as an entity. Being transcends any categorical distinction we care to make in our apprehension of the world. It does this by existing above and beyond any notion of a category that we can form in our understanding. 2/ Being is indefinable. The term entity cannot be applied to Being because it cannot be defined using traditional logic, (i.e. a technique for understanding which derives its terms either from higher general concepts, or by recourse to ones of lower generality). In other words, because Being is neither a thing nor a genus it follows that it cannot be defined according to logic, whose job is to set out the rules that govern the categorisation of phenomena and concepts. 3/ Being is self-evident Whenever one thinks about anything, or makes an assertion, or even asks a question; some use is made of Being. But the intelligibility of Being, in this sense, is only an average sort of intelligibility (common sense understanding). This average intelligibility is also indicative of its scholarly unintelligibility, i.e., the way that the question: "what is Being?", is often ignored in philosophical investigations. [ref. ¶ 1, page 22 - 23] Subsequently Heidegger elaborated a more considered conceptualising of Being into five characteristics: 1/ Dasein is a Being who understands that it exists, and what is more the Being of Dasein is, in part, shaped by that understanding. 2/ The above statement can be seen to serves as a working definition of the formal conception of existence, 3/ Dasein exists and moreover Dasein and existence are one. For example if Dasein is 'the human Being' and existence is 'the world,' then Dasein and the world are one. The consequence of this is that Dasein and existence cannot be separated - even analytically separated. 4/ Dasein is also an entity which I myself am. In other words each one of us (as human Beings) defines existence in terms of our own existence, a concept that Heidegger terms Mineness. Therefore the only way that Being can be understood is as My Being.' This applies even when Being and Dasein are considered in general. 5/ Mineness belongs to any existent Dasein, in the sense that how I regard 'my Being', creates the conditions that make authenticity and inauthenticity possible. [ref. ¶ 12, page 78] Being alongside As an existentiale, Being-alongside-the-world does not mean the same thing as the-Being-present-at-hand-together-of-things-that-occur. "There is no such thing as the side-by-sideness of an entity called 'Dasein' with another entity called 'World,' for that would imply that they were separate 'things'". Of course when speaking ontically about two things, a kind of side-by-sidedness applies; we can say for instance that "the table touches the door" or "The chair touches the wall" because the two things in those examples can be present-at-hand together alongside one another . Although the word 'touch' is problematic in these instances for two reasons" 1/ in actuality, two separate things cannot 'touch' at all, because there is always going to be a minute space between them, even if that space is perceived of as nothing. 2/ Because the usage of the word 'touch' is an anthropomorphisation. In the sense that when talking about entities, tough used as a metaphor to connotes a human closeness. In other worlds the very sense that belongs only to an entity like Dasein. See also worldless [ref. ¶ 12 page 81] Being in From the perspective of our common sense understanding, "Being-in" is a term we usually associate with our involvement in a situation or a context. Thus, "Being in" is not thought about solely in isolation, but in terms of "Being in something or other". For example we can say that: the water is in the glass, However, in terms of inness the description cannot be terminated with that proposition for is not the glass also in the kitchen, which is in the house, which is in the village, which is in the county and so on until we realise that, in terms of inness, the glass (and everything else described) are actually located in worldspace. Thus, the inness of "Being-in-the-world" or to put it more precisely, this inness can be defined as, "the-Being-present-at-hand-as-things-within-the-world". This present-at-hand type of 'Being-in' can be further isolated into "Being-present-at-hand-along-with". This sense here is that the Being-present-at-hand describes a definite relationship of location, where something exists with something else; both having the same kind of Being. This sense of 'Being-in' thus can be used as a way to describe patterns of existence and is therefore an example of a characteristic in our way of looking at things categorically [ref. ¶ 12, page 79] Being-in does not suggest a spatial relationship of the "in-one-anotherness" of things present at hand, anymore than Heidegger's use of the word primordially signifies a spatial relationship. [ref.¶ 12, page 80]. As Heidegger later points out the spatial quality of an entity can only be clarified in terms of it Being part of the structure of worldhood, not as its apriori spatial condition. This conception is contrary to Kant's famous transcendental phenomenology which regards space and time as the a priori conditions that make the perception of reality possible. Heidegger contends that we will not be able to discover the world if we take spatiality as its grounding apriori condition [ref. ¶ 14, page 93]. Being-in-the-world Being-in-the-world is the grounding state of Being. It is the fundamental ground upon which every other determination of Being rests. Being-in-the-world is a state of Dasein which therefore is necessarily a priori, although it should nevertheless be understood that Being-in-the-world is not by itself a sufficient determinate of Dasein's Being for the reason that Dasein's Being can only be truly understood in the future sense of the my to be. Being-in-the-world therefore describes the formal understanding of the ground on which Dasein's Being stands. It can only elaborate the broad principles upon which any actual Dasein operates, rather than describing the Being of any particular Dasein with precision. Being-in-the-world is a compound expression, but it names a unitary phenomenon. It underscores the fact that in Heidegger's philosophy 'Being' (the Being of Dasein) and 'the world' are not separate entities but must be grasped together. In this sense, there is no subject and object, nor is there any division between internal and external. However, structurally speaking, this does not prevent us from talking about 'Being' and 'the world' separately, since the structure of Being-in-the-world consists of items which actually may be looked at in three distinct ways: 1/ in terms of the world or Worldhood. 2/ In terms of Who - the entity which in every case has Being-in-the-world as the way in which it exists is a "who." 3/ In terms of Being-in = This conception looks at the ontological constitution of the "Inhood" of Being-in. [ref. ¶ 12, page 78 - 79] Being (The formal understanding of) The answer to the question "What is Being?" in a formal (general) sense is obtained by noticing the connotations of inness as a dwelling place found in both the word In (inn) and the first person conjugation of the very "to be" -"I am." In German this is "ich bin," where "bin" is associated with 'bei', [act], so "ich bin" means "I reside," or "I dwell alongside". Thus, in terms of Heidegger's ontology "am" also means "dwell alongside," or "I reside," when expressed as an existentiale. In the context of 'Being-in,' the way that this 'alongside' is meant is in the sense of, "I reside alongside the world." The "world" here connotes both 'familiarity with' and concern for' the things that I reside alongside with. The "I" in these significations has the characteristic of "I myself am". Thus "Being-in" stands for those things which are familiar to me. "Being", as the infinitive of "I am", signifies "to reside alongside." The fact that the answer to a general "What is Being?" question is that Being is "I reside alongside", perhaps strikes us as rather strange since I reside alongside seems like a very particular expression, and the temptation is to cut the "I" completely out of the formulation and talk in terms of Being as a general residing alongsideness. However in Heidegger's formulation of Being the "I" represents the wholeness of Being and therefore 'I' is a general term. This is a paradox of Heidegger's philosophy (in the literally sense of the Greek word paradox as meaning against orthodoxy). The paradox is that the pronoun "I" is not to be thought of as designating a singular or particular entity. This is because everything is grounded on the wholeness of Being and general, and therefore general ontological structures are described in the seemingly particular terms of mineness. In order to grasp this we must set aside all associations between the "I" of minenss and the "I" of Cartesian subjectivity, and indeed the "I" of the first person singular also. In Heidegger phenomenological conception, the infinitive of "I am" signifies "to reside alongside" and in this sense Heidegger conceives of Being as that which we are familiar with. Therefore, the formal expression for the Being of Dasein can be expressed as I reside alongside myself or I myself am. This formal understanding has Being-in-the-world as its essential state. Although we must, again, remind ourselves that looking at the structure of Being is not the same thing as looking at Being itself. Here the distinction implied by "the map is not the territory" very much applies! [ref. ¶ 12, page 80] A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z - C - Care Care is synonymous with Dasein because Being-in-the-world belongs essentially to Dasein. In actual fact, this is what is meant by the meaning of Being conceived of as "I reside alongside"--see Being (the formal understanding of). Dasein's Being is always looking out towards the world is therefore is essentially manifested in care and concern. And also the ontological conception of Being-in as the "alongsidedness of things," suggests both their close proximity to Dasein, and also their intimate intertwining with Dasein. In making the Being of Dasein visible as care, care itself must be taken as an ontological structural concept. In this sense, care has nothing to do with its everyday significations of "trials and tribulations", or "being bound up in the 'cares of life'." Although, it is true that ontically we can come across these aspects of care in every Dasein. And, like the opposite state of 'gaiety'-- which in its true signification means 'a freedom from care'--they are only possible because Dasein is synonymous with care when understood ontologically. [ref. ¶ 12, page 84] Category Entities present-at-hand within the world are understood ontically and their characteristics can be arranged into categories. Dasein on the other hand is understood ontologically and its characteristics are arranged into existentiale. The difference between existentiale and category is both in the way they are used (existentiale applies only to Dasein, category applies to entities within the world) but in the different paradigmatic assumptions (the differences between an ontical and ontological understanding) that underpin them. In traditional philosophy, categories are defined as tools for analysis. For example, in Aristotle's Organon, categories enumerated all the possible kinds of thing which can be the subject or the predicate of a proposition. The classical Aristotelian view that claims that categories are discrete entities characterized by a set of properties which are shared by their members. These are assumed to establish the conditions which are both necessary and sufficient to capture meaning. Therefore the tradition of categorisation instigated by Aristotle, ideally illuminates a relationship between the subjects and objects of knowledge (source - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Categorization). The use of categories is predicated on the assumption that reality can be studied by slicing it into parts and grouping those parts into sets, based on some perceived similarity between the parts. In the traditional philosophical paradigm, this slicing is not seem in terms of doing violence to the 'wholeness of reality', for the wholeness of reality is considered to be a mystery that needs to be taken apart and analysed in order to be understood. In addition, one also has to bear in mind that the violence of cutting up objects for study in this way in no way effects the person who is studying them. Since this person, as a subject, is detached from the objects of study and emotionally indifferent to them. However in Heidegger's ontological paradigm, such distinctions collapse and therefore the assumptions upon which are based also collapse. HEIDEGGER'S DEFINITION Heidegger argues, when we encounter entities in the world, we already address ourselves to the question of their Being. This is meant in the sense of when a child points at something and asking "what's that?" the gesture and the question already implies that she is aware that there is a 'Being' there in need of a name. Moreover, the "what's that" question also points to the fact that there is 'something' which is already distinguishable from the manifold of the world, in other words which stands out from the rest in terms of its Being. According to Heidegger, the action of addressing oneself to an entity's Being is what the ancients understood by the term 'category'. Their use of category signifies making a public accusation, in the sense of asking someone to account for their actions in front of witnesses. When used ontologically, the term category has a similar meaning - a kind of putting things on trial, but in this case what is made to account for itself is the Being of entity itself. In other words, the particular kind of language we use to determine a category lets everyone else see the object in terms of its Being. When we use Language in this way it allows us to uncover the "what's that?" of an object's Being that exists before it is named. The Categories are therefore what are 'sighted' in words (the logos), which implies the articulation of an explicit description of the Being of a given entity, rather than the covering over of that Being of that entity with a name. [ref. ¶ 9, page 70] Concern The ontical meaning of concern comes in three colloquial significations: 1/ 'to carry something out,' or 'to get it done.' 2/ 'to provide oneself with something' and 3/ 'to be concerned about the success of the undertaking'. In contrast to these ontical significations, the ontological expression 'concern' designates - the Being of a possible way of Being-in-the-world. Thus concern is an existentiale and the term has been chosen because it allows us to make visible the Being of Dasein as care. Dasein's facticity is such that its Being-in-the-world has always dispersed itself into definite ways. A primary characteristic of Dasein is that it is a Being concerned with its own existence. [ref. ¶ 12, page 84] Covering up Covering up is the counter-concept to phenomenology. There are many senses in which a phenomenon can be covered up. 1/ Hiddenness In the sense that a phenomenon has not been discovered (in which case it is neither known nor unknown). 2/ Burying In the sense that a phenomenon can be buried over, i.e., it has been discovered once, but has now lapsed back into obscurity. However, in this case, the burial is hardly ever total. Something may still be visible if only as a semblance (but nevertheless it is a semblance of the entity's Being). 3/ Disguise In the sense that a phenomenon can be disguised as something else, with the attendant possibilities of lies and deception which makes the discovery of the true being of that phenomenon especially difficult. Furthermore covering up, whether in terms of hiddenness, burying or disguise has two additional possibilities: i/ Covering up which is accidental ii/ Covering up which with the best of intentions gets 'lost in translation' when immediate experience is represented in language. In the latter case, the Being of the entity gets understood in an empty way because its ownmost Being gets lost. [ref. ¶ 7, page 60 - 61] A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z - D - Dasein Dasein is one of the core terms in Being and Time. It can be simply defined as entity that is conscious of the meaning of its own existence. In practical terms, this means the human being is Dasein, since, arguably, no other life-forms on the planet are conscous of thier own existence. For example, it is argued that no other animals buries their dead. Here are some passages which illustrate how Heidegger's utilises the concept of Dasein. 1. To work out the question of Being adequately, we must make an entity—the inquirer—transparent in his own Being. Thus in the very act of asking of the question, "What is Being?" this inquirery becomes Dasein's mode of Being. Dasein therefore gets its essential character from what is inquired about-—namely, Being. [ref. ¶ 2, page 27] 2. The meaning of Being, which human beings themselves possess, we call "Dasein". This means that Dasein alone has a special distinctiveness as compared with other entities. Provisionally we can say that Dasein's concern with its own Being is an issue for it. This implies that Dasein's relationship to its own being is constitutive for the definition of Being per se. [ref. ¶ 4, page 32] 3. The Fundamental ontology must be sought in the existential analytic of Dasein, because it is the source of all other ontologies. [ref. ¶ 4, page 34] This means that the human being itself is the ground upon which all other notions of the world and the existence of things stand. This implies that there is no objectivity nor subjectivity, and no cleaving of existence into interior (mental) categories and exterior (physical) categories, since the world and Dasein are only perceived and perceivable through Dasein's own awareness of its Being. 4. Dasein is, of course, close to us, in the sense that our "Being" and our notion of ourselves are the same thing. But but this is also a paradox, since Dasein is simultaneously also the thing which is farthest away. The fact that Dasein is onto-ontologically prior (to its own thoughts about itself), means that Dasein's own structure of Being is effectively concealed; hidden from view. But, when we speak of it in terms of a pre-ontological understanding, Dasein is hardly a stranger to us. [ref. ¶ 5, page 36 - 37] 5. The interpretation of Being has peculiar difficulties, which can basically be put down to the fact that we are the object of our own inquiry. When we consider ourselves as entities under examination, our behaviour changes, and thus the nature of the object we are looking at also changes. [ref. ¶ 5, page 37] Dealings Heidegger's contention is that the Being of those entities which we encounter as closest to us can be exhibited phenomenologically, if we examine how these entities are used in our everyday Being-in-the-world. If this task is undertaken, Heidegger asserts that we find our relationship to entities always manifests in terms of care and concern. Thus dealings evokes this notion of Dasein's relationship with things of value is being based on care and concern. [ref. ¶ 15, page 95] Deseverance When we speak of deseverance we do not mean remoteness (or closeness) or even a distance.' Deseverance stands for a constitutive state of Dasein's Being. A state where removing something (in sense of putting away or hiding it) is only a factical mode. De-severance, as an existentiale, means discovering remoteness as a determinate, categorical characteristic of entities whose are not Dasein and making that remoteness disappear, bringing it close. Dasein is essentially de-severant: it lets any entity be encountered close by as the entity which it is. But only to the extent that entities are revealed for Dasein in their deseveredness. Things can not be desevered from each other because things do not have Being of themselves. Things merely have a measurable distance between them, which we can come across in our desevering. This is in fact the only way that 'remotenesses' and distances become accessible with regard to other things within-the-world. [page 139] Discourse The denotative meaning of Discourse is "talk". In the ontology of ancient Greece, man's Being is defined by its potential and capacity for discourse. Talk is therefore for Heidegger the clue for discerning those structures of Being which we encounter in addressing ourselves to anything or speaking about anything. [ref. ¶ 6, page 48] In ancient Greek, Discourse means to make manifest, in the sense of revealing what one is talking about in the discourse. In this way discourse was similar to the ancient Greek definition of Logos (words/language) which also meant 'to show something', or 'to let it be seen', (Aristotle called it uncovering). Thus the Greeks defined the function of language (the logos) in terms of the 'making manifest' of discourse. In the discourse, the 'that,' which is made manifest is discourse itself. This underscores the fact that discourse is never a fiat (a fiat is an act of creation by speaking, like in Genesis, Chapter 1, verse 3, when God said "let there be light" and there was light). In reality however, the things one talks about are not actually created or called into being merely by the talk. Discourse, in this sense, is therefore 'just talk.' However, things which do not exist, (like ideas and myths) can appear to be existent when announced in discourse, for example we can talk of 'pink elephants' or 'pigs that fly'. In this sense discourse makes these things manifest and seemingly real. For example, a person who is troubled by a problem is advised to get it out into the open by talking about it - "a problem shared is a problem halved." But the reasoning behind such advice is predicated on a notion that Heidegger is trying to articulate here. Namely that discourse objectifies thoughts and presents them as things which show themselves and can therefore be dealt with for straightforwardly as we deal with other existent things in the world. [ref. ¶ 7, page 56] A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z - E - Entities The term entities is used strategically throughout Being and Time, so that Heidegger can avoid talking about "things". This is because the term "things" already presupposes an understanding of their existence, which Heidegger thinks is false and seeks to contest. As he points out, we are on dangerous ground even by addressing entities as 'Things', for in doing so we have "tacitly anticipated their ontological character". This was, in a nutshell, the mistake of Descartes and his forebears. Heidegger argues if you talk about the world in terms of things, the only "thing" you are ever going to uncover is the totally erroneous conception of the "Thinghood and Reality." [ref. ¶ 15, page 95] Environment Dasein's everyday world is what we call the environment. The word "environment" is made up of the prefix 'environ,' which designates a space. Therefore, it seems obvious that a spatial character incontestably belongs to any environment. However, Heidegger argues the word environment does not have a primarily 'spatial' meaning. In fact its spatial quality can only be clarified in terms of the structure of worldhood, not as its a priori condition [ref. ¶ 14, page 94]. The environment and nature itself (as that which is environing) is discovered in any work which is ready-to-hand: In roads, streets, bridges, buildings, our concern discovers Nature as having some definite direction. A covered railway platform takes account of bad weather; an installation for public lighting takes account of the darkness, or rather of specific changes in the presence or absence of daylight-the 'position of the sun'. In a clock, account is taken of some definite constellation in the world-system. When we look at the clock, we tacitly make use of the 'sun's position', in accordance with which the measurement of time gets regulated in the official astronomical manner. When we make use of the clock-equipment, which is proximally and inconspicuously ready-to-hand, the environing Nature is ready-to-hand along with it. [ref. ¶ 15, pages 100 - 101] (see also spatiality) Equipment (and assignment) In our everyday existence, we encounter equipment of numerous sorts for writing, sewing, working, transportation, measurement, etc. Heidegger defines equipment as, essentially, 'something in-order-to'. Structurally, this in-order-to describes what Heidegger calls an assignment, that is and process which employs 'X' (a piece of equipment) to achieve something 'Y' (a task). The term assignment' indicates that a piece of equipment is made visible in its ontological genesis, Now, you may say that a piece of equipment is always visible, "Is not a hammer something that is quite obviously there before us?" The answer is no, for the reason that a rock, or a piece of wood, or even a human fist, can serve just as well as a hammer on occasions. Therefore, jumping to the conclusion that a hammer is an object, a mere "thing," is precisely the mistake people make when they view equipment purely in material terms. Strictly speaking, we can say that there is no such 'thing' as a piece of equipment. In fact, equipment only becomes truly visible as equipment through its use, i.e. in the act of assigning from 'X' to 'Y'. [ref. ¶ 15, page 97] Equipmentality In Heidegger analysis of equipment he presumes two things: 1. That the kind of Being which equipment has must be exhibitable in some way, and 2. If we can identify this, we will be able to defining its value. These assumptions will be our first clue in defining what turns an entity into an item of equipment - in order to discover the entity's equipmentality. [ref. ¶ 15, page 97]. However, we have to understand that in our dealing with equipment, its equipmentality is not grasped thematically as a verb - we cannot understand what a hammer does merely by miming the action of hammering in mid air, for to do this would be to disregard the piece of wood, the nail, in other word, its equipment structure. Equipment Structure Any 'individual' item of equipment only shows itself in a metonymic sense of being a part of a greater system - something which Heidegger calls its equipment structure. To the Being of any equipment there already belongs a totality of equipment. For instance the equipment of hammering is not merely a hammer, but an nail, piece of wood, workbench, lighting, furniture, windows, doors, room. However, we do not usually consider this totality of equipment, eventhough the task of the particular piece of equipment under consideration could not be performed without it. Thus, we can say there is always an aspect of the equipmentaility of equipment which includes the totality of equipment needed for a particular assignment, but that this totality usually never shows itself if equipment is regarded only in its material sense as a thing. If we take an example of a less that obvious piece of equipment, a room, we can say that the room is both a piece of equipment (to paraphrase Le Corbusier - a machine for living in) and is also a collection of other equipment that comes together to constitute a room. Of course a room is not normally considered in terms of equipmentality, but rather as the space 'between four walls. Hence we easily fall into the trap of considering the room philosophically in terms of the abstract notion of space, and therefore not in terms of the more everyday notion of it as a piece of equipment. [ref. ¶ 15, page 97 - 98] (For more on this last remark, see also spatiality) Everydayness see Average Everydayness Exhibiting Exhibiting is nothing else that the Being already at hand, in other words, the being of existent things shows itself. Exhibiting is equivalent to our understanding of Being as a "taking a look beforehand" - or the understanding we take from things before we articulate that understanding back to ourselves as thoughts [ref. ¶ 7, page 25] (see average everydayness). This 'showing' of existence lies at the bottom of any procedure of addressing oneself to thoughts of an entity, or in our discussing it. Additionally, in the context of apophantic judgements, the logos in the mode of exhibiting can also become visible, in itself, as a relation to something. [ref ¶ 7, page 58]. Exhibiting is absolutely necessary for the for Heidegger's phenomenology, for to have such a science means to grasp its objects in a way so that everything about them, which is up for discussion, is both exhibited directly and demonstrated directly. [ref ¶ 7, page 59] Existentia, Existence, Essentia We will examine these individually in a moment but it is very important to understand how the meaning of these three terms is distinguished, since Heidegger's analysis of Dasein depends on it: 1. Existentia = Entities whose Being is only present-at-hand and which are understood ontically. 2. Existence = Entities whose Being is an issue for them (Dasein) and who are understood ontologically. 3. Essentia = synonymous with 'essence', a vague and potentially misleading term that Heidegger seeks to supplant with 'existentia' (when he is talking about things that are not Dasein) and 'existence' (when he is talking about Dasein). Heidegger asserts that, in so far as we can talk about Dasein's "essence," we must do so only in terms of the Being of Dasein. But this is also why Heidegger does not want to discuss Being in terms of essences, for the notion is too vague, "the Being of Dasein should be discussed only in terms of its 'Existence." [ref. ¶ 9, page 67] Existentiale (Existentalia) Existentalia (plural) are certain characteristics of Dasein that are revealed by the analysis of its existence. In Heideggerian terms, an existentiale (singular) concerns Dasein's residing alongside the world and its involvement with entities within the world which is always expresses in terms of care and concern [ref. ¶ 12, page 82]. Normally, if we were analysing anything entity other than Dasein we would use the term category. But Heidegger forbids this, because Dasein is not like any other entity (Dasein is, in fact, the ground upon which the perception and conception of everything else rests) and therefore Dasein needs to be analysed in a different way to other entities. The existence structure of Dasein must be defined existentially. Heidegger therefore wants his 'existentalia' to be sharply distinguished from the concept of 'category,' as it is ordinarily understood [ref. ¶ 9, page 70]. 'Existentalia' and 'category' are the two basic possibilities for characters of Being. The entities that correspond to them are these... 1/ Existentialia = Dasein 2/ Categories = Entities that present at hand, i.e., not Dasein It is important to realise that these two terms require different kinds of primary interrogation. In other words, any entity that is either a 'who' (existence) or a 'what' (present-at-hand) is treated differently. [ref. ¶ 9, page 71] Using the existentiale we may discern some notable patterns in the manifold impressions of Being. These patterns can be articulated into principles with which we can define (broadly) the phenomenological manifestations of the Being of Dasein. This is systematising and in this sense the existentiale is a conceptual tool which allows us to form a certain hypotheses which also have a legislative function qua Being. In other words, these hypotheses concerning the structure of Being in general can be used to make predictions. Thus, the functions of the existentiale (both systematising and legislative) are similar to the functions of the traditional category in philosophy. Where they differ however is in the philosophical assumptions one has to take on board before one applies them. [ref. ¶ 12, page 82] Existentiell "Existentiell" refers to someone's personal understanding of their own existence For an individual Dasein, the question of existence never gets clarified except through existing. The understanding of oneself that we acquire along the way Heidegger calls "Existentiell". [ref. ¶ 4, page 33] Extential "Extential" refers to a more general understanding of existence. The question of existence is close to Dasein, but this does not mean that Dasein is necessarily conscious of the question of existence. But the structuring of the question "What is Being?" points the way for the formal analysis of what constitutes existence. The context of such structuring we call "Existentality". But its analytic has the character of an understanding which is not extentiell, i.e. structure plus content. But extential: structure minus content. [ref. ¶ 4, page 33] Existentiality The word existentiality is derived from existential, i.e., the formal understanding of Being in general . By "existentiality" we understand the state of Being that is constitutive for those entities that exist. But the idea of such a constitutive state of Being already includes Being as its core component. And this is the reason why we are prevented in working out the general answer to the question, "What is Being?" before the question itself has been answered. [ref. ¶ 4, page 33] A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z - F - Factically A Heideggerian term for which we can usually substitute "in fact" [ref. ¶ 2, page 27], but which also references the concept of facticity Facticity An understanding of specific structures in advance comes from Dasein understanding of its ownmost Being, in the sense of regarding that as a certain 'factual Being-present-at-hand.' In other words Dasein understands its existence as a fact. And yet this kind of fact has quite a different ontology from the factual occurrence of some thing - for instance like the existence of a type of a mineral in the ground. Things present-at-hand exist in worldspace but nevertheless are worldless, thus we can talk about them ontically and arrange them into categories. However whenever Dasein "is", the isness of Dasein is also a Fact; and the factuality of that Fact is what Heidegger terms Dasein's facticity . (Apologies for the all the double-barrelled concepts in that last sentence. All their presence means is that there is a reflexive (self conscious) aspect to discussing one's Being. Thus, to be conscious of one's own existence implies that one is conscious of that consciousness, if you see what I mean) Facticity is a term which stands for a definite way of Being, and it has a complicated structure which cannot even be grasped by people who have a naive ontological understanding. The concept of "facticity" implies that an entity 'within-the world' has Being-in-the-world so that it can understand itself and its Being-in. That is it understands itself, as if it is bound up in its 'destiny' with the Being of those entities which it encounters within the world. The facticity of facts like the Beingness of being underscores the point that there is a reflexive component to existence as I have already mentioned. This is something which points to the existence of an interpreter, "myself," who is bound up in the apprehending of the world and the self. In traditional philosophy the adoption of the paradigm of objectivism makes us miss the fact that the interpreter (subject) and interpreted (object) are bound up together in their Being. Moreover, the traditional 'objective' paradigm denigrates the role of the interpreter, because its perceptions of the world are described as being "merely subjective". In Heidegger's ontological paradigm, however, the subject does not exist and therefore there cannot be any subjectivity either. Although this is not to say Dasein is not prone to error in perceiving the world, for that would deny the ability of the world to surprise Dasein. Rather, what Heidegger's is saying, is that there can be no facts that exist independent of people perceiving them as such. [ref. ¶ 12, page 82] A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z - G - Grasping Grasping is the simple awareness that something present-at-hand has the temporal structure of a pure 'making present' of something. In the grasping, those entities which show themselves to be present-at-hand are therefore understood as entities in the most authentic sense. Presence then is literally an interpretation of something with regard to the present (immediacy of perception). [ref. ¶ 6, page 48] A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z - H - Hermeneutics Hermeneutics = the science of interpretation Heidegger asserts that a phenomena can be grasped in and for themselves in immediate perception. The function of language (logos) is to reveal what phenomena show. However language has a different Being from the phenomena it describes, so the danger is that language will only a 'appear' to tell us what the phenomena is. In other words, the inherent danger of describing phenomena in language is that the Being of language (because it is different from the Being of phenomena) can effectively a cover up the being of phenomena. Therefore, in order to sort out the covering up of language from the truth of language, we need a method of interrogating language which is both systematic and reflexive enough to hopefully alert us to any potential covering ups. This method is what Heidegger calls, "hermeneutics," or the business of interpretation. As Heidegger asserts - our investigation will show that the meaning of phenomenological description, as a method, lies in interpretation. It is therefore through hermeneutics, as a systematising approach to interpreting, that the authentic meaning of Being can be articulated. Language, in the form of words (logos), when it represents the phenomenology of Dasein, always has the character of hermeneutics. [ref. ¶7, page 61 - 62] There are three points about this to bear in mind.