罗尔斯 正义论

John Rawls (1921-2002)A Theory of Justice (Harvard, 1971)(see also Political Liberalism (1993), an important up-date... But we lookat only at TJ.)Choosing Morality First sentence: He says he is“generalizing and carrying to a higher level of abstraction” the“familiar theory of the social contract as found, say in Locke, Rousseau,and Kant” etc.Question: Is he?The principles of justice are (to be) the object of an “original agreement”- Basic: they are to “regulate all further agreements”- they are about the basic structure of society- and are arrived at from a hypothetical situation of equal liberty ...Project: to choose “once and for all what is to count as just and unjust”[note: two senses of ‘agreement’:(a) we all think the same(b) we make a deal or contract About the term ‘contract’ applied at “a certain level of abstraction”The merit of the contract terminology is that it“conveys the idea that principles of justice may be conceived as principlesthat would be chosen by rational persons ... and.. in this way ... justified”[Surely a “contract” implies mutual benefit via mutual agreement - itwould be irrational to act unless the other did too...that is: contracts obligate from our interests because it is not advantageousto keep one’s contracts unless the other does.This element seems de-emphasized in Rawls.....1Original Position:People are said to be “rational and equal”- In what respects are we “equal”?Rawls: all have the same right in the procedure for choosing principles;- each can make proposals, submit reasons .. and so on.- represents equality between human beings as moral persons- - “as creatures having a conception of their good and capable of a senseof justice.“The basis of equality is taken to be similarity in these two respects....[Note that it’s not having the same conception of the good, but in, merely,having one]Question: In what sense is this a kind of “equality”??The phrase ‘conception of the good’ isn’t super-clear, but presumably it’swhat one in general wants and hopes for in lifeThis always includes some accommodation to one’s actual abilities....- Is the supposition that people are “rational and equal” by nature?[That’s what Locke and Hobbes thought....]- Is fairness an additional property, or is it supposed to be exemplified inthe OP?- Rawls says: these are the principles “to which they would agree if they were free and equal persons” whose relations to each other are “fair”Why should we talk this way??- later talks about “reflective equilibrium” -- see later slide...2The “Veil of Ignorance”essential: no one knows his/her own:1) place in society2) “conception of the good”3) “special psychological propensities”4) “fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, intelligence,strength, and the like...”-> this is said to make the agreement “fair”:“no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural chance or othe contingencyo of social circumstances”[Note: on the face of it, Rawls is not saying that any inequalities that might in future result from some people being better at certain things than others,due to superior native abilities, are thereby unjust. Or is he? ......- the point here is that it doesn’t follow!]OP is said to embody “widely accepted and reasonable constraints ...general recognition of this fact would provide the basis for public acceptance ..What he says:“Yet a society satisfying the principles of justice as fairness comes as closeas a society can to being a voluntary scheme, for it meets the principle swhich free and equal persons would assent to under circumstances thatare fair.”In this sense its members are auotonomous and the obligations they recognize self-imposed.[really?]After choosing the basic principles, we would move on to “choose a constitution and a legislature .. and so on”3Questions about the “Veil of Ignorance”:1. Why is it necessary, if all must agree?- on the usual interpretation, an unbiased result is guaranteed by the fact of voluntary universal agreement2. If the veil if indispensable, there is this problem:why would rational people, not behind the veil, pay any attention to results produced while behind it?3. Is the veil motivated by intuition, or by reason?- note that Rawls claims to buy the standard idea of rationality[in his later book, Political Liberalism, he distinguishes between ‘rational’and ‘reasonable’ and claims only to appeal to “reasonable” people...]4. Rawls pays NO attention to the distinction of negative from positiverights.The case for them is so different that one would have thought he mightnotice...4Assumptions about People:(1) rationality - interpreted in the narrow sense of economic theory: oftaking the most effective means to given ends.”(2) mutual disinterest [but not egoists]- “not taking interest in one another’s interests”[note: difference between assuming they do not (false) and not assumingthey do (true...)]- must “try to avoid any controversial ethical elements”- would the principle of utility be accepted?this is “an open question”[is it??]inference from this:”no one has reason to acquiesce in an enduring loss for himself in order tobring about a greater net balance of satisfaction” [for all]“It may be expedient but it is not just that some should have less in orderthat others may prosper”But “there is no injustice in the greater benefits earned by a few providedthat the situation of persons not so fortunate is thereby improved”[question: how much?- (the answer: “as much as possible”(!) - as we’ll see shortly...]claim:- everyone’s well-being depends upon a scheme of cooperation withoutwhich no one could have a satisfactory life[so] the the division of advantages should be such as to draw forth the willing cooperation of everyone taking part5The Two Principles are proposed as a “fair agreement”- on the basis of which those better endowed, or more fortunate intheir social position, neither of which we can be said to deserved,could expect the willing cooperation of others when some workablescheme is a necessary condition of the welfare of all”Nullifying Nature“Once we decide to look for a conception of justice that nullifies theaccidents of natural endowment and the contingencies of socialcircumstance ... we are led to these principles...”[?] [Who said anything about “nullifying” these??Distinction:(a) nullifying for purposes of arriving at principles(b) arriving at principles which nullifyThese are hugely different!6Rationality of the contract[question: what would make it “rational to adopt” these principles?Standard concept of rationality is Hobbesian: it’s rational to do whatmaximises my utilityNote that I can’t do this if I don’t know who I am!To get a suitable deal we have to know what the others have to offer- To know this, we must know what we and they want.[See selection from p. 542]The aim is to rule out those principles that it would be rational to proposefor acceptance ... only if one knew certain things that are irrelevant fromthe standpoint of justice. For example, if a man knew that he was wealthy,he might find it rational to advance the principle that various taxes forwelfare measures be counted unjust; if he knew that he was poor, hewould most likely propose the contrary principle...”But if we know nothing of ourselves, we cannot choose anything, canwe?- The motivation is to make the principles unbiased in favor of anybody inparticular, and thus acceptable to all.Methodological Intuitionism“There is another side to justifying ... This is to see if the principles whichwould be chosen match our considered convictions of justice or extendthem in an acceptable way ...”“For example, we are confident that religious intolerance and racialdiscrimination are unjust ....”“These convictions are provisional fixed points which we presume anyconception of justice must fit ...”“But we have much less assurance as to what is the correct distribution ofwealth and authority...”7“Reflective Equilibrium”“In searching for the most favored description .. we work from both ends.We begin by describing it so that it represents generally shared andpreferably weak conditions. We then see if those conditions are strongenough to yield a significant set of principles. If not, we look for futurepremises equally reasonable...presumably there will be discrepancies ... We can either modify theaccount of the initial situation or we can revise our existing judgments..By going back and forth, sometimes altering the conditions of thecontractual circumstances, at others withdrawing our judgments andconforming them to principle, I assume that eventually we shall find adescription of the initial situation that both expresses reasonable conditionsand yields principles which match our considered judgments .. This state ofaffairs I refer to as reflective equilibrium...”[Questions:a) why wouldn’t we prefer a description that was true?- suggestion: work from premises that seem to be true, to conclusions- if the conclusions seem wrong, find out what went wrong up in thepremises.- if all investigation confirms the premises and our reasoning is sound, dowe nevertheless reject conclusions because we don’t like them?b) what if “our” ‘considered judgments’ differ?c) Are “considered judgments” to be taken to be epistemically basic?What role do they play in theory-> How can a theory that just restates what we believe be philosophicallyenlightening?8“I shall maintain that the OPP would choose “two rather differentprinciples”:1. one that requires equalities in the assignment of basic rights and duties2. Inequalities (e.g. of wealth and authority) “are just only if they result incompensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the leastadvantaged members of society”[note: the second principle doesn’t seem to be about inequalities ofothe same thing as the first principle is ...The Two Principles (first statement):1. Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basicliberty compatible with a similar liberty for others2. Social and economic inequalities to be arranged so that they areboth(a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and(b) attached to positions and offices open to all.Explanation on (1)“The basic liberties of citizens:- political liberty (right to vote and be eligible for public office)- freedom of speech and assembly- liberty of conscience and freedom of thought- freedom of the person, along with- right to hold personal property[note that private property in capital is not included]- freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by rule of law9explanation of (2):- distribution of income and wealth - need not be equal but it must be “toeveryone’s advantage..”Note the difference between advantage and non-disadvantageThe latter is the Pareto rule (= the classical liberal liberty principle =Rawls’ first principle (maybe) = the non-harm principle- applies to design of organizations that make use of differences inauthority and responsibility[this seems to mean, all organizations.[But, private ones are (already) voluntary - do they have to meet theprinciple too??]10The General conceptionall social values* - liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and thebases of self-respect - are to be distributed equally unless an unequaldistribution of any or all of these values is to everyone’s advantage*Primary goods: things that every rational man is presumed to want(“to want whatever he wants”)distinguish social from natural goods:social: e.g., rights and liberties, income and wealth(influenced by basic structure of society)natural: health and vigor, intelligence and imagination...(not influenced by the basic structure)Priority of Liberty[suppose that] giving up some liberties might produce social/economicgains- general conception “requires that everyone’s position be improved”ruled out: that men forgo certain political rights when the economicreturns are significant [is this true??]Serial ordering of principles expresses an underlying preference amongprimary social goods [see p. 542, next slide]11Rawls on the basis of the priority of liberty (p. 542-543 - not in ourselection):“... as the conditions of civilization improve, the marginal significance forour good of further economic and social advantages diminishes relative tothe interests of liberty, which become stronger as the conditions for theexercise of the equal freedoms are more fully realized.Beyond some point it becomes and then remains irrational from thestandpoint of the original position to acknowledge a lesser liberty for thesake of greater material means and amenities of office.”1. as the general level of well-being rises (cf. index of primary goods theless favored can expect) only the less urgent wants remain to be met byfurther advances- at least insofar as men’s wants are not largely created by institutions andsocial forms- obstacles to the exercise of the equal liberties decline- a growing insistence upon the right to pursue our spiritual and culturalinterests asserts itself- Increasingly it becomes more important to secure the free internal life ofthe various communities of interests in which persons and groups seek toachieve, in modes of social union consistent with equal liberty, the endsand excellencies to which they are drawn.- In addition men come to aspire to some control over the laws and rulesthat regulate their association, either by directly taking part themselves inits affairs or indirectly through representatives with whom they areaffiliated by ties of culture and social situation.“To be sure, it is not the case that when the priority of liberty holds, allmaterial wants are satisfied. Rather, these desires are not so compelling asto make it rational for the persons in the original position to agree to satisfythem by accepting a less than equal freedom ....”“... under favorable circumstances the fundamental interest in determiningour plan of life eventually assuems a prior place ... Thus the desire forliberty is the chief regfulative intereswt that the parties must suppose theyall will have in common in due course. The veil of ignorance forces themto abstract from the particiulars of otheir plans of life, thereby leading tothis conclusion. The serial ordering of the two principles then follows.”[it does??]12Equality versus the Safety NetEgalitarianism: everyone gets the sameSafety Net: everyone gets enough[question: how much is that? Who decides?]Rawls said that “the benchmark is equality” - but invents maximin to getthat albatross off his neck...The Maximin Rule (re the Second Principle):Rawls previously adumbrates the idea of “primary goods”= “ things that everyone may be presumed to want, whatever they want”- it’s an important question whether there are any such things- an alternative is to talk in terms of utility- this allows for indefinite variability, but defeats interpersonal comparison- which is essential for the use of any distributive rule that talks aboutrelative “social shares”‘maximin’ = ‘maximize the minimum’A Dilemma for Maximin[which tries to steer between the Scylla of the market and the Charybdisof Socialism]1. maximize, against what constraints? (maximize, if what?)- If there are no constraints, then the rule becomes Equality- for with Equality, the minimum = the maximum2. What Rawls says: incentives- meaning that if A won’t do more unless he gets more, and what he doesbenefits at least some and harms no one (which would violate the Libertyprinciple) , then A is allowed to proceed?If so, Maximin = the market- and the second principle can be jettisonedThus: Rawls has not found the happy medium between the market andsocialism. Depending on the poorly-stated constraints, it could be either -but there’s no principled way of deciding where in between.13Final formulation:1. Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total systemof equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all2, Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are:a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with thejust savings principle; andb) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions ofequality of opportunityPriority rules 1: The principles of justice are to be ranked in lexical orderand therefore liberty can be restricted only for the sake of liberty. Thereare two cases:a) a less extensive liberty must strengthen the total system of libertyshared by allb) a less than equal liberty must be acceptable to those with the lesserlibertyPriority rule 2: (Priority of Justice over Efficiency and Welfare):The second principle of justice is lexically prior to the principle ofefficiency and to that of maximizing the sum of advantages; and fairopportunity is prior to the difference principles. There are two cases:a) an inequality of opportunity must enhance the opportunities of thosewith the lesser opportunityb) an excessive rate of saving must on balance mitigate the burden ofthose bearing this hardshipGeneral conception:All social primary goods - liberty and opportunity, income and wealth,and the bases of self-respect - are to be distributed equally unless anunequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of theleast favored(Rawls says these are “reasonable enough in many cases” ....)14Ideal vs. Nonideal theory and the Circumstances of JusticeNonideal is when the “circumstances of justice” do not obtain.These circumstances: [TJ, 126-130]- make human cooperation both possible and necessary- people roughly similar in physical and mental powers[in that “no one can dominate the rest” - cf. Locke...]- vulnerable to attack- subject to having plans blocked by the united force of others- natural resources not so abundant as to make cooperation superfluous- nor so harsh as to make it pointless- “while mutually advantageous arrangements are feasible, the benefitsthey yield fall short of the demands men put forward”- “have their own plans of life”- conflicting claims possible (and likely)- take no interest in one another's interests- shortcomings of knowledge, thought, and judgmentNote: these are straight Hobbesianequality of vulnerability[moderate] rationalityameliorable scarcityno strong emotional attachment to othersno morality [prior to the Veil of Ignorance meeting ...]Question: suppose these do not obtain, in some respect or other. is therethen (as Hume says) no justice?Rawls’ second major work, Political Liberalism, attempts to integrate allthis with practical politics....15