Biology and Philosophy 19: 377–396, 2004.
© 2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
Extended Phenotype – But Not Too Extended. A Reply
to Laland, Turner and Jablonka
RICHARD DAWKINS
University Museum of Natural History, University of Oxford, UK
I am grateful to the three commentators for their thoughtful and penetrating
remarks, and to the Editor for commissioning them. All three have forced me
to think, re-opening neural pathways that had suffered neglect as I turned to
other things in the years since The Extended Phenotype (henceforth EP) was
published. Their essays raise so many interesting points, it would take another
book to reply to them properly. Instead, on the basis that it is better to say a
few things thoroughly than lots sketchily, I shall concentrate on what I take
to be each author’s central argument.
J. Scott Turner and Kevin Laland both, in their different ways, want to
go further than me in extending the phenotype. Or so they see it. I am not
so sure that further is the right word. Progress implies movement in a useful
direction, whereas their extensions – of the organism, and into niche creation
– occasionally reminded me of Stephen Leacock’s knight who jumped on
his horse and galloped off in all directions. I don’t intend that flippantly or
disrespectfully. The relevant point about the extended phenotype is that it is
a disciplined extension. There are lots of other tempting ‘extensions’, which
sound similar but take us off in misleading directions. I have always fought
shy of misapplying the phrase to a profligate range of apparently plausible
extensions.
To take a more extreme example than these commentators consider, when
I am asked by lay people (as I frequently am) whether buildings count as
extended phenotypes, I answer no, on the grounds that the success or failure
of buildings does not affect the frequency of architects’ genes in the gene
pool. Extended phenotypes are worthy of the name only if they are candidate
adaptations for the benefit of alleles responsible for variations in them. I might
admit the theoretical possibility of generalising to other kinds of replicators
such as memes (or something ‘epigenetic’ that Eva Jablonka might be able
to explain but I wouldn’t), in which case my ‘no’ answer might be softened.
But it is enough of a problem already, getting my more hard-headed scientific
colleagues to accept the extended phenotype, without arousing their active
hostility by mentioning memes (which many see as simplistic) or ‘epigenetic
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inheritance systems’ (which some might write off as obscurantist). I shall
return to the important point, which I enthusiastically accept, that replicators
do not have to be made of DNA in order for the logic of Darwinism to work.
Laland speaks, I suspect, for all three authors when he espouses cyclical
causation. He quotes me as saying
There are causal arrows leading from genes to body. But there is no
causal arrow leading from body to genes.
Laland, who disagrees, generously wants to absolve me from responsibility
for this, saying that he is quoting out of context. But I am happy to stand
by it. ‘Cyclical causation’ leaves me cold. I must, however, make very clear
that I mean causation statistically. Experimentally induced changes in bodies
are never correlated with changes in genes, but changes in genes (muta-
tions) are sometimes correlated with changes in bodies (and all evolution
is the consequence). Of course most mutations occur naturally rather than
experimentally, but (because corrrelation can’t establish causation) I need to
focus on ‘experimentally induced’ in order to pin down the direction of the
causal arrow. It is in this statistical sense that development’s arrow goes only
one way. Attempts to argue for a reverse arrow recur through the history of
biology, and always fail except in unimportant special-pleading senses.
Sterelny, Smith and Dickerson (1996), follow Griffiths and Gray in saying
“Most acorns rot, so acorn genomes correlate better with rotting than with
growth”. But this is dead wrong. It misunderstands the very meaning of
correlation which is, after all, a statistical technical term. Admitting that
most genomes rot, the relevant question is whether such variation as there
may be in acorn genomes correlates with such variation as there may be
in tendency to rot. It probably does, but that isn’t the point. The point is
that the question of covariance is the right question to ask. Sterelny and
Kitcher (1988) in their excellent paper on ‘The Return of the Gene’ are very
clear on the matter. Think variation. Variation, variation, variation. Heritable
variation; covariation between phenotype as dependent variable, and putative
replicator as independent variable. This has been my leitmotif as I read all
three commentators, and it will be my refrain throughout my reply.
Laland’s main contribution to our debate is ‘niche construction’. The
problem I have with niche construction is that it confuses two very different
impacts that organisms might have on their environments. As Sterelny (2000)
put it,
Some of these impacts are mere effects; they are byproducts of the
organisms’s way of life. But sometimes we should see the impact of
organism on environment as the organism engineering its own environ-
ment: the environment is altered in ways that are adaptive for the
engineering organism.
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Niche construction is a suitable name only for the second of these two (and
it is a special case of the extended phenotype). There is a temptation, which
I regard as little short of pernicious, to invoke it for the first (byproducts) as
well. Let’s call the first type by the more neutral term, ‘niche changing’, with
none of the adaptive implications of niche construction or – for that matter –
of the extended phenotype.
A beaver dam, and the lake it creates, are true extended phenotypes insofar
as they are adaptations for the benefit of replicators (presumably alleles
but conceivably something else) that statistically have a causal influence
on their construction. What crucially matters (here’s the leitmotif again) is
that variations in replicators have a causal link to variations in dams such
that, over generations, replicators associated with good dams survive in the
replicator pool at the expense of rival replicators associated with bad dams.
Note what a stringent requirement this is. Although it is not necessary that
we should already have evidence for the replicator-phenotype covariance,
extended phenotype language commits us to a can only have come about
through replicator-phenotype covariance. The beaver’s dam is as much an
adaptation as the beaver’s tail. In neither case have we done the necessary
research to show that it results from gene selection. In both, we have strong
plausibility grounds to think it is. The same is not true – would not even be
claimed by Laland and his colleagues – of most of their proposed examples
of niche construction.
See how different is the ‘pernicious’ sense of niche construction, the
byproduct that I’d prefer to sideline as ‘niche changing’. Here, the dam alters
the environment of the future, in some way that impinges on the life and
wellbeing of beavers in general, and probably others too. Not particularly
the welfare of the beavers that built the dam, not even of their children or
grandchildren. The dam is good for beaverdom, and more. Beavers, frogs,
fishes and marsh marigolds all benefit from a beaver-induced flooding of their
niche. This is too loose and vague to count as a true extended phenotype, or
as true niche construction. The deciding question is ‘Who benefits?’ And the
reason it matters is that we have a Darwinian explanation of the dam only if
dam-friendly alleles of the dam builders themselves benefit at the expense of
alternative alleles.
I have no wish to downplay the importance of niche changing. It is a fair
description of many important biological events, ranging from the irreversible
oxygenation of Earth’s early atmosphere by green bacteria and now by plants,
to the greening of deserts by ecological successions of plants climaxing
in dense forest communities, and including Scott Turner’s heuweltjies (a
fascinating example, of which I had been ignorant).
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Most biologists would accept that the beaver dam is an evolved adaptation
for the benefit of the genes of the responsible beaver. It would be a bold
scientist (James Lovelock, perhaps) who would suggest that the oxygenation
of the atmosphere by plants is an adaptation for the benefit of something.
The oxygenation of the atmosphere is a hugely important niche change, and
woe betide any creature, including any plant, that fails to adapt to it. But the
presence of oxygen is nobody’s adaptation (or at least, you’ll have your work
cut out if you want to argue that it is). It is a byproduct of plant biochemistry
to which all living creatures, plants included, must adapt. Beaver dams may
or may not benefit other beavers, or fishes or water beetles or pondweeds,
but such diffuse and unfocused benefits cannot explain why they are there.
The only benefits that can be adduced in Darwinian explanation of dams
are benefits to the alleles (or other responsible replicators) of the particular
beavers that build them. Otherwise, natural selection could not have shaped
their evolution. Long-term consequences of niche changing are interesting
and important, but they do not provide a Darwinian explanation for why
animals change their niches.
Laland pays some lip service to this point when he speaks of ecological
inheritance, and says that it resembles the inheritance of territory or property.
Local exclusiveness is indeed a vital ingredient of true niche construction.
As long as beavers have a high chance passing their lake on to their own
grandchildren rather than to somebody else’s grandchildren, there is at least
a chance of making a workable Darwinian model of niche construction. But
the rhetoric of niche construction neglects to follow the lip service, and we
are left believing it to be a larger and a grander theory than it really is.
Those aspects of niche construction theory that work are already included
within extended phenotype theory. Those aspects that don’t fit within existing
extended phenotype theory don’t work.
Don’t work as Darwinian adaptations, that is. They can still be interesting
in other ways. Earthworms are mentioned by both Laland and Turner, and
Laland’s splendid ‘accessory kidneys’ are a gift to Turner and his ‘extended
organism’. Earthworms radically change the environment in which they, and
all other soil organisms including – significantly – rival earthworms live.
Again, we certainly have niche alteration but, please, not niche construction
until a lot more work has been done to establish this onerous claim.
Ecological succession is a form of niche changing – not niche construc-
tion – which follows a repeatable, regular pattern. A desert is colonised by
weeds, which then change conditions sufficiently to allow the subsequent
invasion by an orderly succession of plants and animals, each wave altering
niches in ways that favour the next wave, culminating in a climax forest. But,
important and repeatable as ecological succession is, it is not a Darwinian
381
adaptation on the part of prior member of the succession on behalf of later
members. Rather, natural selection within the gene pools of later members of
the succession favours those individuals that take advantage of the conditions
inadvertently set up by earlier members. The climax forest is a consequence
of colonisation by weeds decades or even centuries earlier. The forest is not
an extended phenotype of the weeds’ genes, nor is it helpful or illuminating
to call it a niche constructed by the weeds. The same can be said of the
repeatably regular pattern of development of coral reefs, in which generations
of polyps build literally on the environment provided by centuries of dead
predecessors, and form the foundation – literally and metaphorically – for the
marine equivalent of a climax forest community.
Moving on from ecological succession to longer-term processes that look
a bit like niche construction, coevolutionary arms races are the outstanding
example (Dawkins and Krebs 1979). Predators impose new selection pres-
sures on prey, which respond in evolutionary time such that future generations
of prey impose changed selection pressures on future generations of pred-
ators. The coevolutionary positive feedback spirals that result are responsible
for the most advanced and stunning illusions of design that the natural world
has to offer. Again this is a case of animals changing future niches, and
changing them in fascinating ways, but again it isn’t niche construction, and
no helpful purpose is served by lumping it with beaver dams or ecological
succession. Understanding requires us to respect clear distinctions.
I don’t denigrate niche changing as an important biological phenomenon.
But it is not the same thing as true niche construction. Nothing but confusion
will result from treating one as a continuation of the other. Since this seems to
be a misunderstanding that is eagerly waiting to happen, niche construction
is a phrase that should be abandoned forthwith.
That’s all I want to say about niche construction. Now, the extended
organism, which is J Scott Turner’s main contribution to our debate. Turner,
like Laland, is aware of the distinction between benefit to the agents respon-
sible for a phenotype, and benefit to the world at large. But, as with
Laland, his enthusiasm is in danger of misleading others into forgetting the
distinction.
Turner, like Jablonka as we shall see, thinks I am too much of a genetic
triumphalist. For the moment I shall leave that on one side while I focus
on the wonderful examples of would-be extended organisms that Turner
offers us from his own work on termites. Yes, the Macrotermes nest, with
its underground living and brooding chambers and its overground ventila-
tion apparatus, has many of the attributes of an organism. And yes, it
is an intriguing conceit that the fungi are cultivating the termites, rather
382
than the other way around. Indeed, I said something pretty similar about
cellulose-digesting gut microbes in EP (p. 208):
Could the evolution of eusociality in the Isoptera be explained as an
adaptation of the microscopic symbionts rather than of the termites
themselves?
Once again, note that the extended phenotype is a disciplined hypothesis.
Speculative as my suggestion was, it was a very specific and tightly limited
speculation. Implicitly it postulated alleles in microorganisms (or fungi to
take in Turner’s hypothesis) which vary in their effects upon termite social
behaviour (or mounds). The fact that there is no actual evidence for either
speculation need not worry us at this stage. The point is to be precise about
the genetic nature of the speculation. Adaptive hypotheses, however wild
and speculative, must not be vaguely Panglossian but precisely limited to
specified alleles (or other replicators) which vary and which exert a causal
influence on variation in the phenotype of interest.
Let’s apply these rigorous standards to the hypothesis that a termite mound
is an extended organism. We shall conclude in favour, but it is important
to make the case properly, in what I have called a disciplined manner. We
shall take for granted the physiological, homeostatic and thermodynamic
arguments put by Turner – not because they are unimportant but because he
has made them so well. Instead, we concentrate on the genetics (using genes
to stand for other conceivable replicators). Mound morphology is sure to be
influenced by a number of genes, acting via mound embryology which, in the
terms of our discussion, is another name for termite behaviour. These genes
are to be found in the cells of many different organisms (using ‘organism’ in
the conventional, non-extended sense). They include genes in the cell nuclei
of numerous individual worker termites. They also might include genes in
fungi, genes in gut symbionts, and genes in mitochondria or other cytoplasmic
elements in the cells of termites, fungi or gut symbionts. So, we potentially
have a rich pandemonium of genetic inputs to our mound phenotype, coming
at it from as many as three kingdoms.
For my money, the analogy of mound with organism stands up well. The
fact that we have a heterogeneously sourced genetic input to the embry-
ology of the phenotype doesn’t matter. Lots of genes affect each aspect of
my bodily phenotype, including, for all I know, mitochondrial genes. My
‘own’ nuclear genes tug me in more or less different directions, and my
phenotype is some sort of quantitative polygenic compromise. So that is not
a difference that might stop the mound being an organism. What, then, is
the prime characteristic of an organism? It is that, at least to a quantitatively
appreciable extent, all its genes are passed on to the next generation together,
in a small ‘bottlenecked’ propagule. The rationale for this is given in EP,
383
especially Chapter 12, ‘Host phenotypes of parasite genes’ and Chapter 14,
‘Rediscovering the Organism’, and I shall not repeat it here. Instead, let’s
go straight to the termite mound to see how well it holds up. Pretty well.
Each new nest is founded by a single queen (or king and queen) who then,
with a lot of luck, produces a colony of workers who build the mound. The
founding genetic injection is, by the standards of a million-strong termite
colony, an impressively small bottleneck. The same is, at least quantitatively,
true of the gut symbionts with which all termites in the new nest are infected
by anal licking, ultimately from the queen – the bottleneck. And the same is
quantitatively true of the fungus, which is carefully transported, as a small
inoculum, by the founding queen from her natal nest. All the genes that pass
from a parent mound to a daughter mound do so in a small, shared package.
By the bottleneck criterion, the termite mound passes muster as an extended
organism, even though it is the phenotype of a teeming mass of genes sitting
in many thousands of workers.
I won’t miss an opportunity to emphasise (though again I shall not repeat
the full argument from EP) that every organism (conventionally defined) is
already a symbiotically cooperating union of its ‘own’ genes. What draws
them, in a Darwinian sense, to cooperate is again ‘bottlenecking’: a shared
statistical expectation of the future. This shared expectation follows directly
from the method of reproduction, according to which all of an organism’s
‘own’ nuclear genes, and its cytoplasmic genes for good measure, pass to
the next generation in a shared propagule. To the extent that this is true of
parasite genes (for example bacteria that travel inside the host’s egg), to that
very same extent aggressive parasitism will give way in evolutionary time to
amicable and cooperative symbiosis. The parasite genes and the host genes
see eye to eye on what is an optimum host phenotype. Both ‘want’ a host
phenotype that survives and reproduces. But to the extent that parasite genes
pass to their own next generation via some sideways route which is not shared
with those of the host genes, to that same extent the parasite will tend to
be vicious and dangerous. In such cases, the optimum phenotype from the
parasite genes’ point of view may well be dead – perhaps having burst in a
cloud parasite spores. All our ‘own’ genes are mutually parasitic, but they
are amicably cooperative parasites because their shared route to the future in
every generation leads them to ‘see eye to eye’ on the optimal phenotype.
A termite mound, then, is a good extended organism. A heuweltjie, by
my reading of Turner’s description, is not. It is more like a forest or a
coral reef. The genes that contribute to the putative heuweltjie phenotype
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