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首页 Scott Shapiro,Planning Theory and the Nature of …

Scott Shapiro,Planning Theory and the Nature of Law

Scott Shapiro,Planning Theory a…

蓟门烟树
2011-05-25 0人阅读 0 0 0 暂无简介 举报

简介:本文档为《Scott Shapiro,Planning Theory and the Nature of Lawpdf》,可适用于高等教育领域

访谈INTERVIEWPlanningTheoryandtheNatureofLaw:anInterviewwithProfessorScottShapiroLegalTheoryinCHN:Asweallknow,legalpositivismhasplayedacrucialroleinmoderndebatesoflegaltheoryForalongtimelegalpositivismhasfocusedonconceptualanalysisandhasbeentreatedasanacademictraditionirrelevanttoissuessuchas“howshouldjudgesdetermineconcretecases”However,wehavenoticedthatinyourforthcomingLegality,youhaveconstructedalegalinterpretationtheorybasedonpositivism,aimingatdefendinglegalpositivisminthejudicialarea,whereRonaldDworkinhasconstructedacompletelyantiPositivistlegaltheoryAslegaltheoryresearchersinChina,wearealsoconcernedwiththenatureofthiscauseweareengagedin,andtrytodeterminethecentralaspectoflegaltheoryCanyouexplainunderwhatconsiderationyoutrytoputmoreattentiononjudicialissuesAndhowshouldweviewtherelationbetweenlegaltheoryandlegalpracticeShapiro:TherearemanyaspectsoflegaltheorythathaveadirectbearingonhowjudgesshoulddecideconcretecasesNormativejurisprudenceismostclearlyrelevanttolegalpracticeTorttheoryanalyzestortlaw,criminallawtheoryanalyzescriminallawandconstitutionaltheoryanalyzesconstitutionallawThesediscussionsoften(thoughnotalways)haveimplicationsforhowcertainlegalquestionsoughttoberesolvedItakeit,however,thatyourquestionconcernstherelevanceofanalyticalstudiesoflawand,inparticular,thedebatebetweenlegalpositivismandnaturallawWhatistherelationshipbetweenwhatanalyticaljurisprudesdoandwhatlawyersdoIthinkthedominantviewamongmostlegalphilosophers,lawprofessorsandlawyersisthatanalyticaljurisprudencehasverylittletodowithhowjudgesshoulddecidecasesTheyarehappytoadmit,ofcourse,thatconceptualclaritycanonoccasionhelpavoidcertainkindsofconfusionsandresolvecertainlegaldisputesHohfeld’sfamousanalysisofrightsisanotablecasewhereanalyticaljurisprudenceiscreditedwithsomepracticalutility(Indeed,Hohfeld’smotivationforwritinghisarticleswastohelpthepracticinglawyer“FundamentalLegalConceptions”begins:“Oneofthegreatesthindrancestotheclearunderstanding,theincisivestatement,andthetruesolutionoflegalproblems,frequentlyarisesfromtheexpressortacitassumptionthatalllegalrelationsmaybereducedto“rights”and“duties,”andthattheselattercategoriesarethereforeadequateforthepurposeof访谈INTERVIEWanalyzingeventhemostcomplexlegalinterests,suchastrusts,options,escrows,“future”interests,corporateinterests,etc”)IhavealsoheardadministrativelawyersuseDworkin’sdistinctionsbetweendifferentsensesof“discretion”inordertoparsecertainsectionsoftheAdministrativeProcedureActButthesearetheexceptionsthatprovetheruleMostlegalphilosophers(especiallythoseofthepositivisticpersuasion)regardanalyticaljurisprudenceashavinglittletonorelevanceforthepracticinglawyerThisdoesnotmean,ofcourse,thattheythinkitshouldnotbepursuedLegalphilosophersregardanalyticaljurisprudenceasworthpursuingbecauseitisintellectuallyexcitingItisgoodforitsownsakeLawyersandlawprofessors(atleastinAmerica)typicallytakeaharsherattitudeForthem,analyticaljurisprudenceisacuriousfieldofstudyItsconcernsarefrequentlydismissedasformalandarid,tooscholastictobeofrealinterestorvaluePutbluntly,theyareawasteoftimeMyfavoritequoteisfromRichardPosner,whowroteinhisClarendonLectures:“IhavenothingagainstphilosophicalspeculationButonewouldlikeittohavesomepayoffsomethingoughttoturnontheanswertothequestion‘Whatislaw’ifthequestionistobeworthaskingbypeoplewhocouldusetheirtimeinothersociallyproductivewaysNothingdoesturnonit”Asyounoteinyourquestion,DworkinhasbuckedthetrendandhasforcefullyarguedthatjurisprudenceisintimatelyconnectedtolegalpracticeInLaw’sEmpire,forexample,hewrites:“Lawyersarealwaysphilosophers,becausejurisprudenceispartofanylawyer’saccountofwhatthelawis,evenwhenthejurisprudenceisundistinguishedandmechanical”IthinkDworkinoverstatesthepoint,butIbasicallyagreewithhimWhilelawyersaren’tphilosophers,theyoftenneedphilosophersiftheyaretoresolvecertaintypesofquestionseffectivelyLegalitybeginsbyarguingthatmanyofthemostpressingpuzzlesthatlawyersconfrontincludingwhohaslegalauthorityoverusandhowweshouldinterpretconstitutions,statutes,andcaseswillremainelusiveuntilcertainquestionsaboutthenatureoflawareresolvedAnexampleshouldhelpillustratethepointConsidertheongoingdebateabouttheconstitutionalityofthedeathpenaltyintheUnitedStatesTheEightAmendmenttotheUnitedStatesConstitutionstates:“Excessivebailshallnotberequired,norexcessivefinesimposed,norcruelandunusualpunishmentsinflicted”ThisconstitutionalprovisionhasgivenrisetoendlessdiscussionsaboutwhetheritshouldbereadasprohibitingpunishmentsthatareactuallycrueloronlythosethatwerethoughttobecruelbythosewhodraftedandratifiedtheprovisionFollowingthefirstinterpretation,thedeathpenaltywouldbeunconstitutionalifstatesponsoredexecutionscouldbeshowntobeactuallycruelFollowingthe访谈INTERVIEWsecondinterpretation,thedeathpenaltyisdefinitelyconstitutionalbecauseitisclearfromotherprovisionsintheConstitutionthattheframersthoughtthatthedeathpenaltywasconstitutionalNoticethatthisinterpretivedisagreementisadisputeaboutwhatdeterminesthecontentofUnitedStatesconstitutionallawThefirstpositionstatesthattheplainmeaningofthetextdeterminesthecontentoftheEightAmendmentprohibition(because“cruel”meanscruel,USlawprohibitspunishmentsthatareactuallycruel)ThesecondpositionstatesthattheintentionsoftheframersdeterminethecontentoftheEighthAmendment(because“cruel”mustbeinterpretedaccordingtothebeliefsoftheframers,USlawprohibitspunishmentthattheframersthoughtwascruel)Wemightnowask:howarewetoresolvethisdisagreementWhatdeterminesthecontentoftheEighthAmendment:plainmeaningororiginalintentAnditisherethatdebatesinanalyticaljurisprudencebecomeparticularlyrelevantFortheonlywaytofigureoutwhetherplainmeaningororiginalintentdeterminesUnitedStatesconstitutionallawistoknow,moregenerally,whichtypesoffactsultimatelydeterminethecontentofanylawSo,forexample,ifthelegalpositivistsareright,theonlywaytodemonstratethatoneinterpretivemethodologyoranotheriscorrectistopointtothesocialfactorfactsthatmakeitso,perhapsbyshowingthatcourtsroutinelyfollowonemethodologyandnottheotherOntheotherhand,ifthenaturallawyerisright,thentheonlywaytoestablishone’spositionisbyengaginginmoralandpoliticalphilosophyThus,forexample,onemightargueforonemethodologyoveranotherbyshowingthatconsiderationsofdemocratictheorysupportreadingtheConstitutioninacertainwayIhopethisexampleshowsthatanalyticaljurisprudenceiscapableofmakingacrucialpracticaldifferenceinlegalpracticeForthereisoftennowaytoresolvespecificdisagreementsaboutthelawwithoutfirstresolvingdisagreementsaboutthenatureoflawingeneralInordertoshowconclusivelythatthelawisthusandsoinaparticularcase,itisnotenoughtoassertthatthelawwascreatedbysomeonewithauthorityandthatoneisinterpretingthelegaltextsproperlyOnemustalsobecapableofdemonstratingthatoneisjustifiedinascribinglegalauthoritytothatpersonandininterpretingtheirtextsaccordinglyItisinthissense,Ibelieve,thattheresolutionofcertainlegaldisputesdependsontheabilitytoresolvecertainphilosophicaldisputesIfthepositivistisrightandtheexistenceandcontentoflegalsystemsareultimatelydeterminedbysocialfactsalone,thentheonlywaytodemonstrateconclusivelythatapersonhaslegalauthorityorthatoneisinterpretinglegaltextsproperlyistoengageinsociologicalinquiryOnlybylookingtowhatpeoplethink,intend,claim,sayordocanthelawyerdefinitivelydemonstratethatthelawisthusandsoinany访谈INTERVIEWparticularinstanceOntheotherhand,ifthenaturallawtheoristisrightandtheexistenceandcontentoflegalsystemsareultimatelydeterminedbymoralfacts,thenitisimpossibletodemonstrateconclusivelywhatthelawisinanyparticularcasewithoutengaginginmoralinquiryMoralphilosophywouldbeindispensableforestablishingthetruthoflegalpropositionsbecauseitwouldbeessentialforestablishingthevalidityofclaimsaboutlegalauthorityandproperinterpretivemethodologyIdonotmeantosuggestthatthevalueofanalyticaljurisprudenceisexhaustedbyitspracticalrelevanceNothingcouldbefartherfromthetruthIamabigfanofphilosophyforphilosophy’ssakeLegaltheoryshouldbestudiedbecauseitisinterestingItneedsnootherjustificationthanthatLegalTheoryinCHN:ProfessorArthurRipsteinfromtheUniversityofTorontopraisedyourLegalityasnearlythemostimportantbookinlegaltheoryeversinceDworkinpublishedLaw’sEmpireApparentlyLegalitygivesafreshandpowerfulexplanationofthenatureoflaw,namelythe“PlanningTheoryofLaw”Accordingtothistheory,legalactivitiesaresharedplanningactivitiesAlegalsystemisanormativesystemconsistingofplans,thefunctionofwhichistoorganizeandguidelegalactivitiesUnderthiscondition,membersofonecommunitycouldacttogetherinordertoachievetheirgoalsthatwouldotherwisebeunattainableEverynewtheoryisdevelopedsomewhattofigureoutcertainquestionsthatcannotbeexplainedbyprevioustheoriesFromthisperspective,comparingwithHLAHart’stheoryofsocialrulesandDworkin’sinterpretationtheory,whatistheadvantageof“PlanningTheoryofLaw”Shapiro:Asyoucorrectlypointout,newtheoriesaredeveloped(oratleastoughttobedeveloped)becauseofperceivedinadequaciesoftheirpredecessorsIbegansearchingforanalternativetoHartandDworkinbecauseIcametobelievethattheiraccountsweresubjecttoseriousobjectionsLetme,therefore,sketchoutverybrieflywhyIthinkanewtheoryoflawisneededwiththeobviouscaveatthattheseissuesarecomplexandthatamuchfullerexaminationisneededtodojusticetothesegreatlegaltheoriesofHartandDworkin(Legalitydiscussesthesemattersforseveralhundredpages)ConsiderHart’sPracticeTheoryThePracticeTheorycomprisestwomainclaimsFirst,socialpracticesarebehavioralandattitudinalregularitiesOnthisview,socialpracticesexistwithinagroupwhenevermostmembersofthegroupconformtoacertainpatternofbehaviorandtakethe“internalpointofview”towardsthat访谈INTERVIEWpattern,ie,acceptthepatternasastandardforguidanceandevaluateofconductSecond,socialrulesaresocialpracticesForexample,agrouphasasocialrulerequiringmentotakeofftheirhatsuponenteringachurchjustincasemostmenbaretheirheadswhenenteringchurchandthosemenwhodonotbaretheirheadsarecriticizedfornotdoingso(bymeansofsuchstatementsas:“Yououghttotakeoffyourhatinchurch”or“ItwaswrongofmenottohavetakenoffmyostrichhatlastSunday”)AccordingtoHart,theruleofrecognitionisasocialruleandhenceasocialpractice:itexistsandhasthecontentitdoesbecause,andonlybecause,membersofagrouptaketheinternalpointofviewtowardsacertainbehavioralregularityanduseittoevaluatethevalidityofnormsthatfallswithintheirpurviewThePracticeTheory,unfortunately,isseriouslyflawedFirst,itseemswrongtoidentifyruleswithpracticesRulesareabstractentities,whereaspracticesareconcreteeventsthatresidewithinspaceandtimeSocialrulescannotbereducedtosocialpracticesbecauseeachbelongstodifferentmetaphysicalcategoriesSecond,Hartcannotevenmaintainthatsocialpracticesnecessarilycreatesocialrulesbecausenoteverysocialpracticecreatesasocialruleand,indeed,mostdonotForexample,thereisasocialpracticetolockone’scaratnightButthereisnorulerequiringitThereisasocialpracticeofcarryinganumbrellawhenitrains,butthereisnosocialrulemandatingitIfsocialpracticescanfailtogeneratesocialrules,thenHarthasnojustificationforhiscoreclaimthattheexistenceandcontentoftheruleofrecognitionisdeterminedbysocialpracticeThePlanningTheoryagreeswithHartthatlegalsystemsrestoncertaintypesofsocialnormsButthesenormsaresharedplans,notsocialpracticesSharedplansareabstractentitiesthatmembersofagroupaccept,notconcretebehaviorengagedinbythesemembersThePlanningTheory,therefore,doesnotmakethesamecategorymistakeasthePracticeTheoryFurthermore,thePlanningTheorydoesnotclaimthatsocialpracticesnecessarilygeneratesocialrulesorsharedplansItmerelyclaimsthatthesocialpracticethatliesatthefoundationoflawisstructuredbyasharedplanItisasharedplanbecauseitsfunctionistoguideandorganizetheplanningbehaviorofthegroupofofficialsAndsincethenormisasharedplan,itmustbepracticedbythatgroupifitistoexistTheymustacceptitanditmustdisposethemtoactaccordinglyHart’sPracticeTheorysuffersfromathirdfataldefectAsDworkinpointedout,itisapervasivefeatureoflegalpracticethatparticipantsdisagreeaboutthecriteriaoflegalvalidityButiftheruleofrecognitionisasocialruleandsocialrulesaresocialpracticesthenwidespreaddisagreementabouttheircontentisimpossibleWidespreaddisagreementabouttheexistenceofapracticewouldunderminetheconsensusneededforsuchapracticetoexistinthefirstplace访谈INTERVIEWDworkin,ofcourse,takesthepossibilityofthesesortsofdisagreementsasprovingthatthecriteriaoflegalvalidityarenotsetoutinanysocialruleOnhiswellknownview,thegroundsoflawaredeterminedbypoliticalmorality,namely,thesetofprinciplesandpoliciesthatplaceallpastpoliticaldecisionsintheirmorallybestlightSincethegroundsoflawarenotdeterminedbysocialconsensus,butratherbyaconstructiveinterpretationofpastpoliticaldecisions,legalparticipantscandisagreewithoneanotheraboutwhichprinciplesandpoliciespresentthelawinitsbestlightIamoneofthefewpositivistswhothinksthatDworkinisabsolutelyrightaboutthefundamentalimportanceoflegaldisagreementstolegaltheoryandtheinabilityofHartianpositivismtoexplainthemNevertheless,Idon’tbelievethatDworkin’salternativeisthecorrectoneMychiefreservationaboutDworkin’sresponse,ironically,isthatitisintensionwithabasictruthaboutlawchampionedbyHart,namely,thatlegalsystemsareneededpreciselybecausemoralquestionsarecomplexandcontentiousRecallHart’sclaimabouttheruleofrecognitionHartfamouslyarguedthatthefundamentalrulesoflegalsystemssolvethevariousdefectsofprelegal,customarysocietiesLegalsystemsaddresstheproblemofuncertaintybyprovidingarulewhichdetermineswhichrulesarebinding–thesocalled“ruleofrecognition”Byreferringtotheruleofrecognition,normativequestionscanberesolvedwithoutengagingindeliberation,negotiationorpersuasionIfthereisadoubtabouttheappropriatenessofsomebehavior,theruleofrecognitioncandirectthepartiestotheauthoritativelistofrulesontherockinthetownsquare,thepastpronouncementsofCongress,thedecisionsofcertainjudgesandsoon,todeterminetheanswerIfwesupposethatlaw’saimistoresolvedoubtsanddisagreementsaboutmoralmatters,thenitscontentcannotbediscoveredinthemannerthatDworkinsuggestsForiftheproperwaytodiscoverwhichinterpretivemethodologyisthecorrectonerequiredmoralphilosophy,interpreterswouldeffectivelyunsettletheverymattersthatthelawismeanttosettleDworkin’smoralmethodology,inotherwords,defeatsthepurposeoflawHavingtoansweraseriesofmoralquestionsispreciselythediseasethatthelawaimstocure,socannotbethecureitselfIspentthelastpartofLegalityshowingthatthePlanningTheorycanaccountforthepossibilityofdisagreementsaboutthegroundsoflawwithoutinvokingmoralityButsinceyouaskaboutthisissuelateron,Iwon’tsayanymorenowabouttheadvantagesofthePlanningTheoryinthisregardLegalTheoryinCHN:Your“PlanningTheoryofLaw”isbasedonthephilosophyofactionofMichael访谈INTERVIEWBratman,especiallytheplanningtheoryofagencyHowever,professorBrunoCelanoofUniversitàdiPalermoarguesthat,inBratman’sview,theplanisproducedandappliedthebyagenthimselfforfutureactingandthinkingitisregardedasaselfmanagementtoolOnthecontrary,theauthorityoflawistoestablishandapplyplansforothersInotherwords,Bratman’sconceptofplancannotbeusedtoanalyzethelaw,thatis,thisconceptualtoolofplanningtheorywillnotbehelpfulinunderstandingthequestionofthenatureoflawWhatdoyouthinkaboutthisgeneralargumentHowwillyourespondtoitShapiro:ThebasicideaofthePlanningTheoryisthatlegalactivityisactivityofsocialplanningLegalinstitutionsplanforthecommunitiesoverwhomtheyclaimauthority,bothinthesenseoftellingtheirmemberswhattheymayormaynotdo,aswellasauthorizingsomeofthesememberstoplanforothersThus,whenalegislatureenactslegislation,itisliterallyadoptingplansforthemembersofthecommunityThePlanningTheory,therefore,treatsplanningnotjustasanactivitythatwedoforourselvesitissomethingthatwemaydoforothersaswellIplanmychildren’slives,thelawschooladministrationplansthefaculty’slivesandtheNewHavenCityCouncilplansthelivesoftheresidentsofNewHavenOfcourse,authoritiesdon’tcompletelyplanoutourlives–weplanthemouttoobuttheauthorities’plansoverrideourplanswhenthetwoconflictBecauselegalactivityisplanningactivity,lawscreatedbyitareplansFurthermore,thefundamentallawsofalegalsystem,ie,thosethatcompriseitsconstitution,areplansaswellTheyareplansforplanningTheyregulatetheprocessoflawcreationandapplicationAccordingtothePlanningTheory,then,lawsareplans(orinthecaseofcustom,planlikenorms)TheirfunctionistoguideandorganizetheconductofmembersofacommunitybothovertimeandacrosspersonsLawsguideconductinthesamewaythatplansdo,namely,bycuttingoffdeliberationanddirectingthesubjecttoactinaccordance

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