孙子兵法(中英对照)

孙子兵法（中英对照）Lionel Giles 译本 http://i.mop.com/djxa0/blog/2006/09/10/2248995.html 《孙子兵法》计篇第一 计篇...............................2 I. LAYING PLANS .........................................................................................................................3 02《孙子兵法》作战篇第二 作战篇...............................5 II. WAGING WAR ..........................................................................................................................5 03《孙子兵法》谋攻篇第三 谋攻篇...............................7 III. ATTACK BY STRATAGEM ...................................................................................................8 04《孙子兵法》形篇第四 形篇...............................9 IV. TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS .................................................................................................10 05《孙子兵法》势篇第五 势篇.............................11 V. ENERGY ...................................................................................................................................12 06《孙子兵法》虚实篇第六 虚实篇.............................14 VI. WEAK POINTS AND STRONG ..........................................................................................15 07《孙子兵法》军争篇第七 军争篇.............................17 VII. MANOEUVRING .................................................................................................................18 08《孙子兵法》九变篇第八 九变篇.............................20 VIII. VARIATION IN TACTICS .................................................................................................21 09《孙子兵法》行军篇第九 行军篇.............................22 IX. THE ARMY ON THE MARCH ............................................................................................23 10《孙子兵法》地形篇第十 地形篇.............................26 X. TERRAIN .................................................................................................................................27 11《孙子兵法》九地篇第十一 九地篇 .............................30 XI. THE NINE SITUATIONS......................................................................................................31 12《孙子兵法》火攻篇第十二 火攻篇.............................36 XII. THE ATTACK BY FIRE ......................................................................................................36 13《孙子兵法》用间篇第十三 用间篇.............................38 XIII. THE USE OF SPIES ...........................................................................................................38 The main text of the Art of War was translated into English 96 years ago and is no longer copyright protected, so I can reproduce it here. The weakness of gender bias The original text is rarely gender specific, but this and many other English translations assume all troops, leaders, generals and enemies are men. This is a assumption of the translator not a statement of Sun Tzu. I believe this is a grave misunderstanding of Sun Tzu's overarching principal of independent analysis. Like western history, Chinese history has only a handful of powerful women, but those that existed were quite significant. Assuming your enemies and allies must be all male is at best indicative of superficial analysis. Mao (a student of the Art of War) led the victorious "People's Army" including many women. Also this translation is incomplete and the English is quite dated, but here it is: Sun Tzu on the Art of War The Oldest Military Treatise in the World Translated from the Chinese By LIONEL GILES, M.A. (1910) －－－－Lionel Giles 注：In 1910, Lionel Giles, of the British Museum translated the book into English. This translation become popular, especially after the copyright ran out. 《孙子兵法》计篇第一 计篇 孙子曰：兵者，国之大事，死生之地，存亡之道，不可不察也。 故经之以五，校之以计，而索其情： 一曰道， 二曰天， 三曰地， 四曰将， 五曰法。 道者，令民於上衕意者也，可与之死，可与之生，民不诡也。 天者，阴阳、寒暑、时制也。 地者，高下、远近、险易、广狭、死生也。 将者，智、信、仁、勇、严也。 法者，曲制、官道、主用也。 凡此五者，将莫不闻，知之者胜，不知之者不胜。 故校之以计，而索其情。 曰：主孰有道？ 将孰有能？ 天地孰得？ 法令孰行？ 兵众孰强？ 士卒孰练？ 赏罚孰明？ 吾以此知胜负矣。 将听吾计，用之必胜，留之； 将不听吾计，用之必败，去之。 计利以听，乃为之势，以佐其外。势者，因利而制权也。 兵者，诡道也。故能而示之不能，用而示之不用，近而示之远，远而示之近。 利而诱之，乱而取之，实而备之，强而避之，怒而挠之， 卑而骄之，佚而劳之，亲而离之，攻其不备，出其不意。 此兵家之胜，不可先传也。 夫未战而庙算胜者，得算多也； 未战而庙算不胜者，得算少也。 多算胜，少算不胜，而况无算乎！吾以此观之，胜负见矣。 I. LAYING PLANS 1. Sun Tzu said: The art of war is of vital importance to the State. 2. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected. 3. The art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors, to be taken into account in one's deliberations, when seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in the field. 4. These are: (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth; (4) The Commander; (5) Method and discipline. 5,6. The Moral Law causes the people to be in complete accord with their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by any danger. 7. Heaven signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons. 8. Earth comprises distances, great and small; danger and security; open ground and narrow passes; the chances of life and death. 9. The Commander stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerely, benevolence, courage and strictness. 10. By method and discipline are to be understood the marshalling of the army in its proper subdivisions, the graduations of rank among the officers, the maintenance of roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the control of military expenditure. 11. These five heads should be familiar to every general: he who knows them will be victorious; he who knows them not will fail. 12. Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to determine the military conditions, let them be made the basis of a comparison, in this wise:-- 13. (1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral law? (2) Which of the two generals has most ability? (3) With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth? (4) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced? (5) Which army is stronger? (6) On which side are officers and men more highly trained? (7) In which army is there the greater constancy both in reward and punishment? 14. By means of these seven considerations I can forecast victory or defeat. 15. The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it, will conquer: let such a one be retained in command! The general that hearkens not to my counsel nor acts upon it, will suffer defeat:--let such a one be dismissed! 16. While heading the profit of my counsel, avail yourself also of any helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules. 17. According as circumstances are favourable, one should modify one's plans. 18. All warfare is based on deception. 19. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near. 20. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him. 21. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in superior strength, evade him. 22. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant. 23. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. If his forces are united, separate them. 24. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected. 25. These military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged beforehand. 26. Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought. The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory and few calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all! It is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose. 02《孙子兵法》作战篇第二 作战篇 孙子曰：凡用兵之法，驰车千驷，革车千乘，带甲十万，千里馈粮， 则内外之费，宾客之用，胶漆之材，车甲之奉，日费千金，然後十万 之师举矣。 其用战也贵胜，久则钝兵挫锐，攻城则力屈，久暴师则国用不足。 夫钝兵挫锐，屈力殚货，则诸侯乘其弊而起，虽有智者，不能善其後矣。 故兵闻拙速，未睹巧之久也。夫兵久而国利者，未之有也。 故不尽知用兵之害者，则不能尽知用兵之利也。 善用兵者，役不再籍，粮不三载； 取用於国，因粮於敌，故军食可足也。 国之贫於师者远输，远输则百姓贫。 近师者贵卖，贵卖则百姓竭，财竭则急於丘役。 力屈、财殚，中原内虚於家。 百姓之费，十去其七；公家之费：破军罢马，甲胄矢弩，戟盾蔽橹，丘牛大车，十去其六。 故智将务食於敌。 食敌一钟，当吾二十钟； 箕杆一石，当吾二十石。 故杀敌者，怒也；取敌之利者，货也。故车战，得车十乘已上，赏其 先得者，而更其旌旗，车杂而乘之，卒善而养之，是谓胜敌而益强。 故兵贵胜，不贵久。 故知兵之将，民之司命，国家安危之主也。 II. WAGING WAR 1. Sun Tzu said: In the operations of war, where there are in the field a thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand mail-clad soldiers, with provisions enough to carry them a thousand li, the expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainment of guests, small items such as glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots and armour, will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day. Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men. 2. When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, then men's weapons will grow dull and their ardour will be damped. If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength. 3. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State will not be equal to the strain. 4. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardour damped, your strength exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that must ensue. 5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays. 6. There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare. 7. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war that can thoroughly understand the profitable way of carrying it on. 8. The skilful soldier does not raise a second levy, neither are his supply-wagons loaded more than twice. 9. Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Thus the army will have food enough for its needs. 10. Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be maintained by contributions from a distance. Contributing to maintain an army at a distance causes the people to be impoverished. 11. On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes prices to go up; and high prices cause the people's substance to be drained away. 12. When their substance is drained away, the peasantry will be afflicted by heavy exactions. 13,14. With this loss of substance and exhaustion of strength, the homes of the people will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their income will be dissipated; while government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses, breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields, protective mantles, draught-oxen and heavy wagons, will amount to four-tenths of its total revenue. 15. Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy. One cartload of the enemy's provisions is equivalent to twenty of one's own, and likewise a single picul of his provender is equivalent to twenty from one's own store. 16. Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger; that there may be advantage from defeating the enemy, they must have their rewards. 17. Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been taken, those should be rewarded who took the first. Our own flags should be substituted for those of the enemy, and the chariots mingled and used in conjunction with ours. The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept. 18. This is called, using the conquered foe to augment one's own strength. 19. In war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns. 20. Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of the people's fate, the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall be in peace or in peril. 03《孙子兵法》谋攻篇第三 谋攻篇 孙子曰：凡用兵之法， 全国为上，破国次之； 全军为上，破军次之； 全旅为上，破旅次之； 全卒为上，破卒次之； 全伍为上，破伍次之。 是故百战百胜，非善之善也； 不战而屈人之兵，善之善者也。 故上兵伐谋，其次伐交，其次伐兵，其下攻城。攻城之法为不得已。 修橹轒轀 具器械、三月而後成，距闉，又三月而後已。 将不胜其忿，而蚁附之，杀士三分之一，而城不拔者，此攻之灾也。 故善用兵者，屈人之兵而非战也。 拔人之城而非攻也，破人之国而非久也，必以全争於天下， 故兵不顿，而利可全，此谋攻之法也。 故用兵之法，十则围之，五则攻之，倍则分之，敌则能战之，少则能 逃之，不若则能避之。故小敌之坚，大敌之擒也。 夫将者，国之辅也。辅周则国必强，辅隙则国必弱。 故君之所以患於军者三：不知军之不可以进而谓之进，不知军之不可 以退而谓之退，是为縻军；不知三军之事，而衕三军之政者，则军士 惑矣；不知三军之权，而衕三军之任，则军士疑矣。三军既惑且疑， 则诸侯之难至矣，是谓乱军引胜。 故知胜有五： 知可以战与不可以战者胜， 识众寡之用者胜， 上下衕欲者胜， 以虞待不虞者胜， 将能而君不御者胜。 此五者，知胜之道也。 故曰：知己知彼，百战不贻； 不知彼而知己，一胜一负； 不知彼不知己，每战必贻。 III. ATTACK BY STRATAGEM 1. Sun Tzu said: In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy's country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is better to recapture an army entire than to destroy it, to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire than to destroy them. 2. Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting. 3. Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy's plans; the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy's forces; the next in order is to attack the enemy's army in the field; and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities. 4. The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be avoided. The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various implements of war, will take up three whole months; and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three months more. 5. The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants, with the result that one-third of his men are slain, while the town still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a siege. 6. Therefore the skilful leader subdues the enemy's troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field. 7. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the Empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph will be complete. This is the method of attacking by stratagem. 8. It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy's one, to surround him; if five to one, to attack him; if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two. 9. If equally matched, we can offer battle; if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy; if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him. 10. Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in the end it must be captured by the larger force. 11. Now the general is the bulwark of the State; if the bulwark is complete at all points; the State will be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the State will be weak. 12. There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his army:-- 13. (1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army. 14. (2) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in an army. This causes restlessness in the soldier's minds. 15. (3) By employing the officers of his army without discrimination, through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to circumstances. This shakes the confidence of the soldiers. 16. But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is sure to come from the other feudal princes. This is simply bringing anarchy into the army, and flinging victory away. 17. Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory: (1) He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight. (2) He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces. (3) He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its ranks. (4) He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared. (5) He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the sovereign. 18. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle. 04《孙子兵法》形篇第四 形篇 孙子曰：昔之善战者，先为不可胜，以侍敌之可胜。不可胜在己，可 胜在敌。故善战者，能为不可胜，不能使敌之必可胜。故曰：胜可知 ，而不可为。不可胜者，守也；可胜者，攻也。守则不足，攻则有余 。善守者，藏於九地之下；善攻者，动於九天之上。故能自保而全胜 也。 见胜不过众人之所知，非善之善者也；战胜而天下曰善，非善之善者 也。故举秋毫不为多力，见日月不为明目，闻雷霆不为聪耳。古之所 谓善战者，胜於易胜者也。故善战之胜也，无智名，无勇功。故其战 胜不忒。不忒者，其所措必胜，胜已败者也。故善战者，立於不败之 地，而不失敌之败也。是故胜兵先胜而後求战，败兵先战而後求胜。 善用兵者，修道而保法，故能为胜败之政。 兵法：一曰度，二曰量，三曰数，四曰称，五曰胜。地生度，度生量 ，量生数，数生称，称生胜。 故胜兵若以镒称铢，败兵若以铢称镒。 胜者之战民也，若决积水於千仞之谿者，形也。 IV. TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS 1. Sun Tzu said: The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of defeating the enemy. 2. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself. 3. Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat, but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy. 4. Hence the saying: One may know how to conquer without being able to do it. 5. Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive. 6. Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength; attacking, a superabundance of strength. 7. The general who is skilled in defence hides in the most secret recesses of the earth; he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven. Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves; on the other, a victory that is complete. 8. To see victory only when it is within the ken of the common herd is not the acme of excellence. 9. Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and the whole Empire says, "Well done!" 10. To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength; to see the sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the noise of thunder is no sign of a quick ear. 11. What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, but excels in winning with ease. 12. Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit for courage. 13. He wins his battles by making no mistakes. Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is already defeated. 14. Hence the skilful fighter puts himself into a position which makes defeat impossible, and does not miss the moment for defeating the enemy. 15. Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory. 16. The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and strictly adheres to method and discipline; thus it is in his power to control success. 17. In respect of military method, we have, firstly, Measurement; secondly, Estimation of quantity; thirdly, Calculation; fourthly, Balancing of chances; fifthly, Victory. 18. Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of quantity to Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity; Balancing of chances to Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of chances. 19. A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound's weight placed in the scale against a single grain. 20. The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting of pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep. 05《孙子兵法》势篇第五 势篇 孙子曰：凡治众如治寡，分数是也；斗