Bulletin
of the
Atomic
Scientists
IT IS 6 MINUTES TO MIDNIGHT
®
Nuclear notebook
Russian nuclear forces, 2011
Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris
Abstract
With RussiaÕs ratification of New START in January 2011 comes a commitment to bilateral nuclear reductions.
With a 2018 deadline as the goal, the treaty sets out to limit the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads
and the number of deployed ballistic missiles and heavy bombers. But, the authors write, there are other
numbers to watchÑthose that are not limited by New START; Russia is positioned to maintain thousands of
other non-deployed strategic and nonstrategic warheads. The authors assess the countryÕs nuclear forces,
providing clear analysis of intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear-powered ballistic submarines, strategic
bombers, and nonstrategic tactical weapons.
Keywords
ICBM, intercontinental ballistic missiles, New START, nonstrategic tactical weapons, nuclear-powered
ballistic submarines, Russia, SSBN, strategic bombers, US
O
n January 25, 2011, Russia ratified
the New Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (START)
with the United States, recommitting
itself to bilateral nuclear reductions.
The treaty limits Russian (and US)
deployed strategic nuclear warhead
levels to 1,550 and deployed ballistic mis-
siles and heavy bombers to 700 (com-
bined), with a deadline of 2018. Yet
Russia can be expected to maintain
thousands of other non-deployed strate-
gic and nonstrategic warheads, since
New START does not place any limit
on the total stockpile size, capping only
the number of deployed strategic war-
heads allowed on long-range delivery
vehicles (Kristensen, 2011).
We estimate that as of March
2011, Russia had approximately 2,430
nuclear warheads assigned to opera-
tional intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic
missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers.
Russia also has a large inventory of
3,700”5,400 nonstrategic nuclear war-
heads, plus an additional 3,000warheads
awaiting dismantlement, for a total
inventory of nearly 11,000 nuclear
warheads.1
Of RussiaÕs 2,430 strategic offensive
nuclear weapons, we estimate 1,583 are
deployed on approximately 455 ballistic
missiles, with another 844 warheads
assigned to 76 heavy bombers.
(In normal circumstances, bombers are
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
67(3) 67–74
! The Author(s) 2011
Reprints and permissions:
sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0096340211407147
http://thebulletin.sagepub.com
by guest on May 5, 2011bos.sagepub.comDownloaded from
Table 1. Russian nuclear forces, 2011
Type/name
Russian
designation Launchers
Year
deployed
Warheads x
yield (kilotons)
Total
warheads
Strategic offensive weapons
ICBMs
SS-18 M6 Satan RS-20V 50 1988 10�500/800 (MIRV) 500
SS-19 M3 Stiletto RS-18 50 1980 6�400 (MIRV) 300
SS-25 Sickle RS-12M (Topol) 120 1985 1�800 120
SS-27 Mod 1 RS-12M2 (Topol-M) 51 1997 1�800 51
SS-27 Mod 1 RS-12M1 (Topol-M) 18 2006 1�800? 18
SS-27 Mod 2 RS-24 6 2010 3�400? (MIRV) 18
Subtotal 295 1,007
SLBMs
SS-N-18 M1 Stingray RSM-50 4/64 1978 3�50 (MIRV) 192
SS-N-23 Skiff R-29RM 1/16 1986 4�100 (MIRV) 64
SS-N-23 M1 RSM-54 (Sineva) 5/80 2007 4�100 (MIRV)1 320
SS-N-32 RSM-56 (Bulava) (1/16) (2011) 6�100 (MIRV) (96)
Subtotal 10/160 576
Bombers/weapons
Bear-H6 Tu-95 MS6 32 1984 6�AS-15A ALCMs, bombs 192
Bear-H16 Tu-95 MS16 31 1984 16�AS-15A ALCMs,
bombs
496
Blackjack Tu-160 13 1987 12�AS-15B ALCMs or
AS-16 SRAMs, bombs
156
Subtotal 76 8442
Subtotal strategic offensive forces �2,430
Nonstrategic and defensive weapons
ABM/Air defense
SA-10 Grumble 1,900 1980 1� low �630
53T6 Gazelle 68 1986 1�10 683
Land-based air
Bombers/fighters �682 ASM, bombs �800
Ground-based4
Short-range ballistic missiles ? 1�? ?
Naval
Submarines/surface ships/air SLCM, ASW, SAM, ASM,
DB, torpedoes
�590
Subtotal nonstrategic and defensive forces �2,0805
Total �4,5006
1The Sineva probably carries at least four MIRVed warheads. US intelligence in 2006 estimated that the missile can carry up to 10 warheads but
lowered the estimate to four warheads in 2009.
2The bomber weapons are kept in storage, not deployed on the aircraft. We estimate that only a few hundred weapons are present at the two
bomber bases, with the remainder in central storage.
3All 32 Gorgon missiles apparently have been removed from the ABM system.
4NATO’s International Military Staff (IMS) briefed the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in November 2009 that the Russian Zapad and Ladoga
exercises in August ” September 2009 included “missile launches, some of which may have simulated the use of tactical nuclear weapons”
(Aftenposten, 2011).
5Numbers may not add up due to rounding. All nonstrategic warheads are in central storage. The 2,080 listed make up the estimated nominal load
for nuclear-capable delivery platforms. An additional 1,600”3,300 nonstrategic warheads are awaiting dismantlement, for a total inventory of
3,700”5,400 nonstrategic warheads.
6In addition to nonstrategic warheads, we estimate that an additional 3,000 retired strategic warheads are awaiting dismantlement, for a total
inventory of approximately 11,000 warheads.
Key
ABM: Antiballistic missile, ALCM: Air-launched cruise missile, ASM: Air-to-surface missile, ASW: Antisubmarine weapon, DB: Depth bomb,
ICBM: Intercontinental ballistic missile, MIRV: Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle, SAM: Surface-to-air missile, SLBM: Submarine-
launched ballistic missile, SLCM: Sea-launched cruise missile, SRAM: Short-range attack missile.
68 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 67(3)
by guest on May 5, 2011bos.sagepub.comDownloaded from
not loaded with nuclear weapons; we
estimate that all but a few hundred
bomber weapons have been transferred
to central storage sites.) New START
counts the actual number of warheads
deployed on ballistic missiles, but it
does not count actual bomber weapons;
instead, it attributes a single weapon to
each aircraftÑregardless of its actual
assigned load.2 Under these warhead
accounting rules, RussiaÕs current arse-
nal would count as 1,659 deployed stra-
tegic warheads, which means that by
2018, Russia will have to reduce its
deployed levels by about 110 warheads.
In 2010, Russia adopted a newmilitary
doctrine that describes its policy of
nuclear weapons use. Despite conjec-
ture that the new doctrine deepens
Russian reliance on nuclear weapons
and increases the chances of potential
first-use, the document generally
appears to reaffirm a retaliatory posture
with an option to preempt if necessary.
The new doctrine describes the role
of nuclear weapons as Òpreventing the
outbreak of nuclear military conflicts
and military conflicts involving the use
of conventional means of attack (a large-
scale war or regional war),Ó with nuclear
forces maintained for Òstrategic stabil-
ityÓ at an Òadequate level.Ó According
to the document, Russia Òreserves the
right to utilize nuclear weapons in
response to the utilization of nuclear
and other types of weapons of mass
destruction against it and (or) its allies,
and also in the event of aggression
against the Russian Federation involving
the use of conventional weapons when
the very existence of the state is under
threatÓ (emphasis added).3 In 2009, a
Russian official said that Moscow did
not rule out preemptive nuclear strikes
in critical situations for national
security, but such a scenario is not
included in the public version of the
2010 doctrine.
ICBMs
Russia deploys nearly 300 ICBMs of six
types, loaded with just over 1,000
nuclear warheads. This is a reduction
of 30 missiles over the last year, caused
by the ongoing retirement of SS-18
(RS-20V), SS-19 (RS-18), and SS-25
(RS-12M) missiles, which are being
replaced (on less than a one-for-one
basis) by SS-27 missiles. RussiaÕs mis-
siles are organized in three missile
armies with 11 divisions.
The SS-27 (Topol-M) comes in three
variants: the SS-27 Mod. 1, a single-war-
head missile that can be either mobile
(RS-12M1) or silo based (RS-12M2); and
the SS-27 Mod. 2 (RS-24), a mobile mis-
sile equipped with multiple indepen-
dently targetable reentry vehicles. All
new Russian ICBMs deployed over the
next decade will be RS-24 s. Deployment
of the silo-based SS-27 Mod. 1 has
reached 51 operational missiles, orga-
nized into five regiments. Russia
deploys 18 mobile SS-27 Mod. 1 s north-
east of Moscow at Teykovo, where six
SS-27 Mod. 2 s (each estimated to carry
three warheads) are deployed with the
54th missile regiment.
By 2016, the three Topol-M variants
will constitute approximately 80 per-
cent of the ICBM force, according to
the Russian military (RIA Novosti,
2010 a). To reach that goal, Moscow
will need to increase the pace of retire-
ment of SS-18, SS-19, and SS-25 missiles
and double production and deployment
of the silo-based SS-27Mod. 1 andmobile
SS-27 Mod. 2.
Kristensen and Norris 69
by guest on May 5, 2011bos.sagepub.comDownloaded from
Roughly half of RussiaÕs deployed
ICBM warheads are carried on approxi-
mately 50 SS-18 s, a 10-warhead heavy
ICBM first deployed in 1988. Sergey
Karakayev, commander of the Strategic
Rocket Forces, announced that the ser-
vice life of the SS-18 would be extended
and the missile kept in service until 2026
(RIA Novosti, 2010 b). Approximately
300 warheads are deployed on the silo-
based, six-warhead SS-19, which first
entered service in 1980; the service life
of the missile has also been extended,
possibly through 2016. The single-war-
head SS-25 is rapidly being reduced,
with approximately 27 missiles with-
drawn from service each year. The mis-
sile, which first entered service in 1985,
will probably be retired by 2015.
Defense Minister Vladimir Popovkin
stated in early 2011 that a new Òheavy
ICBMÓ is included in RussiaÕs arms pro-
curement program through 2020.4 The
new missile would carry up to 10 war-
heads and be deployed in 2018
(Gorenburg, 2011; VPK News, 2011).
Nuclear-powered ballistic missile
submarines (SSBNs)
RussiaÕs 10 active SSBNs (six Delta IVs
and four Delta IIIs) are equipped with
160 submarine-launched ballistic mis-
siles (SLBMs) and carry an estimated
576 warheads. Russian submarines can
launch their missiles while docked
pier-side, if necessary. As in 2010, the
Delta IVs remain part of the Northern
Fleet based at Yagelnaya Bay on the
Kola Peninsula, and the Delta IIIs are
based at Rybachiy on the Kamchatka
Peninsula as part of the Pacific Fleet.
The Delta III boats will eventually be
replaced by Borey-class SSBNs; how-
ever, development of the new class and
the missile it will carry, the Bulava (SS-
N-32), has been slow. In fact, the first
Borey boat, Yuri Dolgoruki, has been
under development for more than 10
years. After test failures in 2008 and
2009, the Bulava SLBMÑwhich can
carry up to six warheads and has a
range of up to 9,000 kilometersÑhad
two successful test-launches in late
2010 from a converted Typhoon-class
SSBN; however, for the system to enter
service, the Yuri Dolgoruki will have to
successfully test-launch Bulavas in 2011.
The second Borey-class SSBN, the
Alexander Nevsky, has been delayed
until later this year at the earliest, and
the third is slated for completion in
2012 but might also be delayed. Russia
plans to build up to eight Borey-class
SSBNs, able to carry 16 Bulava SLBMs
each. It also has plans to develop, by
2020, a fifth-generation SSBN that
would carry both ballistic and cruise
missiles (RIA Novosti, 2011).
Russia is upgrading its Delta IV
SSBNs to carry the Sineva SLBM, an
improved version of the SS-N-23 missile.
Upgrades are complete for five of the
subs (Bryansk, Karelia, Tula,
Verkhoturie, and Ekaterinburg); the
sixth boat (Novomoskovsk) began its
modernization in 2009 and is expected
to return to service in 2012.
Russia conducted six SLBM test-
launches in 2010. On August 6, the Tula
test-launched two SLBMs, one of which
was a Sineva, from the Barents Sea.
On October 7, the Delta III Typhoon-
class Dmitrii Donskoi launched a
Bulava, also from the Barents Sea (the
first successful launch following a
string of failures). On October 28, two
SLBMs were test-launched from oppo-
site ends of Russia: in the east, an
SS-N-18 from the Sea of Okhotsk by the
70 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 67(3)
by guest on May 5, 2011bos.sagepub.comDownloaded from
Delta III Svyatoi Georgii Pobedonosets,
and in the west, a Sineva from the
Barents Sea by the Delta IV Bryansk;
the next day, the Dmitrii Donskoi suc-
cessfully test-launched another Bulava
from the Barents Sea. A third Bulava
test-launch, the first from the Yuri
Dolgoruki, was scheduled for December
2010 but was delayed until mid-2011.
Russian SSBNs conducted seven stra-
tegic deterrent patrols in 2010, down
from nine the previous year. Russia
does not run continuous at-sea deterrent
patrols (unlike Western powers), but it
occasionally deploys SSBNs on training
patrols.
Strategic bombers
Russia deploys 76 strategic bombers
(though not all of them are fully opera-
tional): 13 Tu-160 s (Blackjacks), 32
Tu-95MS6s (Bear H6s), and 31 Tu-
95MS16s (Bear H16s). Russia continues
to modernize the targeting and naviga-
tion systems in many of these strategic
aircraft (RIA Novosti, 2008c). In total,
the bombers are capable of carrying up
to 844 weapons. As described above, the
weapons are not deployed on the bom-
bers; instead, we estimate that a few hun-
dred weapons are stored at the bomber
bases and that the rest are kept in central
storage facilities. The Tu-160 s and Tu-
95MSs are equipped to carry various
nuclear bombs, as well as the nuclear
AS-15A (Kh-55) air-launched cruise mis-
sile (ALCM). Russia is converting some
of its nuclear ALCMs into conventional
missiles (designation Kh-555). An
advanced nuclear cruise missile (Kh-
102) has been in development for more
than 10 years but is still not deployed.
Russia has begun developing a new
strategic bomber that is expected to
enter service in 2025”30.5 The new
bomber would replace the Tu-160 and
Tu-95MS heavy bombers and the
nuclear-capable medium-range bomber
Tu-22M3, according to Maj. Gen.
Anatoly Zhikharev, the commander of
strategic aviation (Itar-Tass, 2010; RIA
Novosti, 2009).
During 2010, Russian heavy bombers
continued their long-range training
exercises into the Pacific, North
Atlantic, and Arctic oceans, where they
were intercepted by US, Canadian,
British, Norwegian, and Japanese air-
craft. While the Russian exercises
receive much attention, the combat
effectiveness of the bombers is probably
limited due to aging equipment and lim-
ited support aircraft.
Nonstrategic (tactical) weapons
RussiaÕs inventory of nonstrategic
nuclear weaponsÑfar larger than the
US inventoryÑremains a flash point in
security discussions, as illustrated by
the US Senate debate over New
START and NATOÕs statements in its
new Strategic Concept. The Russian
government says it has reduced its non-
strategic nuclear weapon inventory by
75 percent since 1991 (Russian
Federation, 2010b). Because this figure
is much greater than the 60 percent
reduction that Col. Gen. Vladimir
Verkhovtsev cited in 2007 (Pravda,
2007), it seems Russia may have disman-
tled additional nonstrategic weapons
over the last four years.
Estimates of the 1991 Soviet inventory
of nonstrategic nuclear weapons range
from 15,000 to 21,700.6 Based on the
Russian governmentÕs claim of a 75 per-
cent reduction, the current Russian non-
strategic nuclear arsenal would
Kristensen and Norris 71
by guest on May 5, 2011bos.sagepub.comDownloaded from
comprise some 3,700”5,400 warheads;
this number roughly matches the range
of Ò3,000”5,000 plusÓ mentioned in a
September 2009 US embassy cable
(Hedgehogs.net, 2010). We estimate
RussiaÕs nonstrategic inventory includes
as many as 5,390 weapons: 2,270 naval
warheads; 2,000 warheads for the air
force; and up to 1,120 missile- and air-
defense warheads. Some ground-
launched warheads might remain.
These warhead numbers far exceed
the capacity of RussiaÕs nuclear-capable
nonstrategic naval, air force, and air-
defense delivery platforms, which we
estimate may be assigned a nominal
inventory of 2,080 warheads. Most of
the remaining 3,310 nonstrategic weap-
ons are probably retired and awaiting
dismantlement; given this, we anticipate
that the Russian nonstrategic nuclear
arsenal might decline by as much as 50
percent over the next decade.
When one considers the actual capac-
ity of the nonstrategic delivery vehicles
in the Russian armed forces, however,
the distribution of RussiaÕs nonstrategic
nuclear weapons inventory takes on a
different look. Using assumptions about
the nominal load for each type of deliv-
ery platform, we estimate that approxi-
mately 800 AS-4 air-to-surface missiles
and bombs are assigned for delivery by
Tu-22M (Backfire) intermediate-range
bombers and by Su-24 (Fencer) fighter-
bombers (bombs only). Some of the Su-
24 s are undergoing amodernization pro-
gram, but the aircraft will be replaced by
Su-34 (Fullback) fighter-bombers, which
might inherit the nuclear fighter-bomber
strike role.
We estimate that MoscowÕs antiballis-
tic missile system and mobile air-defense
systems are allocated nearly 700 war-
heads for the Gazelle ballistic missile
interceptors and SA-10 Grumble air-
defense system (and possibly also the
SA-12 Growler system). The air-defense
interceptors apparently have some
capacity against ballistic missiles as
well. Several SA-12 regiments, each of
which have about eight launchers and 32
missiles, are deployed around Moscow,
and Russia plans to deploy at least 18 sys-
tems by 2015 that will form the core of
RussiaÕs air and missile defenses through
at least 2020 (RIANovosti, 2008a, 2008b).
Naval nonstrategic delivery platforms
are allocated an estimated 590 warheads
for cruise missiles, antisubmarine weap-
ons, anti-air missiles, torpedoes, and
depth bombs (we believe that surface
ships are no longer assigned nuclear tor-
pedoes). The first new Severodvinsk-
class nuclear-powered attack submarine
is expected to enter service this year
with a nuclear capability, including
land-attack cruise missiles.
Rumors about Russian nonstrategic
nuclear weapons deployments near
NATO re-emerged in 2010 with an arti-
cle in the Wall Street Journal describing
a classified US intelligence assessment
that ÒRussia has expanded tactical [non-
strategic] nuclear deployments near
NATO allies several times in recent
yearsÓ (Entous and Weisman, 2010).
The report was followed in early 2011
by Lithuanian Defense Minister Rasa
JuknevicieneÕs claim that Russia deploys
nonstrategic nuclear weapons in the
Kaliningrad region (Agence-France
Presse, 2011). While Russia might have
nuclear-capable delivery systems in
Kaliningrad, we do not believe it stations
any nuclear warheads in the oblast.
Although Russia has declared that it
would eliminate all of its ground-
launched tactical (nonstrategic) nuclear
warheads in accordance with the 1991
72 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 67(3)
by guest on May 5, 2011bos.sagepub.comDownloaded from
presidential nuclear initiatives agreed
by George H. W. Bush and Mikhail
Gorbachev, it appears that some
ground-launched nonstrategic warheads
remain. In a briefing to theNorthAtlantic
Council about two September 2009
Russian military exercises, NATOÕs
International Military Staff reported
that the exercises included Òmissile
launches, some of which may have simu-
lated the use of tactical nuclear weaponsÓ
(Aftenposten, 2011). NATO concluded
that the Russian armed forces were Ònot
able to conduct large scale conventional
operationsÓÑand that Russia was Òstill
relying on the use of tactical nuclear
weapons, even in local or regional con-
flictsÓ (Aftenposten, 2011).
Acknowledgements
Jana Honkova, an intern at FAS, provided valuable
research.
Notes
1. We believe that Russia stores its weapons at
48 permanent storage sites across Russia
(Norris and Kristensen, 2009: 86”98).
Other essential references for following
Russian
本文档为【俄罗斯核力量2011】,请使用软件OFFICE或WPS软件打开。作品中的文字与图均可以修改和编辑,
图片更改请在作品中右键图片并更换,文字修改请直接点击文字进行修改,也可以新增和删除文档中的内容。
该文档来自用户分享,如有侵权行为请发邮件ishare@vip.sina.com联系网站客服,我们会及时删除。
[版权声明] 本站所有资料为用户分享产生,若发现您的权利被侵害,请联系客服邮件isharekefu@iask.cn,我们尽快处理。
本作品所展示的图片、画像、字体、音乐的版权可能需版权方额外授权,请谨慎使用。
网站提供的党政主题相关内容(国旗、国徽、党徽..)目的在于配合国家政策宣传,仅限个人学习分享使用,禁止用于任何广告和商用目的。