民族主义、新权威主义和政治自由主义：是它们在塑造中国政治议程吗？

Nationalism, Neo-Authoritarianism, and Political Liberalism: Are They Shaping Political Agendas in China? Author(s): Yongnian Zheng Source: Asian Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Winter, 1993), pp. 207-227 Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30172166 . Accessed: 01/04/2011 18:40 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. 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YONGNIAN ZHENG P ost-Mao reform has led to ideological changes and given rise to new ide- ologies that have great political significance. But few studies have been done on the impact of ideological changes on political agenda.' The purpose of this article is to examine some major changes in economic as well as polit- ical ideology and their implications for political development in China. Used here, "ideology" mainly refers to "systems of thought and belief by which [individuals and groups] explain . . . how their social system operates and what principles it exemplifies."2 In Ann Swidler's words, ideology is a "tool kit" of habits, skills, and styles from which people construct "strategies of action."3 To explain to themselves and to others the nature and justification of the changes they wish to introduce, Chinese leaders and their intellectual fellows have been compelled to give a more specific context to the general goal of development to which they all subscribe. In doing this, they have been able to draw upon or create various ideologies and have placed a strong emphasis on these ideologies' functions, which include the importance of an action-oriented belief system in explaining the world, justifying action, limit- ing policy choices, and creating social solidarity.4 The major ideologies that I will examine include nationalism, neo-authori- tarianism, and political liberalism. My main points are that the old ideology of the planned economy is being reassessed in the light of a new philosophy, nationalism; that economic priority is becoming the major tenet of a new ideology, i.e., neo-authoritarianism; and that liberal intellectuals' ideal of Chinese democracy is being expressed partially by some of the leaders of the 207 208 Asian Affairs young generation. These ideologies often overlap, but they differ in many major aspects concerning economy and politics. The conflict and negotiation among different factions have dominated, and will continue to dominate, reform agendas. This article is divided into four sections. In the first three, I describe some major ideological changes and their impact on Chinese politics; in the last sec- tion, I discuss the impact of those changes on political agendas in China. My analysis is based on interviews conducted among members of the think tank of former general secretary of the Chinese Communist party (CCP) Zhao Ziyang and on published materials and those circulated internally. The Ideology of the Planned Economy and Nationalism The planned economy as a systematic ideology in China has been set forth by Chen Yun and developed by others.5 They have assumed that a general po- litical framework is needed for smooth economic operation. Since 1979, Chen has emphasized repeatedly the importance of state planning,6 employing the well-known metaphor of the "bird cage economy," which likens the plan- market relationship to the cage-bird one. If the cage is too tight, the bird will suffocate. However, if there is no cage, the bird will fly away. Therefore, there must be enough room for market operation, but the state must be able to control market performance. Furthermore, the state has to continually adjust the "cage size" because the "cage" might be expanded into a province, a region, several regions, the whole country, or even into foreign countries.7 According to this perspective, the Chinese economy basically consists of two parts, the planned sector and the market-regulated one. The whole socialist economy must consist of two economic sectors: (1) the planned economic sector (with a plan based on proportion); (2) the sector regu- lated by the market (without a plan, and production according either to chang- es of demand or supply in market, regulated blindly). The first sector is basic and principal; the second is subordinate, but also essential. [As long as we] con- trol political power, and have the first sector economy, we are able to construct socialism. Also, the second sector is beneficially complementary (basically it is harmless) .... [A] crucial problem is that up to now we have not realized con- sciously the necessity and inevitability of the coexistence of these two economic sectors, and have not been sure of what different proportions of these two economic sectors should exist in the whole national economy.8 The market sector is indispensable and essential, but, without a plan, the market would be blind and anarchistic. If planning is overly rigid and exces- sive, the market should be introduced. Thus, economic reforms are always necessary. As readjustments are repeatedly carried out, "it is not necessarily the case that the planned economy will become larger and larger, and market Nationalism, Neo-Authoritarianism, and Liberalism 209 adjustment with be reduced. Perhaps it is market adjustment that will increase."'9 The state must play an important role in reforms, however, be- cause readjustments involve an integrated set of policies that include an ex- panded role for financial control in state planning, a reduction of output tar- get levels, and reduced capital construction. Either economic reforms or political reforms must operate within the con- text of state plans. In other words, the most important aim of any reform is to reach a reasonable proportion between the market and the plan. This basic principle has also been proposed and supported by other leaders such as Yao Yilin and Li Peng and was emphasized by the report of the Twelfth CCP Congress held in September 1982. It stated that China must implement the planned economy based on public ownership, with the pillar of China's na- tional economy being planned production and circulation. At the same time, however, the state can allow the market to regulate a portion of production. Thus, the market economy can function within the framework of the state plan.'0 The followers of this concept oppose the fast introduction of market mech- anisms into Chinese economic life. They realize the importance of reforming the old planned economy institutions in China, but they argue that the market system has been a development of the West, where underlying the market institution is an entrepreneurial or middle class. They say that the introduc- tion of such a market institution into China is doomed to fail because China does not have such a middle class. Planned economy advocates criticize those who propose the reform of old economic institutions and the introduction of the market system, believing that social crises are the results of such institutional reforms. One spokesman of this line of thinking, Xiao Gongqin, argues: [Due to the institutional reform, market mechanisms were introduced in large scale, but] new systems are not able to produce expected efficacy because of the lack of supporting factors, and because the old planned systems, which has had the function of integration, is already undermined, even destroyed. As a result, economic behavior of social members (including units and enterprises) is con- strained effectively neither by the old system and norms nor by the market sys- tems and norms. .... [This] has led to an anarchic situation for individuals' social behavior, beliefs, and values, i.e. an anomie condition. This anomie ... will lead to serious anarchy, moral and social crises." Planned economy advocates thus doubt whether China can use the market system to reform the old planned economy. For them, Chinese reformers in the past have oversimplified Western economic theories such as those of Mil- ton Friedman. Chinese liberal reformers have had a dream that China can es- tablish a national market order through the utilizaton of market price and the introduction of market institutions. Planned economy advocates emphasize that the market determinists have been wrong because the market system has 210 Asian Affairs no general application. China's economic reform indeed concerns the market system, but the market system cannot resolve China's economic problems. Economic crises in many former socialist countries have been produced by the fast implementation of the market system. Similarly, in the past few years of reforms, the market system did not resolve China's problem. Instead, it created economic as well as moral crises, which in turn threatened the legit- imacy of the government.12 Economically, the nation is divided by various provincial "dukedoms." According to two well-known economists, Shen Liren and Dai Yuanchen, economic circles describe the result of economic decentralization during the economic reform as a new economic phenomenon-"dukedom economy." That means, 30 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities [Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai] are all big dukes, 300 prefectures and cities are middle dukes, and 2,000 counties are small dukes. Those dukes have their own domains and political regimes, and seek to develop independently.3 To these scholars, decentralization has led to two major negative conse- quences for the Chinese economy. The first major result is "localism," which in turn leads to an overheating economy and a rapid expansion of demands. Localism occurs after administrative decentralization, as provincial govern- ments institute their own economic goals, which conflict frequently with that of the central government. The second outcome results in the Chinese economy's becoming fragmented while the industrial structure among different regions tends to remain the same, without regard to differing com- parative advantages. This local behavior seriously conflicts with the central government's overall modernization strategy. Serious social and political problems have followed economic ones under the planned economy paradigm. The flow of Western values into China has endangered traditional Chinese morality. People, especially college students, have had increasingly higher expectations for the government, and the inabil- ity of the government to satisfy their demands has often led to discontent and even demonstrations. Indeed, the economic, social, and political crises have created a strong na- tionalist passion in China. Since 1986, many Chinese scholars as well as gov- ernment officials have reconsidered the central government's decentralization strategy of economic reform. To many of these intellectuals, China needs to give high priority to its traditional values and to strengthen the role of the party, which itself must change its priority in the whole political economy if China wants to become a strong nation in this world. New nationalism'4 can be an effective strategy for the party to strengthen its role in economic as well as political development. This new nationalism is a form of the planned economy but has been modified and developed by many intellectuals of the younger generation, for example, Chen Yuan and Xiao Gongqin. After the Nationalism, Neo-Authoritarianism, and Liberalism 211 government's crackdown against the 1989 democracy movement, and especially after the breakdown of the former Soviet Union, a group was organized by the editorial department of China's Youth that systematically proposed this new nationalism. China's Youth (which is controlled by the Communist Youth League of China) published Chen's essay, "Deep Problems in Our Economy and Our Choices: On Some Problems about the Situation of Our Economic Development and Operating Mechanism,"'5 at the beginning of 1991 and then in September privately circulated (among party officials and high-level government officials) a report entitled "China's Feasible Countermeasures and Strategic Choices after Dramatic Changes in the Soviet Union." The major aims of this new nationalism include strengthening the govern- ment through recentralization; maintaining the party rule through transform- ing the revolutionary party to an administrative one; combining Chinese traditional values and Chinese Marxism as a dominant ideology; opposing radical marketization in the economy; and emphasizing national iiterest and patriotism in the international arena. A China's Youth editorial states: [Facing the serious situation after dramatic changes in the Soviet Union,] we must eliminate "unrealistic capitalism" from our thinking line, and reexplain creatively the basic theory of the socialist, especially the socialism with Chinese character- istics; in our struggle against the "peaceful transformation", we must strengthen the conceptions of national interest and state interest; in [implementing] open- door and reform policies, we must emphasize realism and rationalism; in the economy we must reject and criticize any radical reform; and we must create a Chinese tradition-centered... new culture. The emergent task for party-building is to transform a revolutionary party to an administrative party, and the party should no longer have a destructive theory as its guideline of modernization.'6 New nationalists argue that the decentralization strategy has led to a frag- mented economy and made it hard to develop a nationwide market. Whether China can continue to be a unified country becomes problematic under the process of decentralization. To avoid the breakdown of the economy, even the country, recentralization is imperative. Chen Yuan argues: Local initiatives are necessary for economic development. They are certainly good. But their initiatives must be identified with national economic stability and coordination and helpful for the development of national division of labor and a unified market. Their initiatives cannot be over-decentralized and over-commer- cialized. Otherwise, they will be harmful for macro-management and turned into blindness. . . . [In the past decade of reform,] necessary centralization was rejected, absolute decentralization was sought. Consequently, commercialization was introduced into various localities and [economic] departments. Their behavior was so commercialized that "dukedom economy" was formed.17 A crucial problem facing the Chinese economy is "whether the central government is able to centralize necessary power, especially economic power 212 Asian Affairs organized around fiscal capacity" in a relatively short time because in any modern economy fiscal and financial power must be centralized in order for the central government to implement macro-management. For new nationalists, the party's controlling the military is not enough. The party needs to have its own enterprises and property. According to them, three major reasons justify party ownership. First, no one has been responsi- ble for state-owned property. As a result, short-term behavior is widespread, and various actors-party and government officials, enterprise managers, and those who have opportunities to use state-owned property-abuse state- owned property. The party can best be in charge of state-owned property because it has been responsible for the property in rural areas and construc- projects in various localities. Second, government at different levels frequently faces the conflict between its functions as supervisor and as property owner. When local governments supervise economy, they, due to their regional interests, often use countermeasures to resist higher-level government supervision. Consequently, duplicate construction and oversized investment dominate the reform process. Party ownership can avoid such situations by adjusting the overall distribution of investments and supervising local governments' behavior. Third, party ownership is favorable for stability and will promote political reform. If the party has property, it can have more to say in political decision making. Further, new sources for the legitimacy of Chinese socialist ideology, which was originally based on foreign Marxism and Maoism, can be created by combining Maoist Marxism and Chinese traditional values. With dramatic changes in the Soviet Union, foreign Marxism is challenged, and the party should turn away from this. The party needs to put emphasis on Maoism inte- grated with Chinese traditional values. More important, national interest and patriotism must be given priority in international affairs as well as in resisting "peaceful transformation." The importance of the old Marxism has tended to decline among people, espe- cially in the young generation. Tradition can provide most people with basic values in their judgement of domestic and foreign affairs.1" Xiao Gongqin labels the new nationalists as "neo-authoritarian" or "neo- conservative." The following citation from Xiao summarizes the main con- tent of new nationalism: Administrative power should be strengthened greatly. The country must be gov- erned by this powerful administrative power. Crime and corruption, especially corruptive and self-interested behavior among all levels of state officials, must be punished according to law so that an awful law deterrence will be established. Radical pluralism and local economy, which are basically political romances, should not be carried out. Due to the lack of full development of autonomous individuality and contract human relations, pluralist democracy will only be a "poor transformation", and is undesirable. Economically, political romanticism and the "institutional determinism" must be overcome so that a stable, moderate Nationalism, Neo-Authoritarianism, and Liberalism 213 process of separating politics from economy can be reached, and modernized factors within society will be promoted. [Finally,] a totalitarian and unlimited government will gradually transform into a limited government through reform and economic changes. Culturally, ideological pluralism should be supported and encouraged within the framework of the "four basic principles". Only by doing so, will academic activities possibly flourish. And China's reform will thus avoid its blindness.19 The Ideology of Strong Government and Economic Priority Many i