Rethinking East Asian Security

Rethinking East Asian Security Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal As in other regions, international security in East Asia has been trans- formed by the end of the Cold War. Yet, debate about the direction of change, let alone the reality of the transformation, has been much slower to develop in this region than in Europe. The reasons for these tardy reactions suggest that East Asians, and an interested wider world, have serious cause for concern about the risks of conflict in East Asia. The debate about East Asian security is dominated by two theories of the future. On the one hand, there is the 'back to the future' view es- poused by realists, who argue that the end of the Cold War has released indigenous conflicts that were previously suppressed. It is argued that Asia could easily destabilise, with a classical balance of power politics coming to dominate the international relations of the region. On the other hand, the more liberal view argues that the complex interdependence of the late twentieth century has curtailed military rivalry between industrial- ised states. The East Asian states, especially Japan and the newly industri- alising countries (NICs), are ensnared in this web of trading and financial dependencies. Combined with the decline of the divisive influence of the Cold War, this interdependence can eradicate serious conflict in the re- gion. Both of these arguments are persuasive, but the fear is that the pessimists may be closer to the truth. Assessing the balance between them is complicated by the aversion of Asians to being honest about their security concerns. The analysis that follows will assess the main arguments of the protago- nists in order to identify the greatest risks of conflict. Trying to peer into the future is a notoriously hazardous business and those attempting it usually draw on both history and theory for guidance. That will also be our strategy. In each of the following sections we will take one perspective and use it as a lens through which to examine security relations in East Asia. Any lens tends to highlight some features of the object under scrutiny and suppress others. By adding several such examinations to- gether, we hope to assemble a reasonably clear picture of the security Barry Buzan is Professor of International Studies at the University of Warwick, and a Project Director at the Center for Peace and Conflict Research in Copenhagen. Gerald Segal is Senior Fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and Editor of The Pacific Review. Survival, vol. 36, no. 2, Summer 1994, pp. 3-21. D o w n lo ad ed B y: [ Ge or ge W as hi ng to n Un iv er si ty ] At : 15 :0 5 26 A ug us t 20 10 4 • Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal situation in East Asia as a whole. The next section deploys the historical lens to examine the legacy on which the future international relations of East Asia might draw. Following that we turn to theory, looking first through the realist lens at the balance of power and military security, then through the international political economy lens at economics and secu- rity, and finally through the lens of international society as a framework for regional order. We conclude by arguing that 'back to the future' is a distinct possibility in Asia, and by considering the nature of balance of power politics in the early twenty-first century and how it would fit into the wider world order. HISTORY The lessons of history are seldom clear and often deceptive. Recent conditions always differ significantly from older ones even when tempting similarities invite comparison, and, of course, there are several layers of history to choose from. It is clear that Cold War history is not entirely obsolete. There are still four states ruled by communist parties, and the Korean conflict is the same explosive cocktail of an ideological and civil war. Relations between Taiwan and China fall into a similar category, as do aspects of the Cambodian conflict. The boundary dispute and status rivalry between India and China also remain unaltered. Although this relationship did not have its origins in Cold War ideology or superpower competition, it did develop during the Cold War and was in part shaped and reinforced by it. One legacy of the Cold War for contemporary Asia is thus a set of unresolved rivalries and flashpoints. A second, stemming in part from the particular way in which the region was divided up by the Cold War, is the almost complete absence of significant multilateral political organisations, either regional forums or military alliances. A third, echoing much older history, is a widespread fear of potential Chi- nese expansionism in many of the countries around its periphery. The first half of the twentieth century was dominated by the rise of Japan, its clash with Russian imperialism and Japan's briefly successful bid to subjugate virtually the whole region to its military power and industrial economy. In this history is rooted the still strong and politically active fear and hatred of Japan in many countries. China and Korea, in particular, still remember the cruelty and arrogance of Japanese occupa- tion, as to a lesser extent do many of the countries of South-east Asia. Russia remembers the humiliation of being the first European power to lose a major war to a non-white people and the threat to its sparsely populated holdings in Siberia.1 One legacy from this period is a politically hamstrung Japan, which is unable to play a leadership role in the region commensurate with its power.2 Another is the smouldering hostility be- tween Japan and Russia, which might seem to be a Cold War left-over but has its roots further back in history. D o w n lo ad ed B y: [ Ge or ge W as hi ng to n Un iv er si ty ] At : 15 :0 5 26 A ug us t 20 10 Rethinking East Asian Security • 5 1200 kim Indian Ocean D o w n lo ad ed B y: [ Ge or ge W as hi ng to n Un iv er si ty ] At : 15 :0 5 26 A ug us t 20 10 6 • Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were dominated by the clash between the Asian and European civilisations. This was the start of the ancient Sino-centric civilisation being penetrated and eventually domi- nated by the military and economic power of the European 'barbarians'. The belief that it must right the wrongs of the humiliating history that began during this time is the main reason why China does not see itself as a status quo power. This is not just perceived as remaking China as a great power, but also a question of resolving territorial disputes. China's ruth- lessness, sometimes even at the cost of damaging its^ reputation and economic interests, has been evident in its handling of the takeover of Hong Kong3 and its determination to acquire islands in the South China Sea. China's claim over Taiwan has also not been resolved and any sign that Taiwan might survive as an independent entity are firmly opposed by China, as was recently illustrated by its withdrawal from talks on limiting conventional arms transfers after the United States announced the sale of F-16 fighter aircraft to Taiwan/In short, China feels it is fully within its rights to change the territorial status quo, even though most other coun- tries view such action as aggressive and dangerous. China's acute concern with traditional notions of sovereignty is in sharp distinction to Japan, which by virtue of its far greater interdependence with the global market economy is moving towards what can be termed a 'post-modern' definition of sovereignty.4 This fundamental difference in how the international system is perceived is related to the cultural prob- lems of how to modernise and how far to westernise. This is the basis of the successful Japanese adaptation, which led to Japan first joining and then superseding European imperial power in East Asia. There are two legacies from this period. One is the uncertainty over Russia's colonial borders, which remained geographically fixed when other European powers withdrew from Asia. The other, which is more diffuse, is the fact that some Asian states have coped better than others with the challenge of modernisation. Before European powers had penetrated Asia a Sino-centric imperial power had dominated the region. This power was remarkably durable, though it did wax and wane over the millennia. What was also remarkable was the degree of detachment of this civilisation from those that devel- oped further west. A few ideas, people and luxury goods travelled the silk roads but there was no strategic interaction between China and the classi- cal civilisations in South Asia, Mesopotamia or the Mediterranean. The main legacy from this is a fear of Chinese domination, particularly in South-east Asia as a whole and Vietnam in particular. One might also see a shadow of the future in the rival penetrations by cultural, religious and ethnic influences from India and China into South-east Asia that occurred. D o w n lo ad ed B y: [ Ge or ge W as hi ng to n Un iv er si ty ] At : 15 :0 5 26 A ug us t 20 10 Rethinking East Asian Security • 7 All of these historical legacies remain and, taken together, they suggest political fragmentation and hostility characterising the region's interna- tional relations. There is little that binds its states and societies together but much that divides them. Any chance of finding unifying common ground against the West has long since disappeared. As the particular distortions imposed by the Cold War unravel, many historical patterns that were either suppressed or overridden by ideological and superpower rivalry are reappearing. Sino-Japanese rivalry is perhaps the most worry- ing because it involves the two biggest powers in the region. There is the potential for Sino-Indian rivalry as the two giants of Asia slowly consoli- date their modernisations and extend their military power. While the US may potentially be able to hold a stable balance of power in the region, it depends upon the extent of the relative decline of American power and the country's isolationist tendency when faced with intense local rivalries unmediated by some overriding ideological cause. History, therefore, strongly reinforces the view that Asia is in danger of heading back to the future. MILITARY SECURITY AND THE BALANCE OF POWER What do the traditional realist concerns with the balance of power and military strength suggest about the future of Asia? Without doubt, of fundamental importance is the lifting of the superpower overlay and the withdrawal of Soviet-Russian and American power and engagement from the region. This process is broadly comparable to that in Europe, though the particular details are quite different.5 For four decades Asia, like Europe, has been in the grip of the rival containment and counter-contain- ment strategies of the two superpowers. This grip created its own pattern of ideological and military alignments, and drew American power deeply into East Asia. Although the Sino-Soviet split and inter-communist rivalry gave it a unique twist, security relations in East Asia were nonetheless deeply affected by the Cold War. Now Soviet power has imploded, the global ideological confrontation has collapsed into a few local pockets, and America is reducing its military power in response to domestic de- mands and the end of the Cold War. The realist can argue, citing historical precedent, that the break-up of the superpower overlay allows, and indeed compels, local patterns of amity, enmity and balance of power to reassert themselves. The cost for East Asia of its freedom from foreign rivalries is that it now has to deal with indigenous insecurities that have deep roots of their own. The inter- esting, and in some ways alarming, fact about this analysis of East Asia is that we have little historical experience to guide us: there is no record of indigenous modern international relations in the region. For almost all of this century Asia has been dominated by foreign powers: first the Euro- D o w n lo ad ed B y: [ Ge or ge W as hi ng to n Un iv er si ty ] At : 15 :0 5 26 A ug us t 20 10 8 • Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal pean empires and later the superpowers. The Japanese expansion was certainly indigenous, but it occurred while China was in chaos and most of the rest of the region was under European occupation or control, and so does not provide a model for post-Cold War security dynamics. During the Cold War a whole set of Asian states achieved independ- ence, and some of them have become industrial and commercial powers. But they developed with their international relations much constrained and shaped by the Cold War. With the lifting of these restraints it is not clear what the regional pattern of security relations will be. These states have no modern experience of how to relate to each other on terms largely defined by the local dynamics of regional relations. In this sense, specula- tion about the future of Asia is profoundly different from that in Europe, where pre-Cold War patterns of power (im)balance play a significant role in post-Cold War relations. One possible parallel is with the international relations emerging out of the wreckage of the Soviet Union, where a group of wholly new states have both to find their feet and work out their interrelationships. Another is with nineteenth-century Europe, where a cluster of powerful, national- istic and industrialising states had to deal with boundary disputes, histori- cal fears and status rivalries. In East Asia, the question is what kind of regional patterns will fill the power vacuum left by the superpowers? For the realist, of central importance will be China's growing strength and the uncertainty about whether Japan will challenge China for regional influ- ence. The withdrawal of the superpowers and the rise of China and Japan (and further in the background India) is in part matched by increases in defence spending and arms acquisition. China's defence budget has dou- bled over the past four years, at a time when those of all the other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council have de- creased. China has embarked on a major programme of military moderni- sation, spurred on by the lessons of the 1990-91 Gulf War. It has acquired in-flight refuelling technology and modern weapons from Russia and is discussing long-term coproduction of state-of-the-art weaponry with Rus- sia. China is the most important part of the local arms dynamic. Taiwan has responded by purchasing modern fighter aircraft and ships from the US and France. South-east Asians concerned about Chinese intentions in the South China Sea are also buying new weapons systems. Many of these countries are increasingly able to afford the expensive advanced technol- ogy of modern warfare and their rapid pace of economic growth often hides the extent to which defence spending has increased, since it is not expanding as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) (see table below).6 South Korea, threatened by both the increasingly aggressive and D o w n lo ad ed B y: [ Ge or ge W as hi ng to n Un iv er si ty ] At : 15 :0 5 26 A ug us t 20 10 Rethinking East Asian Security • 9 unstable policy of North Korea and the general withdrawal of American power, is also spending more on its armed forces. Change (1985-92) in Defence Expenditure (constant 1985 $m) Australia China Japan North Korea South Korea Malaysia Singapore Taiwan Thailand Vietnam NATO (Europe) USA $m change -333 2,514 3,750 931 2,790 551 431 1,237 420 -650 -715 -15,448 % change -7.1 12.6 28.5 22.4 63.5 31.2 36.2 29.9 27.6 -27 -0.7 -5.7 Source: IISS Military Balance 1993-94 (London: Brassey's for the IISS, 1994). Note the major debates about the true size of Chinese defence spending, with some suggesting the figures are three times larger. So far this is more of an arms build-up than an arms race. States in the region are responding to the uncertainty about future threats, their own rapidly expanding economic strength, and the diminishing security com- mitments of the superpowers. There are as yet no highly focused competi- tive arms accumulations (except the long-standing one in Korea) and it is still rare for military expenditure to rise as a percentage of gross national product. But this can easily change, as happened in the Gulf during the 1970s when the arms build-up that followed British withdrawal and the rise in oil prices turned into the arms racing and wars of the 1980s and 1990s. In East Asia, the trend is clearly towards the development of more powerful indigenous arms industries, making the states less dependent on external supplies. Japan views this arms build-up with growing concern. Although its defence spending has remained low as a percentage of GDP, the rapidly increasing size of the GDP and the modernity of its economy gives Japan a formidable purchasing power and the ability to develop a threatening D o w n lo ad ed B y: [ Ge or ge W as hi ng to n Un iv er si ty ] At : 15 :0 5 26 A ug us t 20 10 10 • Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal arsenal at relatively short notice. So far, Toyko has avoided acquiring such offensive systems as in-flight refuelling or aircraft carriers, but it has already warned China that by acquiring such weapons Beijing risks destabilising the region. As the US continues to reduce its forces in the Pacific, so doubts will rise in Japan about the reliability of the American strategic umbrella and the consequent need to fill a perceived strategic vacuum. Such a change in Japanese policy would not only spur China to even greater efforts but would provoke fears in the Koreas and South-east Asia, where memories of Japanese imperialism are still assiduously culti- vated by political elites. Paradoxically, a crucial part of the momentum for the arms race comes from the American intention to cut back its forces. The US fuels arms races by creating a power vacuum instead of establishing a structure of arms control or collective security. By seeking to arm states, for example in South-east Asia, Taiwan or South Korea, to lessen their fears about an American withdrawal, regional insecurities are often exacerbated. By becoming ever more desperate for markets for American weapons as the Europeans cut back their purchases, the US is making it easier for local states to increase the pace and lethality of the arms build-up and conse- quently risk creating an arms race. Looming behind the build-up of conventional arms is the spectre of nuclear proliferation. Rising concern about nuclear security parallels that about conventional arms and has the same motive: local responses to the weakening or withdrawal of superpower nuclear umbrellas. China has, of course, been a nuclear weapon state since 1964. India became a threshold nuclear power with its test explosion in 1974 and Pakistan acquired a threshold nuclear weapon capability during the 1980s. The proliferation 'chain' that led from China to India to Pakistan has the potential to spread further, both east and west, should India and Pakistan seek overt nuclear weapon status. In East Asia, there is evidence that North Korea is moving towards nuclear weapon capability.7 South Korea, Taiwan and Japan are all wealthy, advanced industrial economies with substantial civil nuclear industries. Although South Korea and Taiwan have renounced the weapon-potential technologies of enrichment and reprocessing, both have the basis of a military nuclear programme that could produce weapons within a few years. Japan has what might be called a policy of'recessed' deterrence.8 It has civilian rockets and guidance systems capable of being converted into nuclear missiles, and has a nuclear industry with large stockpiles of fissile material that can be