The importance of being We：Human nature and intergroup relations

Selected Bibliography Alexander, M. G., Brewer, M. B., & Herrmann, R. K. (1999). Images and affect: A functional analysis of out- group stereotypes. Journal of Personality and Social Psy- chology, 77, 78–93. Brewer, M. B. (1979). Ingroup bias in the minimal inter- group situation: A cognitive–motivational analysis. Psycho- logical Bulletin, 86, 307–324. Brewer, M. B. (1988). A dual process model of impression formation. In T. Srull & R. Wyer (Eds.), Advances in so- cial cognition (Vol. 1, pp. 1–36). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Brewer, M. B. (1991). The social self: On being the same and different at the same time. Personality and Social Psy- chology Bulletin, 17, 475–482. Brewer, M. B. (1997). The social psychology of intergroup relations: Can research inform practice? Journal of Social Issues, 53, 197–211. Brewer, M. B. (1998). Category-based versus person-based perception in intergroup contexts. In W. Stroebe & M. Hewstone (Eds.), European review of social psychology (Vol. 9, pp. 77–106). London: Wiley. Brewer, M. B. (1999). The psychology of prejudice: In- group love or outgroup hate? Journal of Social Issues, 55, 429–444. Brewer, M. B. (2004). Taking the social origins of human nature seriously: Toward a more imperialist social psychol- ogy. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 8, 107–113. Brewer, M. B., & Campbell, D. T. (1976). Ethnocentrism and intergroup attitudes: East African evidence. New York: Halsted Press. Brewer, M. B., & Caporael, L. R. (2006). An evolutionary perspective on social identity: Revisiting groups. In M. Schaller, J. Simpson, & D. Kenrick (Eds.), Evolution and so- cial psychology (pp. 143–161). New York: Psychology Press. Brewer, M. B., & Chen, Y. (2007). Where (who) are col- lectives in collectivism: Toward a conceptual clarification of individualism and collectivism. Psychological Review, 114, 133–151. Brewer, M. B., Dull, V., & Lui, L. (1981). Perceptions of the elderly: Stereotypes as prototypes. Journal of Personal- ity and Social Psychology, 41, 656–670. Brewer, M. B., & Gardner, W. (1996). Who is this “we”? Levels of collective identity and self representations. Jour- nal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 83–93. Brewer, M. B., & Miller, N. (1984). Beyond the contact hypothesis: Theoretical perspectives on desegregation. In N. Miller & M. Brewer (Eds.), Groups in contact: The psy- chology of desegregation (pp. 281–302). New York: Aca- demic Press. Brewer, M. B., & Pierce, K. P. (2005). Social identity complexity and outgroup tolerance. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31, 428–437. Kramer, R. M., & Brewer, M. B. (1984). Effects of group identity on resource utilization in a simulated commons dilemma. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 46, 1044–1057. Reeder, G. D., & Brewer, M. B. (1979). A schematic model of dispositional attribution in interpersonal percep- tion. Psychological Review, 86, 61–79. Roccas, S., & Brewer, M. B. (2002). Social identity com- plexity. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 6, 88– 106. The Importance of Being We: Human Nature and Intergroup Relations Marilynn B. Brewer Ohio State University The author discusses the nature of in-group bias and the social motives that underlie ethnocentric attachment to one’s own membership groups. Two common assumptions about in-group bias are challenged: that in-group Editor’s Note Marilynn B. Brewer received the Award for Distinguished Scientific Contributions. Award winners are invited to de- liver an award address at the APA’s annual convention. A version of this award address was delivered at the 115th annual meeting, held August 17–20, 2007, in San Fran- cisco, California. Articles based on award addresses are reviewed, but they differ from unsolicited articles in that they are expressions of the winners’ reflections on their work and their views of the field. 728 November 2007 ● American Psychologist positivity necessitates out-group derogation and that in- group bias is motivated by self-enhancement. A review of relevant theory and research on intergroup relations provides evidence for 3 alternative principles: (a) in-group attachment and positivity are primary and independent of out-groups, (b) security motives (belonging and distinctiveness) underlie universal in-group favoritism, and (c) attitudes toward out-groups vary as a function of intergroup relationships and associated threats to belonging and distinctiveness. Keywords: social identity, intergroup relations, in-group bias, ethnocentrism, optimal distinctiveness theory A differentiation arises between ourselves, the we-group, or in-group, and everybody else, or the others-groups, out- groups. The insiders in a we-group are in a relation of peace, order, law, government, and industry, to each other. Ethno- centrism is the technical name for this view of things in which one’s own group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it. Each group nourishes its own pride and vanity, boasts itself superior, ex- alts its own divinities, and looks with contempt on outsiders. (Sumner, 1906, pp. 12–13) The fact that individuals value, favor, and conform to their own membership groups (in-groups) over groups to which they do not belong (out-groups) is among the most well- established phenomena in social psychology. According to Sumner’s analysis in his classic book Folkways (Sumner, 1906), the essential characteristics of an individual’s rela- tionship to in-groups are loyalty and preference. Loyalty is represented in adherence to in-group norms and trustwor- thiness in dealings with fellow in-group members. Prefer- ence is represented in differential acceptance of in-group members over members of out-groups and positive evalua- tion of in-group characteristics that differ from those of out-groups. Although the concept of ethnocentrism was originally coined to refer to allegiance to national or ethnic group identities, the tendency to favor members of one’s in- groups over out-groups has been found to extend across all forms of group membership. Groundbreaking experiments conducted by Henri Tajfel and his colleagues in Bristol, England, in the early 1970s (Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971) demonstrated that merely catego- rizing individuals into two arbitrary but distinct social groupings was sufficient to elicit in-group favoritism. In this so-called minimal group paradigm, participants chose to allocate higher rewards to members of their own cate- gory relative to members of the out-group category, even in the absence of any personal identification of group members, any past history, or any direct benefit to the self. Since the initial minimal group experiments, hundreds of studies in the laboratory and the field have documented in-group favoritism in myriad forms (Brewer, 1979; Brewer & Campbell, 1976; Diehl, 1990; Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992). In addition to the allocation bias demon- strated by Tajfel, preferential treatment and evaluation of in-groups relative to out-groups has appeared in evaluations of group products (e.g., Gerard & Hoyt, 1974), application of rules of fairness (Ancok & Chertkoff, 1983; Ng, 1984; Platow, McClintock, & Liebrand, 1990), attributions for positive and negative behavior (Hewstone, 1990; Weber, 1994), and willingness to trust and cooperate (Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Miller, Downs, & Prentice, 1998; Wit & Kerr, 2002; Yuki, Maddux, Brewer, & Takemura, 2005). There is considerable evidence that such in-group benefit- ing is considered normative in its own right (Blanz, Mum- mendey, & Otten, 1997; Platow, O’Connell, Shave, & Hanning, 1995) and that it is activated automatically when a group identity is salient (Otten & Moskowitz, 2000; Ot- ten & Wentura, 1999; Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtman, & Tyler, 1990). Despite years of research on the mechanisms, modera- tors, and consequences of in-group bias, the nature of in- group favoritism is poorly understood and often misrepre- sented in the research literature and textbooks on social psychology. In this brief review, I challenge two of the more common assumptions about in-group favoritism and suggest some alternative principles to interpret research in this arena. Challenging Some Pervasive Assumptions About In- Group Bias Sumner’s (1906) definition of ethnocentrism cited at the beginning of this article contains four separate proposi- tions. The four distinguishable elements can be character- ized as follows: 1. Human social groups are organized into discrete in-group/out-group categories (the social categori- zation principle). 2. Individuals value their in-groups positively and maintain positive, cooperative relationships with members of the in-group (the in-group positivity principle). 3. In-group positivity is enhanced by social compari- son with out-groups in which in-group attributes and outcomes are evaluated as better than or supe- rior to those of out-groups (the intergroup compar- ison principle). 4. Relationships between in-groups and out-groups are characterized by antagonism, conflict, and mu- tual contempt (the out-group hostility principle). In contrast with Sumner’s expectation that these four elements necessarily cohere into a pattern that is univer- sally characteristic of intergroup relations, a review of relevant social psychological research suggests that the components can be distinguished both empirically and con- 729November 2007 ● American Psychologist ceptually. Yet, common representations of the concept of in-group favoritism treat it as if all four elements were in- extricably linked. One consequence is that researchers and textbook authors frequently define in-group bias as positiv- ity toward the in-group and negativity or derogation of out-groups. In-Group Bias Does Not Imply Out-Group Derogation Sumner (1906) explicitly believed that in-groups emerged from intergroup conflict: The relation of comradeship and peace in the we-group and that of hostility and war towards others-groups are correlative to each other. The exigencies of war with outsiders are what make peace inside, lest internal discord should weaken the we-group for war. Sentiments are produced to correspond. Loyalty to the in-group, sacrifice for it, hatred and contempt for outsiders, brotherhood within, warlikeness without—all group together, common products of the same situation. (pp. 12–13) This position is reiterated in more modern accounts of eth- nocentrism and intergroup relations from proponents of evolutionary psychology (Alexander, 1979; Kurzban & Leary, 2001). However, the idea that in-group cooperation is born of intergroup conflict is inconsistent with contem- porary research on social identity and intergroup relations (Brewer, 1999). Despite widespread belief that in-group positivity and out-group derogation are reciprocally related, empirical research demonstrates little consistent relation between the two. Indeed, results from both laboratory ex- periments and field studies indicate that variations in in- group positivity and social identification do not systemati- cally correlate with degree of bias or negativity toward out-groups (Brewer, 1979; Hinkle & Brown, 1990; Koster- man & Feshbach, 1989; Struch & Schwartz, 1989). For example, in a study of the reciprocal attitudes among 30 ethnic groups in East Africa, Brewer and Campbell (1976) found that almost all of the groups exhibited systematic differential positive evaluation of the in-group over all out- groups on dimensions such as trustworthiness, obedience, friendliness, and honesty. However, the correlation between degree of positive in-group regard and social distance to- ward out-groups was essentially .00 across the 30 groups. In-group bias is simply a relative positivity toward in- groups vis-a`-vis out-groups. Like any differential, the dif- ference between in-group evaluations or treatment and cor- responding evaluations of an out-group can be accounted for by enhanced in-group positivity, enhanced out-group negativity, or both. In my review of the early minimal group experiments (Brewer, 1979), I concluded that most minimal group studies that assessed ratings of the in-group and out-group separately found that categorization into groups leads to enhanced in-group ratings in the absence of decreased out-group ratings. Further, the positive in-group biases exhibited in the allocation of positive resources in the minimal intergroup situation are essentially eliminated when allocation decisions involve the distribution of nega- tive outcomes or costs (e.g., Mummendey et al., 1992), suggesting that individuals are willing to differentially ben- efit the in-group compared with out-groups but are reluc- tant to harm out-groups more directly. In a more recent review of developmental studies on intergroup attitudes, Cameron, Alvarez, Ruble, and Fuligni (2001) similarly concluded that children tend to display a positivity bias toward their in-group, but no negativity toward the out- group. Thus, it is wrong to equate in-group favoritism and out- group hostility, and psychologists need to look for the ori- gins of in-group formation and ethnocentric attachment to in-groups in factors other than intergroup conflict. Human Sociality and Selection for Group Living Attachment to groups must be understood within the con- text of the profoundly social nature of human beings as a species. Group living is part of human evolutionary his- tory, inherited from our primate ancestors but evolved to a level of interdependence beyond that of any other social primate (Brewer & Caporael, 2006; Caporael, 1997). Even a cursory review of the physical endowments of the human species—weak, hairless, extended infancy—makes it clear that we are not suited for survival as lone individuals or even as small family units. Many of the evolved character- istics, such as omnivorousness and tool making, that have permitted humans to adapt to a wide range of physical en- vironments create dependence on collective knowledge and cooperative information sharing. As a consequence, human beings are characterized by obligatory interdependence (Caporael & Brewer, 1995). With coordinated group living as the primary survival strategy of the species, the social group, in effect, provided a buffer between the individual organism and the exigen- cies of the physical environment. Given the morphology and ecology of evolving hominids, the interface between hominids and their habitat must have been a group process. Matters of coping with the physical habitat—finding food, defense from predation, moving across a landscape—are largely group processes. Over time, if exploiting a habitat is more successful as a collective group process than as an individual process, then not only would more successful groups persist, but so also would individuals better adapted to group living. Thus, researchers would expect that the basic elements of human psychology—cognition, motiva- tion, emotion—would be attuned to the structural require- ments of social groups and social coordination. This perspective on the evolutionary significance of group coordination for human survival assumes that there is no need to require intergroup conflict to account for in- group formation. In fact, in light of both paleoanthropo- 730 November 2007 ● American Psychologist logical and archaeological evidence, it makes little sense to see conflict as the source of in-group formation. There is no reason to believe that early hominids lived under dense population conditions in which bands of people lived in close proximity with competition over local resources. Esti- mates of the total human population during the Middle Pa- leolithic are less than 1.5 million (Hassan, 1981). Group living was well established much earlier—2.5 million years ago by human ancestors—and complex sociality evolved early among primate ancestors (Foley, 1996). Researchers have found early evidence of population packing from around 15,000 years ago (Alexander, 1989; Stiner, 2002), too recently to have been relevant to the origins of human sociality. As Alexander (1989) himself admitted, there is no evidence of intergroup conflict in early human evolu- tionary history. Given the costs of intergroup fighting com- bined with low population density, flight rather than fight would seem to be the strategy of choice for our distant ancestors. Opposing Social Motives and Optimal Distinctiveness Theory Coordinating groups must meet certain structural require- ments in order to exist, just as organisms must have certain structural properties in order to be viable. For community- sized groups, these organizational imperatives include mo- bilization and coordination of individual effort, communi- cation, internal differentiation, optimal group size, and boundary definition. The benefits to individuals of coopera- tive arrangements cannot be achieved unless prior condi- tions have been satisfied that make the behavior of other individuals predictable and coordinated. Group survival depends on successful solutions to these problems of inter- nal organization and coordination. If individual humans cannot survive outside of groups, then the structural requirements for sustaining groups cre- ate systematic constraints on individual biological and psy- chological adaptations. Campbell (1974, 1990) called such constraints downward causation across system levels. Downward causation operates whenever structural require- ments at higher levels of organization determine or shape some aspects of structure and function at lower levels (a kind of reverse reductionism). Among the structural requirements of groups are bound- edness and constraints on group size. The advantage of extending social interdependence and cooperation to an ever wider circle of conspecifics comes from the ability to exploit resources across an expanded territory and buffer the effects of temporary depletions or scarcities in any one local environment. However, expansion comes at the cost of increased demands on obligatory sharing and regulation of reciprocal cooperation. Both the carrying capacity of physical resources and the capacity for distribution of re- sources, aid, and information inevitably constrain the po- tential size of cooperating social networks. Thus, effective social groups cannot be either too small or too large. To function, social collectives must be restricted to some opti- mal size—sufficiently large and inclusive to realize the advantages of extended cooperation, but sufficiently exclu- sive to avoid the disadvantages of spreading social interde- pendence too thin. On the basis of this analysis of one structural require- ment for group survival, I have theorized that the conflict- ing benefits and costs associated with expanding group size would have shaped social motivational systems at the indi- vidual level. A unidirectional drive for inclusion would not have been adaptive without a counteracting drive for differ- entiation and exclusion. Opposing motives hold each other in check, with the result that human beings are not com- fortable either in isolation or in huge collectives. These social motives at the individual level create a propensity for adhering to social groups that are both bounded and distinctive. As a consequence, groups that are optimal in size are those that elicit the greatest levels of member loy- alty, conformity, and cooperation and those in which the fit between individual psychology and group structure is en- sured. My theory of optimal distinctiveness (Brewer, 1991) was derived from these speculations about the relationship between optimal group size and human social motives. The theory posits that humans are characterized by two oppos- ing needs that govern the relationship between the self- concept and membership in social groups. The first is a need for assimilation and inclusion, a desire for be