瑞士信贷 2010年4月全球能源研究报告

DISCLOSURE APPENDIX CONTAINS IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES, ANALYST CERTIFICATIONS, INFORMATION ON TRADE ALERTS, ANALYST MODEL PORTFOLIOS AND THE STATUS OF NON-U.S ANALYSTS. FOR OTHER IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES, visit www.credit-suisse.com/ researchdisclosures or call +1 (877) 291-2683. U.S. Disclosure: Credit Suisse does and seeks to do business with companies covered in its research reports. As a result, investors should be aware that the Firm may have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report. Investors should consider this report as only a single factor in making their investment decision. 14 April 2010 Global Equity Research Energy / Oil & Gas Oil Prices SECTOR REVIEW The Next Cycle Could Be Different ■ Changes to Our Supply-Demand Model Lead to Greater Tightening: We’ve made a number of adjustments to our supply and demand model. Higher demand estimates have trumped raised supply potential to lead to a net tightening of spare capacity relative to our prior forecasts. This is supportive of near-term prices. We raised oil prices to $80/bbl from $70/bbl, with a new trading range of $70-90/bbl. The futures strip is in the mid-$80s/bbl through 2010 and slightly above $90/bbl through to 2015. ■ Demand Momentum Might Peak in Coming Quarters: Oil prices have nearly doubled in the past 12-months as the US ISM and global IP momentum rapidly recovered off its lows. This has happened in the face of high spare capacity. We might be moving into an end game. Oil prices will likely continue to receive support from rising demand estimates as the OECD takes over from non-OECD as the source of incremental positive oil demand news flow. However, IP may be peaking. Oil prices typically stabilise or roll-over once IP has peaked. The debate will then shift to the next phase. ■ Tightening Markets Expected Through to 2013: Demand is expected to outpace supply growth through 2013. This will lead to a tightening of spare capacity to as low as 3MBD by 2013. There remains a residual risk that the oil price up-cycle reignites, if demand recovers more strongly than our raised forecasts today or if supply falls short. We note that OPEC stands ready to add barrels to the market if substantial oil price upside above $85/bbl materialises. ■ A Very Different World Might Emerge Beyond 2015: While it’s too early to impact oil prices, a different world may emerge as we look further ahead. We’ve included a “what-if” analysis that evaluates what would happen if Russian Tax reform came through, if recent discoveries made their way into production, if Iraq delivered 5mbd by 2017, and if the market levers on demand (gas substitution and lower energy intensity) started working their magic in the OECD, China and the Middle East. Under these circumstances, global spare capacity would at first fall to 4MBD in 2013-14, but then start rising sharply after 2015. Pricing in this world would likely be very different to the fear that has placed a bid under oil prices this past decade. In the recovery phase evidence to support this “what-if” might be difficult to find, but we are monitoring the data closely. Research Analysts Prashant Gokhale 852 2101 6944 prashant.gokhale@credit-suisse.com Edward Westlake 212 325 6751 edward.westlake@credit-suisse.com Jonathan Wolff, CFA 212 538 4563 jon.wolff@credit-suisse.com Brian Dutton 416 352 4596 brian.dutton@credit-suisse.com Brad Handler 212 325 0772 brad.handler@credit-suisse.com Emerson Leite, CFA 55 11 3841 6290 emerson.leite@credit-suisse.com James Neale 44 20 7888 9114 james.neale@credit-suisse.com Mark Henderson +44 20 7883 6901 mark.henderson.2@credit-suisse.com Arun Jayaram, CFA 212 538 8428 arun.jayaram@credit-suisse.com Tao Ly +44 20 7888 1778 tao.ly@credit-suisse.com Kim Fustier +44 20 7883 0384 kim.fustier@credit-suisse.com 14 April 2010 Oil Prices 2 Focus Charts Figure 1: Global IP Growth Cycles vs Oil Price Figure 2: Change in Global Oil Demand Estimates -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 19 86 19 88 19 90 19 92 19 94 19 96 19 98 20 00 20 02 20 04 20 06 20 08 20 10 10 100 1000 Global IP (LHS) WTI o il price - LOG Scale (%) Age of Plenty -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 OECD Non-OECD (MMBD) Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates. Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates. Figure 3: Non-OPEC Production—Potential and Risked Figure 4: Global Oil Spare Capacity—CS Base Case 44.0 46.0 48.0 50.0 52.0 54.0 56.0 58.0 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011E 2013E 2015E 2017E Non-OPEC (Potential) Non-OPEC (risked) - 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 20 03 20 04 20 05 20 06 20 07 20 08 20 09 20 10 E 20 11 E 20 12 E 20 13 E 20 14 E 20 15 E 20 16 E 20 17 E 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 90.0 100.0 110.0 Spare Cap CS Base Case WTI (MMBD Source: IEA, Credit Suisse estimates. Source: IEA, Credit Suisse estimates. Figure 5: Global Oil Spare Capacity—Risked and Blue-Sky Scenario Figure 6: OPEC Capacity Growth Potential by Country - 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 20 03 20 04 20 05 20 06 20 07 20 08 20 09 20 10 E 20 11 E 20 12 E 20 13 E 20 14 E 20 15 E 20 16 E 20 17 E Spare cap - Potential Spare Cap CS Base Case MBD) -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Algeria Iran Iraq Kuwait Libya Nigeria Qatar Angola Ecuador Saudi Arabia UAE Venezuela (MMBD) Source: IEA, Credit Suisse estimates. Source: IEA, Credit Suisse estimates. 14 April 2010 Oil Prices 3 Demand Momentum Might Peak in Coming Quarters Oil prices have nearly doubled in the past 12-months as the US ISM and global IP momentum rapidly recovered off its lows. This has happened in the face of high spare capacity. In the last recession, Oil prices peaked about 5 months after the peak in Global IP momentum. Our economists believe that global IP momentum is peaking now. Oil prices may well continue to rally during this 5-6 month timeframe, we think. There is still residual momentum in oil demand growth—OECD demand in particular is yet to fire. Recent OECD data points, especially in the US have been more positive and some of this is being priced in. Further improvement in OECD data points could keep oil prices supported through 3Q. In this report, we outline our view of what might happen next. We believe global capacity will tighten through 2013. Sluggish non-OPEC supply is not able to offset rising demand. This tightening of capacity, albeit from high levels, will likely keep prices elevated in the $70-90/bbl range. Given sluggish non-OPEC supply through 2013, there remains a residual risk that the oil price up-cycle reignites, if demand recovers more strongly than our raised forecasts today or if supply falls short. We note that OPEC stands ready to add barrels to the market if substantial oil price upside above $85/bbl materialises. We are raising our WTI oil price forecast from $70/bbl flat, to $80/bbl flat. Beyond 2013, an interesting debate is emerging. Unsurprisingly given increased spending across the industry, the medium term supply picture has more options today to offset mature decline than we would have outlined several years ago. Notably, Iraq is opening up, the giant pre-salt and other discoveries in Brazil together with new discoveries elsewhere offer the prospect of strong growth in offshore production, and Russia is considering tax reform. On the demand side, a price shock is leading consumers and governments to shift consumption patterns. In aggregate, these effects could tilt the balance towards higher spare capacity in the second half of this decade. Tightening Spare Capacity in Coming Years Our deep dive of global upstream projects suggests that supply is slightly higher on an absolute basis than earlier forecasts (+300kbd near term). Growth in non OPEC is still sluggish beyond 2010 and our demand revisions are even greater. We expect global demand to grow 1.7mbd in 2010, 2mbd in 2011 (or 2% and 2.3% pa) and at 0.9-1.4mbd thereafter on a normalized basis. Spare capacity should fall—suggesting that the market will have a tightening bias. We expect spare capacity to average closer to 3mbd in 2013- 2014 versus 6MBD today. At this point in the cycle (2103-2104), we believe that the market might be most vulnerable to a “melt up”—vulnerable to demand being stronger than expected and supply being weaker than expected. In Q407/1Q2008, headline spare capacity of around 2.5mbd, cheap money, tight refining, and visions of very strong demand growth were enough of a mixture to set oil prices alight. But It Could Be a Very Different World if….. Our analysis also looks at what would happen if Russian Tax reform came through, if recent discoveries made their way into production, Iraq delivered 5mbd by 2017, and if the market levers on demand (gas substitution and lower energy intensity) started working their magic in the OECD, China and the Middle East. Under these circumstances (and we believe these are all independently possible) global spare capacity would at first fall to 4MBD in 2013-14, but then start rising sharply after 2015. Under this scenario, world oil prices might settle back into a marginal pricing mode by mid-decade. What looks clear is that the comfort of the futures curve could be challenged one way or the other. Strengthening economy is taking oil with it. After IP peaks we address the question of where to next. Raising oil prices to $80/bbl from $70/bbl—markets tighten through 2013 Greater supply potential after the middle of the decade than we’ve seen in some time Spare capacity could fall to 3MBD again in 2013-14; underpinning oil prices in the medium term Beyond 2014, market levers could allow spare capacity to grow once more 14 April 2010 Oil Prices 4 Changes to Macro Forecasts Figure 7: New Macro Assumptions 1Q10A 2Q10E 3Q1 0E 4Q10E 20 08A 2009 A 201 0E 2011E 2012E 2013E LT MACRO ASS UMPTIONS Oil & Gas Prices WTI ($ /bbl) 7 8.6 85.0 88.0 80.0 99.6 61.7 82.9 80.0 80.0 80 .0 80.0 Brent ($/bbl) 7 6.7 83.0 86.0 78.0 97.6 61.9 80.9 78.0 78.0 78 .0 78.0 US Natural Gas NYMEX ($/mcf) 5.4 5.3 5.3 5.8 8.9 4.0 5.4 6.5 7.0 7 .0 7.0 Refining Ma rgins $/bbl US East Coa st (PADD I) 6-3-2-1 8.3 9.0 9.0 7.5 9.6 6.3 8.4 9.0 8.0 8 .0 8.3 US Midwes t (PADD II) 3-2-1 6.2 8.5 8.5 7.0 11.3 8.5 7.5 8.6 8.2 8 .5 8.5 US Gulf Coast (PADD III) 3-2-1 7.3 8.0 8.0 6.5 10.3 7.8 7.5 8.0 7.0 7 .0 7.0 US Rock ies (PADD IV) 3-2-1 1 4.3 15.0 15.0 13.5 26.3 14.5 14.5 15.0 14.0 14 .5 14.8 US West Coa st (PADD V ) 5-3-1 1 1.2 13.5 13.5 12.0 17.6 13.8 12.6 13.5 12.5 13 .0 14.0 NW Europe (Rotterdam) 20-6-1 5.5 4.8 4.8 4.8 10.8 4.5 5.0 5.4 7.0 7 .0 7.0 Asia-P acific (Singapore) 6-2-3 - 8.1 6.0 6.0 6.0 13.2 5.6 6.5 7.0 7.0 7 .0 7.0 Crude Oil Price Discounts $/bbl US Heavy (WTI-Maya) 8.9 11.0 11.0 11.0 15.7 5.2 10.5 11.0 11.0 11 .0 9.5 US Medium Sour (WTI-MARS) 2.9 3.5 4.0 4.0 6.1 1.4 3.6 4.5 4.5 4 .5 4.5 US Sour (W TI-WTS) 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 3.8 1.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 2 .0 2.0 EU Sour (Brent-Urals ) 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.8 0.7 1.5 1.5 1.5 1 .5 1.5 1Q10A 2Q10E 3Q1 0E 4Q10E 20 08A 2009 A 201 0E 2011E 2012E 2013E LT OLD MACRO ASSUM PTIONS Oil & Gas Prices W TI ($/bbl) 7 0.0 70.0 70.0 70.0 99.6 61.7 70.0 70.0 70.0 70 .0 70.0 Brent ($/bbl) 6 8.0 68.0 68.0 68.0 97.6 61.9 68.0 68.0 68.0 68 .0 68.0 US Natural Gas NYMEX ($/mcf) 4.8 5.3 5.3 5.8 8.9 4.0 5.3 6.5 7.0 7 .0 7.0 Refining Ma rgins $/bbl US East Coast (PADD I) 6-3 -2-1 6.7 9.5 7.6 8.6 9.6 6.3 8.1 7.6 7.6 7 .6 7.6 US Midwest (PA DD II) 3-2-1 7.4 10.5 8.4 9.5 11.3 8.5 8.9 8.4 8.4 8 .4 8.4 US Gulf Coast (PA DD III) 3-2-1 7.0 10.0 8.0 9.0 10.3 7.8 8.5 8.0 8.0 8 .0 8.0 US Rockies (PADD IV) 3-2-1 1 0.5 15.0 12.0 13.5 26.3 14.5 12.8 12.0 12.0 12 .0 12.0 US W est Coast (PADD V) 5-3-1- 1 2.6 18.0 14.4 16.2 17.6 13.8 15.3 14.4 14.4 14 .4 14.4 NW Euro pe (Rotterdam) 20-6-11 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 10.8 4.5 4.8 5.4 7.0 7 .0 7.0 Asia-Pacific (Singa pore) 6-2-3 -1 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 13.2 5.6 6.0 7.0 7.0 7 .0 7.0 Crude Oil Price Discounts $/bbl US Heavy (W TI-Maya) 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 15.7 5.2 8.0 9.0 10.0 10 .0 10.0 US Medium Sour (W TI-MARS) 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 6.1 1.4 4.0 5.0 5.0 5 .0 5.0 US Sour (WTI-WTS) 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 3.8 1.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 2 .0 2.0 EU Sour (Bre nt-Urals) 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.8 0.7 1.5 1.5 1.5 1 .5 1.5 1Q10A 2Q10E 3Q1 0E 4Q10E 20 08A 2009 A 201 0E 2011E 2012E 2013E LT CHANGES TO MACRO AS SUMPTIONS Oil & Gas Prices WTI ($/bbl) 12.4% 21.4% 25.7% 14.3% 0.0% 0 .0% 18.4% 14.3% 14.3% 1 4.3% 14.3% Brent ($/bbl) 12.8% 22.1% 26.5% 14.7% 0.0% 0 .0% 19.0% 14.7% 14.7% 1 4.7% 14.7% US Natural Gas NYMEX ($/mcf) 13.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0 .0% 3.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% Refining Ma rgins $/bbl US East Coast (PADD I) 6-3 -2-1 24.1% -5.3% 18.4% -12.3% 0.0% 0 .0% 4.5% 17.9% 5.3% 5.3% 8.6% US Midwest (P ADD II) 3-2-1 -16.1% -19.0% 1.2% -25.9% 0.0% 0 .0% -15.5% 2.5% -2.4% 1.2% 1.2% US Gulf Coast (PA DD III) 3-2-1 4.8% -20.0% 0.0% -27.8% 0.0% 0 .0% -12.2% -0.5% -12.5% -1 2.5% -12 .5% US Rockies (PADD IV) 3-2-1 36.3% 0.0% 25.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0 .0% 13.4% 24.7% 16.7% 2 0.8% 22.9% US West Coast (PA DD V ) 5-3-1- -10.8% -25.0% -6.3% -25.9% 0.0% 0 .0% -17.9% -6.5% -13.2% -9.7% -2 .8% NW Europe (Rotterdam) 20 -6-11 13.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0 .0% 3.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% Asia-Pacific (Singa pore) 6-2-3 -1 34.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0 .0% 8.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% Crude Oil Price Discounts $/bbl US Heavy (WTI-Maya) 10.9% 37.5% 37.5% 37.5% 0.0% 0 .0% 30.8% 22.2% 10.0% 1 0.0% -5 .0% US Medium S our (W TI-MARS) -26.7% -12.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0 .0% -9.8% -10.0% -10.0% -1 0.0% -10 .0% US Sour (WTI-W TS ) -5.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0 .0% -1.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% EU Sour (Bre nt-Urals) -4.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0 .0% -1.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% Source: Credit Suisse estimates 14 April 2010 Oil Prices 5 IP Momentum Peaking—the Initial Tightening Phase Is Nearly Over In the Age of Plenty, from 2004 through 2008, the world experienced a growth spurt unprecedented in its duration. The resultant strong non-OECD oil demand growth coincided with a period of weaker non-OPEC delivery and a general lack of upstream investment to cause the last up-cycle. We may have dodged the bullet of a Depression and the market is rebounding strongly out of the Great Recession but we remain concerned that oil demand expectations embed a return to the “Age of Plenty” environment. IP has rallied more sharply than expected but may be close to a peak. IP rolling over may ring the bell on this phase of the recovery. Oil demand data points will likely still improve over the balance of 2010, as the recovery momentum shifts from non- OECD to OECD. This could sustain prices through 2Q and 3Q. However, attention will then move to the next phase. Figure 8: Global IP Growth Cycles vs Oil price—Good 2003-2008 was a anomaly not a norm -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 19 86 19 87 19 88 19 89 19 90 19 91 19 92 19 93 19 94 19 95 19 96 19 97 19 98 19 99 20 00 20 01 20 02 20 03 20 04 20 05 20 06 20 07 20 08 20 09 20 10 20 11 10 100 1000 G loba l IP (LHS ) WTI o il price - LO G Sca le (%) (%) A ge o f P len ty Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates Figure 9: Global IP momentum vs Oil price - 1998 - 2000 Figure 10: -4.00 -2.00 0.00 2.00 4.00 6.00 8.00 10.00 0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 - 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50 Global IP Momentum - LHS Oil Price - rebased -RHS 5 Months from IP Peak, Oil corrected 20-25% 5M Lag from Peak in global IP From IP Momentum Bottom (Oct 1998) -15.00 -10.00 -5.00 0.00 5.00 10.00 0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 - 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00 1.20 1.40 1.60 1.80 2.00 Global IP Momentum - LHS Oil Price - rebased -RHS Global IP Monentum in this cycle peaks in March 2010,a nd then slows Last data point for March is US$82/bbl Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates Source: Company data, Credit Suisse estimates Oil prices through 2Q and 3Q may be sustained by improved data points in the OECD 14 April 2010 Oil Prices 6 We looked back at the last big recession—1998/1999 to see what oil prices did as the global economy recovered. Oil prices rose and doubled from the time the US ISM bottomed and crossed 50. The oil price momentum was concurrent with global IP growth bottoming out and rising. Similar to today, Oil prices more than doubled over the 18-20 months that it took for global IP growth to peak. Oil prices then peaked about 5-6 months after the IP peak, after which they rolled over fell 25% and then held a range until the US invaded Iraq, Venezuela started having problems and global IP bottomed and took off again, entering what we call an “Age of plenty”—where China’s WTO entry sparked off a structural change, and the world entered into a unprecedented state of growth that was unrivalled in its length, as well as breadth. Not all cycles are similar—however there broad similarities that one can draw out. Much like 1998/1999 global spare capacity was high this time around and much of the price action happened despite the high spare capacity numbers. As IP momentum peaks, the market focus is likely to shift towards the next stage of the recovery, we think. 14 April 2010 Oil Prices 7 Tightening Spare Capacity Provides Medium-Term Support Exhibit 11: Outlook for Spare Capacity, Risked and WTI ($/bbl) - 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 20 03 20 04 20 05 20 06 20 07 20 08 20 09 20 10 E 20 11 E 20 12 E 20 13 E 20 14 E 20 15 E 20 16 E 20 17 E 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 90.0 100.0 110.0 Spare Cap CS Base Case WTI (MMBD Source: IEA, Credit Suisse estimates. Reboot Firmly Entrenched: In the short term, the recovery trade is definitely on, led mainly by non-OECD oil demand growth. OECD demand growth is sluggish in Europe and Asia, but we are seeing signs of recovery in the United States. Prices are likely to remain in within a $70-90/bbl range, with demand recovering and non-OPEC supply remaining fairly stagnant through 2013. The market could even start to reflect concerns that the tightening of spare capacity may go too far as a global economic recovery takes hold. A melt-up in 2013 cannot be ruled out—much will depend on how the outlook beyond 2013 compares with last time around. OPEC Stand Ready to Cap Price Upside Potential: Despite this recovery thesis, there is ample spare capacity today and a commitment from OPEC to use this spare capacity. At the recent oil ministerial meeting in Cancun, Mexico, the Saudi delegation sent an unidentified spokesperson front and center to the press to draw a line in the sand: if prices were to breach $85/bbl and stay there—the spokesperson is reported to have said— markets should expect that the GCC countries would increase output to bring prices down. More Refining Surplus Also: Part of the rationale for the last cycle was an inability of refiners to process the heavy oil that constituted spare capacity. Improvements to the refining tool since then should lessen this constraint in future Spare capacity will likely fall from 2010 through to 2013 14 April 2010 Oil Prices 8 Figure 12: Global Refining Demand and Supply Growth Figure 13: Spare Capacity (1,000) (500) - 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 19 95 19 96 19 97 19 98 19 99 20 00 20 01 20 02 20 03 20 04 20 05 20 06 20 07 20 08 20 09 E 20 10 E 20 11 E Global Refining supply growth Global demand growth (MBD) Includes 1mbd of capacity - 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 19 90 19 91 19 92 19 93 19 94 19 95 19 96 19 97 19 98 19 99 20 00 20 01 20 02 20 03 20 04 20 05 20 06 20 07 20 08 20 09 E 20 10