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Martin J. Osborne - An Introduction to Game Theory.pdf

Martin J. Osborne - An Introduc…

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简介:本文档为《Martin J. Osborne - An Introduction to Game Theorypdf》,可适用于高等教育领域,主题内容包含SelectedchaptersfromdraftofAnIntroductiontoGameTheorybyMartinJOsbornePleas符等。

SelectedchaptersfromdraftofAnIntroductiontoGameTheorybyMartinJOsbornePleasesendcommentstoMartinJOsborneDepartmentofEconomicsStGeorgeStreetUniversityofTorontoToronto,CanadaMSGemail:martinosborneutorontocaThisversion:Copyrightc–byMartinJOsborneAllrightsreservedNopartofthisbookmaybereproducedbyanyelectronicormechanicalmeans(includingphotocopying,recording,orinformationstorageandretrieval)withoutpermissioninwritingfromOxfordUniversityPressContentsPrefacexiiiIntroductionWhatisgametheoryAnoutlineofthehistoryofgametheoryJohnvonNeumannThetheoryofrationalchoiceComingattractionsNotesIGameswithPerfectInformationNashEquilibrium:TheoryStrategicgamesExample:thePrisoner’sDilemmaExample:BachorStravinskyExample:MatchingPenniesExample:theStagHuntNashequilibriumJohnFNash,JrStudyingNashequilibriumexperimentallyExamplesofNashequilibriumExperimentalevidenceonthePrisoner’sDilemmaFocalpointsBestresponsefunctionsDominatedactionsEquilibriuminasinglepopulation:symmetricgamesandsymmetricequilibriaNotesvviContentsNashEquilibrium:IllustrationsCournot’smodelofoligopolyBertrand’smodelofoligopolyCournot,Bertrand,andNash:somehistoricalnotesElectoralcompetitionTheWarofAttritionAuctionsAuctionsfromBabyloniatoeBayAccidentlawNotesMixedStrategyEquilibriumIntroductionSomeevidenceonexpectedpayofffunctionsStrategicgamesinwhichplayersmayrandomizeMixedstrategyNashequilibriumDominatedactionsPureequilibriawhenrandomizationisallowedIllustration:expertdiagnosisEquilibriuminasinglepopulationIllustration:reportingacrimeReportingacrime:socialpsychologyandgametheoryTheformationofplayers’beliefsExtension:FindingallmixedstrategyNashequilibriaExtension:MixedstrategyNashequilibriaofgamesinwhicheachplayerhasacontinuumofactionsAppendix:RepresentingpreferencesoverlotteriesbytheexpectedvalueofapayofffunctionNotesExtensiveGameswithPerfectInformation:TheoryIntroductionExtensivegameswithperfectinformationStrategiesandoutcomesNashequilibriumSubgameperfectequilibriumFindingsubgameperfectequilibriaoffinitehorizongames:backwardinductionTicktacktoe,chess,andrelatedgamesNotesContentsviiExtensiveGameswithPerfectInformation:IllustrationsIntroductionTheultimatumgameandtheholdupgameExperimentsontheultimatumgameStackelberg’smodelofduopolyBuyingvotesAraceNotesExtensiveGameswithPerfectInformation:ExtensionsandDiscussionAllowingforsimultaneousmovesMoreexperimentalevidenceonsubgameperfectequilibriumIllustration:entryintoamonopolizedindustryIllustration:electoralcompetitionwithstrategicvotersIllustration:committeedecisionmakingIllustration:exitfromadecliningindustryAllowingforexogenousuncertaintyDiscussion:subgameperfectequilibriumandbackwardinductionExperimentalevidenceonthecentipedegameNotesCoalitionalGamesandtheCoreCoalitionalgamesThecoreIllustration:ownershipandthedistributionofwealthIllustration:exchanginghomogeneoushorsesIllustration:exchangingheterogeneoushousesIllustration:votingIllustration:matchingMatchingdoctorswithhospitalsDiscussion:othersolutionconceptsNotesviiiContentsIIGameswithImperfectInformationBayesianGamesIntroductionMotivationalexamplesGeneraldefinitionsTwoexamplesconcerninginformationIllustration:Cournot’sduopolygamewithimperfectinformationIllustration:providingapublicgoodIllustration:auctionsAuctionsoftheradiospectrumIllustration:juriesAppendix:AnalysisofauctionsforanarbitrarydistributionofvaluationsNotesExtensivegameswithimperfectinformationTobewrittenNotesIIIVariantsandExtensionsStrictlyCompetitiveGamesandMaxminimizationIntroductionDefinitionsandexamplesStrictlycompetitivegamesMaxminimization:somehistoryTestingthetheoryofNashequilibriuminstrictlycompetitivegamesNotesRationalizabilityIntroductionIteratedeliminationofstrictlydominatedactionsIteratedeliminationofweaklydominatedactionsNotesContentsixEvolutionaryEquilibriumIntroductionMonomorphicpurestrategyequilibriumEvolutionarygametheory:somehistoryMixedstrategiesandpolymorphicequilibriumAsymmetricequilibriaExplainingtheoutcomesofcontestsinnatureVariationonatheme:siblingbehaviorVariationonatheme:nestingbehaviorofwaspsNotesRepeatedgames:ThePrisoner’sDilemmaThemainideaPreferencesInfinitelyrepeatedgamesStrategiesSomeNashequilibriaoftheinfinitelyrepeatedPrisoner’sDilemmaNashequilibriumpayoffsoftheinfinitelyrepeatedPrisoner’sDilemmawhentheplayersarepatientSubgameperfectequilibriaandtheonedeviationpropertySomesubgameperfectequilibriaoftheinfinitelyrepeatedPrisoner’sDilemmaNotesRepeatedgames:GeneralResultsNashequilibriaofgeneralinfinitelyrepeatedgamesSubgameperfectequilibriaofgeneralinfinitelyrepeatedgamesAxelrod’sexperimentsReciprocalaltruismamongsticklebacksFinitelyrepeatedgamesNotesBargainingTobewrittenRepeatedultimatumgameHoldupgamexContentsAppendix:MathematicsIntroductionNumbersSetsFunctionsProfilesSequencesProbabilityProofsReferencesPrefaceGametheoreticreasoningpervadeseconomictheoryandisusedwidelyinothersocialandbehavioralsciencesThisbookpresentsthemainideasofgametheoryandshowshowtheycanbeusedtounderstandeconomic,social,political,andbiologicalphenomenaItassumesnoknowledgeofeconomics,politicalscience,oranyothersocialorbehavioralscienceItemphasizestheideasbehindthetheoryratherthantheirmathematicalexpression,andassumesnospecificmathematicalknowledgebeyondthattypicallytaughtinUSandCanadianhighschools(Chapterreviewsthemathematicalconceptsusedinthebook)Inparticular,calculusisnotused,exceptintheappendixofChapter(Section)Nevertheless,allconceptsaredefinedprecisely,andlogicalreasoningisusedextensivelyThemorecomfortableyouarewithtightlogicalanalysis,theeasieryouwillfindtheargumentsInbrief,myaimistoexplainthemainideasofgametheoryassimplyaspossiblewhilemaintainingcompleteprecisionTheonlywaytoappreciatethetheoryistoseeitinaction,orbetterstilltoputitintoactionSothebookincludesawidevarietyofillustrationsfromthesocialandbehavioralsciences,andoverexercisesThestructureofthebookisillustratedinthefigureonthenextpageThegrayboxesindicatecorechapters(thedarkergray,themoreimportant)AnblackarrowfromChapteritoChapterjmeansthatChapterjdependsonChapteriThegrayarrowfromChaptertoChaptermeansthatthelatterdependsweaklyontheformerforallbutSectiononlyanunderstandingofexpectedpayoffs(Section)isrequired,notaknowledgeofmixedstrategyNashequilibrium(Twochaptersarenotincludedinthisfigure:Chapterreviewsthetheoryofasinglerationaldecisionmaker,andChapterreviewsthemathematicalconceptsusedinthebook)Eachtopicispresentedwiththeaidof“Examples”,whichhighlighttheoreticalpoints,and“Illustrations”,whichdemonstratehowthetheorymaybeusedtounderstandsocial,economic,political,andbiologicalphenomenaThe“Illustrations”forthekeymodelsofstrategicandextensivegamesaregroupedinseparatechapters(and),whereasthosefortheothermodelsoccupythesamechaptersasthetheoryThe“Illustrations”introducenonewtheoreticalpoints,andanyorallofthemmaybeskippedwithoutlossofcontinuityThelimiteddependenciesbetweenchaptersmeanthatseveralroutesmaybetakenthroughthebook•Ataminimum,youshouldstudyChapters(NashEquilibrium:Theory)and(ExtensiveGameswithPerfectInformation:Theory)•OptionallyyoumaysamplesomesectionsofChapters(NashEquilibrium:PrefaceStrategicgames:Theory:Illustrations:Mixedstrategies:BayesiangamesImperfectinformation:Maxminimization:Rationalizability:EvolutionaryequilibriumTopicsExtensivegames:Theory:Illustrations:Extensions:SignalinggamesImperfectinformation,:Repeatedgames(I,II)Coalitionalgames:Core:BargainingTopicsxivFigureThestructureofthebookTheareaofeachboxisproportionaltothelengthofthechaptertheboxrepresentsTheboxescorrespondingtothecorechaptersareshadedgraytheonesshadeddarkgrayaremorecentralthattheonesshadedlightgrayAnarrowfromChapteritoChapterjmeansthatChapteriisaprerequisiteforChapterjThegrayarrowfromChaptertoChaptermeansthatthelatterdependsonlyweaklyontheformerPrefaceIllustrations)and(ExtensiveGameswithPerfectInformation:Illustrations)•YoumayaddtothisplananycombinationofChapters(MixedStrategyEquilibrium),(BayesianGames,exceptSection),(ExtensiveGameswithPerfectInformation:ExtensionsandDiscussion),(CoalitionalGamesandtheCore),and(Bargaining)•IfyoureadChapter(MixedStrategyEquilibrium)thenyoumayinadditionstudyanycombinationoftheremainingchapterscoveringstrategicgames,andifyoustudyChapter(ExtensiveGameswithPerfectInformation:ExtensionsandDiscussion)thenyouarereadytotackleChaptersand(RepeatedGames)AllthematerialshouldbeaccessibletoundergraduatestudentsAonesemestercourseforthirdorfourthyearNorthAmericaneconomicsmajors(whohavebeenexposedtoafewofthemainideasinfirstandsecondyearcourses)couldcoveruptoabouthalfthematerialinthebookinmoderatedetailPersonalpronounsThelackofasexneutralthirdpersonsingularpronouninEnglishhasledmanywritersofformalEnglishtouse“he”forthispurposeSuchusageconflictswiththatofeverydayspeechPeoplemaysay“whenanairplanepilotisworking,heneedstoconcentrate”,buttheydonotusuallysay“whenaflightattendantisworking,heneedstoconcentrate”or“whenasecretaryisworking,heneedstoconcetrate”Theuseof“he”onlyforrolesinwhichmentraditionallypredominateinWesternsocietiessuggeststhatwomenmaynotplaysuchrolesIfindthisinsinuationunacceptableToquotetheNewOxfordDictionaryofEnglish,“theuseofhetorefertorefertoapersonofunspecifiedsexhasbecomeahallmarkofoldfashionedlanguageorsexisminlanguage”Writershavebecomesensitivetothisissueinthelasthalfcentury,butthelackofasexneutralpronoun“hasbeenfeltsinceatleastasfarbackasMiddleEnglish”(Webster’sDictionaryofEnglishUsage,MerriamWebsterInc,,p)Acommonsolutionhasbeentouse“they”,ausagethattheNewOxfordDictionaryofEnglishendorses(andemploys)ThissolutioncancreateambiguitywhenthepronounfollowsreferencestomorethanonepersonitalsodoesnotalwayssoundnaturalIchooseadifferentsolution:Iuse“she”exclusivelyObviouslythisusage,likethatof“he”,isnotsexneutralbutitsusemaydosomethingtocounterbalancethewidespreaduseof“he”,anddoesnotseemlikelytodoanyharmAcknowledgementsIoweahugedebttoArielRubinsteinIhavelearned,andcontinuetolearn,vastlyfromhimaboutgametheoryHisinfluenceonthisbookwillbecleartoanyonePrefacefamiliarwithourjointlyauthoredbookAcourseingametheoryHadwenotwrittenthatbookandourpreviousbookBargainingandmarkets,IdoubtthatIwouldhaveembarkedonthisprojectDiscussionsovertheyearswithJeanPierreBenoıˆt,VijayKrishna,MichaelPeters,andCarolynPitchikhaveimprovedmyunderstandingofmanygametheoretictopicsManypeoplehavegenerouslycommentedonallorpartsofdraftsofthebookIamparticularlygratefultoJeffreyBanks,NikolaosBenos,TedBergstrom,TilmanBorgers,RandyCalvert,VuCao,RachelCroson,EddieDekel,MarinaDeVos,LaurieDuke,PatrickElias,MukeshEswaran,XinhuaGu,CostasHalatsis,JoeHarrington,HiroyukiKawakatsu,LewisKornhauser,JackLeach,SimonLink,BartLipman,KinChungLo,MassimoMarinacci,PeterMcCabe,BarryO’Neill,RobinGOsborne,MarcoOttaviani,MarieRekkas,BobRosenthal,AlRoth,MatthewShum,GioraSlutzki,MichaelSmart,NickVriend,andChuckWilsonIthankalsotheanonymousreviewersconsultedbyOxfordUniversityPressandseveralotherpressesthesuggestionsintheirreviewsgreatlyimprovedthebookThebookhasitsoriginsinacourseItaughtatColumbiaUniversityintheearlysMyexperienceinthatcourse,andincoursesatMcMasterUniversity,whereItaughtfromearlydrafts,andattheUniversityofToronto,broughtthebooktoitscurrentformTheKyotoInstituteofEconomicResearchatKyotoUniversityprovidedmewithasplendidenvironmentinwhichtoworkonthebookduringtwomonthsinReferencesThe“Notes”sectionattheendofeachchapterattemptstoassigncreditfortheideasinthechapterSeveralcasespresentdifficultiesInsomecases,ideasevolvedoveralongperiodoftime,withcontributionsbymanypeople,makingtheiroriginshardtosummarizeinasentenceortwoInafewcases,myresearchhasledtoaconclusionabouttheoriginsofanideadifferentfromthestandardoneInallcases,IcitetherelevantpaperswithoutregardtotheirdifficultyOvertheyears,IhavetakenexercisesfrommanysourcesIhaveattemptedtorememberwhereIgotthemfrom,andhavegivencredit,butIhaveprobablymissedsomeExamplesaddressingeconomic,political,andbiologicalissuesThefollowingtableslistexamplesthataddresseconomic,political,andbiologicalissuesSOFARCHECKEDONLYTHROUGHCHAPTERGamesrelatedtoeconomicissues(THROUGHCHAPTER)PrefaceExercise,Section,ExerciseProvisionofapublicgoodSectionCollectivedecisionmakingSection,ExerciseCournot’smodelofoligopolySectionCommonpropertySection,Exercise,Exercise,Exercise,ExerciseBertrand’smodelofoligopolyExerciseCompetitioninproductcharacteristicsSectionAuctionswithperfectinformationSectionAccidentlawSectionExpertdiagnosisExercise,ExercisePricecompetitionbetweensellersSectionReportingacrime(privateprovisionofapublicgood)ExampleAllpayauctionwithperfectinformationExerciseEntryintoanindustrybyafinanciallyconstrainedchallengerExerciseThe“rottenkidtheorem”SectionTheholdupgameSectionStackelberg’smodelofduopolyExerciseAmarketgameSectionEntryintoamonopolizedindustrySectionExitfromadecliningindustryExampleChainstoregameGamesrelatedtopoliticalissues(THROUGHCHAPTER)ExerciseVoterparticipationSectionVotingExerciseApprovalvotingSectionCollectivedecisionmakingSection,Exercise,Exercise,SectionHotelling’smodelofelectoralcompetitionPrefaceExerciseElectoralcompetitionbetweenpolicymotivatedcandidatesExerciseElectoralcompetitionbetweencitizencandidatesExerciseLobbyingasanauctionExerciseVoterparticipationExerciseAllocatingresourcesinelectioncampaignsSectionBuyingvotesinalegislatureSectionCommitteedecisionmakingExerciseCohesionofgoverningcoalitionsGamesrelatedtobiologicalissues(THROUGHCHAPTER)ExerciseHermaphroditicfishSectionWarofattritionTypographicconventions,numbering,andnomenclatureInformaldefinitions,thetermsbeingdefinedaresetinboldfaceTermsaresetinitalicswhentheyaredefinedinformallyDefinitions,propositions,examples,andexercisesarenumberedaccordingtothepageonwhichtheyappearIfthefirstsuchobjectonpagezisanexercise,forexample,itiscalledExercisezifthenextobjectonthatpageisadefinition,itiscalledDefinitionzForexample,thedefinitionofastrategicgamewithordinalpreferencesonpageisDefinitionThisschemeallowsnumbereditemstofoundrapidly,andalsofacilitatespreciseindexentriesSymboltermMeaningExerciseHardexerciseDefinitionPropositionExample:agamethatillustratesagametheoreticpointIllustrationAgame,orfamilyofgames,thatshowshowthetheorycanilluminateobservedphenomenaImaintainawebsiteforthebookThecurrentURLishttp:wwweconomicsutorontocaosborneigtDraftchapterfromAnintroductiontogametheorybyMartinJOsborneOsbornechassutorontocawwweconomicsutorontocaosborneVersion:Copyrightc–byMartinJOsborneAllrightsreservedNopartofthisbookmaybereproducedbyanyelectronicormechanicalmeans(includingphotocopying,recording,orinformationstorageandretrieval)withoutpermissioninwritingfromOxfordUniversityPress,exceptthatonecopyofuptosixchaptersmaybemadebyanyindividualforprivatestudyIntroductionWhatisgametheoryThetheoryofrationalchoiceWhatisgametheoryGAMETHEORYaimstohelpusunderstandsituationsinwhichdecisionmakersinteractAgameintheeverydaysense“acompetitiveactivityinwhichplayerscontendwitheachotheraccordingtoasetofrules”,inthewordsofmydictionaryisanexampleofsuchasituation,butthescopeofgametheoryisvastlylargerIndeed,Idevoteverylittlespacetogamesintheeverydaysensemymainfocusistheuseofgametheorytoilluminateeconomic,political,andbiologicalphenomenaAlistofsomeoftheapplicationsIdiscusswillgiveyouanideaoftherangeofsituationstowhichgametheorycanbeapplied:firmscompetingforbusiness,politicalcandidatescompetingforvotes,jurymembersdecidingonaverdict,animalsfightingoverprey,bidderscompetinginanauction,theevolutionofsiblings’behaviortowardseachother,competingexperts’incentivestoprovidecorrectdiagnoses,legislators’votingbehaviorunderpressurefrominterestgroups,andtheroleofthreatsandpunishmentinlongterm

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