Sociocognitive Self-Regulatory Mechanisms Governingresolver

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 2001, Vol. 80, No. 1, 125-135 Copyright 2001 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0022-3514/01/$5.00 DOI: 10.1O37//O022-3514.80.1.125 Sociocognitive Self-Regulatory Mechanisms Governing Transgressive Behavior Albert Bandura Stanford University Gian Vittorio Caprara, Claudio Barbaranelli, and Concetta Pastorelli University of Rome, "La Sapienza" Camillo Regalia Universita Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milan This longitudinal research examined a structural model of the self-regulatory mechanisms governing transgressive conduct. Perceived academic and self-regulatory efficacy concurrently and longitudinally deterred transgressiveness both directly and by fostering prosocialness and adherence to moral self- sanctions for harmful conduct. The impact of perceived social self-efficacy was mediated through prosocialness. Moral disengagement and prosocialness affected transgressiveness through the mediating influence of irascible affectivity and hostile rumination. Ruminative affectivity, in turn, both concurrently and longitudinally affected transgressiveness. Moral disengagement also contributed independently to variance in transgressiveness over time. This pattern of relations was obtained after controlling for prior transgressiveness. The structural model was replicated across gender and provided a better fit to the data than did several alternative models. Social cognitive theory analyzes human self-development, ad- aptation, and change from an agentic perspective (Bandura, 1999b, 2001). The capacity to exercise some measure of control over one's thought processes, motivation, affect, and action operates through mechanisms of personal agency. Diverse lines of research have documented the prominent role that self-regulatory mecha- nisms play in the development and pursuit of socially valued life courses (Bandura, 1995, 1997; Caprara & Cervone, 2000; Cervone & Shoda, 1999; Schunk & Zimmerman, 1994; Zimmerman, 1989). The longitudinal research presented in this article extends this line of inquiry to self-regulatory mechanisms governing transgressive forms of behavior. Among the mechanisms of human agency, none is more focal or pervasive than beliefs of personal efficacy. In social cognitive Albert Bandura, Department of Psychology, Stanford University; Gian Vittorio Caprara, Claudio Barbaranelli, and Concetta Pastorelli, Diparti- mento di Psicologia, University of Rome, "La Sapienza," Rome, Italy; Camillo Regalia, Department of Psychology, University Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milan, Italy. The research reported in this article was supported by grants from the Grant Foundation, the Spencer Foundation, and the Jacobs Foundation. This article was prepared while Claudio Barbaranelli was a visiting scholar at Stanford University on a grant from the Fulbright Exchange Program. We thank Kay Bussey for her helpful comments on an earlier version of this article. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Albert Bandura, Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, Cali- fornia 94305-2130, or Gian Vittorio Caprara, Dipartimento di Psicologia, Universita Degli Studi di Roma, University of Rome, "La Sapienza," Via dei Marsi 78, 00185 Roma, Italy. Electronic mail may be sent to bandura@psych.stanford.edu or caprara@uniromal.it. theory, the self-efficacy belief system is the foundation of human motivation, well-being, and personal accomplishments. Unless people believe that they can bring about desired outcomes and forestall undesired ones by their actions, they have little incentive to act or to persevere in the face of difficulties and adversities. Whatever other factors may operate as guides and motivators, they are rooted in the core belief that one has the power to influence one's own functioning and life circumstances. Perceived self-efficacy plays a pivotal role in causal structures because it affects courses of actions not only directly but also through its impact on cognitive, motivational, and affective deter- minants. Such beliefs influence whether people think productively, self-debilitatingly, pessimistically, or optimistically; how well they motivate themselves and persevere in the face of adversities; their vulnerability to stress and depression; and the life choices they make (Bandura, 1995, 1997; Maddux, 1995; Schwarzer, 1992). These diverse effects identify the multiple pathways through which a strong sense of efficacy oriented toward positive self- development can affect transgressive behavior. It does so, in large part, by promoting prosocialness, curtailing the propensity to dis- engage moral self-sanctions from socially alienating and harmful conduct, and countering ruminative and vengeful affectivity (Ban- dura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996a; Bandura, Pas- torelli, Barbaranelli, & Caprara, 1999). That a resilient sense of personal efficacy is a vital personal resource has been amply documented by meta-analyses of findings from diverse spheres of functioning by heterogeneous populations in a variety of environ- mental conditions (Holden, 1991; Holden, Moncher, Schinke, & Barker, 1990; Multon, Brown, & Lent, 1991; Stajkovic & Luthans, 1998). 125 126 BANDURA ET AL. A growing body of evidence shows that efficacy beliefs are linked to domains of functioning rather than conforming to an undifferentiated trait (Bandura, 1997). In the present study, we examined the role of three major domains of perceived personal efficacy that have been verified cross-culturally (Pastorelli et al., in press) and shown to be predictive of developmental outcomes (Bandura, 1997). These domains include academic, social, and self-regulatory efficacy to resist peer pressure for transgressive activities. However, social cognitive theory identifies several pro- cesses that can produce some covariation even across distinct activity domains. One such process involves metacognitive self- regulation. Proficient performance is partly guided by higher order self-regulatory skills, which include generic skills for evaluating task demands, constructing alternative options, setting proximal goals to guide one's efforts, and creating self-incentives to sustain engagement in taxing activities and to manage stress and debili- tating intrusive thinking. Such generalizable self-regulatory skills enable people to improve their performance in a variety of activ- ities (Meichenbaum & Asarnow, 1979; Zimmerman, 1989). Ge- neric metastrategies learned in one realm of activity tend to be used in other activity domains (Bandura, Jeffery, & Gajdos, 1975). A second process that can promote cross-domain covariations concerns beliefs in one's learning efficacy. Perceived learning capability affects how people approach the mastery of new chal- lenges. Having achieved success in a particular activity domain can create a more general sense of efficacy to learn in other life situations. To the extent that people consider their self-regulatory capabilities and learning efficacy in their self-appraisals, they will exhibit at least some generality in their sense of personal efficacy across different activities. Codevelopment across diverse domains can also give rise to covariation when the development of competencies in different spheres are promoted together. For example, students are likely to develop comparably high perceived self-efficacy in language and mathematics in superior schools but relatively low perceived self- efficacy in these diverse subjects in ineffective schools, which do not promote much in the way of academic competencies in any subject matter. Adoption of particular lifestyles also clusters ac- tivity domains for codevelopment. Thus, students who are aca- demically oriented are likely to pursue a supportive constellation of extracurricular activities, cultivate prosocial relationships, and shun involvement in delinquent pursuits (Donovan & Jessor, 1985; Elliott, 1993). Thus, although self-efficacy beliefs are multifaceted rather than undifferentiated, some interdomain covariance is expected. The self-regulatory mechanisms through which moral agency is exercised are of special relevance to the self-management of transgressive behavior. In social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1999a), moral agency has dual aspects—inhibitive and proactive. The inhibitive form of morality is expressed in the power to refrain from behaving inhumanely. The proactive form of morality is expressed in the power to behave humanely. After individuals adopt personal standards, their negative self-sanctions for actions that violate their standards and their positive self-reactions for conduct faithful to their moral standards serve as the regulatory influences (Bandura, 1991). These self-reactive influences serve as the motivational and cognitive regulators of moral conduct. Personal standards do not function as invariant internal regula- tors of conduct, however. Self-sanctions do not impinge on con- duct unless they are activated, and there are numerous sociocog- nitive maneuvers by which moral self-reactions can be selectively disengaged from detrimental conduct. In the conception of moral agency, social cognitive theory specifies eight mechanisms of moral disengagement that operate at different points in the control of behavior by moral self-sanctions (Bandura, 1991, 1999a). They center on the construal of injurious conduct itself, the sense of personal agency for the actions taken, the representation of the injurious effects that flow from actions, and the characterization of the recipients of maltreatment. One set of disengagement practices operates on the cognitive construal of the conduct itself. Through moral justification, detri- mental conduct is made personally and socially acceptable by portraying it as serving socially worthy or moral purposes (Kelman & Hamilton, 1989; Rapoport & Alexander, 1982; Reich, 1990; Sanford & Comstock, 1971). Language shapes the thoughts on which actions are based. Sanitizing euphemisms and convoluted language is widely used to make harmful conduct look respectable or benign (Bollinger, 1982; Diener, Dineen, Endresen, Beaman, & Fraser, 1975; Lutz, 1987). How behavior is viewed is also colored by what it is compared with. Through advantageous exonerative comparison, detrimental conduct can lose its repugnancy or even appear benevolent by contrasting it with more flagrant inhumani- ties (Bandura, 1991). Moral control operates most strongly when people regard them- selves as contributors to harmful outcomes. The second set of disengagement mechanisms operates by obscuring, minimizing, or disclaiming the agentive role in the harm that one causes. This disengagement is achieved by displacement and diffusion of re- sponsibility (Bandura, Underwood, & Fromson, 1975; Diener, 1977; Milgram, 1974; Zimbardo, 1995). Further ways of weaken- ing moral control operate by misrepresenting the harm caused by one's conduct (Klass, 1978). As long as the harmful effects are ignored, minimized, distorted, or disbelieved, there is little reason for self-sanctions to be activated. The final set of disengagement mechanisms operates on the recipients of detrimental acts. Ascription of blame to the victims for their plight or to compelling circumstances can serve self- exonerative purposes (Crick & Dodge, 1994; Darley, Klosson, & Zanna, 1978; Ferguson & Rule, 1983; Weiner, 1986). The strength of moral self-sanctions also depends partly on how perpetrators view those whom they maltreat. To perceive another person as human activates, through perceived similarity, empathic reactions that counteract cruelty (Bandura, 1992). However, self-censure for cruel conduct can be disengaged by dehumanization that strips people of human qualities or invests them with demonic or bestial qualities (Bandura, Underwood, et al., 1975; Haritos-Fatouros, 1988; Keen, 1986). A substantial body of evidence has demonstrated the disinhibi- tory power of moral disengagement. The moral disengagement is shown in the perpetration of large-scale inhumanities (Andrus, 1969; Bandura, 1990; Kelman & Hamilton, 1989; Rapoport & Alexander, 1982; Reich, 1990) and social punitiveness in labora- tory conditions conducive to disengagement of moral self- sanctions (Bandura, Underwood, et al., 1975; Diener, 1977; Mil- gram, 1974; Tilker, 1970; Zimbardo, 1969). Research in which proneness to moral disengagement is assessed verifies some of the processes through which it is presumed to operate. To justify and disown responsibility for the harm done to others and to dehuman- SELF-REGULATORY MECHANISMS IN TRANSGRESSIVENESS 127 ize and blame them for their maltreatment are not conducive to prosocial relationships. Effective moral disengagement also frees one from the restraints of self-censure experienced as anticipative guilt for detrimental conduct. Self-exoneration for wrongdoing fosters a self-righteousness that not only justifies one's conduct but also breeds inimical rumination. Indeed, high moral disengagers experience low guilt over injurious conduct, are less prosocial, and are more prone to vengeful rumination (Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996a). Prosocialness operates as another influential factor in the pos- ited causal structure. In recent years, a conceptual shift has been witnessed from the prevailing focus on the impact of negative risk factors on developmental trajectories toward the influential role of positive enablement factors in shaping the directions that lives take. Prosocialness, as reflected in cooperativeness, helpfulness, sharing, and empathicness, is one such factor that helps to promote advantageous self-development (Bandura et al., 1996b; Caprara, Barbaranelli, Pastorelli, Bandura, & Zimbardo, 2000; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998; Patterson, Reid, & Dishion, 1992; Wentzel, 1991). A prosocial orientation also deters aggressive conduct by fostering social networks conducive to harmonious relationships and em- pathic and vicarious emotional arousal over the suffering of others (Bandura, 1992; Feshbach & Feshbach, 1986; Miller & Eisenberg, 1988). An agentic perspective assigns a prominent role to self- generated emotional arousal and affect regulation in the self- management of socioemotional life (Bandura, 1997, 1999b). Situ- ationally induced anger arousal has been shown to increase the likelihood and intensity of injurious behavior (Berkowitz, 1993; Zillmann, 1983). People live extensively in a psychic environment that is largely of their own making. The instigators to detrimental conduct often involve problems of thought. Anger arousal dissi- pates with time, but it can be repeatedly regenerated by cognitive self-arousal (Bandura, 1973). Many people are quick to rouse themselves into angered states by ruminating over perceived in- sults, inequities, and indignities. Anger arousal often fuels retali- ative schemes. Hostile ruminative affectivity not only distorts thinking but also predisposes people to untoward conduct, espe- cially if combined with infirm capability for affect self-regulation. The behavioral effects of ruminative affectivity have been corrob- orated experimentally in simulated conditions in which partici- pants can inflict shocks of varying intensity on provocateurs. Individuals who have a low threshold for anger arousal and are prone to hostile rumination behave more punitively than those who are slower to anger and disinclined to dwell on grievances and possible retaliations (Caprara, Coluzzi, Mazzotti, Renzi, & Zelli, 1985; Caprara, Renzi, Alcini, D'Imperio, & Travaglia, 1983; Ca- prara, Renzi, Amolini, D'Imperio, & Travaglia, 1984; Caprara et al., 1986). The conceptual analysis presented thus far has examined how particular sociocognitive determinants separately foster or deter detrimental conduct and the supportive empirical evidence for their contributory role. In the present study, we examined how these various self-regulatory determinants operate in concert within an integrative causal structure in governing transgressive behavior. Transgressiveness encompassed varied detrimental con- duct, including interpersonal breaches by lying, cheating, and stealing; destructiveness; verbal and physical assaults; and sub- stance abuse. We proximally and longitudinally analyzed the paths of influence. Figure 1 summarizes schematically the direct and mediated links in the posited structural model. Perceived self-efficacy to regulate one's academic activities and to ward off peer pressure to engage in detrimental activities both directly and mediationally affects transgressive behavior by supporting prosocialness, adher- ence to moral self-sanctions, and low proneness to vindictive rumination. In addition, perceived social efficacy affects transgres- sive conduct through the mediated effects of prosocialness. We posited the following structural relations among the medi- ating factors. Children who exhibited high prosocialness, as man- ifested in helping, sharing, and empathicness, would refrain from ruminative vengefulness toward others. Those who strongly ad- Figure I. Posited causal structure through which perceived self-efficacy and moral disengagement operate in concert with other sociocognitive factors to concurrently and longitudinally affect transgressive conduct. 128 BANDURA ET AL. hered to moral self-sanctions against hurting others would be more likely than high moral disengagers to act prosocially in their interpersonal relationships and to exhibit a low propensity for irascible affectivity and hostile rumination. Low ruminative affec- tivity, in turn, would reduce the likelihood of transgressive behav- ior. Prosocialness and moral disengagement would concurrently and longitudinally affect transgressive behavior both directly as well as mediationally through ruminative affectivity. Method Participants The participants in this longitudinal study were 564 children tested initially at 11 years of age with staggered annual starts for two separate cohorts. There were 304 boys and 260 girls. We selected the participants from two schools in a residential community located near Rome, Italy. For each cohort, the sociocognitive factors and transgressiveness assessed in the sixth grade served as predictors of level of involvement in transgressive activities in the eighth grade. Adaptation in the adolescent phase was selected for study because it is an especially important period in the life course when adolescents have to concurrently manage major biological, educational, and social role transi- tions (Eccles & Midgley, 1989; Furstenberg, Eccles, Elder, Cook, & Sameroff, 1999; Graber, Brooks-Gunn, & Petersen, 1996). It is also a period of experimentation with risky activities and substance use (Elliott, 1993; Jessor, 1986). The community from which the participants were selected represents a microcosm of the larger society, containing families of skilled workers, farmers, professionals, and local merchants and their service staffs. Fifteen percent were in professional or managerial ranks, 38% were merchants or operators of other types of businesses, 16% were skilled workers, 30% were unskilled workers, and 1% were retired. The socioeconomic diversity of the sample adds to the generalizability of the findings. This community adheres to a stringent consent procedure for the conduct of research in the schools. Each research proposal must be approved by a school council composed of parent and teacher representatives as well as student representatives at the junior high and high school levels. In addi- tion, parents must give consent, and children are free to decline to take part if they so choose. The study was structured to the parents and the children as a project designed to gain a better understanding of child development. Informed consent was obtained from 100% of the families, with 91 % of the sample reassessed in the f